

Dear Mr. Garrison,

These lines


express what you have meant
to us:

"The strength of virgin forests
bounced his mind,
The bush of spacious prairies
still'd his soul.
His words were raks in acorns;
and his thoughts
were roots that firmly gript
the granite truth."


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CHARACTERS AND EVENTS



Photograph by Doris Ulmann

JOHN DEWEY

CHARACTERS AND EVENTS

POPULAR ESSAYS
IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BY JOHN DEWEY

EDITED BY JOSEPH RATNER

VOLUME I

Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability. To try to escape from the snares and pitfalls of time by recourse to traditional problems and interests—rather than that, let the dead bury their own dead. JOHN DEWEY



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PREFACE

The most elaborate philosophies are founded on a few simple ideas. For the generation in which the philosophy is developed these fundamental ideas are most often obscured by the abstruse and technical aspects of the system; but in the course of time they rarely ever fail to disengage themselves from the superstructure they support and to become part of the common intellectual coin which circulates in the realm of mind. Instrumentalism has been unusually superior in this respect to the law of time; its basic ideas have been rapidly appropriated, if not completely assimilated, by contemporary thought. This easy "naturalization" is partly due—to employ Mr. Dewey's own criterion—to the fact that instrumentalism is grounded in the pervasive interests of life and is concerned with the values that all men cherish; but it is also in significant measure due to the fact that Mr. Dewey has constantly used his philosophy as a basis for analyzing and interpreting current social and political affairs. To be able effectively to develop, in popular essays, the social and political implications of instrumentalism, he had to divest philosophic principles of their technical garments and dress them in the fashion of common speech and circumstance; as a result, large audiences have had, through these essays, ready access to the essentials of his teaching.

It is hardly just a sheer accident of Mr. Dewey's interest or versatility that made him apply instrumentalism to the criticism of current events. Such application is a natural consequence of his central doctrine concerning the nature of reason or intelligence. According to instrumentalism, reason or intelligence does not reside in some transcendental sphere where it concerns itself primarily with observing its own precious states, and from where, when it is so inclined, it views as a pale spectator what goes on below; the proper home of intelligence

is the world, and its true function is to act as critic and regulator of the forces operative within it. This doctrine, which is the philosophic *raison d'être* of these essays, is also one of their fundamental unifying principles.

Except for a few essays dealing with purely local or purely evanescent events—mostly Chinese—all of Mr. Dewey's popular social and political writings are included in these volumes. Some of the essays—those on Matthew Arnold and Ernest Renan—antedate the technical formulation of the philosophy of instrumentalism, but it will be found that that philosophy already appears in them in nascent form. It was impossible to arrange all of the essays included in these volumes in an order that would exhibit in minute detail the natural progression of ideas and the philosophic viewpoint which underlies and permeates them all. This is easily accounted for by the fact that they were, a few exceptions apart, written independently of each other, and at widely differing times. The essays did naturally lend themselves, however, to an order of arrangement that would exhibit these desirable characters in a general way. Some of the *Books* permitted a more integrated development of ideas than others; but in all of the *Books*, despite the occasional gaps that separate individual essays from their neighbors, an inherent form of intellectual development will be found. The task of ordering the *Books* themselves in this manner was quite easy. The study of men and the affairs of men is the foundation for the study of the problems men have to face and solve; and these studies are the foundation for the discovery of those principles and those ideals that will enable man to reach and enter the haven he seeks. The instrumentalist order of philosophic inquiry proceeds, that is, from the study of human nature and conduct to the study of the public and its problems.

Titles of essays were changed to give greater formal unity to the volumes; the original titles are preserved in footnotes. These and other editorial changes—few in number and inconsequential in character—were approved by Mr. Dewey.

I am greatly indebted to Mr. Milton Halsey Thomas of

Columbia University for his generous permission to use his excellent and complete bibliography of Mr. Dewey's writings. Mr. Thomas saved me an incalculable amount of work; and what I am even more grateful for—because so much more important—he undoubtedly saved me from committing grave sins of omission. I wish also to thank Mr. Daniel Mebane for the courtesy with which he helped me both with and to the files of *The New Republic*.

For permission to reprint, especial thanks are due the Editors of *The New Republic*; essays which first appeared in their journal form a goodly portion of the total number reprinted. In only lesser measure thanks are also due the Editors of *Asia*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The Christian Century*, *The Current History Magazine*, *The Dial*, *The Elementary School Journal*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Hibbert Journal*, *The Independent*, *The International Journal of Ethics*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, *The Journal for Race Development*, *The Nation*, *The Open Court*, *The Philosophical Review*, *The Psychological Review*, *Science*, *The Survey*, *The University of California Chronicle*, and *The World Tomorrow*. Thanks would gladly be extended to include the editors of *The Andover Review* and *The Seven Arts* but, alas, these journals are no longer in what is known as existence; and so, in lieu of giving thanks to their editors, we place a wreath of laurel on their tombs.

JOSEPH RATNER.

March 19, 1929.

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BOOK ONE
CHARACTERS

Let us admit the case of the conservative: if we once start thinking no one can guarantee what will be the outcome, except that many objects, ends and institutions will be surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.

JOHN DEWEY.

I. MATTHEW ARNOLD AND ROBERT BROWNING¹

"The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken; not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable; not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything. . . . Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea, the idea *is* the fact. . . . More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry."—MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"Not a creed unshaken," "not a dogma unquestioned, every tradition threatening to dissolve,"—this is Matthew Arnold's counterphrase to Carlyle's "Our relations all an inquiry and a doubt." In a world of disintegrated intelligence and a broken authority, Arnold sees men more and more turning to poetry for consolation, for stay, for interpretation. There is absence of any coherent social faith and order; there is doubt whether any theory of life at once valuable and verifiable, true to intelligence and worthy to the emotion, is any longer possible, and yet there is also demand for authority and for instruction. We may say science is verifiable, but it lacks sympathy, consolation, humanity; it does not afford instruction where instruction is most wanted,—in the ordering of life. What once afforded all this, says Mr. Arnold, has lost its hold as truth; it no longer appeals verifiably to us. This is the difficulty of the situation: the true does not inspire, does not aid; that which

¹ From *The Andover Review*, August, 1891; published under the title *Poetry and Philosophy*.

once gave stay and interpretation is no longer true. In poetry men find a wide interpretation of life, noble ideas about life, and also a kind sympathy with all its colored moods, with all phases of its movement. Keen feeling, wide sympathy, noble ideas, serious emotion, are found there. What more do we want? What more natural than, in the difficulty of our times, men turning to poetry for guidance? We may well believe that poetry is more and more becoming our religion and our philosophy. Here, let us also add, there is no need to ask if this or that be scientifically true. "For poetry the idea is everything; all else is illusion. For poetry the idea is the fact."

We have the thought of Matthew Arnold before us. What shall we say of it? Shall we make bold to criticise the position? Spite of the clear insight of this great critic, shall we venture to say that his insight was essentially limited in range? that he saw but a small part of the forces really at work in modern thought?

We need not be detained by what our critic says regarding the existing disintegration of intellectual authority in matters of belief. Making allowance for overstatement, all will admit readily that there is enough of unrest, enough of doubt in modern thought, to make it worth while to raise this question, Where shall we find authority, the instruction which our natures demand? Shall we cease to find it in philosophy, or in science, and shall we find it in poetry?

I think none desire that poetry shall not be more and more the vehicle of serious thought and ennobling emotion, that it shall not more and more convey genuine and helpful interpretation of life. *Absit omen.* We have fallen too much on days of trivial subjects, ornate treatment, cheap sentiment, and artificial imagery not to sympathize with all that Mr. Arnold says about the high calling of poetry. We cannot too often return to the idea that its purpose is to deepen the sense of what is worthy, of what is permanent in life. The question only presses the more earnestly: How is poetry to interpret valuable meanings of life, how to animate to the execution of them; how is it to be kept from the evils that threaten it, from the

frivolous, the sensual, the artificial? Can it do all this, if it is not backed and sustained by something which commends itself to the intelligence? Call this something what you will, theology, philosophy, or theory of life, how can poetry preserve its genuineness and its sustaining force, if it cut loose from all verifiable account of the universe? Who shall keep the keeper? I know of but one answer. Truth, and truth alone, can do this. And I confess I do not understand how that can be true for the imagination, for the emotions, which is not also true for intelligence.

It is easy to disparage science, it is easy to laugh at philosophy, with its "reasoning about causation and finite and infinite being." Both are remote enough from our immediate spiritual and ethical interests. Face to face with the supreme question concerning the right ordering of life they seem ludicrously insufficient. But, after all, science means only knowledge,—philosophy, only love of wisdom, only the essay at reaching the meaning of this experience of ours. I cannot believe that the attempt to know truth, to grasp the meaning of experience, is remote from conduct, from the ideals and aspirations of life. In the words of Carlyle, I verify my own conviction: "Belief, indeed, is the beginning and first condition of all spiritual force whatsoever; only so far as imagination is *believed* can there be any use or even any enjoyment of it." The imagination rests upon belief; it is from belief that it gets its cue to stay, to interpret, its consolation. If there is belief in the high and serious values of the universe, with what glory shall not the imagination portray and inspire life, what consolations shall not issue from it! But let intelligence lose this belief in the meaning and worthiness of experience, and poetry is but the tricking out of illusions, the devising of artifices. I can well comprehend that poetry may deliver truth with a personal and a passionate force which is beyond the reach of theory painting in gray on gray. Indeed, it is the emotional kindling of reality which is the true province of poetry.

Astronomers tell us that meteors are cold rock, cold as the frozen emptiness of space, molten by contact with our earthly

atmosphere, and thence glowing like the stars. Thus do I conceive of poetry. The graceless, rigid, dark facts of science, of philosophy, pass through the atmosphere of personality, of the hopes and fears of a human soul, and issue illumined and to illuminate. Without the basis of fact, of fact verifiable by science, our light is a will-o'-the-wisp, a wandering flame generated in the stagnant marshes of sentiment. In a word, there must be the possibility of science and philosophy to criticise, to verify. Poets are indeed seers and makers; but if what they make has matter, has weight, if what they see is more than shadow, the poets must reveal, they must round out to high completeness, the meaning of the life that is about them. Poets cannot be freed from the conditions which attach to the intelligence of man everywhere. The poet and the ploughman gaze at the same scene, only the eyes of one are holden. If the life which the poet presents to us as throbbing, as pregnant, ever new from God, is other than the genuine revelation of the ordinary day-by-day life of man, it is but dainty foolery or clumsy masquerading. If life is, indeed, dull and blank and unappealing, poetry will be depressing, mechanical, merely decorative. If life is abundant, promising, endless, poetry will be spontaneous, buoyant, passionate; it will have enjoyment. If life carries meaning with it, fulfills purpose, makes exactions which are opportunities, poetry will be high-minded, a power to stay and to console.

Nor is this all. What life is found to be depends in large measure upon the prevailing theory of life, upon the interpretation of it which commends itself to the intelligence. Life is not a raw, unworked material to which the poet may directly apply himself. As it comes to the poet, life is already a universe of meanings, of interpretations, which indeed the poet may fill out, but not dispense with. For good or for ill, centuries of reflective thought have been interpreting life, and their interpretations remain the basis and furnish the instrument for all the poet may do; he may simply use the assimilated results of the labors of scientific men and philosophers. Let the philosophy of a time be materialistic, mechanical, and the poetry of that time is artificial and unworthy. If the poet

succeeds in rising above the thought that has taken possession of contemporary life, it is because by instinct or by desire he falls back on the larger and freer ideas of an earlier day. If the ideas of a time breathe the solemn atmosphere of a divine order, if they find reality surcharged with meaning, we can imagine the poetry that results. It is the poetry of Homer, of Dante, of Shakespeare. If the philosophy of a time is agnostic, if it utters a scorn of life as it seems to be, that philosophy will also sound its note in the poetry of its day.

Thus are we brought again to our starting-point. If we are correct in our judgment that a poet must draw his sustenance from the intelligence of his time, the poetry of to-day must feel the touch of what we call our agnosticism, and the poets of to-day must be somewhat moved by this trait of contemporary life.

Are they thus moved? What is their attitude toward the agnosticism, the doubt, the pessimism, of the present day?

I wish now to speak in this relation of two poets who have recently passed from us. One of them is Mr. Arnold himself, poet as well as critic; the other is Mr. Robert Browning. How do these, both serious and high-minded poets, stand affected by the popular philosophy? How do they affect us who go to them to learn of life?

Nothing in Arnold the poet strikes us more than the teaching of Arnold the critic. Translated from the impersonal narrative of prose into the warmth of poetry, it is the same lesson. Compare the passage standing as our text with this:—

“Wandering between two worlds, one dead
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to lay my head,
Like them, on earth I wait forlorn.”

Or with this:—

“The sea of faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled:
But now I only hear
Its melancholy long withdrawing roar.”

Indeed, Arnold's distinguishing sign among modern poets is the melancholy beauty with which he has voiced the sense of loss; his sad backward glance at the departure of old faiths and ideals; the brooding memories of joys whose spring has fallen away; the shapeless, hopeless hope for the dawn of a new joy, new faith.

I should say that the source of regret which expires from Arnold's lines is his consciousness of a twofold isolation of man —his isolation from nature, his isolation from fellow-man. No longer, he seems to say, may man believe in his oneness with the dear nature about him: the sense of a common spirit binding them together has vanished; the sense of a common purpose outworking in both has fled. Nature, in ceasing to be divine, has ceased to be human. The faith that one idea, one fulfillment, unites in cherished bonds man to nature, is no more; in its stead, the consciousness of isolation. There is still, indeed, grateful companionship with nature, but below this companionship is the knowledge of an impassable gulf:—

“Thou hast been, shalt be, art alone:
Or, if not quite alone, yet they
Who touch thee are unmating things,—
Ocean and clouds, and night and day,
Lorn autumns and triumphant springs.”

The companionship is not at bottom real: it is only on man's side; Nature lacks the element of purpose which alone could give joyful response to man's needs. Man solaces and strengthens his spirit by recourse to Nature, but Nature goes her own way and man must return to his; strengthened and solaced, indeed, but only that he may live self-poised like Nature, careless, unheeding of all beyond self. Companionship no longer is rooted in the heart of things; it is no longer the outcome of a single life.

Man, repulsed from the intimacy of communion with Nature, may turn to man for fellowship; but here, too, is found isolation:—

“Like drift-wood spars which meet and pass
Upon the boundless ocean plain,
So on the sea of life, alas!
Man meets man, meets and parts again.”

No reader of Arnold can fail to notice how spontaneously he takes his most characteristic metaphor from the sea and the matters of the sea. The verses I am about to quote have the same inspiration and tell the same story. As the islands of the sea are separated by that sea which is common to them all, so men are separated by that very life in which all share. Between them is

“The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea.”

“Yes, on the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
We mortal millions live alone.”

I am aware, however, of no passage of Arnold's which comes to us so laden with the gospel of the isolation of life as that poem which gives us his reading of history, “Obermann Once More.” The sad tone reaches its highest note in the description of the loss of Christian faith. From the land whence once came the words of humanity's life,—

“Ah, from that silent, sacred land
Of sun and arid stone,
And crumbling wall and sultry sand,
Comes now *one* word alone!
From David's lips that word did roll,
'Tis true and living yet:
No man can save his brother's soul,
Nor pay his brother's debt.
Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Must labor.”

Not from him who identified himself with the woe and the joy of all men's lives, but from David, sounds the final word of Palestine. The life of common brotherhood, struggle and des-

tiny of Christianity has given way to the old isolated struggle of the individual.

“No man can save his brother’s soul
Nor pay his brother’s debt.”

That is, I take it, the last word of Arnold’s poetic message, his last interpretation of life. Perhaps I should rather say this is the keynote of it all. To say it is the last is to say his last message is one of weakness and despair. Contrary to this, the philosophy which Mr. Arnold leaves us is one of endeavor, of strenuous, almost buoyant, endeavor, in spite of the fact that this endeavor must spring from sadness. If man is isolated, in that isolation he may find himself, and, finding himself, living his own life, lose all his misery. Although man may not commune with Nature, he may yet follow and repeat her. If the works of Nature go on,

“Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God’s other works may be,”

man should emulate this self-sufficient energy. Isolation is translated into self-dependence. Separation throws man farther into himself, deepens his consciousness of his own destiny and of his own law. The verses which close the poem called “Youth of Man,” while far from the most poetical of his lines, sum up, I think, his interpretation of life:—

“Sink, O youth, in thy soul!
Yearn to the greatness of nature;
Rally the good in the depths of thyself.”

This is the outcome of the loneliness of life. Regret and melancholy are not the final fruit. Obey nature, go thy way, heeding nothing less than the concerns of men. As a consolation for thy loneliness, yearn to the greatness of nature. Is man helpless to save another’s soul? Then all the more let him rally the good in the depths of himself!

How does this message stand related to the dictum of Arnold

that poetry is to take the place of philosophy, of theology? How does it stand related to our dictum that the interpretation of life which poetry gives us must be parallel to the demonstrations of philosophy? I do not know how any one can apprehend the message uttered by Arnold and not feel its heart and substance to be that reflective and philosophic interpretation of life given by one school of the world's great moralists,—by the Stoics. As surely as Arnold's style, his deftness, his delicacy, his simplicity testify to the influence of Virgil, of *Æschylus*, of Homer, so surely do his ideas and their substance testify to Marcus Aurelius and to Epictetus and to Kant. I do not mean by this that Arnold has put the "Meditations" or the "Critique of Practical Reason" into verse. I do not even imagine that Arnold had much acquaintance with Kant, or was attracted by such as he had. Speaking broadly, however, the ideas of the Stoics, of Kant, and of Matthew Arnold, grow out of the same soil. There is in all three the conception of the individual as shut off from real communion with nature and with fellow-man, and yet as bearing in himself a universal principle.

"And thou, thou lonely heart,
Which never yet, without remorse,
Even for a moment didst depart
From thy remote and spherèd course
To haunt the place where passions dwell,
Back to thy solitude again."

This is precisely in the sense of Epictetus, precisely in the vein of Kant. I would not, however, insist upon detailed likeness in special points. What is alike in all is the underlying spirit, the attitude towards life. The individual flung back from the world and from society upon himself, and within himself finding the secret of a new strength, the source of a new consolation,—this is the interpretation of life common to all. How can such an interpretation have use, have enjoyment, be a consolation, be a stay in poetry, and yet have no legitimacy in theory? What alembic does the poet possess that he may

apply ideas to life with the assurance that in poetry the ideas are the fact, while the same ideas in the hands of the philosopher are unverifiable, discredited dogmas, shaken creeds, or failing traditions? I cannot rid myself of the conviction that the weight and the humanity of the message of the poet are proportionate to the weighty and human ideas which he develops; that these ideas must be capable of verification to the intelligence,—must be true in that system of knowledge which is science, in that discussion of the meaning of experience which is philosophy.

But what if Mr. Arnold's interpretation of life be partial? What if a completer account of experience, a deeper and more adventurous love of wisdom, should find community below all isolation? Would not the philosophy of life which revealed this limitation of Mr. Arnold's interpretation, reveal also the limitation of his poetry? This is the question that comes to me when I put Mr. Arnold's poetry, with all its nobility, beside the poetry of Robert Browning.

What a change from a serene yet cold air of one to the genial, glowing atmosphere of the other, which envelops and embraces everything in this world of ours as if in fear that something might escape its loving touch. What a change from the pallid colors in which one paints life to the varied warmth of the other! What a change from the almost remote and academic sympathies of the one to the passionate human sympathies of the other! Where Arnold finds food for pensive regret, a rendering of triumphant hope is borne to us from Browning. When the world tells a story of softened melancholy to Arnold, Browning reads a tale of keen and delicious joy. If Arnold sings of calm, self-poised resignation and endeavor, the trumpet peal of an abounding life bursts from Browning. Arnold stands upon the sandy, barren shore of that vast ocean where is seen only "the turbid ebb and flow of human misery," whence comes only the melancholy sounds of a withdrawing faith. Browning takes his place on this homely, every-day earth of ours:—

“Do I stoop? I pluck a posey.
Do I stand and stare? All’s blue.”

Strenuous, abounding, triumphant optimism,—that is the note of Browning:—

“How good is man’s life, the men living! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy!”

Buoyant faith, that is the attitude of Browning:—

“God’s in his heaven!
All’s right with the world!”

What is the source of this note of Browning, what the authority for his attitude? It is only when we go to his ideas, the ideas which he applies to life, by which he criticises and interprets life, that we get the secret of his superior passion, of his superior joy, of his superior sympathy. An adequate rendering of Browning’s conception of the meaning of life does not come within the scope of this article. The most inadequate rendering cannot fail to note that Browning knows and tells of no isolation of man from nature, of man from man. No account, however brief, can fail to record the abundance, the intensity, the vibrating fullness, the impassioned sanity of his verse, basing themselves upon Browning’s realization that the world was made for man, and that man was made for man:—

“This world’s no blot for us,
No blank. It means intensely and means good.”

This is the uniform utterance of Browning.

“Such a soul,
Such a body, and then such an earth,
For ensphering the whole!”

“The earth’s first stuff
Was neither more nor less, enough
To house man’s soul, man’s need fulfill.”

“How the world is made for each of us!
All we perceive and know in it
Tends to some moment’s product thus
When the soul declares itself.”

In these verses we have the epitome of Browning’s interpretation of life: the subordination of earth to man, to a common self. Just that which was conspicuously absent in Arnold is conspicuously present in Browning,—the sense of a common idea, a common purpose, in nature and in man. Thus it is man need not simply look to nature for encouragement in bearing the burden of the world, for strength to be like her, self-poised, self-dependent. Man may rejoice in her every pulse of life, having the conviction that in her life he, too, lives; knowing that her every event furthers some deed of his, knowing that her beauty is the response to some aspiration of his. Let one know, as Browning sings in “Rabbi Ben Ezra,” that nature, that the earthly life, and all “this dance of plastic circumstance,” are but the machinery to shape the soul, to form the spirit; are but the potter’s wheel that moulds the clay to “heaven’s consummate cup”; let him know that the meaning of life, the “uses of the cup,” are

“The festal board, lamp’s flash, and trumpet’s peal,
The new wine’s foaming flow,
The master’s lips aglow!”—

let him know all this, and he will understand why the song of Browning is one of joy and victory.

Add to this Browning’s conception of the relation of man to man. Consider how he finds in the contacts of life, not isolation, but companionship, service, love,—the first and the last word.

To relate how he finds, in the minglings of life and life, the secret and the key to our experience, would be to summarize, one by one, his poems. Even a casual acquaintance with Browning suffices to show that love, as he conceives it, is no accident and no mere occurrence of the life-journey, but at once its path and its goal. Everything

“Of power and beauty in the world
The mightiness of love is curled
Inextricably round about.
Love lies within it and without.”

We are led again to our old question. The greater vigor and sensuousness of Browning, his wider range, his more human touch, all spring from the ideas through which he sees and interprets life. But are the ideas true? Are they verifiable? Are they sporadic outbursts of a fancy which has no root in the nature of things, or are they the revelations of an imagination which is but another name for insight? If the ideas which give both substance and shape to Browning’s poetry are only artificial make-ups of his individual fancy, what claim have they even for serious attention, to say nothing of power to stay by and to uphold? If these ideas are not ideas of soberness and of truth, as well as of fancy and passion, they are no more to us (the harsh word must be said) than freaks of a madman’s brain.

If Mr. Arnold’s message has weight and penetration with us, it is because that message conveys something of the reality of things. If there are messages, in comparison with which Mr. Arnold’s seems pallid and academic, it is only because these other messages bring us word from a more abiding, a more human world than Mr. Arnold has known. The great power of poetry to stay and to console—a power which neither Arnold nor any other critic can exaggerate one whit—is just because of the truth, the rendering of the reality of affairs, which poetry gives us. The importance and the endurance of poetry, as of all art, are in its hold upon reality. We hear much, on this side and that, of realism. Well, we may let realism go, but we cannot let go reality. Here, too, we may turn to Robert Browning himself:—

“Truth, truth, that’s the gold. And all the good
I find in fancy is, it serves to set
Gold’s inmost glint free.”

It is because, amid the conventionalities and make-believes of our ordinary life, poetry flashes home to us some of the gold which is at the very heart and core of our every-day existence, that poetry has its power to sustain us, its sympathy to enhearten us. Now science and philosophy, I repeat, however technical and remote in form and method, are the workings of the one selfsame spirit in its communing with this same world. There are, indeed, diversities of operation. And if the advantage in directness and universality of appeal, in wealth and passionateness of garb, is upon the side of poetry, let us remember that, after all, the advantage upon the side of method and standard are with the side of science and philosophy.

Indeed, this present separation of science and art, this division of life into prose and poetry, is an unnatural divorce of the spirit. It exists and endures, not because of a glow to life which philosophy cannot catch, nor because of a verifiable truth which poetry cannot detect and convey. It exists because in the last few centuries the onward movement of life, of experience, has been so rapid, its diversification of regions and methods so wide, that it has outrun the slower step of reflective thought. Philosophy has not as yet caught the rhythmic swing of this onward movement, and written it down in a score of black and white which all may read. Or if in some degree philosophy has laid hold of the secret of this movement, it has not yet been able to tell it in straightforward, simple syllables to the common consciousness. In its own theory, this common consciousness tells by rote a doctrine of an earlier and outworn world. But this movement, which has so escaped the surer yet heavier tread of critical thought, has in manifold ways danced itself into the poetic measures of our century. The deeper and wider spiritual life which makes this movement has found an expression in Wordsworth and Shelley, in Browning and in Mr. Arnold himself, which has, as yet, been denied to it in English philosophy. That which seemed to Mr. Arnold a flight from philosophy into poetry was in reality but a flight from a hard and partial philosophy to a fuller and freer one.

It is not because poetry is divorced from science that it gave Mr. Arnold's nature such satisfaction, but because his philosophic instinct was so deep and real that he revolted from the professional philosophy of the day as he found it in Great Britain, and sought refuge in the unnamed, unprofessed philosophy of the great poets of England and of all time.

Here, indeed, is just our problem. We must bridge this gap of poetry from science. We must heal this unnatural wound. We must, in the cold, reflective way of critical system, justify and organize the truth which poetry, with its quick, naïve contacts, has already felt and reported. The same movement of the spirit, bringing man and man, man and nature, into wider and closer unity, which has found expression by anticipation in poetry, must find expression by retrospection in philosophy. Thus will be hastened the day in which our sons and our daughters shall prophesy, our young men shall see visions, and our old men dream dreams.

2. ERNEST RENAN

I¹

Many things in Renan's *The Future of Science* tend to arouse interest. The way in which the great philosophic formulations of Germany, just then losing currency as official doctrine, were continued by passing over into the attitude and atmosphere of science, especially of historic science, is a point fastening attention. That which in Hegel had been an attempt at a comprehensive philosophising of the universe has become, in Renan, the conception and method of the science of philology. The conception of philology is of a science of the human intellect as a single whole developing throughout all history, and having its record in language, in a sense which understands by language all records which the human race has left of itself, whether in the *form* of language, or in its substance—in literature. The method (and this is 1848) is fixed by the idea of evolution. “The science of man will only then be placed in its true light when students realise that consciousness is evolved—that it only attains its plenitude after having gone through diverse phases. . . . The great progress of modern thought has been the substitution of the category of *evolution* for that of *being*; . . . formerly everything was conceived as ‘being,’ as an accomplished fact; people spoke of law, of religion, of politics, of poetry in an absolute fashion. At present everything is conceived as in process of *formation*.” And when we go on to consider the law of evolution: from the undifferentiated homogeneous, the syncrète, through the multiplicity which results from analysis, to a synthesis which comprehends, while it never destroys, the multiplicity: when we consider this, the transference of the Hegelian doctrine be-

¹ From *The Open Court*, Dec. 29, 1892; published under the title *Two Phases of Renan's Life: The Faith of 1850 and the Doubt of 1890*.

comes even more marked. It is the same law, only considered now as the law of historic growth, not as the dialectic unfolding of the absolute.

Remembering the date, Renan's protest against the psychology of the time and his sketch of its true course attains importance. His protest is directed against the static and purely individual character of the current psychology. Psychology has confined itself to a study of the human intellect in its mature state. The necessity for the future is a form of psychology which Renan, significantly enough, terms an *embryogeny* of the human soul, a psychology which shall study the first appearance and gradual development of those powers which we now have ready-made. Not less striking, in its pre-*vision*, is the idea that this genetic science is to deal equally with the race and with the individual in their growth from infancy. Surely there is something more than a chance anticipation of the modern conception of the relation of ontogeny and phylogeny when Renan says, "Each individual travels in his turn along the line which the whole of mankind has followed, and the series of the development of human reason is parallel to the progress of individual reason." Aside, then, from the study of childhood, Renan suggests as a method of reproducing the mind of the past, the products, the monuments in which the mind has recorded itself. Chief of these records is language. "The deep study of its mechanism and history will always prove the most efficacious means of mastering primeval psychology." Through this study we should get, Renan goes on to say, "the facts which interested the mind, at its first awakening, the influences that affected it, the laws that governed it. Beyond this, psychology is to give less emphasis, less absoluteness, to the manifestations of psychical life in the individual and more to those of humanity. History itself, in final definition is to be conceived as the psychology of humanity."

Of interest again is Renan's grasp of the conflict which is always going on between specialisation and generalisation in science, and his idea of the way to direct the conflict, so as to

sustain the minimum of loss. The discussion is of special interest in connection with the present reaction against Renan's work as too viewy, too given to broad generalisation, lacking in the detailed element of technical research. The balance is difficult to keep, but certainly Renan's theory cannot be charged with erring in this direction, and if his practice errs the next generation may count the error no more heinous than that of a devotion to detail which carefully ignores all larger meaning. On one side, Renan demands an ever increasing amount of specialistic work, of monographs, of technical research, on every point however minute. Although the "grand" histories have already been attempted, yet without more numerous and extensive monographs, their real history cannot be written short of a century. He even goes to the point of saying that the "true heroes of science are they, who, capable of the loftiest views have been able to resign themselves to the rôle of humble monographers." And again, "the specialist-savant, instead of deserting the true arena of humanity, is the one who labors most efficaciously for the progress of the intellect, seeing that he alone can provide us with the materials for constructions." But all this is no excuse for the isolation and dispersion which exists at present. "The great present obstacle is the dispersion of work, the self-isolation among special studies which renders the labors of the philologist available only to himself and a small number engaged in the same subject." The defect is not in the multiplicity or minuteness of investigations, but in the fact that there is no machinery for distributing them, no apparatus for condensing and concentrating the results of the special research of one so as to put them at the disposal of all others. It is a form of egotism which insists that one's monograph shall always remain in just the state in which one wrote it; which resists all reduction of it to its gist so as to make it available, in its net outcome, for any and all investigators. The real need is for organisation, for control not of the liberty of individual specialisation, but of the results so reached. Our ideal must be to reproduce on

a large scale the ideal attained, in small, in certain monastic orders—a grand scientific workshop.

Suggestive as are all these and many other special discussions of Renan, the most important thing to my mind is, after all, the conception which Renan had, in 1850, of the universal—the social, the religious significance of science and his partial retraction of this faith in 1890. The book in question, *The Future of Science*, was written, it may be of interest to recall, in 1848 and 1849. It was the outcome of the conflux of two movements—the growth of the scientific spirit in Renan in his progress out of Catholicism and of the political movement which found its expression in the various revolutions of '48. The volume breathes a constant and bracing tone of optimism: *The Future of Science* is not the future of erudition nor yet of knowledge as such. It is a social future, a development of humanity, which Renan has in mind. This was the origin of the book—"the need I felt of summing up in a volume the new (i.e., social) faith which had replaced the shattered Catholicism." But just as he was ready to publish he went to Italy in connection with certain researches in the literary history of France and in Averroism. The artistic side of life, till then, as he says, closed to him, opened; it unbent him. Nearly all his ideals of 1848 vanished as impossible of realisation. He became, as he puts it, reconciled to reality—a world in which "a great deal of evil is the necessary condition for any good, in which an imperceptible amount of aroma requires for its extraction an enormous *caput mortuum* of dead matter." Was he reconciled to reality? or was it that the æsthetic spell passed over him, that he went to Italy a democrat—a believer in the universal function of science—and returned an aristocrat—sceptical of the intellectual and artistic life as one capable of being shared in by any beyond the select few? However it was, when he came back to his volume it no longer satisfied him, either in substance or in style. The *coup d'état*, happening soon after, added the finishing touch. The result was the Renan with whom we are most familiar: the man quite dis-

illusioned, quite conscious of the impossibility of deciding among the multitude of ends which life presents, something of a dilettante, but always sympathetic and always conscientiously bent on the faithful culture of that spot of ground which belonged to him to till. The contrast between the enthusiast of 1848, apparently most interested in science because of the social mission of science, and the Renan of 1890, purposely ignoring its social function, is one of the most interesting things that I know of in literary history. I cannot do better than to close these remarks with a quotation from the *Moderne Geister* of Brandes. After quoting the later creed of Renan as summed up in the saying, "The scholar is a spectator in the universe; he knows the universe belongs to him only as an object of study," he goes on: "it is difficult to measure the demoralising effect upon French scholars exercised by the Second Empire; how their life became accommodated to the *fait accompli*. Everywhere under Napoleon III. the higher French culture is characterised by an inclination to quietism and fatalism. Traces of this influence are to be seen everywhere. Complete freedom from enthusiasm was quite synonymous with culture and ripeness of judgment." Brandes quotes what Renan said to him in disparagement of universal education: in contrast read the enthusiastic plea for universal culture in *The Future of Science* and the transition is before you.

The Renan of 1848 wrote: "The most sublime works are those which humanity has made collectively and to which no name can be attached . . . What do I care for the man that stands between humanity and me? What do I care for the insignificant syllables of his name? That name itself is a lie; it is not he; it is the nation; it is humanity toiling at a point of space and time that is the real author." In 1871, in his *Intellectual and Moral Reform* Renan writes: "At its outset, civilisation was an aristocratic accomplishment: it was the work of a very few—nobles and priests—who made it obtain through what the democrats call the imposition of force. The continued preservation of civilisation is also the work of the aristocratic class." In 1848 he wrote: "Only one course re-

mains and that is to broaden the basis of the family and to find room for all at the banqueting table of light. . . . The aristocracy constitutes an odious monopoly if it does not set before it for its aim the tutelage of the masses—their gradual elevation." In 1871, his tone is: "The people properly so-called and the peasantry, to-day the absolute masters of the house, are in reality only intruders, wasps who have usurped possession of a hive they did not build."

II¹

The fundamental conception of Ernest Renan's work *The Future of Science* is that science is both subjectively and objectively social: that its material, in its most important respects, is to be found in the history of humanity, and that its aim is furthering the organisation of humanity. The relation of science to the welfare of man is the true text of the book; and this in no limited definition of welfare, but in a sense so broad as to include his religious attitude, as well as his intellectual and artistic enjoyments. "As for myself," he says at the outset, "I recognise only one result of science: namely the solution of the enigma, the final explanation to mankind of the meaning of things,—the explanation to man of himself,—giving him in the name of the sole legitimate authority (the whole of human nature) the creed which religion gave him ready-made." And if Renan conceives the theoretical outcome of science to be this revelation of man to himself, his conception of its practical resultant is no less broad: "The whole march of Europe for four centuries is summed up in this practical conclusion: to elevate and ennoble the people, and to let all men have a share in the delights of intelligence."

I intend to quote, at some length, a passage from the beginning of the fifth chapter of *The Future of Science*, which sums up his idea both of the nature and the end of science, and afterwards I shall go over some of the main points one by one.

¹ From *The Open Court*, Jan. 5, 1893; published under the title *Renan's Loss of Faith in Science*.

"It is not altogether inadvertently that I designate by the name of *science* that which is ordinarily called *philosophy*. To philosophise is the word by which I would most willingly sum up my life; nevertheless, seeing that the popular use of the word still expresses only a partial form of the inner life, that besides it only implies the subjective fact of the individual thinker, we must employ the more objective word; *To know when assuming the standpoint of humanity*. Yes, the day will come when humanity shall no longer believe; but when it shall know; the day when it shall know the metaphysical and moral world as it now knows the physical; the day when the government of humanity shall no longer be given to accident and intrigue, but to the rational discussion of what is best, and to the most efficacious means of attaining what is best. If such be the aim of science, if its object be to teach man his final aim and law, to make him grasp the true sense of life, to make up with art, poetry, and virtue, the divine ideal which alone lends worth to human existence, if such be its aim, then is it possible that it should have its serious detractors? But, it will be asked, will science accomplish these marvellous destinies? All I know is that if science does not accomplish them, nothing else will, and that humanity will forever be ignorant of the significance of things."

The definition of science, then, is to know from the standpoint of humanity; its goal is such a sense of life as will enable man to direct his conduct in relation to his fellows by intelligence and not by chance. It is to this that I would direct special attention—Renan's faith in '48 in the social basis and aim of science.

According to Renan the present era is marked by intelligence coming to consciousness of its social function. Up to, say the French Revolution, the function of science had been analytic—mainly negative and dissolving. All science is criticism, but criticism in the past has been equivalent to an analysis of existing conceptions, sentiments, and habits which resulted in destroying their validity. Reason has thus appeared to have no positive and constructive function; its work is to be exhausted in analysis, in disintegration of the given. But science, having carried its analysis, its tearing apart, to the end, finally comes upon the underlying unity; the destruction

of the preconceived ideas and institutions only serves to reveal the basic whole. Thus analytic science finally came upon humanity as that unity to which all is to be referred. The work of science is henceforth predominantly synthetic. The unity reveals the law and end; theory must pass over into practice; knowledge into action. This is the final significance of the French Revolution. Humanity finally became conscious of itself as one whole; "after having groped for centuries in the darkness of infancy without consciousness of itself, and by the mere motor force of its organism, the grand moment came when, like the individual, it took possession of itself." The French Revolution is the first conscious attempt to make action, the practical affairs of life, the expression of reason. It presents a scene hitherto unknown in history: "the scene of philosophers radically changing the whole of previously received ideas and carrying out the greatest of all revolutions on deliberate faith in system." That the outward, the apparent, result should have been in many regards unsatisfactory is no cause for wonder. The Revolution interpreted its idea, the control of life by reason, in the light of a narrow conception of reason; it did not recognise the reason already embodied in institutions, simply because that reason had not been inserted by itself; it interpreted reason in a sense which made it opposed to instinct. The inevitable temporary result was the substitution of instability and upheaval for an established order. The outcome was such as to discredit with many the whole attempt. But this is to confuse the application of the principle, at first necessarily imperfect, with the principle itself. In reality, "the principle involved admits of no controversy. Intelligence alone must reign, intelligence alone. Sense is to govern the world." And again Renan says: "The doctrine which is to be maintained at all hazards is that the mission of intellect is the reforming of society according to its own principles." And once more: "Hence by every way open to us we are beginning to proclaim the right of reason to reform society by means of rational science and the theoretical knowledge of existing things."

What, then, is to be the effect of this development of science when it gets to the point of recognizing the unity of humanity, upon art—including poetry—and religion? Upon these points Renan had no more doubt than upon the social mission of science. When science gets to the comprehensive synthesis of humanity, poetry and science must flow together. Just because science, in its fulness, is the science of humanity, its highest development must mean, to give the whole of human nature full play—to give the sympathies their due place. But, on the other hand, since it is the business of science to reveal in its truth the unity, sympathy and admiration can have their full (free) chance only as science does its work, tearing down false idols in order to make plain the truth. “The pretended poetic natures who imagined that they could get to the true sense of things without science will then turn out to be so many chimaera-mongers, and the austere savants who shall have neglected the more delicate gifts . . . will remind us of the ingenious myth of the daughters of Minyas, who were changed into bats because unable to get beyond argument in presence of signs to which a more generous method of explanation should have been applied.” If, indeed, there is no meaning in the world, then science can only destroy poetry; but only on this condition. How shall we limit the real universe by supposing that the paltry dreams which we have been able up to this time to invent are superior in grandeur and splendor to the reality which science shall reveal to us? “Has not the temple of our God been enlarged since science revealed to us the infinity of the worlds? . . . Are we not similarly justified in supposing that the application of scientific method to the metaphysical and moral region . . . will also simply shatter a narrow and paltry world to open another world of infinite marvels?” The truth is that either there is no ideal, naught but a deceiving dream, or else this ideal is embodied in the universe and is to be found and drawn thence by science. “The ideal is near everyone of us.”

So with religion; whatever science takes away, it is only because it presents us with deeper truth. This conception is,

indeed, the animating spirit of the book; it is so interwoven with the whole treatment that I shall only select one or two quotations. The man of science is the real "custodian of the sacred deposit"; "real religion is the culmination of the discipline and cultivation of the intelligence"; "social and religious reform will assuredly come . . . but it will come from enlarged science common to all, and operating in the unrestricted midst of human intelligence"; "hence, science is a religion, it alone will henceforth make the creeds, for science alone can solve for men the eternal problems, the solution of which *his* nature imperatively demands." In the course of his discussion, Renan brings out at length the point only suggested in the above—that this religious outflowering of science is to be expected when, on one hand, its scope has been extended to take in humanity, and when, on the other, its practical outcome, if not its abstruse results, has been made the possession of all men. "It is not enough for the progress of human intelligence that a few isolated thinkers should reach very advanced posts, and that a few heads shoot up like wild oats above the common level. . . . It is a matter of great urgency to enlarge the whirl of humanity; otherwise a few individuals might reach heaven, while the mass is still dragging along upon the earth. . . . The moment intellectual culture becomes a religion, from that moment it becomes barbarous to deprive a single soul of it."

I may sum up by saying that Renan's faith in '48 was that science was to become universalised—universalised in its *range* by coming to include humanity as its subject-matter; universalised in *application* by being made, as to its salient outcome, the common possession of all men. From this extension, Renan expected further results to flow: he expected that science was to become a "social motor," the basis of ordering the affairs of men; he expected that it was to find expression in a wonderful artistic movement, and that, above all, it was to culminate in a great religious outburst. How was it in 1890?

In one sense Renan stands where he stood forty years before. He still believes that he was right at the outset of his

"intellectual career in believing firmly in science and in making it the object of his life." He even says that after all he was right in '48; "save a few disappointments, progress has travelled on the lines laid down in my imagination." And yet when we come to examine Renan's later position in more detail, these few disappointments seem of more importance than the successes attained. Science in the abstract, science as the most worthy end of the few capable ones, Renan undoubtedly still believes in as firmly as ever. But the faith in the social career of science, of a wide distribution of intelligence as the basis of a scientifically controlled democracy, has all but vanished; the idea of science as lending itself to art, to a wide idealistic interpretation of the universe, and as flowering in a religious outburst, the conception of an appropriation of truth by all men has become to him the dream of a youthful enthusiasm. He has learned through the experience of mature years that "intensive culture constantly adding to the sum total of human knowledge, is not the same as extensive culture disseminating that knowledge more and more for the welfare of the countless human beings in existence. The sheet of water in expanding continues to lose in depth." Thus it is that "enlightenment, morality, art will always be represented among mankind by a magistracy, by a minority, preserving the traditions of the true, the good, and the beautiful." Instead of science becoming a social motor and thus giving a basis for social organisation at once free and saturated with law, there is now disbelief in the power of science to make its own way and realise its truth in practice: "We have to pay dearly, that is in privileges, the power that protects us against evil." "While, through the constant labor of the nineteenth century, the knowledge of facts has considerably increased, *the destiny of mankind has become more obscure than ever.*" Could any retraction be imagined more complete, I had almost said more abject, than this when compared with his constant proclamation of '48 that *the business of science is just to reveal to man his destiny*—that any other conception of science makes it but an elaborate trifling?

As against the faith of '48 that science is to reveal the

meaning incorporate in reality, and that this is the only true idealism, we have the constant identification, in his later writings, of the ideal with certain fond dreams which the cultured man will always cherish for himself, yet without hope of verification. The ideal is no longer the aim indicated by the universe itself, and to be followed as laid bare by inquiry; "it is very clear that our doctrine affords no basis for a *practical* policy; on the contrary, our aim must be carefully dissimulated." As for science and religion, we must give up all hope of attaining, so far as the mass is concerned at least, any faith and enthusiasm based on knowledge. In his *Intellectual and Moral Reform*, already alluded to, Renan virtually proposes to the ruling powers a concordat: the ecclesiastic authorities are to allow the savants complete freedom of thought and inquiry, provided the savants, in turn, leave the masses to their existing faith without attempting to extend to them the enlightenment which they themselves have gained. In his preface of 1890 to *The Future of Science* he seriously doubts whether any consensus of belief is open to mankind at large, except upon condition of return to primitive credulity. "It is possible that the ruin of idealistic beliefs is fated to follow hard upon the ruin of supernatural beliefs; that the real abasement of the morality of humanity is to date from the day when it has seen the reality of things. . . . Candidly, I fail to see how the foundations of a noble and happy life are to be relaid without the ancient dreams."

While a study of the reasons which have induced this apparent loss of faith in the larger and social function of science would be even more interesting than the fact itself, I do not propose here to enter at length upon the discussion. Renan himself indicates one reason when he says that at present science seems to be made for the schools rather than the schools for science. So far as much of its spirit and aim is concerned, science is the legitimate successor of the old scholasticism. The forty years since Renan wrote have not done much to add the human spirit and the human interpretation to the results of science; they have rather gone to increase its technical and remote character. Furthermore, Renan does

not seem to have realised sufficiently the dead weight of the intrenched class interest which resists all attempt of science to take practical form and become a "social motor." When we remember that every forward step of science has involved a readjustment of institutional life, that even such an apparently distant and indifferent region as the solar system could not be annexed to scientific inquiry without arousing the opposing force of the mightiest political organisations of the day; when we recall such things it is not surprising that the advance of scientific method to the matters closest to man—his social relationships—should have gone on more slowly than was expected. The resistance from the powers whose existence is threatened by such advance has not become less effective in becoming more indirect and subtle. One thing is certain: this decrease of faith cannot be explained as a personal idiosyncracy of Renan's; it lies deep in the life of the last half century.

I confess to surprise that this partial retraction of Renan's has not been exploited by the reactionaries. It is certainly spoils for those, who, in their assumed concern for the moral and spiritual affairs of humanity, take every opportunity to decry science and proclaim its impotence to deal with serious matters of practice. I cannot but think that the Renan of '48 was wiser than he of '90 in the recognition of the fact that man's interests are finally and prevailingly practical; that if science cannot succeed in satisfying these interests it is hardly more than an episode in the history of humanity; that the ultimate meaning and control will always be with the power that claims this practical region for its own—if not with science, then with the power of the church from which Renan was an early apostate. It is a continual marvel that so many men of science who have abandoned and even attacked all dogmatic authority, should take refuge for themselves in agnosticism—that they should not see that any lasting denial of dogmatic authority is impossible save as science itself advances to that comprehensive synthesis which will allow it to become a guide of conduct, a social motor.

3. MAURICE MAETERLINCK¹

"At the present time, nothing is more striking than the disarray which troubles our instincts and sentiments, and even our ideas, as soon as it is a matter of the intervention of the unknown or of mystery in the really serious events of our life. We find in this disarray some sentiments that do not correspond any longer to living, precise, and accepted ideas—such as those that refer to the existence of a well-defined God, more or less anthropomorphic, attentive, personal, and providential. We find there sentiments that are still half ideas, such as those that refer to fatality, to destiny, to the justice of things. We also find some ideas that are on their way to becoming sentiments—such as those that refer to the genius of the species, the laws of evolution and selection, the will of the race, etc. We find there also some ideas that are merely ideas, and that are too uncertain, too sparse for us to foresee the moment when they will be transformed into sentiments, and have, accordingly, a serious influence on our manner of acting, of accepting life, and of being happy or unhappy."

Maeterlinck employs the words I have quoted to point out the embarrassment under which poets and dramatists at present labor. The words serve equally well to denote the present state of philosophy. The intellectual revolution described in the last four centuries is too vast to have made itself at home in our daily imaginations, and too recent to have generated appropriate feelings. Apart from a subsoil of such images and feelings any philosophy is barren. Science has neutralised the soil from which sprang the earlier philosophies of the race; with the destruction of supernaturalism, materialism, which was only an anti-supernaturalism, has lost its support. The

¹ From *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1911; published under the title *Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life*.

bounded and complacent Epicurean naturalism of the past has been rendered impossible by the perception that the nature in which our frail lives are set is infinite in extent and duration, and that our being is the culminating and precarious pinnacle of a series of struggles.

In a situation in which, as Maeterlinck says, our sentiments are no longer attached to ideas that are sincerely accepted, and our ideas have not yet sublimated themselves into sentiments that have a decisive influence on our behavior and our weal and woe, the meditations of a writer who is primarily an artist and secondarily a philosopher have unusual significance for those interested in philosophy—especially if the artist be as lucid and as truthful as Maeterlinck. Art, especially dramatic art, is sympathetic and flexible. It secures unity, the degree of harmony necessary to its career, through interplay of diversified individual elements. Subordination and logical unity are effected by admitting each element to its just rôle in a developing movement. Where art is dramatic, philosophy is schematic, and its depiction of unity correspondingly inflexible and exclusive. At times when philosophy has reflected beliefs and images that were themselves uniform and compact, a rigid logic was natural and its hardness and restrictions were not felt. But when the sentiments that lead to action are divided from general ideas about the world, and these ideas are themselves faltering, literature foreshadows and augments ideas that only later can be coherently articulated. The most characteristic philosophic ideas of this generation are to be found, not in philosophy, but in art. In Maeterlinck especially we find a power of transmuting abstract ideas into feelings which gives unusual clarity and body to his presentiments of future philosophy. For Maeterlinck has so worked his philosophy into his art that one does not have to torture the art in order to discover the philosophy. With infinite frankness and amiability he has taken us into his confidence. "It is necessary," he tells us, "to form a general idea of the world. All our moral life, all our human life, supports itself by such a conception." And, again, he says that "the tissue of the daily life,

the surface occupied by special goods and evils, has its identity in, and is lighted or made sombre by, the dominant idea of the generation that unrolls it. Whatever its form or its disguise, this idea always reduces itself on last analysis to a certain conception of the universe. Individual and public calamities have only a passing influence on the happiness and unhappiness of men unless they modify, with respect to their gods, infinity, the unknown and the economy of the world, the general ideas that enlighten and nourish men." It is not necessary to say that a man who expresses so simply his sense of the importance of general ideas chooses thereby consciously to enroll himself among philosophers.

What are the general ideas dominating the present age, "ideas as yet purely ideas, uncertain and sparse," and yet ideas that Maeterlinck endeavors to focus, to fund, and to transform into living sentiments? According to Maeterlinck, an idea concerning the unknown, a certain way of envisaging the mystery that bathes our life and our consciousness, is the leading general idea of a time. "Men," says Maeterlinck, "excel more or less, go farther or less far, higher or lower, in what they know, in proportion to the respect they have for what they do not know, in proportion to the amplitude their imagination and intelligence is able to give the totality of forces they cannot know. The consciousness of the unknown in which we live is what confers on our life a meaning it would not have if we enclosed ourselves in what we know, or if we believed too readily that what we know is more important than what we still ignore."

This doctrine constitutes, I suppose, the essence of what is termed the mysticism of Maeterlinck. But Maeterlinck represents a manner of mysticism—if so label it we must—which is unique in history: a naturalistic, yes, if you will, a materialistic, mysticism. I know no writer of our own day who accepts more frankly, who welcomes more bravely than Maeterlinck, all the methods and results of the natural sciences, and without discount, and without evasion. I know of no other writer who maintains such a vivid, intimate, and persisting

sense of the change wrought, and wrought for the better, in our inmost moral being by that development of naturalistic intelligence we call science.

Almost without exception, those philosophers who are conventionally known as mystics have used the gradual shadings off of our life into an impenetrable beyond as a *motif* for abasing man, insulting reason, and belittling nature. They have deduced from the shortness of the tether of intelligence, in contrast with the long reaches of the unknown, the need of some private, secret, and illicit mode of union with the eternal powers. But Maeterlinck tells us that the mysteries which were accepted by the ages that preceded intelligent and free inquiry were artificial mysteries, and that these mysteries must be "stripped of all that our errors, our fears, and our lies have added to them." The older notions of the infinite were not fruitful because they were born of ignorance, that is, of impotence and fear. "The thought of the unknowable and the infinite becomes truly salutary only when it is the unexpected recompense of the intelligence that has given itself loyally and unreservedly to the study of the knowable and the finite. There is a notable difference between the mystery which comes before our ignorance and the mystery which comes after what we have learned." "Rarely," says Maeterlinck, "does a mystery disappear; ordinarily it only changes its place. But it is often very important, very desirable, that it manage to change its place. From a certain point of view, all the progress of human thought reduces itself to two or three changes of this kind—to have dislodged two or three mysteries from the place where they did harm in order to transport them where they become harmless, where they can do good. Sometimes it is enough, without a mystery changing its place, if we can succeed in giving it another name. That which was called 'the gods' is now called 'life.' And if life is just as inexplicable as the gods, we have at least gained this, that in the name of life no one has authority to speak, nor right to do harm."

And again he says that although the contents of the sealed vials of the world remain obscure, "there is gain in the fact

that the inscriptions we write upon them to-day convey less menace to us, so that we are able to approach them and touch them, to lay our ears close to them, and to listen with wholesome curiosity." "We have had for a long time a pride, stupid enough, in believing ourselves to be miraculous beings, unique and marvellously accidental in our setting in nature, probably fallen from another world, without any sure attachments to the rest of life, and, in any case, endowed with an isolated, incomparable, monstrous faculty. It is much preferable not to be such prodigies, for we have learned that prodigies do not fail to disappear in the normal evolution of nature. It is much more consoling to observe that we follow the same route as the soul of this great world; that we have the same intentions, the same hopes, the same tests, and almost—except for our dream of justice and pity, which is our own specific work—the same feelings. . . ." "This is why our attitude in the face of the mystery of these forces is changed. It is no longer that of fear, but of courage. It is no longer the kneeling of a slave before his master, but it permits the look of equal to equal, for we carry within ourselves the equal of the most profound and the greatest mysteries." And again he says that "the most immeasurable gods never put to men questions like those that are put without respite to us by that which their adorers called nothing, but which in reality is nature. Those gods reigned in a dead space, without events and without images, and hence without points of reference for our imaginations, and having on our thoughts and feelings only a static and immobile influence. Hence the sense of the infinite, which is the source of all higher activity, atrophied in us. As soon as our intelligence is not imperiously invoked to the extremity of its own powers by some new fact—and there are hardly any new facts in the reign of the gods—it falls asleep, is contracted and effaced, and wastes away. Not at the time when the Hindoo, Hebrew, or Christian theology flourished; not in the days when Greek and German metaphysic employed all the forces of human genius, was our representation of the universe animated, fertilised, and reinforced by assistance as unfore-

seen, as charged with mystery, as energetic, as real as now. Of old, we conversed with our weak logic or our disordered imagination with respect to the enigma; at present, coming out of our too subjective residence, we attempt to enter into relation with the enigma itself."

I do not feel competent to paraphrase these sayings, but it is not false to their spirit to say that if we take any of the great works in which the past endeavored to document the infinite mystery (as the *Divine Comedy* of Dante), we see that its harshness, its violence, its narrowness are all its own, and that its beauty, its power to pacify passion and to nourish sentiment, are borrowed from our own more just perspective, and that they flow from the inexhaustible stock of ordinary life that all ages possess in common. The supernatural and metaphysical infinities of the past were blank spaces that furnished no points of contact for reflection, no food for imagination. They were segregated and remote infinities; they did not enter life at every point, but at a few arbitrarily selected points, while the infinity of natural event and energy enter into our lives equally at all points. We fail to note the contracted and finite scale to which the professed infinite was actually reduced because we add generous reaches to the singularly limited conceptions about the unknown that belonged to those who, by a strange illusion, we imagine more sensitive to it than ourselves. Even religions have largely been recipes for dealing with the inexplicable so as to put us on our guard against it, or to render us immune against its contagion; they have been devices for changing awe into familiarity, or else of segregating mystery once for all, so that by some recurrent act of conventional respect the bulk of our daily lives may be secured against its intrusion.

It is not, I think, sufficiently noted that most of the earlier dramas of Maeterlinck, instead of interpreting the general idea of the world appropriate to this generation—that is to say, reflecting his own philosophy—set forth a metaphysic that is mediæval and feudal. Vows, prayers, violent struggle, silent submission, loyal ignorance, fated love and fatal fear lend a

troubling beauty to the scene, but intelligence, questioning, truthful, bold, that "flame," as he somewhere calls it, "confined and frail, but precise, exclusive, invincible as the blowpipe," did not act. The force of an external destiny works out its will upon an erring ignorant humanity, but no one has the thought of conquering this force by questioning it in order to co-operate with it.

The latter thought is the general conception that rules, however inarticulately, the life of to-day. When this conception of the accord of intelligence with the unknown forces becomes articulate, the new drama will, Maeterlinck tells us, be born, "a theatre of peace and of beauty without tears," for a "truly illumined consciousness has passions and desires infinitely less exacting, infinitely more pacific, more salutary, more abstract, and more generous than an unillumined consciousness."

The philosophy of our century discovers many and diverse attitudes taken toward the stripping off from nature by science of animistic intention and providence. It shows reluctant submission, pathetic and backward glancing wistfulness. It shows, too, strange insensitiveness to the profundity, the revolutionary character of this change. It shows elaborate devices to escape from the obvious impact of the movement of knowledge by proving, through an examination of the possibility and grounds of knowledge, that the facts gleaned by knowledge makes no difference to our traditional view of the world, because, after all, everything is consciousness. It shows evasions, flight, and refuge in some special fortress of super-empirical and unnatural knowledge, or of transcendental, over-individual will. Maeterlinck is not unique in truthful facing of the situation, but he is unique, I think, in the quality of inspired hope with which he welcomes the transformation; in the simplicity of his feeling that the idealism of man in his willingness to doubt, his courage to inquire, and his impulse—not to be denied—to kindness and justice, presents a fuller and richer idealism than the mythical and romantic idealizations of nature which have formed the substance of the dominant philosophies of the past. To this statement of the fundamental

and primary principle of his thought it remains to add two derived principles.

It is suggestive of the subterranean and devious paths by which in times of intellectual transition a new consensus of belief and unity of outlook are reached that one so aloof as is Maeterlinck from the technical philosophies of to-day should be concerned with the problem of the relation of instinct to consciousness, of passion and affection to deliberate reflective thought, and that he should have arrived at conclusions analogous to those which in the last decade have been formulated in the newest philosophic isms of the day. There are, he constantly tells us, two modes of intelligence: the intelligence of the species unconsciously recording and carrying the past history of the globe, and now unconsciously groping its way onward into a future; and the intelligence of the individual, conscious, deliberate, and reflective. Intellectual and moral sanity, happiness, depend upon the balance of these two forms. He might have used the words of Bergson: "Instinct finds, but does not search; reason searches, but cannot find"; adding, that since what we find is meaningless save as measured by searching, instinct and passion must be elevated into reason; while reason, in order to attain, must revert into unconscious attitude and vital impulse. Simply the exigencies of language lead us, says Maeterlinck, "to separate the thoughts of our brain from the passions and sentiments of our heart. Men imagine that passions, even the most generous, veil and trouble the clarity of thought. But when passion lessens and intelligence is clear, it has nothing to do; it functions in the void; it has no object." We have no claim to say we understand anything till it is impossible for us not to conform our lives to that thing, till, in short, it has become incorporate in our being, and reflective consciousness has passed into an enlarged and clarified instinct. Our thought is indeed the invincible flame of the blowpipe, but it is futile and lawless save as it plays upon the stuff of our impulses and passions to purge their dross, so as to leave the noble metal of character in just action. Morality, he says, even in its most limited sense, is the "logic and

inevitable subordination of things to the accomplishing of a general mission"; the part of conscious reason is to ensure the logical subordination, but instinct, the groping of universal nature within us, alone furnishes the general mission. Thought, he says, again, is never an exact picture of the conditions that produce it, but is the shadow of a struggle, like that of Jacob with the angel. Here, again, Maeterlinck may be a mystic, but a mystic of the intelligence, not of the obscuration that fears intelligence.

Compare the two following passages. First is the pæan of reflection, of conscious inquiry and conscious statement: "The invincible duty of a being is to be read in its distinguishing organs, those to which others are subordinated. It is written in our eyes, our ears, our nerves, our marrow, every lobe of our brain, in the nervous system, that man exists in order to transform all that we absorb of earthly things into a particular energy of a quality unique on this globe. I know of no other creature that has been fashioned to produce this strange fluid which we call thought, intelligence, understanding. Flame, heat, light, even life and instinct, more subtle than life, and most of the intangible energies that crowned the world before our coming, have paled in contact with the new effluence. Sometime, perhaps, it will reign in plenitude of power; meanwhile our only care is to give it all that it asks of us, to sacrifice for it whatever might retard its development. Let us nourish the flame on our feelings and passions, on all that we see and touch, on its own essence, that is, on the meaning it derives from the discoveries, experience, and observation that result from its every movement."

Compare with this glorification, which no rationalist, no intellectualist has ever exceeded, the following words, and the whole thought of Maeterlinck, in however bare outline, is before us: "We wrongly believe that because the harvest of life passes along the road of intelligence it has been gathered upon this road. Reason, which is the elder child of our intelligence, after having opened the subterranean doors behind which the vital and instinctive forces of our being sleep im-

prisoned, ought to seat itself on the threshold of our moral life. It waits there, lamp in hand, and its sole presence renders the threshold inaccessible to that which is not conformable to the nature of light. Beyond, in regions where its rays do not penetrate, the life of obscurity continues. Reason is not troubled thereby, rather it is rejoiced. It knows that in the eyes of the God which it desires, nothing—dream, thought, or act—that has not crossed its arcade of light can add or take away from the ideal being it forms. The duty of the flame is to be as clear, as extended as possible, and not to abandon its post. It does not hesitate even when nothing happens save the stir of lower instincts and of shades. But it happens that among the captives that wake, some more radiant than itself approach the entrance. They spread a light more immaterial, more diffuse, more incomprehensible than that of the firm and definite flame its hand protects. These forces are those of love, of unexplained good (or others even more infinite and mysterious), that demand passage. What is reason to do? If she is seated upon the threshold when she has not earned the right to be there, not having had the courage to learn that she is not alone in the world, she is troubled, she is afraid, she closes the doors—and if ever again she resolves to reopen them, she finds only a handful of dry ashes by the sombre steps. But if reason does not tremble (because, by all that it has not been able to learn, it has nevertheless learned that no light is dangerous, and that in the life of reason one can risk reason itself for greater clarity) ineffable exchanges take place, from lamp to lamp, upon the threshold. Drops of an unknown oil are mixed with the oil of human wisdom; and when the white strangers will have passed, the flame of reason's lamp will rise higher, more mighty and more pure, between the columns of a porch that has grown."

A third phase of Maeterlinck's thought I may term his invincible sense of the democracy of life and its experiences. All of our experiences, all the experiences of all men, are equally penetrated by the genuine and the infinite energies of nature. If we still call some hours and some men heroic,

noble, sublime, and others trivial, menial; if we still think and designate in terms of superiority and inferiority, it is because the ignorance of feudalism and the romance of mythology still weigh us down. Every step forward in intelligence leads us to recognition of the equitable and the common. In his own words:—

“The further we travel on the paths of existence, the more we believe in the truth, beauty, and depth of the humblest and most ordinary events of life. We learn to admire them just because they are so general, so uniform, so ordinary. We seek and we expect the extraordinary less and less, for we are beginning to recognise that the infantile demands of our own ignorance and vanity are the most extraordinary things in the vast peaceable and monotonous movement of nature. We do not any longer require hours in which strange and marvellous events occur, for marvellous events occur only to those who have not yet got confidence in themselves and in life. We are finally convinced that we can find the equivalent of heroism and of all that constitutes the sublime and the exceptional in the eyes of the feeble, the ignorant, and the anxious, in existence bravely and completely accepted. . . .”

Again, he says of Emerson (and it is a grateful thought that Maeterlinck has learned so much of Emerson): “For many the hour has come when they have grievous need of new explanations. Heroic hours are less apparent, those of abnegation have not returned. There remains for us only daily life, and yet we cannot live without greatness. Emerson has given an almost acceptable sense to this daily life that has no more its traditional horizons; he perhaps has been able to show us that it is strange, deep, and grand enough to have need of no other goal than itself. . . . We should live, all we who traverse the days and the years, without actions, without thoughts, without light, because our life, notwithstanding everything, is incomprehensible and divine. We should live because no one has the right to withdraw himself from the spiritual issues of commonplace deeds. Emerson is the sage of ordinary days, and ordinary days are in sum the substance of our being.”

Again, "Is it not an ancient error to suppose that when a violent passion possesses us we live our truest lives? I have come to believe that an old man seated in his armchair, waiting patiently with his light beside him, giving an unconscious ear to all the eternal laws that reign through his house, interpreting, without comprehending, the silence of doors and windows, and the quickening voice of the light, submitting with bent head to the presence of his soul and his destiny; an old man who is not aware that all the powers of this world, like so many servants, are mingling and keeping vigil in his room, who does not suspect that the sun itself suspends in space the little table on which he leans, and that every star in heaven and every fibre of the soul are concerned in the closing of an eyelid or the upspringing of a thought—I have come to believe that this old man, motionless as he is, yet lives in reality a deeper, more human and more universal life than the lover who strangles his mistress, the captain who conquers in battle, or the husband who avenges his 'honour.' "

This equality, that is, this equitable quality of experiences, underlies also all our conventional social distinctions. The thinker represents, indeed, individual intelligence, but the masses represent the enduring and pervasive intelligence of the race, more deeply seated in the past, more patiently and courageously engendering the future. "Men that do not think guard the hearth of the tribune; the others carry the torches about; and when the torch begins to waver in a rarefied air, it is wise to come back to the hearth. This hearth does not seem to change its place, but that is because it advances with the world itself, and its little flame marks the real hour of humanity. In truth, the thinker continues to think justly only when he does not lose contact with those who do not think. Every thought that passes with disdain over the great dumb group, every thought that does not recognise a thousand sisters, a thousand brothers asleep in the group, is usually only an accursed and sterile dream."

There is something almost comical in the fancy of Nietzsche that he represents a transvaluation of the conventional values

of the past. In spite of the noise of revolution in which he clothed himself, he repeats only the traditional ethics of the race. No matter what some of the professed codes of morals have professedly taught, the admirations and the efforts of men in the past have always centred about a contrast of superior and inferior, of over-men and under-men, of force and feebleness, of the exceptional and the ordinary. The admirations and the efforts of men have clung to these distinctions, because men isolating their individualities from their birth and destiny in nature inevitably have thought in egoistic terms, in terms of the exceptional and the extraordinary; and as were men's ideas, so were their admirations and their attempts. It has long been said that all men are equal in the presence of death; it was perhaps reserved for Emerson and for Maeterlinck to perceive that all men and all experiences are equal in the presence of life, and because of the presence in that life of nature that is uniform and equable in all its diversities. When one has transmuted the abstract ideas of science into working sentiments, the distinctions of higher and lower, of transcendental and empirical, of the great and the little, the heroic and the ordinary remain, as Maeterlinck has said, the only extraordinary and miraculous things—that is, the only infantile and foolish things. Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Maeterlinck are thus far, perhaps, the only men who have been habitually, and, as it were, instinctively, aware that democracy is neither a form of government nor a social expediency, but a metaphysic of the relation of man and his experience to nature: among these Maeterlinck has at least the advantage of greater illumination by the progress of natural science.

These three ideas seem to me, then, to form the substance of that general idea of the world which Maeterlinck tells us is the most significant thing about a man, or a generation, or a people. The natural kinship of man's intellectual and moral life with nature, naturalistically reported and accepted; the mutual interpretation of unconscious instinct, blind passion, and conscious luminous reason; the unfathomable and equable character of our immediate, ordinary, commonplace experi-

ences, so that our experience has no goal save itself—these ideas define his interpretation of life. I shall not pause to inquire whether ideas so restrained, so parsimonious, in comparison with the elaborate systems of historic philosophy, can be truly said to form a philosophy. At least they present one embodied, authentic instance in which the troubled disarray of idea and of sentiment has vanished; one case in which whole ideas, not half ideas, have been transformed into attitudes of mind and character having a serious influence upon our way of acting, of accepting life, of conceiving happiness. And only out of such transformed ideas can there emerge an enduring philosophy in the future.

4. HERBERT SPENCER¹

I do not know whether it may have occurred to any one else to associate the work of Émile Zola in fiction and of Herbert Spencer in philosophy. I find myself, however, mentally running together the careers of these two men, different as they were in surroundings, interests, aims, and personalities. The two somehow associate themselves in my mind, at least to such an extent that I find no words of my own so apt to characterize the larger features of the work of Herbert Spencer as these borrowed from the remarkable critical appreciation by Henry James of Émile Zola, published in the August, 1903, number of the *Atlantic Monthly*. Mr. James begins by referring to "the circumstance that, thirty years ago, a young man of extraordinary brain and indomitable purpose, wishing to give the measure of these endowments in a piece of work supremely solid, conceived and sat down to *Les Rougon-Macquart*, rather than to an equal task in physics, mathematics, politics, economics. He saw his undertaking, thanks to his patience and courage, practically to a close. . . . No finer act of courage and confidence, I think, is recorded in the history of letters. The critic in sympathy with him returns again and again to the great wonder of it, in which something so strange is mixed with something so august. Entertained and carried out almost from the threshold of manhood, the high project, the work of a lifetime, announces beforehand its inevitable weakness, and yet speaks in the same voice for its admirable, its almost unimaginable, strength."

With few verbal changes, this surely sets forth the case of Mr. Spencer; and in saying the word of criticism which must inevitably shadow all mortal attempts, I again find nothing

¹ From *The Philosophical Review*, March 1904; published under the title, *The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer*.

more appropriate than some further sentences of Mr. James. "It was the fortune, it was in a manner the doom, of Les Rougon-Macquart to deal with things almost always in gregarious form, to be a picture of *numbers*, of classes, crowds, confusions, movements. . . . The individual life is, if not wholly absent, reflected in coarse and common, in generalized terms; whereby we arrive . . . at the circumstance that, looking out somewhere, and often woefully athirst, for the taste of finesse, we find it not in the fruits of our author's fancy, but in a different matter altogether. We get it in the very history of his effort, the image itself of his lifelong process, comparatively so personal, so spiritual even . . . through all its patience and pain."

The point that seems to me so significant (and, indeed, so absolutely necessary to take into the reckoning), when we balance accounts with the intellectual work of Mr. Spencer, is this sitting down to achieve a preconceived idea,—an idea, moreover, of a synthetic, deductive rendering of all that is in the Universe. The point stands forth in all its simplicity and daring every time we open our *First Principles*. We find there republished the prospectus of 1860, the program of the entire Synthetic Philosophy. And the more we compare the achievement with the announcement, the more we are struck with the way in which the whole scheme stands complete, detached, able to go alone from the very start.

Spencer and his readers are committed in advance to a definitely wrought out, a rounded and closed interpretation of the universe. Further discovery and intercourse are not to count; it remains only to fill in the *cadres*. Successive volumes are outlined; distinctive sections of each set forth. All the fundamental generalizations are at hand, which are to apply to *all* regions of the Universe with the exception of inorganic nature, attention being especially called to this exception as a gap unavoidable but regrettable. There is but one thing more extraordinary than the conception which this program embodies: the fact that it is carried out. We are so accustomed to what we call systems of philosophy; the "systems"

of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, that I suspect we do not quite grasp the full significance of such a project as this of Mr. Spencer's. The other systems are such after all more or less *ex post facto*. In themselves they have the unity of the *development* of a single mind, rather than of a predestined *planned achievement*. They are systems somewhat in and through retrospect. Their completeness owes something to the mind of the onlooker gathering together parts which have grown up more or less separately and in response to felt occasions, to particular problems. Our reflection helps bind their parts into one aggregate whole. But Spencer's system was a system from the very start. It was a system in conception, not merely in issue. It was one by the volition of its author, complete, compact, coherent, not in virtue of a single personality which by ways mainly unconscious continually and restlessly reattempts to attain to some worthy and effective embodiment of itself. We are almost inclined to believe in the identification of conscious will with physical force as we follow the steady, unchanging momentum of Spencer's thought.

It is this fore-thought, fore-closed scheme which makes so ominous that phrase of James to the effect that "the high project announces beforehand its inevitable weakness." It is this which makes so unavoidable the appropriation of the phrase regarding absence of the *individual* life. It is this fact which gives jurisdiction to the further remark that "vision and opportunity reside in a personal sense, and in a personal history, and no shortcut to them has ever been discovered." It is this same fact that moves me to transfer to Spencer a further phrase, that the work went on in "the region that I qualify as that of experience by imitation." It may seem harsh to say Spencer occupies himself in any such way as to justify the phrase "experience by imitation." Or, on the other hand, one may say, however the case stands in arts and letters, that in philosophy one must performe work in and with a region of experience which it is but praise to call "experience by imitation," since it is experience depersonalized, from which the qualities of individual contact and career, with their accidents

of circumstance, and corresponding emotional entanglements, have been intentionally shut out. But whether one regard the phrase as harsh, or as defining an indispensable trait of all philosophizing, it remains true that one who announces in advance a system in all its characteristic conceptions and applications has discounted, in a way which is awful in its augustness, all individual contingencies, all accidents of time and place, personal surroundings and personal intercourse, and has made impossible new ideas from new contacts and new expansions of life. It is upon the revelations that arise from the eternal mixture of voluntary endeavor with the unplanned, the unexpected, that most of us learn to depend for shaping thought and directing intellectual movement. We hang upon experience as it comes, not alone upon experience as already formulated, into which we can enter by "imitation." To assure to the world a comprehensive system of the universe, in a way which precludes further development and shapings of this personal sort, is a piece of intellectual audacity of the most commanding sort. It is this extraordinary objectivity of Spencer's work, this hitherto unheard of elimination of the individual and the subjective, which gives his philosophy its identity, which marks it off from other philosophic projects, and is the source at once of its power and of its "inevitable weakness."

The austere devotion, the singleness, simplicity, and straightforwardness of Spencer's own life, and its seclusion, its remoteness, its singular immunity from all intellectual contagion, are chapters in the same story. Here, we may well believe, is the revenge of nature. The element of individual life so lacking in the philosophy, both in its content and in its style, is the thing that strikes us in the history of Spencer's personal effort. No system, after all, has ever been more thoroughly conditioned by the intellectual and moral personality of its author. The impersonal content of the system is the register of the personal separation of its author from vital participation in the moving currents of history.

The seclusion and isolation necessary to a system like Spen-

cer's appear from whatever angle we approach him. Doubtless his autobiography will put us in possession of one of the most remarkable educational documents the world has yet seen. But even without this, we know that his intellectual life was early formed in a certain remoteness. The relative absence of the social element in his education, and his own later conscious predilection for non-institutionalized instruction, for education of the tutorial sort apart from schools and classes, at once constitute and reflect his aloofness from the ordinary give and take processes of development. The lack of university associations is another mark on the score. The lack of knowledge of ancient languages and comparative ignorance of modern languages and literature have to be reckoned with. Nor was Spencer (in this unlike Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and John Mill) a man of affairs, one who continually renewed the region of "experience by imitation," of formulated knowledge, by engaging in those complications of life which force a man to re-think, re-feel, and re-choose; to have, in a word, first-hand experience. It would be hard to find another intellect of first class rank so devoid of historical sense and interest as was Spencer's; incredible as is this fact taken alongside authorship of a system of evolution! Certainly the world may wait long for another example of a man who dares to conceive and has the courage and energy to execute a system of philosophy, in almost total ignorance of the entire history of thought. We have got so used to it that we hardly pause, when we read such statements as that of Spencer, that after reading the first few pages of Kant's *Critique* he laid the book down. "Twice since then the same thing has happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal purposes of a work I can go no further."

It is not Spencer's ignorance to which I am calling attention. Much less am I blaming him for his failure to run hither and yon through the fields of thought; there is something almost refreshing, in these days of subjugation by the mere overwhelming mass of learning, in the naïve and virgin attitude of Spencer. What I am trying to point out is the absence in

Spencer of any interest in the history of human ideas and of acts prompted by them, considered simply as history,—as affairs of personal initiation, discovery, experimentation, and struggle. His insulation from the intellectual currents of the ages as moving processes (apart, that is, from their impersonal and factual deposit in the form of “science”) is the mirror of the secludedness of his early education, and of his entire later personal life. I do not think it necessary to apologize even for referring to the little device by which, when wearied of conversation, he closed his ears and made himself deaf to what was going on about him. There are not two facts here, but only one. His isolation was necessary in carrying out his gigantic task, not merely as a convenience for securing the necessary leisure, protection against encroachment, and the nursing of inadequate physical strength against great odds; it was an organic precondition of any project which assigns the universe to volumes in advance, and then proceeds steadily, irresistibly, to fill them up chapter by chapter. Such work is possible only when one is immune against the changing play of ideas, the maze of points of view, the cross-currents of interests, which characterize the world historically viewed,—seen in process as an essentially moving thing.

We have to reckon with the apparent paradox of Spencer’s rationalistic, deductive, systematic habit of mind over against all the traditions of English thought. How could one who thought himself the philosopher of experience *par excellence*, revive, under the name of a “universal postulate,” the fundamental conception of the formal rationalism of the Cartesian school, which even the philosophers whom Spencer despised as purely *a priori*, had, under the attacks of Kant (whom Spencer to his last day regarded as a sort of belated supernaturalist), found it necessary, long since to abandon? It is too obvious to need mention that Spencer is in all respects a thoroughgoing Englishman,—indeed what, without disrespect and even with admiration, we may term a “Britisher.” But how could the empirical and inductive habit of the English mind so abruptly, so thoroughly, without any shadow of hesitation or

touch of reserve, cast itself in a system whose professed aim was to deduce all the phenomena of life, mind, and society from a single formula regarding the redistribution of matter and motion?

Here we come within sight of the problem of the technical origins and structure of Spencer's philosophy, a problem, however, which may still be approached from the standpoint of Spencer's own personal development. We must not forget that Spencer was by his environment and education initiated into all the characteristic tenets of English political and social liberalism, with their individualistic connotations. It is significant that Spencer's earliest literary contribution,—written at the age of twenty-two,—was upon the proper sphere of government, and was intended (I speak only from second-hand information, never having seen the pamphlet) to show the restrictions upon governmental action required in the interests of the individual. I know no more striking tribute to the thoroughness and success with which earlier English philosophic thought did its work than the fact that Spencer was completely saturated with, and possessed by, the characteristic traditions of this individualistic philosophy, simply, so to speak, by absorption, by respiration of the intellectual atmosphere, with a minimum of study and reflective acquaintance with the classic texts of Hobbes, Hume, and (above all) John Locke. So far as we can tell, Spencer's ignorance of the previous history of philosophy extended in considerable measure even to his own philosophic ancestry; and I am inclined to believe that even such reading as he did of his predecessors left him still with a delightful unconsciousness that in them were the origin and kin of his own thought. The solid body and substantiality of Spencer's individualism is made not less but more comprehensible on the supposition that it came to him not through conscious reading and personal study, but through daily drafts upon his intellectual environment; the results being so unconsciously and involuntarily wrought into the fibre of his being that they became with him an instinct rather than a reflection or theory.

It is this complete incorporation of the results of prior individualistic philosophy, accompanied by total unconsciousness that anything was involved in the way of philosophic preliminaries or presuppositions, which freed Spencer from the lurking scepticism regarding systems and deductive syntheses which permeate the work of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and John Stuart Mill. It was this thoroughgoing unconscious absorption that gave him a confident, aggressive, dogmatic individualism,—which enabled him to employ individualism as a deductive instrument, instead of as a point of view useful in the main for criticising undue intellectual pretensions, and for keeping the ground cleared for inductive, empirical inquiries. The eighteenth century, indeed, exhibits to us the transformation of the sceptically colored individualism of the seventeenth century, taking effect mainly in a theory of the nature and limits of human knowledge, and employed most effectively to get rid of dogma in philosophy, theology, and politics,—the transformation of this, I say, into an individualism which aims at social reform, and thereby becomes positive, constructive, rationalistic, optimistic.

Spencer is the heir not of the psychological individualism of Locke direct, but of this individualism after exportation to and reimportation from France. It was the individualism of the French Encyclopedist, with its unwavering faith in progress, in the ultimate perfection of humanity, and in "nature" as everywhere beneficently working out this destiny, if only it can be freed from trammels of Church and State, which in Spencer mingles with generalizations of science, and is thereby reawakened to new life. Seen in this way, there is no breach of continuity. The paradox disappears. Spencer's work imposes itself upon us all precisely because it so remarkably carries over the net result of that individualism which (contend against it as we may) represents the fine achievement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It preserves it in the only way in which it could be preserved, by carrying it over, by translating it into the organic, the systematic, the universal terms which report the presence of the nineteenth century

spirit. And if a certain constitutional incoherency results, if the compound of individualism and organicism shows cleavages of fundamental contradictions, none the less without this restatement the old would have been lost, and a certain thinness and remoteness would characterize the new. The earlier and more thorough-going formulations of the organic standpoint in post-Kantian thought were, and had to remain, transcendental (in the popular, if not technical sense of the term) in language and idea just because the expression, though logically more adequate, was socially and psychologically premature. It did not and could not at once take up into itself the habits of thought and feeling characteristic of earlier individualism and domesticate them in the social and moral attitude of the modern man.

In the struggle of adjustment, Spencer is without a rival as a mediator, a vehicle of communication, a translator. It is, as we shall see, the successful way in which he exercises this function that gives him his hold upon the culture of our day, and which makes his image stand out so imposingly that to many he is not one creator with many others of the theory of evolution, but its own concrete incarnation. In support of the idea that Spencer's work was essentially that of carrying over the net earlier social and ethical individualism into the more organic conceptions characteristic of the nineteenth century science and action, we can here only refer to the *Social Statics* of 1850,—this being in my judgment one of the most remarkable documents, from the standpoint of tracing the origins of an intellectual development, ever produced. This book shows with considerable detail the individualistic method of the English theory of knowledge in process of transformation into something which is no longer a method of regulating belief, but is an attained belief in a method of action, and hence itself a substantial first principle, an axiom, an indisputable, absolute truth, having within itself substantial resources which may in due order—that is, by use of a deductive method—be delivered and made patent. It shows the individualistic creed dominant, militant; no longer a principle of criti-

cism, but of reform and construction in social life, and, therefore, of necessity a formula of construction in the intellectual sphere. In this document, the world-formula of "evolution" of later philosophy appears as the social formula of "progress." It repeats as an article of implicit faith the creed of revolutionary liberalism in the indefinite perfectibility of mankind. "Man has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation, and the belief in human perfectibility merely amounts to the belief that in virtue of these processes, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life. Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity."

In this characteristic sentence we have already present the conception: first, of evolution; second, of the goal of the evolution as adaption of human life to certain conditions beyond itself; and third (although implicitly—the notion, however, being made explicit in other portions of the same book), the conception that it is the conditions to which life is to be adapted which are the causally operating forces in bringing about the adaptation, and hence the progress. The "organism" of the Synthetic Philosophy is the projection of the individual man of the thought of 1850. The "environment" of the latter system appears in the earlier sketch as "conditions of life." The "evolution" of later systematic philosophy is the "progress" figuring in the early social creed as the continual adaptation of human life to the necessities of its outward conditions. In all, and through all, runs the idea of "nature,"—that nature to which the social and philosophical reformation of the eighteenth century appealed with such unhesitating and sublime faith. Load down the formula by filling "nature" with the concrete results of physical and biological science, and the transformation scene is complete. The years between 1850 and 1862 (the date of the *First Principles*) are the record of this loading. "Nature" never parts with its eighteenth century function of effecting approximation to a goal of ultimate perfection and happiness, but nature no longer proffers itself as a pious reminiscence of the golden age of Rousseau, or a prophetic inspiration of the millennium of Condorcet, but as that

most substantial, most real of all forces guaranteed and revealed to us at every turn by the advance of scientific inquiry. And "science" is in turn but the concrete rendering of the "reason" of the Enlightenment.

Spencer's faith in this particular article of the creed never faltered. Eighteenth-century liberalism, after the time of Rousseau, was perfectly sure that the only obstacles to the fulfillment of the beneficent purpose of nature in effecting perfection have their source in institutions of state and church, which, partly because of ignorance, and partly because of the selfishness of rulers and priests, have temporarily obstructed the fulfillment of nature's benign aims. The *laissez-faire* theory and its extreme typical expression, anarchism, did not originate in the accidents of commercial life, much less in the selfish designs of the trading class to increase its wares at the expense of other sections of society. Whether right or wrong, whether for good or for evil, it took its origin from profound philosophical conceptions: the belief in nature as a mighty force, and in reason as having only to coöperate with nature, instead of thwarting it with its own petty, voluntary devices, for it to usher in the era of unhindered progress.

Spencer's insistent and persistent opposition to the extension of the sphere of governmental action beyond that of police duty, preventing the encroachment of one individual upon another, goes back to this same sublime faith in nature. The goal of evolution of Spencer's ethics, the perfect individual adapted to the perfect state of society, is but the enlarged projection of the ideal of a fraternal society, which made its way into the *Social Statics* from the same creed of revolutionary liberalism. His "Absolute Ethics," deductively derived from a first law of life, has in its origin nothing to do with science, but everything to do with the reason and nature of the Enlightenment. It has, of course, been often enough pointed out that the main features of Spencer's later ethics were already well along before he came to that conception of evolution upon which his sociology and ethics are professedly based. This point has, however, generally been employed as a mode of casting sus-

picion upon the content of his moral system, suggesting that after all it has no very intimate connection with the theory of evolution as such. But I am not aware that attention has been called to this converse fact of greater moment: that Spencer's entire evolutionary conception and scheme is but the projection upon the cosmic screen of the spectrum of the buoyant *a priori* ideals of the later eighteenth century liberalism.

Certain essays, now mostly reprinted in three volumes, entitled *Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, put before our eyes the links of the transformation, the instruments of the projection. We may refer particularly to the essays on "Progress: Its law and Cause," "Transcendental Physiology" (both dated 1857); "The Genesis of Science" (1854), and "The Nebular Hypothesis" (1858), together with "The Social Organism" (1860). What we find exposed in these essays is the increasingly definite and solid body of scientific particulars and generalizations, getting themselves read into the political and social formula, and thereby effecting transformation into the system outlined by the prospectus of 1860. This fusion is, indeed, already foreshadowed in the *Social Statics* itself.

This is not the time or place to go into detail, but I think I am well within the bonds of verifiable statement when I say that Spencer's final system of philosophy took shape through his bringing into intimate connection with each other the dominating conception of social progress, inherited from the Enlightenment, certain larger generalizations of physiology (particularly that of growth as change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and of "physiological division of labor" with accompanying interdependence of parts) and the idea of cosmic change derived from astronomy and geology,—particularly as formulated under the name of the nebular hypothesis. Social philosophy furnished the fundamental ideals and ideas; biological statements provided the defining and formulating elements necessary to put these vague and pervasive ideals into something like scientific shape; while the physical-astronomic speculations furnished the causal, efficient machinery requisite for getting the scheme under way, and supplied still more of

the appearance of scientific definiteness and accuracy. Such, at least, is my systematic formula of the origin of the Spencerian system.¹

We are now, I think, in a position not only to understand the independence of Spencer's and Darwin's work in relation to each other, but the significance of this independence. Because Spencer's thought descended from the social and political philosophy of the eighteenth century (which in turn was a rendering of a still more technical philosophy), and employed the conceptions thus derived to assimilate and organize the generalized conceptions of geology and biology, it needed no particular aid from the specialized order of scientific methods and considerations which control the work of Darwin. But it was a tremendous piece of luck for both the Darwinian and Spencerian theories that they happened so nearly to coincide in the time of their promulgation. Each got the benefit not merely of the disturbance and agitation aroused by the other, but of psychological and logical reinforcement, as each blended into and fused with the other in the minds of readers and students. It is an interesting though hopeless speculation to wonder what the particular fate of either would have been, if it had lacked this backing up at its own weak point, a support all the more effective because it was so surprisingly unplanned,—because each in itself sprang out of, and applied to, such different orders of thought and fact.

This explains, in turn, the identification of the very idea of "evolution," with the name of Spencer. The days are gone by when it was necessary to iterate that the conception of evolution is no new thing. We know that upon the side of the larger philosophic generalizations, as well as upon that of definite and detailed scientific considerations, evolution has an ancient ancestry. From the time of the Greeks, when philosophy and science were one, to the days of Kant, Goethe, and Hegel, on one side, and of Lamarck and the author of *The Vestiges of Creation*, on the other, the idea of evolution has never been without its own vogue and career. The idea is too closely akin

¹ See note at end of this essay.—Ed.

both to the processes of human thinking and to the obvious facts of life not to have always some representative in man's schemes of the universe. How, then, are we to account for the peculiar, the unique position occupied by Spencer? Is this thorough-going identification in the popular mind of Spencer's system with the very idea and name of evolution an illusion of ignorance? I think not. So massive and pervasive an imposition of itself is accountable for only in positive terms. The genesis of Spencer's system in a fusion of scientific notions and philosophic considerations gives the system its actual hold, and also legitimates it.

Spencer's work is rightfully entitled to the place it occupies in the popular imagination. Philosophy is naturally and properly technical and remote from the mass of mankind, save as it takes shape in social and political philosophy,—in a theory of conduct which, being more than individual, serves as a principle of criticism and reform in corporate affairs and community welfare. But even social and political philosophy remain more or less speculative, romantic, Utopian, or "ideal," when couched merely in terms of a program of criticism and reconstruction; only "science" can give it body. Again, the specializations of science are naturally and properly remote and technical to the interests of the mass of mankind. When we have said they are specialized, we have described them. But to employ the mass of scientific material, the received code of scientific formulations, to give weight and substance to philosophical ideas which are already operative, is an achievement of the very first order. Spencer took two sets of ideas, in themselves abstract and isolated, and by their fusion put them in a shape where their net result became available for the common consciousness. By such a fusion Spencer provided a language, a formulation, an imagery, of a reasonable and familiar kind to the masses of mankind for ideas of the utmost importance, and for ideas which, without such amalgamation, must have remained out of reach.

Even they who—like myself—are so impressed with the

work of the philosophers of Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century as to believe that they have furnished ideas which in the long run are more luminous, more fruitful, possessed of more organizing power, than those which Spencer has made current, must yet remember that the work of German philosophy is done in an outlandish and alien vocabulary. Now, this is not a mere incident of the use of language,—as if a man happened to choose to speak in Greek rather than in French. The very technicality of the vocabulary means that the ideas used are not as yet naturalized in the common consciousness of man. The “transcendental” character of such philosophy is not an inherent, eternal characteristic of its subject-matter, but is a sign and exponent that the values dealt in are not yet thoroughly at home in human experience, have not yet found themselves in ordinary social life and popular science, are not yet working terms justifying themselves by daily applications.

Spencer furnished the common consciousness of his day with terms and images so that it could appropriate to its ordinary use in matters of “life, mind, and society,” the most fundamental generalizations which had been worked out in the abstract regions of *both* philosophy and science. He did *this* even though he failed to deduce “life, mind, and society” from a single formula regarding “force.” This is a work great enough for any man,—even though we are compelled to add that the gross obviousness with which it was done shows that Spencer after all measured up to the level of the intellectual life of his time rather than, through sympathy with more individualized and germinal forces, initiated a new movement. Here, again, Spencer’s own aloofness, his own deliberate, self-seclusion counts. Spencer is a monument, but, like all monuments, he commemorates the past. He presents the achieved culmination of ideas already in overt and external operation. He winds up an old dispensation. Here is the secret of his astounding success, of the way in which he has so thoroughly imposed his idea that even non-Spencerians must talk in his

terms and adjust their problems to his statements. And here also is his inevitable weakness. Only a system which formulates the accomplished can possibly be conceived and announced in advance.

Any deductive system means by the necessity of the case the organization of a vast amount of material in such a way as to dispose of it. The system *seems* to fix the limits of all further effort, to define its aims and to assign its methods. But this is an illusion of the moment. In reality this wholesale disposal of material clears the ground for new, untried initiatives. It furnishes capital for hitherto unthought of speculations. Its deductive finalities turn out but ships of adventure to voyage on undiscovered seas.

To speak less metaphorically, Spencer's conception of evolution was always a confined and bounded one. Since his "environment" was but the translation of the "nature" of the metaphysicians, its workings had a fixed origin, a fixed quality, and a fixed goal. Evolution still tends in the minds of Spencer's contemporaries to "a single, far-off divine event,"—to a finality, a fixity. Somehow, there are fixed laws and forces (summed up under the name "environment") which control the movement, which keep it pushing on in a definite fashion to a certain end. Backwards, there is found a picture of the time when all this was set agoing, when the homogeneous began to differentiate. If evolution is conceived of as in and of itself *constant*, it is yet evolution by cycles,—a never-ending series of departures from, and returns to, a fixed point. I doubt not the time is coming when it will be seen that whatever all this is, it is *not* evolution. A thoroughgoing evolution must by the nature of the case abolish all fixed limits, beginnings, origins, forces, laws, goals. If there be evolution, then all these also evolve, and are what they are as points of origin and of destination relative to some special portion of evolution. They are to be defined in terms of the process, the process that now and always is, not the process in terms of them. But the transfer from the world of set external facts and of fixed ideal values to the world of free, mobile, self-developing, and self-organizing

reality would be unthinkable and impossible were it not for the work of Spencer, which, shot all through as it is with contradictions, thereby all the more effectually served the purpose of a medium of transition from the fixed to the moving. A fixed world, a world of movement between fixed limits, a moving world, such is the order.

Note: If our main interest here were in the history of thought, it would be interesting to note the dependence of the development of Spencer's thought, as respects the second of the above factors, upon factors due to the post-Kantian philosophy of Germany. I can only refer in passing to some pages of the *Social Statics* (255 to 261), in which, after making the significant statement that "morality is essentially one with physical truth—is, in fact, a species of transcendental physiology," he refers in support of his doctrine to "a theory of life developed by Coleridge." This theory is that of tendency towards individuation, conjoined with increase of mutual dependence,—a fundamental notion, of course, of Schelling. An equally significant foot-note (page 256) tells us that it was in 1864, while writing "The Classification of the Sciences," that Spencer himself realized that this truth has to do with "a trait of all evolving things, inorganic as well as organic." In his essay on "Transcendental Physiology," Spencer refers to the importance of carrying over distinctions first observed in society into physiological terms, so that they become points of view for interpretation and explanation there. The conception also dominates the essay on "The Social Organism." In fact, he makes use of the idea of division of labor, originally worked out in political economy, in his biological speculations, and then in his cosmological, in very much the same way in which Darwin borrowed the Malthusian doctrine of population. The social idea first found biological form for itself, and then was projected into cosmological terms. I have no doubt that this represents the general course of Spencer's ideas. In the essay on "Progress," Spencer specifically refers to the law of the evolution of the individual organism as established "by the Germans—the investigations of Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer." The law referred to here is that development consists in advance from homogeneity to heterogeneity. He there transfers it from the life history of the individual organism to the record of all life; while, in the same essay, he expressly states that, if the nebular hypothesis could be established, then we should have a single formula for the universe as a whole, inorganic as well as organic. And upon page 36 he speaks of that "which determines progress of every kind—astronomic, geologic, organic, ethnological, social, economic, artistic."

One need only turn to some of the methodological writings of Spencer to see how conscious he was of the method which I have attributed to him. The little essay entitled "An Element in Method," and certain portions of his essay entitled, "Professor Tait on the Formula of Evolution," are particularly significant. The latter indicates the necessity of making a synthesis of deductive reasoning, as exhibited in mathematical physics, with the inductive empiricism characteristic of the biological sciences; and charges both physicist and zoölogist with one-sidedness. The former essay indicates that, in forming any generalization which is to be used for deductive purposes, we ought to take independent groups of phenomena which appear un-

allied, and which certainly are very remote from each other. I am inclined to think that Spencer's method of taking groups of facts, apparently wholly unlike each other, such as those of the formation of solar systems, on one side, and facts of present social life, on the other, with a view to discovering what he calls "some common trait," has, indeed, more value for philosophic method than is generally recognised. In a way, he has himself justified the method, since his Synthetic Philosophy is, speaking from the side of method, precisely this sort of thing, astronomy and sociology forming the extremes, and biology the mean term. But, of course, Spencer's erection of the "common trait" into a force, or law, or cause, which can immediately be used deductively to explain other things, is quite another matter from this heuristic or methodological value. But this note has already spun itself out too long.

5. IMMANUEL KANT¹

A colleague of mine once suggested that old books, philosophic classics, be sent out by philosophic journals for review, to be criticised as if they had just issued from the press. The device would be notable, if it could be acted upon, for bringing to light whatever in the book has stood the test of time as well as whatever is found congenial to contemporary taste and style. The two hundredth anniversary of the birth of Kant, falling in the month of April, suggests application of this method to the thinker who for the past seventy-five years supplied the bible of German thought. It also, however, suggests the difficulty of the task. Most philosophers since the days of the lucky early Greeks have been burdened by the weight of previous writers and the seeming need of carrying their technical apparatus. But no other philosopher has assumed the burden as conscientiously as did Kant. He is so fraught with reminiscence of every other philosopher he has ever read that one is tempted to adopt the statement of an undergraduate who, when asked for the point of interest in Kant, replied that the only interesting thing was how he ever came to be.

There are thinkers full of ancestral piety, and there are thinkers who to themselves at least seem to care nothing for the past, in their eagerness to make a fresh start. It was the fate of Kant, whether fortunately or tragically, to unite the two dispositions in himself. As far as his conscious attitude toward the bases of past thought were concerned, he could hardly have objected to the epithet, given him by his contemporaries, of the "all-destroying"; although he would certainly have added that he had destroyed only to rebuild on surer foundations. But at the same time almost every sentence he

¹ From *The New Republic*, April 30, 1924; published under the title, *Kant After Two Hundred Years*.

ever wrote is charged with reminders of previous thought. These reminiscences form his vocabulary. This is one reason why a whole library of technical commentaries has been written about Kant. But they also affect his way of looking at the world, and his sense of the problems and issues of philosophy—as vocabularies are likely to do. Sometimes one wonders if Kant ever looked a fact of life or nature directly in the face, or in any other way than through the medium of what previous thinkers had said and thought about it. I do not mean that Kant was peculiar in this respect. Philosophers like other professionals and specialists get caught in the intellectual machinery they are operating. Intellectual preparation is indispensable; then it seizes hold of us, and what was to have been a means of direct vision and interpretation becomes an end in itself.

But while Kant was not unique in this respect, he was preëminent. His period was not one of great historical sense; Kant could hardly be expected to have employed a historical method of interpretation. He used the distinctions with which his acquaintance with historical schemes made him familiar; even when he radically changed their meaning he preserved a terminology sanctioned by traditional usage—as for example in his taking over the Aristotelian and scholastic matter and form. He was extraordinarily sensitive to the ideas of every author he studied. He responded to Hume, Shaftesbury, Burke, and Rousseau as well as to thinkers with whom he was congenitally much more sympathetic. To raw experience, to experience in mass, he was remarkably insensitive. Even his marked proclivities for social and political reform in the direction of republican freedom and equality, seem to be conditioned by his intellectual response to Rousseau and other writers, rather than to be a direct response to what was going on about him.

At the same time, he gave a new turn to philosophical thinking; there is no doubt about that. He put an end to the old attempt to reach conclusions about matters of existence, whether soul, external nature or God, by mathematical and

conceptual reasoning. The reasons he proffered have been punctured by modern mathematicians, but the result remains—that concrete experience, not logical conceptions by themselves warrant statements about matters of existence. At the same time, he shattered traditional empiricism by showing that the sensations upon which it depended require thought to get anywhere. All this part of his undertaking is, however, somewhat technical and professional. The significant human thing is that he made these changes in the interest of a system of belief which would give mechanical science, conceived after the Newtonian pattern, complete sway in all matters of fact, in all matters whatsoever where thinking has a claim to intervene; while he reserved a higher ideal realm with which man's moral and religious interests are concerned, a realm where science has no business to enter and where it could say nothing. This was his great achievement: demarcation of two realms, one of mechanical science, the other of moral freedom and faith, connected yet independent, one beginning at the boundaries of the other.

Thus Kant to himself and to many in his own day was a revolutionary. There is no valid intellectual access, he taught, to the things of ultimate importance to man, the things with which traditional philosophy had been preoccupied, God, the soul, immortality, even the universe as an objective single whole. From this standpoint, all previous philosophy had been on the wrong track; it had been attempting the impossible. But the criticism which proved this conclusion, also proved, it seemed to Kant, the existence of a realm beyond scientific knowledge, a realm of whose being we are assured beyond peradventure by the necessities of moral experience. Nevertheless in his criticisms and constructions he worked with the distinctions, terms and issues of traditional philosophy. He reassorted them to make a new pattern; but he did not draw inspiration from a new and fresh personal partaking in the ultimate sources of new ideas—the realities of first-hand experience. See, he says in effect, the intellectual pieces with which past philosophers were occupied; see how these pieces

never fitted together into a world-picture, except with the aid of deep-seated optical illusions. Now put them together in my way, according to my directions, and see how thoroughly and coherently they dovetail into a single picture.

The outcome of Kant's combination of piety toward the old with revolutionary intent was doubtless fortunate for his reputation, and for the influence of his writings for the last century, to an enormous extent in his own country and to some extent throughout the world. Yet it has a tragic phase. Solving a problem by dividing things, putting them in different places where they cannot conflict because they do not touch, is a dangerous procedure. It was a great comfort to many to know they could be as scientific and as mechanistically scientific as they desired in the realm of phenomena, and yet retain intact a superior world of ideal values in which freedom, instead of mechanical necessity, reigned. But the price paid for the comfort was unduly high. Science in such a régime becomes a technical occupation of an intellectual class; it is barren in morals, where fertilization by science is most needed, fruitful only in material appliances and machines used in the material sphere for mundane ends where the world is already too much with us. Morals become an affair of formulas, often sublime in themselves, but without possibility of effective translation, intellectual or practical, into the affairs of the workaday world.

In general, the intellectual problem of Europe since the sixteenth century has been the conflict between inherited traditions and the results and methods of a new science. Even the man in the street is sometimes aware of this conflict, as in the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the churches. But every philosopher has been confronted on some level of thought with the question.

The theories of the western world, outside of science and industry, are inherited from a spiritual idealism formulated in ancient Greece and taken over by the Christian church in the teachings of the fathers and the schoolmen. But the conceptions of science have seemed to point to a very different kind

of world from that depicted in this philosophy. Yet the emotional, religious and moral life of the European world—of which of course America is culturally a part—and to a large extent its artistic activities and achievements, have been deeply intertwined with the view of nature and life which science appears to have discredited.

In some form or other every philosopher from Descartes to Comte, Spencer and Bergson has published a variant version of the terms upon which the tradition incarnate in the higher forms of western life and the new science can meet and get on together:—schemes of reconciliation, of attack by one side upon the other, of compromises with varying degrees of surrender, imposed on this side or that.

Kant sensitively felt the problem and valiantly wrought to solve it. But to many of us it seems increasingly clear that his methods and conclusions only postponed a vital and sincere facing of the question. A destructive revolutionary to many of his contemporaries, he now seems almost wholly on the side of the conservatives. What was revolutionary was largely a professional and technical matter, a transfer of certain issues and ideas from cosmic nature into human nature; it left the mind with no genuinely new ideas with which to meet and confront the predicaments of experience. It did not help men to use science in morals. The transfer was one of those intellectual tours de force that delight professional intellectuals and call out warm adherence and equally ardent opposition.

But the net human outcome was hardly more than a complete separation of the world of ideals and of facts, of moral practice and scientific knowledge, of aspirations and of necessities. Doubtless they had been almost hopelessly confused previously in their relations to each other. Certainly the place and office of each in experience and its relations to the other needed clearing up. But it may be questioned whether confusion is not a more hopeful condition than clear-cut and wholesale separation. Confusion at least implies intersection, and a connection which might render coöperation possible.

Separation surrenders the concrete world of affairs to the domain of mechanism fatalistically understood; it encourages mechanical authority and mechanical obedience and discipline; while it sheds over a life built out of mechanical subordinations the aureole of a superworldly ideal, sentimental at best, fanatical and deadly at worst. Kant himself was truly a pious, honest and good soul, substantial to a degree. But the record of his influence and its consequences may cause one to wonder whether these qualities, even when combined with industrious learning and assiduous reflection, can compensate for the absence of that kind of intelligence which emerges only when a thinker is a first-hand partaker in the vital intellectual currents and issues of his own day—I do not say in its practical movements. Without knowledge of what has been said and thought, intellectual participation will not go far or deep. But Kant and the countless tomes written about him, stand a monument to the evil of that too professional and technical intellectual preoccupation which can see the world only at second-hand through problems which the past has formulated, through distinctions which dead thinkers have elaborated. An intellectual revolution is not of necessity a good thing; but a professed revolution compromised from the outset by subjection to the old and traditional is pretty assuredly a bad thing. A revolution in tradition that after all stays within the bounds of tradition is a boon to men who wish to be modern and conservative at the same time; who want to be both scientific and also idealistic in the ways sanctioned by the past. But it only postpones the day of reckoning. It is possible that the Great War was in some true sense a day of reckoning for Kantian thought, and that from henceforth interest in him will openly become more and more anti-quarian in nature.

6. RALPH WALDO EMERSON¹

It is said that Emerson is not a philosopher. I find this denegation false or true according as it is said in blame or praise—according to the reasons proffered. When the critic writes of lack of method, of the absence of continuity, of coherent logic, and, with the old story of the string of pearls loosely strung, puts Emerson away as a writer of maxims and proverbs, a recorder of brilliant insights and abrupt aphorisms, the critic, to my mind, but writes down his own incapacity to follow a logic that is finely wrought. “We want in every man a logic; we cannot pardon the absence of it, but it must not be spoken. Logic is the procession or proportionate unfolding of the intuition; but its virtue is as silent method; the moment it would appear as propositions and have a separate value, it is worthless.” Emerson fulfills his own requisition. The critic needs the method separately propounded, and not finding his wonted leading-string is all lost. Again, says Emerson, “There is no compliment like the addressing to the human being thoughts out of certain heights and presupposing his intelligence”—a compliment which Emerson’s critics have mostly hastened to avert. But to make this short, I am not acquainted with any writer, no matter how assured his position in treatises upon the history of philosophy, whose movement of thought is more compact and unified, nor one who combines more adequately diversity of intellectual attack with concentration of form and effect. I recently read a letter from a gentleman, himself a distinguished writer of philosophy, in which he remarked that philosophers are a stupid class, since they want every reason carefully pointed out and labelled, and are incapable of taking anything for granted. The condescending

¹ From the *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1903; published under the title, *Emerson—the Philosopher of Democracy*. First read as a paper at the Emerson Memorial Meeting, the University of Chicago, May 25, 1903.

patronage by literary critics of Emerson's lack of cohesiveness may remind us that philosophers have no monopoly of this particular form of stupidity.

Perhaps those are nearer right, however, who deny that Emerson is a philosopher, because he is more than a philosopher. He would work, he says, by art, not by metaphysics, finding truth "in the sonnet and the play." "I am," to quote him again, "in all my theories, ethics and politics, a poet"; and we may, I think, safely take his word for it that he meant to be a maker rather than a reflector. His own preference was to be ranked with the seers rather than with the reasoners of the race, for he says, "I think that philosophy is still rude and elementary; it will one day be taught by poets. The poet is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some struggle, having only reasons for believing." Nor do I regard it as impertinent to place by the side of this utterance, that other in which he said "We have yet to learn that the thing uttered in words is not therefore affirmed. It must affirm itself or no forms of grammar and no plausibility can give it evidence and no array of arguments." To Emerson, perception was more potent than reasoning; the deliverances of intercourse more to be desired than the chains of discourse; the surprise of reception more demonstrative than the conclusions of intentional proof. As he said "Good as is discourse, silence is better, and shames it. The length of discourse indicates the distance of thought betwixt the speaker and the hearer." And again, "If I speak, I define and confine, and am less." "Silence is a solvent that destroys personality and gives us leave to be great and universal."

I would not make hard and fast lines between philosopher and poet, yet there is some distinction of accent in thought and of rhythm in speech. The desire for an articulate, not for silent, logic is intrinsic with philosophy. The unfolding of the perception must be stated, not merely followed and understood. Such conscious method is, one might say, the only thing of ultimate concern to the abstract thinker. Not thought, but reasoned thought, not things, but the ways of things, interest

him; not even truth, but the paths by which truth is sought. He construes elaborately the symbols of thinking. He is given over to manufacturing and sharpening the weapons of the spirit. Outcomes, interpretations, victories, are indifferent. Otherwise is it with art. That, as Emerson says, is "the path of the Creator to his work"; and again "a habitual respect to the whole by an eye loving beauty in detail." Affection is towards the meaning of the symbol, not to its constitution. Only as he wields them, does the artist forge the sword and buckler of the spirit. His affair is to uncover rather than to analyze; to discern rather than to classify. He reads but does not compose.

One, however, has no sooner drawn such lines than one is ashamed and begins to retract. Euripides and Plato, Dante and Bruno, Bacon and Milton, Spinoza and Goethe, rise in rebuke. The spirit of Emerson rises to protest against exaggerating his ultimate value by trying to place him upon a plane of art higher than a philosophic platform. Literary critics admit his philosophy and deny his literature. And if philosophers extol his keen, calm art and speak with some depreciation of his metaphysic, it also is perhaps because Emerson knew something deeper than our conventional definitions. It is indeed true that reflective thinkers have taken the way to truth for their truth; the method of life for the conduct of life—in short, have taken means for end. But it is also assured that in the completeness of their devotion, they have expiated their transgression; means become identified with end, thought turns to life, and wisdom is justified not of herself but of her children. Language justly preserves the difference between philosopher and sophist. It is no more possible to eliminate love and generation from the definition of the thinker than it is to eliminate thought and limits from the conception of the artist. It is interest, concern, caring, which makes the one as it makes the other. It is significant irony that the old quarrel of philosopher and poet was brought off by one who united in himself more than has another individual the qualities of both artist and metaphysician. At bottom the quarrel is not one of

objectives nor yet of methods, but of the affections. And in the divisions of love, there always abides the unity of him who loves. Because Plato was so great he was divided in his affections. A lesser man could not brook that torn love, because of which he set poet and philosopher over against one another. Looked at in the open, our fences between literature and metaphysics appear petty—signs of an attempt to affix the legalities and formalities of property to the things of the spirit. If ever there lived not only a metaphysician but a professor of metaphysics it was Immanuel Kant. Yet he declares that he should account himself more unworthy than the day laborer in the field if he did not believe that somehow, even in his technical classifications and remote distinctions, he too, was carrying forward the struggle of humanity for freedom—that is for illumination.

And for Emerson of all others, there is a one-sidedness and exaggeration, which he would have been the first to scorn, in exalting overmuch his creative substance at the expense of his reflective procedure. He says in effect somewhere that the individual man is only a method, a plan of arrangement. The saying is amply descriptive of Emerson. His idealism is the faith of the thinker in his thought raised to its *nth* power. "History," he says, "and the state of the world at any one time is directly dependent on the intellectual classification then existing in the minds of men." Again, "Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then all things are at risk. The very hopes of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manner and morals of mankind are all at the mercy of a new generalization." And again, "Everything looks permanent until its secret is known. Nature looks provokingly stable and secular, but it has a cause like all the rest; and when once I comprehend that, will these fields stretch so immovably wide, these leaves hang so individually considerable?" And finally, "In history an idea always overhangs like a moon and rules the tide which rises simultaneously in all the souls of a generation." There are times, indeed, when one is inclined to regard Emerson's whole work as a hymn to intel-

ligence, a paean to the all-creating, all-disturbing power of thought.

And so, with an expiatory offering to the Manes of Emerson, one may proceed to characterize his thought, his method, yea, even his system. I find it in the fact that he takes the distinctions and classifications which to most philosophers are true in and of and because of their systems, and makes them true of life, of the common experience of the everyday man. To take his own words for it, "There are degrees in idealism. We learn first to play with it academically, as the magnet was once a toy. Then we see, in the hey-day of youth and poetry, that it may be true, that it is true in gleams and fragments. Then, its countenance waxes stern and grand, and we see that it must be true. It now shows itself ethical and practical." The idealism which is a thing of the academic intellect to the professor, a hope to the generous youth, an inspiration to the genial projector, is to Emerson a narrowly accurate description of the facts of the most real world in which all earn their living.

Such reference to the immediate life is the text by which he tries every philosopher. "Each new mind we approach seems to require," he says, "an abdication of all our past and present possessions. A new doctrine seems at first a subversion of all our opinions, tastes and manner of living." But while one gives himself "up unreservedly to that which draws him, because that is his own, he is to refuse himself to that which draws him not, because it is not his own. I were a fool not to sacrifice a thousand Aeschyluses to my intellectual integrity. Especially take the same ground in regard to abstract truth, the science of the mind. The Bacon, the Spinoza, the Hume, Schelling, Kant, is only a more or less awkward translator of things in your consciousness. Say, then, instead of too timidly poring into his obscure sense, that he has not succeeded in rendering back to you your consciousness. Anyhow, when at last, it is done, you will find it is not recondite, but a simple, natural state which the writer restores to you." And again, take this other saying, "Aristotle or Bacon or Kant propound

some maxim which is the key-note of philosophy thenceforward, but I am more interested to know that when at last they have hurled out their grand word, it is only some familiar experience of every man on the street." I fancy he reads the so-called eclecticism of Emerson wrongly who does not see that it is reduction of all the philosophers of the race, even the prophets like Plato and Proclus whom Emerson holds most dear, to the test of trial by the service rendered the present and immediate experience. As for those who contemn Emerson for superficial pedantry because of the strings of names he is wont to flash like beads before our eyes, they but voice their own pedantry, not seeing, in their literalness, that all such things are with Emerson symbols of various uses administered to the common soul.

As Emerson treated the philosophers, so he treats their doctrines. The Platonist teaches the immanence of absolute ideas in the World and in Man, that every thing and every man participates in an absolute Meaning, individualized in him and through which one has community with others. Yet by the time this truth of the universe has become proper and fit for teaching, it has somehow become a truth of philosophy, a truth of private interpretation, reached by some men, not others, and consequently true for some, but not true for all, and hence not wholly true for any. But to Emerson all "truth lies on the highway." Emerson says, "We lie in the lap of immense intelligence which makes us organs of its activity and receivers of its truth," and the Idea is no longer either an academic toy nor even a gleam of poetry, but a literal report of the experience of the hour as that is enriched and reinforced for the individual through the tale of history, the appliance of science, the gossip of conversation and the exchange of commerce. That every individual is at once the focus and the channel of mankind's long and wide endeavor, that all nature exists for the education of the human soul—such things, as we read Emerson, cease to be statements of a separated philosophy and become natural transcripts of the course of events and of the rights of man.

Emerson's philosophy has this in common with that of the transcendentalists; he prefers to borrow from them rather than from others certain pigments and delineations. But he finds truth in the highway, in the untaught endeavor, the unexpected idea, and this removes him from their remotenesses. His ideas are not fixed upon any Reality that is beyond or behind or in any way apart, and hence they do not have to be bent. They are versions of the Here and the Now, and flow freely. The reputed transcendental worth of an overweening Beyond and Away, Emerson, jealous for spiritual democracy, finds to be the possession of the unquestionable Present. When Emerson, speaking of the chronology of history, designated the There and Then as "wild, savage and preposterous," he also drew the line which marks him off from transcendentalism—which is the idealism of a Class. In sorry truth, the idealist has too frequently conspired with the sensualist to deprive the pressing and so the passing Now of value which is spiritual. Through the joint work of such malign conspiracy, the common man is not, or at least does not know himself for, an idealist. It is such disinherited of the earth that Emerson summons to their own. "If man is sick, is unable, is mean-spirited and odious, it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully withholden from him."

Against creed and system, convention and institution, Emerson stands for restoring to the common man that which in the name of religion, of philosophy, of art and of morality, has been embezzled from the common store and appropriated to sectarian and class use. Beyond any one we know of, Emerson has comprehended and declared how such malversation makes truth decline from its simplicity, and in becoming partial and owned, become a puzzle of and trick for theologian, metaphysician and litterateur—a puzzle of an imposed law, of an un-wished for and refused goodness, of a romantic ideal gleaming only from afar, and a trick of manipular skill, of specialized performance.

For such reasons, the coming century may well make evident what is just now dawning, that Emerson is not only a

philosopher, but that he is the Philosopher of Democracy. Plato's own generation would, I think, have found it difficult to class Plato. Was he an inept visionary or a subtle dialectician? A political reformer or a founder of the new type of literary art? Was he a moral exhorter, or an instructor in an Academy? Was he a theorist upon education, or the inventor of a method of knowledge? We, looking at Plato through the centuries of exposition and interpretation, find no difficulty in placing Plato as a philosopher and in attributing to him a system of thought. We dispute about the nature and content of this system, but we do not doubt it is there. It is the intervening centuries which have furnished Plato with his technique and which have developed and wrought Plato to a system. One century bears but a slender ratio to twenty-five; it is not safe to predict. But at least, thinking of Emerson as the one citizen of the New World fit to have his name uttered in the same breath with that of Plato, one may without presumption believe that even if Emerson has no system, none the less he is the prophet and herald of any system which democracy may henceforth construct and hold by, and that when democracy has articulated itself, it will have no difficulty in finding itself already proposed in Emerson. It is as true to-day as when he said it: "It is not propositions, not new dogmas and the logical exposition of the world that are our first need, but to watch and continually cherish the intellectual and moral sensibilities and woo them to stay and make their homes with us. Whilst they abide with us, we shall not think amiss." We are moved to say that Emerson is the first and as yet almost the only Christian of the Intellect. From out such reverence for the instinct and impulse of our common nature shall emerge in their due season propositions, systems and logical expositions of the world. Then shall we have a philosophy which religion has no call to chide and which knows its friendship with science and with art.

Emerson wrote of a certain type of mind: "This tranquil, well-founded, wide-seeing soul is no express-rider, no attorney, no magistrate. It lies in the sun and broods on the world."

It is the soul of Emerson which these words describe. Yet this is no private merit nor personal credit. For thousands of earth's children, Emerson has taken away the barriers that shut out the sun and has secured the unimpeded, cheerful circulation of the light of heaven, and the wholesome air of day. For such, content to endure without contriving and contending, at the last all express-riders journey, since to them comes the final service of all commodity. For them, careless to make out their own case, all attorneys plead in the day of final judgment; for though falsehoods pile mountain high, truth is the only deposit that nature tolerates. To them who refuse to be called "master, master," all magistracies in the end defer, for theirs is the common cause for which dominion, power and principality is put under foot. Before such successes, even the worshipers of that which to-day goes by the name of success, those who bend to millions and incline to imperialisms, may lower their standard, and give at least a passing assent to the final word of Emerson's philosophy, the identity of Being, unqualified and immutable, with Character.

7. H. G. WELLS¹

Looking back, there now appears something peculiarly significant in Mr. Wells' long preoccupation with the bizarre and the extraordinary. His genius for the phantastic, now that he has come out into the open with a theology, is seen to be evidence not so much of an interest in the other side of things as of a belief that the other side *is* extraordinary, or, in the franker language of an older day, supernatural. His revelling in adventure evinced not a sense of the romantically possible in the seemingly ordinary—a sense like that, say, of Scott or Stevenson—but an extreme urgency *after* something, something that Mr. Wells wanted, something that he wouldn't be happy without. And if I confess to a certain satisfaction in the fullness of the later revelation of what is now seen to have been always implicit, it is because I find a justification of the obscure irritation which Mr. Wells' apocalyptic flights always stirred in me.

God, the Invisible King (fortunately coincident in its publication with Mr. Wells' attacks upon monarchy on earth) labels, with startling unmistakableness, the theological implications of Mr. Britling—implications which without the later tag might have seemed religious. Of the concluding portion of the Britling novel a cynic might have said that Mr. Britling, finding himself alone in the dark, invented a God to keep him company and to give him assurance of the return of dawn. But a more sympathetic critic might have found in the book a vivid sense of forces moving co-operatively toward a better organization of humanity even amid its darkest days; that sense of the better, that sense of possibilities, which is never more pathetic and never more noble than when it shines

¹ From *The Seven Arts*, July, 1919; published under the title *H. G. Wells, Theological Assembler*.

upon the most discouraging actuality. In spite of casual allusions to God as personal and conscious, one might easily have found in the book an illustration of that saying of Santayana's about religion: "Another world to live in—whether we expect ever to pass into it or not—is what we mean by having a religion."

But in *God the Invisible King*, Mr. Wells has done more than enter; he has even done more than take possession. He is a cicerone, showing a flock of personally conducted tourists all of the interesting high spots in this other world, a guide who is never more glibly eloquent than when turning into a "sight" some one of the dark and unsolved uncertainties of life. There is, so it appears, a "modern religion" already in existence. And Mr. Wells does not aspire to any such ambition as to be its prophet. It is enough for him to be its assembler and recorder. As Mr. Wells pontificates: "It is an account rendered. It is a statement and record; not a theory. There is nothing in all this that has been invented or constructed by the writer: I have been but a scribe to the spirit of my generation, I have at most assembled and put together things and thoughts that I have come upon—I have transferred the statements of 'science' into religious terminology, rejected obsolescent definitions and re-co-ordinated propositions that had drifted into opposition." So simple a matter is it to set forth modern religion, not just *a modern religion*.

In comparison with the fact that this material is all there, needing only to be assembled, co-ordinated, defined, and terminologized, the actual contents of modern religion seem to me to shrink into relative insignificance. But one gets the impression that such is decidedly not the case for Mr. Wells, that for him the matter of course is that the modern religion should be there, and the important matter concerns the somewhat less than thirty-nine articles which constitute the true faith of which Mr. Wells is the phonographic recorder. While I cannot recover from my feeling that it is a tremendous comedown to pass from the fact of an established religion to its specifications, I feel bound therefore to record in my turn the gist of

Mr. Wells' record. "God is a spirit, a single spirit and a single person: he has begun and he will never end." The corresponding damning clauses are not explicitly given. One gathers however that the heresy that God is triune ranks—as heresy—above the proposition that he doesn't exist at all, while the heresy that he is material and impersonal is less to be condemned than the one that he doesn't exist at all. In spite of the fact that "modern religion appeals to no authoritative teaching, to no mystery," modern religion declares that God is "immaterial," that "his nature is of the nature of thought and will. Not only has he, in his essence, nothing to do with matter, but nothing to do with space." Since he began and will not end, God does, however, have something to do with time. "He exists in time just as a current of thought may do." God, moreover, is finite and growing. He helps us and we help him. As to the exact relationship of these two helpings I have obtained, I am obliged to confess, no clear idea. It appears at times that "modern religion declares" (Mr. Wells' favorite expression) that God was born in and through man, and that he accomplishes nothing, becomes nothing, except through the assistance of man. But more often it seems to "declare" that man escapes his egoism and achieves what is fine only through inspiration secured from God when man yields complete allegiance. Such an inconsistency in an avowed piece of religious symbolism would amount to nothing. But in a defined theology, translated from science, and with the obsolescent eliminated, it argues some awkwardness in assembling and co-ordinating.

Equal in extraordinariness to Mr. Wells' assurance in transcribing the tenets of modern religion, is his profound conviction that there is something remarkably up to date and liberal in his scheme. I could not have imagined a modern mind so explicit, so emphatic, so aggressive, in assertion of disbelief in a Trinity, in God as a personal creative omnipotent force, in the immaculate conception, in the necessity of an ecclesiastic organization to maintain religion, etc., etc. The spirit of zestful adventure, the unction of daring, with which Mr. Wells

warns off those who cannot follow him in the commonplaces of theological rationalism is an illuminating comment on the intellectual tone which Mr. Wells assumes in his audience—unless it be an evidence of the recentness of his own education. The naïveté of his assumption that traditional theology was *not* an assembling, a rendering, a definition and co-ordination, of what was current in the days of its origin, suggests that we are probably dealing with a state of mind common to Mr. Wells and the audience which he imagines himself addressing. It is difficult to resist the contagion of slang in intimating to Mr. Wells that in their own days various Councils, Synods and Assemblies were also some “assemblers.”

My long time suspicion that the evangelical mind in what is termed Anglo-Saxondom is much more thoroughly engrained than either orthodoxy or Puritanism is borne out by the chapter in which Mr. Wells sets forth the ethic, the “rule of life,” implied in the disclosures of modern religion. Literary versatility has its full scope. “I become a knight in God’s service. I become my brother’s keeper. I become a responsible minister of my king.” Somehow one sees—or is it mere perversity of fancy?—Christian Endeavor Societies turning into Knights Templar, Big Brother Associations, Orders of Prime Ministers and Ambassadors Plenipotentiary of the Invisible King, all with sashes, high signs, paraphernalia, and all beaming with the oil of anointment of an evangelicalized efficiency. Why quarrel with Brother Sunday because he still speaks a dialect which is going out of fashion among the cultured? Surely we all mean about the same. At times Mr. Wells does not even have to define, or to transfer from one language to other, or to reco-ordinate. Under the new religion, “for all, there are certain fundamental duties; a constant sedulousness to keep oneself fit and bright for God’s service . . . a hidden persistent watchfulness of one’s baser motives, a watch against fear and indolence, against greed and lust, against envy, malice and uncharitableness.” In view of the number of pages occupied with just such edificatory material, I am willing to predict that from multitudes of evangelical pulpits in this country will issue

sermons welcoming Mr. Wells into the fold, accompanied with mild deplorings that he has not yet seen the full light. Only in England, I fancy, will Mr. Wells be able to realize an ambition to be roundly denounced for modern and dangerous tendencies.

Of all this, I could make nothing and less than nothing, till I came across the following passage. Between benevolent atheists and those "who have found God" there is, Mr. Wells says, this difference: "The benevolent atheist stands alone upon his own good will, without a reference, without a standard, trusting to his own impulse to goodness, relying upon his own moral strength. . . . He has not really given himself or got away from himself. He has no one to whom he can give himself. His exaltation is self-centered, is priggishness. . . . His devotion is only the good will in himself, etc. etc." In short the only escape, for Mr. Wells, from an unrelieved egoism is recourse to a big *Alter Ego* upon whom is bestowed the name of God. Then there came to my mind that psychological mechanism to which has been given the name of "projection." When an individual finds a conflict in himself which is offensive and with which he cannot successfully cope directly, he "projects" it into or upon another personality, and then finds rest. Uneasy and tortured egoism, finding no rest for itself in itself, creates a huge Ego which, although finite and although not a creator of worlds, is still huge enough to be our King, Leader and Helper.

And then I thought of the humbly minded in all ages and places who live in the sense of the infinite ties, a few perceived but most of them obscure, which bind them to their fellows, to the soil, to the air and to the light of day, and whose strength to suffer and to enjoy is renewed daily by contact and by intercourse. I then seemed better able to understand both that egoism which brings war into the world, and that egoism which revels in masking a baulked egoism by setting it forth in a journalistic declaration of the God of the modern mind. In the light of the world's catastrophe perhaps such is the religious creed of contemporary man.

8. WILLIAM MONTGOMERY BROWN¹

The fundamentalists stole a march on their opponents in the selection of epithets by which to characterize the religious issues at stake. It is evident that the modernists are themselves more or less at fault in this matter, not just because they have accepted the word, but because of an intellectual vagueness which attends their convictions. At least to one outside of the controversy, to one not attached to either wing, religious "liberalism" as stated by its adherents seems to be essentially transitional, mediating, in character. Its psychological value to many persons in easing strain cannot be doubted; no one can deny that there is a social value in movements which modulate from one position to another in a way which avoids the crises and breakdowns incident to abrupt changes. But it is in the interest of intellectual coherence and integrity that the direction of a movement of transition should be recognized, that there should be some clear perception of the outcome to which the moving logic of the situation points.

Bishop William Montgomery Brown has in his lifetime traversed the whole course; he has done it knowingly, aware of where he started and where he has come out. He has moved from one fundamentalism to another creed equally fundamental. He is therefore more than a modernist; he has surrendered a supernaturalism connected with the authority of tradition and the institution of the church for a naturalism connected with the authority of investigation and the institution of science. Yet no reader with a spark of sympathy can gainsay his repeated assertions that at the end he is as religious, in his own conviction indeed more religious than when he was an orthodox bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church,

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 17, 1926; published under the title *Bishop Brown: A Fundamental Modernist*.

where he was more than usually successful in rehabilitating dying churches and founding new ones. His recent book, *My Heresy*, breathes the confidence, assurance, of a faith which knows that it is founded on an indestructible Rock of Ages.

That is the fact which gives interest to the record of the spiritual development of Bishop Brown—the reality of religion so impregnates his life as well as his book that it is difficult to fancy even his ecclesiastic enemies failing to think of him, in spite of his deposition, as Bishop. In his intellectual conceptions, his ideas of the nature of belief, of authority, of the objects of faith and aspiration, he has swung full circle. But the circle is inscribed within an atmosphere which is everywhere religious; nowhere does it cross the boundary. For this reason the movement which the book records has a typical significance which is absent from most heresies. The history of the disowned ardent cleric presents what is lacking in the activities of most modernists: the attainment of a location and a possession which is as fundamental as that of any ecclesiastic who arrogates to himself the title of fundamentalist. Because of this fact, his career makes clear an issue obscured in most recent controversy: What is the foundation of a vital religious experience in this present time?

The intellectual naïveté, the innocence and virginity, of Bishop Brown's temperament is an agency in clarifying the situation. His book as a book is too argumentative, too concerned with making a conclusion definite and strong in the mind of the reader, to be the subtly illuminating "spiritual autobiography" which a literary egoist would have made of the material at hand. But in spite of the reiterated striking of the same note which at times imparts heaviness to the book, the fact is made to stand out that the successive steps of Bishop Brown in "heresy" (surely it cannot be long before the word will be permanently embalmed in quotation marks) represent a succession of widenings and deepenings of faith. His clerical career did not end in a defrocking because he discovered from time to time that he believed less, but because from time to time he discovered that absence of faith in man and knowledge were bound up with the beliefs which he had pre-

viously held. Others who had shared these beliefs remained in their unbelief; his faith moved on.

Thus he found himself without desire, without expectation on his part, moved, rather than moving, from one level to another. Each crisis found him with the naïve belief that his brethren in the faith would respond as soon as he communicated to them the new revelation, that is, the new perception of scientific and social realities, which had been forced upon him; that, even if they did not actively approve and go with him, they would at least acknowledge his right and duty to follow the light which he had seen. Each time the refusal he encountered, refusals to enter even in imagination into the new and larger ways of truth in which he must walk in order to remain true to the faith which was in him, compelled him to further thought to search for the reasons for the refusal.

Only at the very end, at the close of his trial by the bishops and by reason of the character of the trial, was he forced to the conclusion that "My Heresy" consisted essentially in the fact that he had placed faith in truth and reality above and below all other articles of faith. Only then, upon his appeal, did he turn to the business of making the issue clear, of getting written plain upon the record the official attitude of the Church. Till then he had only striven to share the faith which possessed him, even as he had striven to bring others to the faith when he was still orthodox of the orthodox, ecclesiastic of the ecclesiastics. Doubtless history knows many instances of faith which from childhood to old age remained childlike. But the instances in which childlike faith persisted while passing from extremes of literalism and dogmatism to doubt and denial of a personal God, personal immortality and the historic existence of Jesus, are certainly rare.

The way out and onward which Bishop Brown found for himself and which he offered others who would be religious while living in full communion with the present intellectual and social world is the way of symbolic interpretation: Yield glad and complete allegiance to whatever truths are anywhere discovered and treat the formulæ in which bygone ages stated their faith as symbols of what humanity now feels, knows and

aspires to do. There are many, also heretics from the stand-point of the churches, whom the method leaves cold. They have no more interest in retaining as symbolism the Old and New Testament, the Apostles and Nicene Creed, than they have in giving a symbolic interpretation to Plato or Virgil. But even they realize that the church is an historic institution and one with which the religious life of most men has been bound up; they realize that piety to the traditions which are closely associated with deep emotional experiences is a thing to be respected; they know that the church as an institution, and personal piety to the sources from which the ideal life of man has been so largely nourished, are confronted with the problem of adaptation to the intellectual and social realities of present life.

The way of symbolism is with respect to these things a fundamental release, emancipation and inspiration. The issue which the trials of Bishop Brown for heresy have written clear and large upon the record is whether the Christian churches are to continue surrendering to symbolism one after another of the special items of the old beliefs and formulæ, when the coercion of accomplished facts leaves no other course open, while clinging obstinately to literalism and dogmatism as to others; or whether it will voluntarily and graciously concede to all men the fullest liberty of symbolic interpretation of any and all articles and items, reserving its faith for the realities of life itself. Upon the decision of this issue the future of Protestantism depends.

Bishop Brown is no intellectual giant; he makes no claim to great scholarship. But his sincere and genuine faith in spiritual fundamentals has accomplished more in making the issue clear than has been effected by men of greater intellectual stature and profounder scholarship. In comparison with this achievement the crudities and eccentricities which may accompany some of the symbolic interpretations which commend themselves to Bishop Brown are of no importance. He is a fundamentalist in religion, though a heretic in traditional supernaturalism.

9. THEODORE ROOSEVELT¹

In the death of Theodore Roosevelt the America of the generation of 1880 to 1910 lost its typical representative. Indeed, he was its living embodiment rather than its representative. Successful public men are not merely themselves. They are records and gauges of the activities and aspirations of their own day. It is futile to praise them or blame them except as we remember that in so doing we are appraising the time and the people that produced them. Hero worship of the olden type is gone, at least so far as statesmen are concerned. For in a democracy the people admire themselves in the man they make their hero. He is influential with them because he is first influential by them. The ordinary politician is fortunate when by dint of keeping his ear to the ground he can catch and reflect in articulate speech the half-formed sentences of the people. Roosevelt did not have to resort to this undignified posture. He was the phonograph in whose emphatic utterances the people recognized and greeted the collective composition of their individual voices.

To praise or condemn Roosevelt is, then, but to pass judgment on the America which suddenly awakened from the feverish and gigantic expenditures of energy that followed the Civil War to find itself in the face of vast problems and in need of vast reforms. We can better tell the qualities and defects of the period by looking at Roosevelt than in any other way. Through long living in the public eye he had become with extraordinary completeness a public character. It almost seems as if his native individuality, his private traits, disappeared, so wholly did they merge in the public figure.

Of every man who goes into political life there gradually grows up a double. This double consists of the acts of the

¹ From *The Dial*, Feb. 8, 1918.

original individual reflected first in the imaginations and then in the desires and acts of other men. Just because Roosevelt's capture of the imagination of his countrymen was so complete, his public double was immense, towering. One cannot think of him except as part of the public scene, performing on the public stage. His ordinary and native acts gained a representative significance. He shook hands with a locomotive engineer, chopped down a tree at Oyster Bay, hunted big game, or wrote a magazine article on his hunting. Each of the acts somehow swelled with an almost ominous import. Each provoked applause or rebuke, enlisting the partisanships of the crowd. In all of these acts he was delightedly *our* Teddy, ours with admiring acclaim or with disgusted irritation. In these acts, almost equally with those of Roosevelt making a stump speech, writing a state paper, taking a canal, or sending a fleet round the world, he was the man in whom we saw our own ideals fulfilled or betrayed.

One of the things that rankled most in the minds of those who did not like him was that they could not get rid of him, even in the innermost recesses of their minds. His representative, incarnating force was such that he stayed by them. Everything in American life reminded them of something which Roosevelt had said or done. The assimilation of the private individual with the publicly assumed figure is so complete that for all except his personal intimates the former is non-existent. All that an outsider can say of it is that it must have been great to permit such thorough identification with the public self built up out of impacts upon others, and out of reflections back into the native self of the successes and failures, the applause and dislike of others. Only an individuality at once mediocre and great could have become so wholly a public figure. In thinking of him one is never conscious of mysteries, of unexplored privacies, reticences, and reserves, hidden melancholies, or any touch of inaccessible wistfulness.

Roosevelt's inherited advantages of social position, comfortable wealth, education without personal struggle against obstacles, afforded external conditions from which he could launch

himself the more easily, without preliminary apprenticeship and without waste of time, upon his task of representing the America of his day. For this America had grown self-conscious about its pioneer days of log-cabin and rail-splitter learning hardly bought by light of candle-dip. It wanted something less sparse and starved, something more opulent, something more obviously prosperous in culture and social standing. It felt the struggles of the earlier day in the scars it had left behind, and rested easily only in the contemplation of a figure which never reminded it of a past which the nation—for so it seemed—had so happily left forever behind. It was a period of the complacent optimism born of success in overcoming obstacles, and of subconscious irritating memories of the shameful limitations involved in having such obstacles to overcome.

Roosevelt was the Man of Action. In that he incarnated his time. He preached the strenuous life and practised what he taught. The age was delirious with activity. It wanted not only action but action done with such a resounding thump and boom that all men should sit up and take notice. Bagehot somewhere remarked that a large part of the avoidable evils of mankind had arisen because a number of men at some important juncture had not been able to sit quietly in a retired room until things had been thought out. Roosevelt's generation had no sympathy with such a notion. If evils existed it was because men did not act promptly and intensely enough. Gordian knots exist only to be cut by the sword of sharp and vehement action. As soon as they are cut, we should have statistics of the number of strands, the variety of snarls, of the size of the sword and the number of foot-pounds in the blow that annihilated the difficulty. Refinements and subtleties and shades of distinction are not for such a period.

To criticize Roosevelt for love of the camera and the headline is childish unless we recognize that in such criticism we are condemning the very conditions of any public success during this period. A period that is devoted to action can have but one measure of success—that of quantity and extent. This

measure is essentially one of social and political reverberations. It cannot be said that it was reserved for Roosevelt to discover the value of publicity for a public man. But he deeply divined the demand for publicity of an emphatic and commanding kind, and he allowed no private modesty to stand in the way of furnishing it. When one has performed a resounding act it is stultifying not to allow it to resound. While other politicians were still trusting to the gum-shoe, it took courage as well as genial sagacity to adopt the megaphone. Irritated critics of Roosevelt's egotism—which they called megalomania—overlooked the fact that a petty deed cannot be made great by heralding, and that his acts commanded publicity because they were in the first place of a quality to command attention.

Probably nothing in Roosevelt's career so won the attachment of the American people as the fact that he had the courage to take them into his confidence. If it now seems a simple thing for a politician to make the people, in form at least, members of his own household, politically speaking, and to share with them at the breakfast table the political gossip of the day, the simplicity of the performance is evidence of the thoroughness with which Roosevelt did his work. He established a tradition which even a man as opposite in temperament as Wilson has felt obliged to follow, and, whatever his practice, to make central in profession. Just as politicians since Lincoln's time have studiously scanned the latter's methods, so future statesmen will copy the style of publicity which Roosevelt's courageous impetuosity created.

Thinking out loud, or at least seeming to do so, is one of Roosevelt's permanent contributions to the American political tradition. Lack of occasional spasms of frankness will henceforth be resented as evidence both of lack of courage and lack of trust in the people. And these will become—because of Roosevelt they are already becoming—the cardinal vices to a political democracy. Roosevelt's enemies repeatedly believed that he was politically dead, that he had killed himself. Although the vehemence with which they announced his demise was part of a calculated technique for making their prediction

true, they nevertheless sincerely believed that no man could recover from what they took to be stupendous blunders—such as the New Nationalism speech, the recall of judicial decisions, and so on. What they never understood was the admiring affection and unbounded faith with which the American people repaid one who never spoke save to make them sharers in his ideas and to appeal to them as final judges. Because of the power thus given him—combined, of course, with his own power to learn and to grow—probably no public man of any country ever equaled Roosevelt in power to “come back.”

Perhaps the best proof of the completeness with which Roosevelt embodied the belief of his generation in action, action unhesitating, untroubled by fine distinctions or over-nice scruples, is the irritation which his personality aroused in academic men. There are a few exceptions, but upon the whole up to the time of the Progressive campaign they followed him with distrust and only, as they felt, from compulsion of circumstances. A mind which apparently never engaged in criticism, certainly never in self-criticism, which in fact identified criticisms with instantaneous assault, was the natural opposite of the mind tangled in the timidities which result from always criticizing, and hence never acting save when external pressure compels.

It would require a history of the life of the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to explain how and why there developed such devoted admiration of action as action, provided only it was on a large scale. But that Roosevelt was a great figure because he was the exponent in word and in personality of this faith there can be no doubt. Nor can it be doubted that power accrued to him because he exemplified his period in thinking and speaking of action exclusively in moral terms. And with Roosevelt as with the type which adores action for its own sake, to think and to speak were synonymous.

There are those who think that morality does not enter into action until morality has become a problem—until, that is, the right course to pursue has become uncertain and to be sought

for with painful reflection. But by this criterion Roosevelt rarely if ever entered the moral sphere. There is no evidence that he was ever troubled by those brooding questions, those haunting doubts, which never wholly leave a man like Lincoln. Right and wrong were to him as distinctly and completely marked off from one another in every particular case as the blackness of midnight and the noonday glare. Nothing more endeared him to the American people than the engaging candor with which he admitted that in the face of this immense and fixed gulf he was always to be found on the side of righteousness. As he repeatedly confessed, he "stood" for justice, for right, for truth, against injustice, wrong, and falsity. When he did not stand, he fought. Wherever his activities were engaged at all, he saw the combat between the forces of the Lord and of the Devil. The battle at Armageddon was, after all, but the consummating fight in the campaign for Righteousness in which he enlisted when he entered public life. And if upon the whole the moral battle was a cheery thing in which one was stimulated rather than humbled into thoughtful meditation that too reflected the moral simplicity of his generation.

It is true, of course, that the cult of action for its own sake tends to demand for its successful pursuit either a cynical immorality or the certainty of being on the side of the Lord. No politician in America can be successful beyond the local stage who takes the former course. The good old Anglo-Saxon habit of thinking of politics in moralistic terms was strengthened rather than weakened by its voyage across the Atlantic. Not, however, till the time of Roosevelt were economic problems treated in terms of sin and righteousness. Roosevelt borrowed much from Bryan, but Bryan came from Nazareth in Galilee, and spoke the cruder language of the exhorter and the itinerant revivalist. When Roosevelt uttered like sentiments, his utterances had the color and prestige of a respectable cult and an established Church.

It is no part of my intention to appraise what Roosevelt did for our American life in the years around nineteen hundred.

But events move rapidly, and if for a time Roosevelt, as the prophet of a new social day, loomed larger than facts justified, it is already easy to underestimate what we owe him. Positively speaking, pitifully little has been done with our industrial inequities and conflicts. But in addition to what Roosevelt did in arresting some of the worst tendencies of the time, he brought men to where they could behold the newer problems. And it is very doubtful if they could have been led to such a place by any other than the moral road, or by any one who did not spontaneously appeal to ethical convictions and enthusiasms. He made the problem of economic readjustment the problem of rebuke of unrighteousness. He endued the cause of the reformer with the glamour of virility and vitality—and all those other terms of romantic energy that come to the lips when Roosevelt is spoken of.

If under the cover of a buoyant and readily vocalized idealism, Mr. Roosevelt took the steps which a "practical man" interested in success would take irrespective of moral considerations, he was in this also the embodiment of his generation of Americans. The generation was not hypocritical—and neither was he. Prosperity is the due reward and recognition of righteousness. Defeat (in that reign of moral law which Americans were brought up to feel all about them) is the sign manual of evil. The cause of righteousness was too precious to be compromised by the danger of defeat; it not only needed to win but it needed the moral sanction that comes from triumph. And Mr. Roosevelt's glory in the fray and his astuteness in discovering the conditions of success blended with his belief in righteousness. He endowed his frequent dickers with machine politicians and compromises with machine politics with a positive moral glow. They were to him proof that he was not as those academic reformers who profess high ideals and accomplish nothing. *His* belief in righteousness was of the sort that "brought things to pass." He trusted—and correctly enough—to a certain ingrained rectitude which would protect him from being compromised beyond a given point; meantime it

was the corrupt politicians who took chances, not he. This dualism of theoretical idealism with a too facile pragmatism in action has still to be faced in American life.

When an epoch is closed, the following epoch is not usually generous, or even just, to it. What it achieved is taken for granted; what it failed to do is the outstanding and irritating fact. Roosevelt's period has not wholly passed. The men who fought him are now just beginning to "appreciate" him, and their acclaim mixes with the reverberations from old fights and victories. The fact that the old interests have, in profession at least, moved up to about where Roosevelt stood in his heyday measures the progress made. But it also leaves him by association in a somewhat reactionary light. Above all, men are beginning to realize that our serious economic problems are complicated, not simple; that they have to do with deeply rooted conditions and institutions, not with differences between malefactors of great wealth and benefactors of great virtue; and that for the most part even the most arduous fights of Roosevelt were waged with symptoms rather than with causes. The epoch of "Onward, Christian Soldiers" ended with the Progressive campaign in which it consummated. We are in an epoch of special problems of industrial democracy in farm and shop to which the older idealistic slogans of righteousness and the strenuous life are strangely foreign. Roosevelt's "luck" did not desert him. He has been forever saved from any danger of becoming the figurehead and leader of reactionaries.

10. FRANCIS W. PARKER¹

This is neither the time nor the place to attempt a review of the educational philosophy or the educational work of Colonel Parker. But our noble and single-minded friend obeyed above most men the scriptural injunction; he loved and did with his whole mind and his whole soul. Hence it is as impossible to speak of his personality apart from his educational work as it is to speak of his educational work apart from his personality. He was fortunate in the complete identification of his whole being, his whole personality, with the work to which he devoted himself.

Thus there are three things in his educational work which come to me because they are characteristic of his personality, because they belong to the man. Colonel Parker was upon the program of the educational meeting which was held in the city last week, but was kept away by his sickness. The title of his speech was "Education into Citizenship." If there could have been anything more characteristic than this of Colonel Parker's attitude toward education, it was the sub-title: "Relating Especially to Dependent and Defective and Backward Children." His last address sums up the man, his recognition of the social element in education, of that which makes it a real force in community life; and the outgoing of his heart to all those who, being helpless, needed peculiarly tender care. Much as he did for education in the way of improving and reforming its methods of teaching and its administration, the essence of what he did was greater than any specific contribution: it was to inspire the teacher and the child in the schoolroom with his own affectionate and sympathetic personality. He renewed the old lesson as to the shortcomings of all instruction until it adds

¹ From *The Elementary School Teacher*, June 1902; an address delivered at the services held in memory of Colonel Francis Wayland Parker, at the University of Chicago, March 6, 1902.

devotion and love to intellectuality: "The greatest of these is love." He was accustomed to say that the social spirit of the schoolroom does more for the child than the formal instruction given; that what the children learn from contact with one another and the teacher is more than what they learn from the textbook and the lecture. If this be true, then the atmosphere and spirit of the schoolroom must be that of freedom, of confidence, of mutual interest in a common life of work and play. He was accustomed to say that all the resources of the schoolroom should be centered upon the "bad" child—resources of helpfulness and sympathy. That was most needed in the schoolroom. That which to the pedant and formalist is a barrier was to him an appeal. What he did in breaking down the despotism, formalism and the rigidity of the old-fashioned school he did, not just because of abstract theory, but because he insisted that the love and faith which are the tokens of the highest character everywhere, find a peculiarly appropriate place in the contact of the learned and the mature with the little and the feeble.

The second thing that comes to me in the connection of his personality with his educational work is that he believed there is absolutely nothing too good for the children. Many of you, doubtless, have heard him give a talk entitled "Nature and the Child," in which he gave a poetic and idealized sketch (which I supposed to be autobiographical, although he did not say so) of a boy on a farm and his contact with nature. On that farm he studied, without being aware of it, mineralogy, geography, geology, botany, and zoology, and came in contact with nature in all her forms. He believed that what he did there himself in that undirected and casual way every child should be allowed to do, should be encouraged to do, through an educational system. Thus he did much for what is termed the enrichment of the elementary-school curriculum; not, again, just as an intellectual matter of putting in this and that study, but because he believed that whatever there is of value in the history of man and in the world of nature is the true birthright of every child born among us. To do anything by any method, by any

system of administration which keeps the child from full and complete contact with these things, is a wrong against human nature and against the human spirit.

The third point in which his educational faith and his personality came together was his faith in the professional training of teachers, and in the science of education. I once heard him say that it was this thing that induced him to come out here. He gave up a position which, judged by a conventional standard was one of superior dignity and importance. But in the position which he occupied he felt that he was getting away from the children. The more he had to do with such a position, the more also he realized that the future of education depends upon the training of the teacher. His belief in the unrealized possibilities of the art of teaching was sublime. It is an inspiration to all teachers everywhere—just as it has been to those who have come immediately under his personality. Just as he believed that there was nothing in the world of nature or art too good for the child, so he believed that there was nothing in the personality of another, no element of the human spirit, which should not be called forth in the art of educating, of developing the latent possibilities of the human soul. It was that moral goal, that moral ideal, the possibility of a fuller development, which inspired him in the work he did with teachers.

The great lesson that comes home to me from Colonel Parker's life, the great lesson that I feel that I ought to call especially to the attention of the younger people here present, is what it means really to attain success in life. Colonel Parker never temporized, he never used little expediences or policies. He never got lost in the smaller things of life; he kept his eyes steadily on the great things, and he fought onward with all the vigor of his personality for those things which are enduring, invisible, and worth while. He waged warfare against opposition; the opposition that came from those who could not get beyond the things they could see and touch, and who, consequently, had attached themselves to the mechanical and formal. The opposition was sometimes active and virulent; more often

that of indifference and inertia—harder to face than the active sort. But he never wavered a moment; he never compromised; he never sacrificed the spirit to the letter. As a result, more than the usual measure of success came to him.

Twenty-five years ago, in Quincy, Massachusetts, the work he undertook was an object of derision, as well as of sympathy, all over the country. He was a pioneer, and to many he seemed a faddist, a fanatic. It was only twenty-five years ago; and yet the things for which he then stood are taken to-day almost as a matter of course, without debate, in all the best schools of this country. Afterward, in Chicago, he waged, against untoward influences, the battle of the professional training of teachers; he fought to keep away every political and personal influence that might in any way lower the standard of the school. Every year he had to wage the battle over again, and every year he simply made his appeal to the people, to the democracy, in which was his trust. His faith in human nature was rewarded. Every year forces rallied about him, and, working with him, won his battles against the combined ranks of political and personal enemies. He gave years of struggle to the elevation of the education of the child and of the teacher; and in his last years, with full poetic justice, with more than the recognition that comes to most pioneers and apostles in this world, his beneficent friend crowned his work with that generous gift which brought within sight—alas, not within grasp—a realization of his lifelong dreams. These things came to him not because he sought them, but because he sought the things which he considered permanently worthy and desirable. And with these other successes came to him the love and loyalty of devoted and attached friends. He was fortunate above most in winning to himself the loyal assistance and unflinching confidence of others.

When a great life has passed away, we get a better perspective of the things that are really worth while; the smaller things, the temporary things, drop back where they belong; and the qualities that ennoble life—faith, courage, devotion to ideals, an end to fight for and to live for—stand out in their

supreme significance. Our friend's physical presence has left us, but his spirit remains, reinforced and multiplied. It abides not only in this university community and in this city community, but it lives on in the heart and in the work of every teacher throughout this broad land who has been touched by a truer perception of the high ideal and calling of the teacher.

II. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES¹

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of truth to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment—JUSTICE HOLMES.

Were I to select a single brief passage in which is summed up the intellectual temper of the most distinguished of the legal thinkers of our country, I think I should choose this one. It contains, in spite of its brevity, three outstanding ideas: belief in the conclusions of intelligence as the finally directive force in life; in freedom of thought and expression as a condition needed in order to realize this power of direction by thought, and in the experimental character of life and thought. These three ideas state the essence of one type, and, to my mind, the only enduring type, of liberal faith. This article proposes, then, to consider the identity of the liberal and the experimental mind as exemplified in the work of Justice Holmes.

If it were asserted that Justice Holmes has no social philosophy, the remark would lend itself to misconstruction, and, in one sense, would not be true. But in another sense, and that in which the idea of a social philosophy is perhaps most often taken, it would, I think, be profoundly true. He has no social panacea to dole out, no fixed social program, no code of fixed ends to be realized. His social and legal philosophy derives from a philosophy of life and of thought as a part of life, and can be understood only in this larger connection. As a

¹ From *The New Republic*, Jan. 11, 1928; published under the title *Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind*.

social philosophy, "liberalism" runs the gamut of which a vague temper of mind—often called forward-looking—is one extreme, and a definite creed as to the purposes and methods of social action is the other. The first is too vague to afford any steady guide in conduct; the second is so specific and fixed as to result in dogma, and thus to end in an illiberal mind. Liberalism as a method of intelligence, prior to being a method of action, as a method of experimentation based on insight into both social desires and actual conditions, escapes the dilemma. It signifies the adoption of the scientific habit of mind in application to social affairs.

The fact that Justice Holmes has made the application, and done so knowingly and deliberately, as a judge, and in restriction to legal issues, does not affect the value of his work as a pattern of the liberal mind in operation. In his own words: "A man may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; there as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable. All that life offers any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a fact. And if this universe is one universe, if it is so far thinkable that you can pass in reason from one part of it to another, it does not matter very much what that fact is. . . . Your business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from something to the whole of things; to show the rational connection between your fact and the frame of the universe." Justice Holmes has shown fondness for the lines of George Herbert:

Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws,
Makes that and th' action fine.

But he takes it as having "an intellectual as well as a moral meaning. If the world is a subject for rational thought it is all of one piece; the same laws are found everywhere, and everything is connected with everything else; and if this is so, there is nothing mean, and nothing in which may not be seen the universal law." The field which Justice Holmes has tilled is

a limited one, but since he has "lived greatly in it," his legal and social philosophy is great, not limited. It is an expression of the processes and issues of law seen in an infinite perspective; that of a universe in which all action is so experimental that it must needs be directed by a thought which is free, growing, ever learning, never giving up the battle for truth, or coming to rest in alleged certainties, or reposing on a formula in a slumber that means death.

"The Constitution is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." According to the framework of our social life, the community, the "people" is, through legislative action, the seat of social experiment stations. If Justice Holmes has favored giving legislative acts a broader and freer leeway than has, in repeated instances, commended itself to fellow judges, it has not been because he has always thought the specific measures enacted to be wise; it is not hard to see that in many cases he would not have voted in favor of them if he had been one of the legislators. Nor is his attitude due to a belief that the voice of the people is the voice of God, or to any idealization of popular judgment. It is because he believes that, within the limits set by the structure of social life (and *every* form of social life has a limiting structure), the organized community has a right to try experiments. And in his ken, this legal and political right is itself based upon the fact that experimentation is, in the long run, the only sure way to discover what is wisdom and in whom it resides. Intellectual conceit causes one to believe that his wisdom is the touchstone of that of social action. The intellectual humility of the scientific spirit recognizes that the test can only be found in consequences in the production of which large numbers engage. Time has upset so many instances of fighting private wisdom that, even when one's own wisdom is so mature and assured that for one's own self it is the very foundation of one's own conduct, one defers to the beliefs of others to the extent of permitting them a free competition in the open market of social life. Judicial decisions amply prove that it demands courage as well as a generosity beyond the scope of lesser souls to hold that "my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with

the rights of a majority to embody their opinions in law," and to declare that "constitutional law like other contrivances has to take some chances."

The faith that, within certain large limits, our social system is one of experimentation, subject to the ordeal of experienced consequences, is seen in Justice Holmes' impatience with the attempt to settle matters of social policy by dialectic reasoning from fixed concepts, by pressing "words to a drily logical extreme." "There is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires." "It is important for this court to avoid extracting from the very general language of the Fourteenth Amendment a system of delusive exactness." It is impossible to state in any short space the full practical implications of Justice Holmes' repeated warnings against "delusive exactness," where exactness consists only in fixing a concept by assigning a single definite meaning, which is then developed by formal logic, and where the delusion consists in supposing that the flux of life can be confined within logical forms. "The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds. . . . You can give *any* conclusion a logical form." "To rest upon a formula is a slumber, that prolonged, means death."

Yet nothing could be further from truth than to infer that Justice Holmes is indifferent to the claims of exact, explicit and consistent reasoning. In reality, it is not logic to which he takes exception, but the false logic involved in applying the classic system of fictitious fixed concepts and demonstratively exact subsumption under them, to the decision of social issues which arise out of a living conflict of desires. What he wants is a logic of probabilities. Such a logic involves distinctions of degree, consideration of the limitation placed upon an idea

which represents the value of one type of desire by the presence of ideas which express neighboring but competing interests. These requirements can be met only by employing the method borrowed, as far as possible from science, of comparison by means of measuring and weighing. He objects to domination of law by classic logic in the interest of a logic in which precision is material or quantitative, not just formal. To rely on deduction from a formal concept of, say, liberty as applied to contract relations is but a way of hindering judges from making conscious, explicit, their reasons of social policy for favoring the execution of one kind of desire rather than another. Thus the formal logic becomes a cover, a disguise. The judgment, the choice, which lies behind the logical form is left "inarticulate and unconscious . . . and yet it is the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding." "I think the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate and unconscious." Formal logic has become a mask for concealing unavowed economic beliefs concerning the causes and impact of social advantage which judges happen to hold. It is hard to imagine anything more *illogical* than leaving the real premises for a conclusion inarticulate, unstated, unless it be the practice of assigning reasons which are not those which actually govern the conclusion.

Upon the positive side, Justice Holmes has left us in no doubt as to the logical method he desires to have followed. "The growth of education is an increase in the knowledge of measure. . . . It is a substitution of quantitative for qualitative judgments. . . . In the law we only occasionally can reach an absolutely final and quantitative determination, because the worth of the competing social ends which respectively solicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to number and accurately fixed. . . . But it is of the essence of improvement that we should be as accurate as we can." In deprecating the undue share which study of

history of the law has come to play, he says that he looks "forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of a dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on the study of ends to be attained and the reasons for desiring them." More important than either a formal logical systematization of rules of law or a historical study of them is "the establishment of its postulates, from within, upon *accurately measured* social desires instead of tradition." And so he says in another address: "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Summing it all up: "I have had in mind an ultimate dependence of law [upon science] because it is ultimately for science to determine, as far as it can, the relative worth of our different social ends. . . . Very likely it may be with all the help that statistics and every modern appliance can bring us there will never be a commonwealth in which science is everywhere supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?"

There is a definitely realistic strain in the thinking of Justice Holmes, as there must be in any working liberalism, any liberalism which is other than a vague and windy hope. It is expressed in his warning against the delusive certainty of formal logic, against taking words and formulas for facts, and in his caution to weigh costs in the ways of goods foregone and disadvantages incurred in projecting any scheme of "social reform." It is found in his belief that intelligent morals consist in making clear to ourselves what we want and what we must pay to get it; in his conception of truth as that which we cannot help believing, or the system of our intellectual limitations. It is seen in his idea of a rule of law as a prediction of where social force will eventually impinge in the case of any adopted course of conduct. At times, his realism seems almost to amount to a belief that whatever wins out in fair combat, in the struggle for existence, is therefore the fit, the good and the true.

But all such remarks have to be understood in the light of

his abiding faith that, when all is said and done, intelligence and ideas are the supreme force in the settlement of social issues. Speaking in commemoration of the work of Justice Marshall, he remarked: "We live by symbols. . . . This day marks the fact that all thought is social, is on its way to action; that, to borrow the expression of a French writer, every idea tends to become first a catechism and then a code; and that according to its worth an unhelped meditation may one day mount a throne, and . . . may shoot across the world the electric despotism of an unresisted power." Again and again he says that the world is to-day governed more by Descartes or Kant than by Napoleon. "Even for practical purposes theory generally turns out the most important thing in the end." Just because facts are mighty, *knowledge* of facts, of what they point to and may be made to realize, is mightier still.

We live in a time of what is called disillusionment as to the power of ideas and ideals. The seeming eclipse of liberalism is part of this distrust. To believe in mind as power even in the midst of a world which has been made what it is by thought devoted to physical matters, is said to evince an incredible naïveté. To those whose faith is failing, the work of Justice Holmes is a tonic. His ideas have usually been at least a generation ahead of the day in which they were uttered; many of his most impressive statements have been set forth in dissenting opinions. But patience as well as courage—if there be any difference between them—is a necessary mark of the liberal mind. I do not doubt that the day will come when the principles set forth by Justice Holmes, even in minority dissent, will be accepted commonplaces, and when the result of his own teachings will afford an illustration of the justice of his faith in the power of ideas. When that day comes, the spirit of Justice Holmes will be the first to remind us that life is still going on, is still an experiment, and that then, as now, to repose on any formula is to invite death.

12. WILLIAM JAMES

I¹

An adequate estimate of William James's philosophy can hardly be made at this time. Those who have been associated with him for many years can alone contribute to the story of his intellectual development—a fascinating topic, I imagine. Those who have studied under him will tell the tale of his teaching. While I have been honored with his friendship for many years, circumstances forbade intimacy, and I am not fitted to speak fitting words of his personality. Of William James neither as philosopher nor as man shall I, then, attempt to write, but will attempt some scattered and hurried impressions of what falls between.

William James was born in New York City, January 11, 1842, being a little more than a year older than his brother, Henry. He must have come naturally by his psychological and metaphysical bent, for the writings of his father are acute and subtle. Many will recall the delightful introduction to some of them with which he prefaced an edition of the "Literary Remains" of his father. In a daily paper, it is stated that James Russell Lowell called Henry James, Sr., the "best talker in America." The younger James's early education was somewhat scattering, a fact that perhaps had some bearing upon his freely expressed aversion to the over-regimentation of our American college education. Even Harvard he thought too conventional—especially in its unwillingness to make professors of men who would not work well in harness. His special training was scientific, not literary, being had at the Lawrence Scientific School, upon an Agassiz expedition, and finally at the Harvard Medical School, where he graduated in 1870. Classicists can doubtless explain how it happened that a man of

¹ From *The Journal of Philosophy*, Sept. 15, 1910.

such exquisite literary sense was the product of a scientific training. The student of his works notes both that his psychological career grew naturally out of his physiological interests, and that he was moved to strong reaction against the dogmatic attitude of many scientific men of that time. Chauncey Wright, I suppose, was one of the profoundest intellectual influences of his life—but in the reverse direction.

By common consent James was far and away the greatest of American psychologists—it was a case of James first and no second. Were it not for the unreasoned admiration of men and things German, there would be no question, I think, that he was the greatest psychologist of his time in any country—perhaps of any time. The division of philosophy into schools affects the judging of philosophers, but those of the most opposite schools will cordially acknowledge that Mr. James has been one of the few vital and fruitful factors in contemporary thought.

Every one, I suppose, would cite his sense of reality as Mr. James's foremost trait. I would not say that philosophers as a class are lacking in this trait, but the business of philosophy is to generalize and to systematize; and philosophers are under a greater temptation than others to follow the bent of their own leading principles, to fill in missing considerations and to overlook contrary indications. Mr. James was extraordinarily free from this defect. He saw things in the varied aspects which they have by nature, and was content to report them as he saw them.

The saying, commoner a few years ago than now, but still frequently heard, that Mr. James contradicted himself too much for a philosopher and that he lacked the power of systematic reflection, was in fact a tribute to the sincerity and scope of Mr. James's vision and reporting. As matter of fact, the various portions of Mr. James's “radical empiricism” hang together—in my judgment—in a way indicative of good technical workmanship, but he took things as he found them, and if things were not simple, or consistent, or systematized, his

philosophy did not consist in forcing system upon them. In this sense only do I find his thought unsystematic.

In any case, Mr. James has added a precious gift to American philosophic thought. However much or however little it may follow in the path that Mr. James struck out, his influence has made it more hospitable to fact, more sensitive to the complex difficulties of situations, less complacently content with merely schematic unities. One of the defects that troubled Mr. James in the writings of many of the younger philosophers in America, a certain crabbedness and obscurity of style, is, I think, in some degree traceable to this very influence. It is comparatively easy to appear clear when engaged in expounding second-hand ideas or expatiating upon some convention of literary tradition. Groping in unexplored fields after considerations that are themselves obscure lends itself to clear writing only when it coincides with such lucid vision and constructive artistry as Mr. James himself possessed.

This brings me to what I should name as the second of Mr. James's gifts—his power of literary expression. This power strikes both the layman and the professional philosopher, and strikes them at first glance. I shall not be so stupid as to enlarge upon it, and, not being a literary critic, I shall not attempt to describe it. But it is pertinent to remark that in Mr. James's case not only was the style very much of the man, but it was also of the essence of his vision and of his thought. The picturesqueness of reference, the brilliant accuracy of characterization, by which he has enriched philosophic literature, were a part of his sense for the concrete, and for the varied aspects of the world. He was not a philosopher who by taking pains acquired a literary gift; he was an artist who gave philosophic expression to the artist's sense of the unique, and to his love of the individual. It is no accident that the note which sounds through his last systematic work, *The Pluralistic Universe*, is "vision." Akin to the objection that Mr. James was not systematic enough for a philosopher, was the remark that he was more of a literary man than a philosopher—a re-

mark sometimes uttered by those who did not like Mr. James's unprofessional short-cuts to results. The late Dr. W. T. Harris, by temperament and training at the opposite pole of philosophy, did not share this superficial opinion. I recall hearing him say that Mr. James's artistic power was genuine evidence of the depth and reality of his philosophic quality—that only one who had both a direct consciousness of his subject-matter and a sympathetic consciousness of what was stirring, unexpressed, in the minds of other men, could attain Mr. James's artistic distinction.

Even this slight note of appreciation would be incomplete did I not speak of one of the most delightful traits of Mr. James's generous personality—his cordial attitude toward anything that struck him as genuine and individual in the efforts of any other writer, no matter how remote the thought from Mr. James's own. "Philosophy," Mr. James used to say, "is a lonely bug"; and the solitary reflections of many comparatively unknown men in America have been relieved by a word of appreciative encouragement from Mr. James. At times, indeed, Mr. James's discovery of a Spinoza or a Hegel born out of due season, caused some embarrassment to those of us who were less generous. The same largeness of attitude Mr. James carried into discussion and controversy. It would be a nice matter to decide just how much of his reputation for inconsistency was due to his willingness to make concessions to his opponents in the hope of finding common ground beneath, and to his large-minded indifference to minor details of his own former writings.

It is but fitting to note Mr. James's religious belief in the possibilities of philosophy. In spite of his not taking philosophic conventionalities at all seriously, he took philosophy itself very seriously. His popular hold is not at all due, I think, simply to his charm of style. His readers instinctively feel that here is a man who believes something and whose belief is not professional and acquired, but personal and native; a man who believes so deeply in the importance of what he sees and reports that he is not satisfied until his readers also

see and have their tone of belief and life modified accordingly. He was, especially in his later writings, an apostle seeking the conversion of souls. Many a note or postal-card of his will be found, I imagine, which refers to the possibility of some discovery, by some one, perhaps to come soon, of a solving word by which light will be made to shine in darkness. When, in one of his recent writings, he refers to the "pragmatistic church," it is not a sectarian and exclusive spirit which animates the phrase, but a fervor of faith in the importance of genuine philosophy. It is a difficult thing for professional philosophers to retain this genuine faith in its simplicity. It gets lost in the mazes of scholarship; wrapped in the napkin of specialization and buried in the ground of professionalism; or it dissipates along with the disillusionizing of early ardent hopes. Our greatest act of piety to him to whom we owe so much is to accept from him some rekindling of a human faith in the human significance of philosophy.

II¹

By the death of William James, at the age of sixty-eight, America loses its most distinguished figure in the field of philosophy and psychology. A teacher of philosophy and psychology at Harvard from 1880 to 1907 (after having taught physiology eight years in the Harvard Medical School), he was much more than the professor. Lecturer upon the Gifford Foundation at Edinburgh in 1899-1901; Hibbert lecturer at Oxford in 1908; recipient of every type of honorary degree from American and European universities; member of almost every learned academy in Europe, he was much more than the erudite scholar. He was essentially the man of letters, but the man of letters who makes literature the medium of communicating ideas for the sake of public instruction. Never didactic, he was always the teacher. Always brilliant in literary style, he never indulged in literature for its own sake. If the

¹ From *The Independent*, Sept. 8, 1910; published under the title *William James*.

common people read him gladly, it was not alone for a clearness and a picturesqueness that will long be the despair of other philosophers, but because of their instinctive recognition that here at least was a philosopher who believed in life and who believed in philosophy because of his belief in life.

It is a significant fact that many of his most noteworthy books originally appeared as lectures before semi-popular audiences. His *Varieties of Religious Experience* are Gifford lectures; his *Pragmatism*, Lowell lectures; his *Pluralistic Universe*, Hibbert lectures; his *Human Immortality*, an Ingersoll lecture; his application of psychology to education is a series of *Talks to Teachers*. Of the various essays that compose his *Will to Believe*, the greater number are addresses delivered before various philosophical societies. This fact is significant, I say, for it indicates how essentially Professor James's thought is a human affair. He could not help making the expression of his philosophy intelligible, because to him a philosophy that was merely technical and professional missed the point of philosophy: the illumination and enlargement of the human mind on the things that are its most vital concern. William James did not need to write a separate treatise on ethics, because in its larger sense he was everywhere and always the moralist. He believed in his ideas and in his public, and the public's eager response to his ideas justified his confidence. He is almost the only philosopher of the day whose death marks an event in the world of letters and of public affairs, as well as in the realm of university teaching and scholarship.

Mr. James first won his standing as a psychologist. In 1890 appeared his large two-volumed *Principles of Psychology*. In some of its scientific detail the book has, of course, been superseded by later experimental work; the book itself initiated a movement which is already carrying psychology away from some of the positions of the original text. Nevertheless, the book is likely to become a classic—a classic of the order of Locke's *Essay* or Hume's *Treatise*. In a review of Wundt's monumental work on physiological psychology, Mr. James ex-

pressed the opinion that it ranked after Darwin's *Origin of Species* in the variety of its original contributions to important scientific matters. I am not sure that this saying could not better be applied to Mr. James's own work. One advantage, at least, he had; he never lost sight of the forest on account of the trees. Even when dealing with details of physiological and laboratory technique, he never forgets nor allows the reader to forget that the real subject-matter is human nature, not technical details. Comparison with his brother Henry seems to be made inevitable by the popular epigram, which I think is even more inept than such supposed epigrams are wont to be. The difference between the two is not that William James was a literary man and Henry a psychologist, but that the former was concerned with human nature in its broad and common features (like Walt Whitman, he gives the average of the massed effect), while the latter is concerned with the special and peculiar coloring that the mental life takes on in different individualities.

Professionally speaking, the distinctive trait of James's psychology is its remarkable union of the physiological and laboratory attitude with the introspective method. In spite of some efforts by Bain and Spencer, James was practically the first author using the English language to base his psychology on the biological method, with which he had become familiar as medical student and teacher. The reader feels that he is following a man whose training has been in the *natural* sciences, not in the metaphysical. This alone would, however, have secured only the honor of being a pioneer on a road in which he must inevitably have soon been overtaken and surpassed. His lasting achievement is to have laid upon this firm basis of scientific method a superstructure of unrivaled introspective refinement, accuracy and breadth. After reading James one sees that most of what had been called introspection, and that had brought the method into disrepute, was not introspection at all, but simply the spinning out of certain ready-made ideas. With William James introspection meant genuine observation of genuine events, events that most persons are too conven-

tional or too literal to note at all, even though the facts lie close to them. He was almost a Columbus as an explorer of the inner world; even the better of those who precede him seem by comparison clumsy and coarse, or bent on supporting some preconceived theory, while the joy of James was the delight of the explorer in pure discovery. It is impossible to overstate the originality of many portions of his treatise in directions where originality means sincere, unbiased, subtle and sympathetic observation.

The decade from 1890 to 1900 marked a decline of Mr. James's direct interest in psychology, or, rather, a transfer to some applications of psychology to life. The Gifford lectures on *Varieties of Religious Experience* signalized the fruition of his psychological method in a definite philosophic attitude; the ten remaining years of his life were courageously devoted, in spite of continual attacks of the heart trouble to which he finally succumbed, to the elaboration of this philosophy. From the standpoint of method he called it "pragmatism"; from that of substance of doctrine "radical empiricism." The germs of his pragmatism flourish in his psychology; the main ideas of his radical empiricism were outlined in his *Will to Believe*, the essays of which date from the late eighties and the nineties. To understand the roots of his philosophy one must turn to the ideas dominant after 1870.

Broadly speaking, there were just two types of philosophy to choose between at that time. Darwinism had finally won a definitive victory. Herbert Spencer was the guide and philosopher, if not the friend, of an aggressive group of thinkers. On this side, there was a dogmatic, militant philosophy which claimed to speak in the name of science; and in the name of science to banish to the unknowable all that was vague and mystical, or in any way beyond the realm of facts verifiable by the senses. This philosophy, when not materialistic, was positivistic or agnostic. Probably what turned Mr. James from it was its crudity and insensitiveness upon the esthetic side, and its somewhat blatant know-it-all air, as well as the doom it seemed to pronounce, in the name of science, upon man's ideal

aims—upon all that goes, vaguely, under the name of the life of the spirit. Mr. James always had a keen eye for the under dog, and I imagine that “scientific philosophy” was so openly the upper dog of the day as to repel him.

Most of those who turned away from materialism and positivism sought refuge in German idealism. Thomas Hill Green, the Cairds, Bradley and their active disciples naturalized the thought of Kant and Hegel in England; William T. Harris, George S. Morris and others made it at home in this country. Now Mr. James could not find satisfaction in this school any more than in positivism. His training in the methods of natural science made him find neo-Kantianism and Hegelianism rather formal and empty. They proceeded with too much respect for concepts in general and with too little for brute facts in the concrete.

But more than that, they were tarred, to his mind, with that which made the “scientific” philosophy so objectionable to him. Idealism as well as materialism was “absolutistic” in tendency; both made the universe what Mr. James called a “block universe”—a world all in one piece. Such a world left no place for genuine novelty, for real change, for adventure, for the uncertain and the vague, for choice and freedom—in short, for distinctive individuality. It made little difference to Mr. James whether the hard and fast unity to which these things were sacrificed was called Matter or Thought; the intolerable thing was that they were—or seemed to him to be—sacrificed.

One may say, with as much truth as is possible in such a summary statement, that Mr. James’s philosophy took shape as a deliberate protest against the monisms that reduced everything to parts of one embracing whole, and against the absolutisms which regarded reality as having a fixed, final, unalterable character. His was the task of preserving loyalty to fact, respect for the humble particular, so long as it was concretely verifiable, against the pretentious rational formula. This loyalty constituted the empiricism he learned from science. But when “science” presumed to set fixed metes and bounds, when in the name of some general law it denied freedom and reduced

individual life to a meaningless bubble, he protested that science itself was a human product whose justification was in the service it rendered in making human life freer and happier. Idealism means one thing to the technical philosopher—a theory of knowledge. To the common man it means something quite different—faith in the supremacy of moral values. This latter faith Mr. James had, but he held that idealism in this sense was a matter of will—of the will to believe—not something to be demonstrated by rationalistic formula.

It may perhaps seem strange to the layman to learn that a new and vital movement could be launched in philosophy by insisting upon novelty, plasticity or indeterminateness, variety and change as genuine traits of the world in which we live. But so fixed in the contrary sense, so intellectualistic, were the traditions of philosophy, both from the materialistic and the idealistic sides, that for a long time, for almost twenty years, in fact, Mr. James stood practically alone—a voice crying in the wilderness. He was listened to with respect and with admiration, because he said inspiring and suggestive things in a brilliant way. But few or none took him seriously as a philosopher, even when proclaiming his preeminence as a philosopher. By the beginning of this century, however, the tide had turned. The *Zeitgeist* has been visibly with Mr. James instead of against him. Somehow the temper of imagination changed; positivism and idealism had, for the time at least, exhausted themselves. The pragmatism which Mr. James urged with apostolic fervor as a *via media* between natural science and the ideal interests of morals and religion, seemed to be in the air, only waiting the word of a master to precipitate itself. Instead of being at cross purposes with his generation, as he had been during the period when most philosophers are finding their audience and elaborating their systems, he found an eager audience waiting. The result was an immediate efflorescence. The ideas that he long entertained grew and expanded in the new genial warmth. Three books and many articles appeared in the last five years.

I do not know whether there is any precedent for a man

finding himself as a philosopher and presenting himself as a master after the age of sixty. Yet this is what happened in the case of Mr. James. It is characteristic of the man that one does not associate years with Mr. James, to say nothing of thinking of him as old. Even to say that he was sixty-eight is like mentioning some insignificant external fact, like his weight. His intellectual vitality, his openness of mind, his freedom from cant, his sympathetic insight into what other people were thinking of, his frank honesty, his spirit of adventure into the unknown, did more than keep him young; they made age an irrelevant matter. Whatever fate may have in store for Mr. James's pragmatism as a system, it is a great thing for university life and for higher culture in America that Mr. James united the wise maturity of rich experience with the ardor and enthusiasm of youth, and both with the gallantry of a free soul that was all his own.

America will justify herself as long as she breeds those like William James; men who are thinkers and thinkers who are men. I love, indeed, to think that there is something profoundly American in his union of philosophy with life; in his honest acceptance of the facts of science joined to a hopeful outlook upon the future; in his courageous faith in our ability to shape the unknown future. When our country comes to itself in consciousness, when it transmutes into articulate ideas what are still obscure and blind strivings, two men, Emerson and William James, will, I think, stand out as the prophetic forerunners of the attained creed of values.

III¹

It would be hard to say just how it happened, but the immediate effect of re-reading this volume² of extraordinarily well selected and arranged extracts from the writings of William James was to set me wondering about the impact of the

¹ From *The New Republic*, June 30, 1926; published under the title, *William James in Nineteen Twenty-Six*.

² *The Philosophy of William James*, Drawn from his own Works, with an Introduction by Horace M. Kallen.

World War upon the intellectual life of the United States. The volume, together with its penetrating introductory interpretation of the thought of William James, brings home to one afresh how precisely and adequately Mr. James expressed a certain phase of American life-experience. The volume also deepens one's sense of the gap, the seemingly impassable chasm, that exists between the America of to-day and that of the nineties and nineteen hundreds whence dates the intellectual achievement of William James. What and why is this paradox?

Why should the most genuinely characteristic of American voices sound to-day as if coming to us from a by-gone and finished age? The weight of the paradox is increased when one remembers the contrast between the attitude of professional colleagues toward him while his work was doing and his established position to-day. Well do I remember the tone of thirty years ago. A great psychologist, certainly, but as to his ill-advised forays into philosophy, there was an amused and pitying condescension. Yet his ideas of an open universe with its plural and unfinished directions, its irregularities and hazards, its novelties and its unadjusted cross-currents which seemed so wantonly heretical, have already become, I will not say everywhere accepted, yet commonplaces of discussion, though only twenty-five years have passed. One thing is sure: he was a prophet of the future; all the vital currents of science and philosophy have set in the direction in which he pointed. Yet the more certain is his place in general philosophy, his place as a thinker among the thinkers of the world, the more uncertain does it appear whether he is a permanent spokesman for the spirit of the United States, or whether he summed up an age, the pioneer age, of the country when it was passing from the actual scene. Is the spirit to which he gave articulation gone, gone not to return, and shall men henceforth read him simply for what is universally human in his insights, as the first forerunner in the world of philosophy of the new orientation to proceed from the science of nature? Or is that for which he spoke an abiding, an indestructible, possession of

American life? Will Americans go back to him simply for reminiscence and compensation, or for invigoration and girding of loins? Merely to ask the questions occasions a certain depression.

If you wish to know what it was in American life that William James stood for, no better answer can be found than that given by Mr. Kallen in his Introduction. Mr. James gave intellectual expression to the life of the pioneer who made the country. There is similarity between the personal, the private, experiences of James whereby his own thought was nurtured and "the free responses of the American people to the American scene." The latter have to do "with the unprecedented, the hazardous, the unpredictable in the adventure of the white man on the American continent. . . . They are most at play in the effort of the pioneer; the will to believe at one's own risk in the outcome of an enterprise the success of which is not guaranteed in advance is what they sum up to. Freedom, risk, effort, novelty and an indeterminate future all are involved in them." Thus "the private experience of William James and the public experience of Europeans making a home in the American wilderness coincide. . . . Each is an assertion of the autonomy and naturalness of the individual; of his freedom to win to such success or excellence as is within his scope, on his own belief, in his own way, by his own effort, at his own risk during his unending struggle to live in this changing world which was not made for him, this altogether *unguaranteed* world."

But the pioneer has gone. He remains, as Mr. Kallen reminds us, only in the romanticism of the "western" motion-pictures. Organization and regimentation appropriate to the technology of mass production have taken his place. It was not many years ago that Mr. Wells thought to sum up his impressions of this country by reading everything in terms of an unrestrained "individualism." But save as "individualism" was used in a technical sense to denote a temper of indifference to political or governmental action, Mr. Wells was even then interpreting this country not for what it was, but

for what it had been and had ceased to be. The temper of science has moved since the day of James to the intimation of an open and irregular universe; but our own human scene has become relatively trimmed and closed. The older instinctive and unconscious individuality has given way to a self-conscious individualism which expresses its liberality chiefly in rebellion against what are called Puritanic restrictions in personal conduct, while "personal liberty" and liberalism find their apotheosis in the declaration of the inalienable right to patronize a bootlegger. We talk much more about individualism and liberty than our ancestors. But as so often happens, when anything becomes conscious, the consciousness is compensatory for absence in practice.

It happened that I was reading these selections from James at the same time with Graham Wallas's *The Art of Thought*. It would be difficult to frame an interpretation of the pioneer spirit more divergent from the one just stated than that set forth by Mr. Wallas. The divergence is immensely significant in the present context. Mr. Wallas finds the surviving influence of the pioneer mind the chief obstacle to a development of independent intellectual life in this country. To him "pioneer" is almost synonymous with Philistine contempt for thought as a high-brow futility; synonymous with the conforming Fundamentalist in religion; with strenuous effort directed toward future material gain and achievement at the expense of present enjoyment and leisure. In piquant contrast with the writing of Mr. Kallen, he happens to instance William James as the antithesis of the pioneer mind.

Any controversy as to which interpretation of the pioneer spirit is correct would be idle. All sensible persons would admit that "the pioneer spirit" as an entity, as a concept, is something artificially selected and constructed; it allows opportunity of choice from among the traits of the actual pioneer men and women, who, being human, were mixed like the rest of us. But the significant thing is that the free, hazarding, individualistic quality has so receded that when a commentator on contemporary conditions looks for present relics of a

pioneer mind, he finds them precisely in those characters of the American scene which lie, a smothering blanket, upon intellectual and moral individuality.

Unbidden the query arises whether the popular view of "pragmatism" and of Mr. James as its author does not itself testify to a subtle perversion of the reality of James's thought, a perversion which is itself indicative of the change which has come about along with the substitution of a machine-made world for the out-door world of the pioneer. If I mistake not some of the laudatory renown of William James at present springs from attributing to him a view of "consequences" which he had by anticipation bitterly denounced. It was he who said that the weakest point in American character was the tendency to worship "the bitch goddess, success." Yet perhaps some of the vogue of pragmatism among us—as well as of the adverse criticism of foreigners—is the notion that it is somehow a philosophy of, for and by success. There is little room to doubt that in the little less than twenty years since the volume called *Pragmatism* was published, there has taken place a certain transformation of values; some things which were foremost with James have fallen into the background, and things slighted by him have come to the front.

However it may be with the popular interpretation of the pragmatic thought of James, the pragmatism of American life is the predominance of business. A recent American writer¹ has quoted from the head of one of the departments of the United States Chamber of Commerce to the following effect: "Capitalism is to-day triumphant and the American business man, as its conspicuous exponent, occupies a position of leadership which the business man has never held before." The citation is backed up by another from no less an authority than Henry Ford. "Our whole competitive system, our whole creative expression, all the play of our faculties seem to be centred around material production and its by-products of success and wealth." Mr. Otto goes on to say the most ominous feature of the situation is not the general absorption in business,

¹ *Natural Laws and Human Hopes*, by M. C. Otto.

deplorable as that is. "Far worse, is the threatened assumption by business men of leadership in man's aspirational life." "Backed by unnumbered speeches before 'service' clubs and articles in business magazines, and aided by the ramifying arm of governmental agencies, the propaganda for 'practical idealism' is going forward."

The cardinal doctrines of the gospel according to business as set forth by Mr. Otto—and I know of no more ominously significant remarks—are, first, that the hopes upon which men set their hearts are to be dictated by business men; secondly, the technological means for the realization of these hopes are to be furnished by men of science; and, thirdly, the apprenticeship necessary to prepare the rising generation to take its place quickly and efficiently in the industrial system is to be supervised by educators, while the chief responsibility of religious teachers is to foster devotion to those moral and religious codes which are needed to hold the mass of men to habits of sobriety and industry.

We are here, I think, not far away from our theme of the paradoxical relation of William James to American life. The passage suggests the enormous contrast that may exist within the compass of a common conception. That thought, speculation, theory should have a definite meaning in particular consequences in human life was certainly the teaching of William James. The doctrine was an articulate expression of something native in our scene. Yet the distance between it and the current pragmatism which Mr. Otto perceives and condemns is more significant than any difference between any American and any non-American philosophy. It indicates a civil war, an internal split. In which direction are we to move: in that marked out by James or in that which seems to be controlling to-day? Did William James catch a passing and perhaps expiring note and idealize it by imbuing it with his own personality? Or did he penetrate to a reality which is abiding and which will surely manifest itself through the superficial froth and foam which temporarily conceal it?

BOOK TWO
EVENTS AND MEANINGS

Intellectual piety toward experience is a pre-condition of the direction of life and of tolerant and generous coöperation among men. Respect for the things of experience alone brings with it such a respect for others—the centers of experience—as is free from patronage, domination and the will to impose.

JOHN DEWEY.

I. EVENTS AND MEANINGS¹

The words that compose the title are redolent of centuries of technical philosophic discussion. It is not wholly possible for one who has been steeped too deeply in the history of the discussion to extricate the issue from the technical apparatus which has grown up about it. But the issue was one of supreme human importance before philosophers made it their own and it will remain of supreme importance when all professional philosophers disappear. Things are happening about us and to us all the time and to some of them we impute meanings. Be the meanings imputed by different persons the same or different we cannot avoid the imputing. We are made for conversation with our kind. When we are not urged into talk by the necessities of mutual dependence and assistance, we are brought to it by an inner push: communicate and share in the communications of others we must. Solitary confinement is the last term in the prison house of man, and speech with our fellows is the beginning of any liberation from the jail of necessity.

Although talking is itself an event, we cannot talk events. We can only talk meanings. We live in a world of events which determine our destinies, and so we audaciously assign to events the meanings we utter. There are, indeed, some philosophers who have been so aware of the audacity involved in using the frail human gift of speech to impute meanings to events, that they have pretended to eliminate all events, and admit only the meanings of meanings. But such closet attempts are soliloquies, not conversations. Where there is speech there are two, each of whom remains to some extent to the other a bare brute event, something to whose acts and words meaning can be imputed but who is not himself a trans-

¹ From *The New Republic*, August 30, 1922.
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parent meaning. And if we fail to reduce one another to just so much lucid significance, how much greater is our failure with that vast dumb stretch of happenings in space and time which we call the world?

But equally it makes no difference, in view of the necessity to converse which we are under, whether events themselves have meanings or not; have them, that is, apart from us. We shall go on giving them meanings as long as we are human. "The rest is silence"—that is not life but death. It may be supposed that all speech, all attribution of significance, comes after the event, and hence makes no more difference to any coming event than it does to the event which has departed into the lifeless unapproachable recesses of the past. Perhaps our speech is already senescent when most juveniley fresh; while talking of one event we are already being overwhelmed by some new event. But take the most extreme view about the inability of imputed meanings to make a difference to things and it still remains true that they make all the difference in the world to us. For it is just this power to attribute meaning to events—that is, the power of talking about them—that saves us from just being more events, caught in their flux, hurried along with them, caught among them and buffeted to pieces in their stress.

The introspective tendency of our Puritan ancestry is a commonplace. But the intellectual generation characteristic of to-day is even more introspective. Only its introspection is collective: we want to know what is the matter with us, not just with me; with America, not with the soul. Perhaps our fundamental trouble is lack of conversation. We do so much and say so little. Or our saying is so much of it just a little more doing rather than a conversation. Perhaps we need just one more Foundation or reform society—one to encourage sitting down and talking things over, and to discourage other organizations from doing any more things which only add to the infinite heap of things which already oppress us. First, like children, we get together and organize a society, frame its constitution and by-laws, and then, finding there is nothing more

to talk about, drift apart or resort to "doing something." We are not satisfied till we ourselves have relapsed into the stream of events. Or instead of conversing we introspect—and the result is the egotistical soliloquies of the self-conscious intellectual, instead of communication.

Every one who tries to tell us what is the matter with us tells us that we are just rushing about, doing things, on the move without caring where we are going if only movement is accelerating. We call the result "business" because at present business is our most conspicuous form of keeping busy with things. Hence the lack of art, of letters, of the fruits of the spirit. Our humor consists of jokes; our seriousness is exemplified in the Rotarian admonishment of the billboards that it is our solemn obligation to make ourselves prosperous.

All of our critics say this surplusage of activity is our trouble, and it is only too obviously true. But which is effect and symptom and which is cause? Do we fail in thought which is but preliminary conversation, and in art which is public conversation, because we are so busy keeping busy, or do we keep busy and hurry to lose ourselves in the stream of events because we are afraid of conversation, of thought and art which should say something? I fancy that it is the latter. But why this fear? Partly I suppose because events have been too much for us; too many of them and on too vast a scale. We can't find anything to say about them—except ejaculations. And so we just plunge into them and add to their overwhelming mass. Or because we feel helpless to converse about them, we reminiscently mumble over things said in the past. We revive the "classics." Or we become extreme modernists and string words together in a jumble, feeling that if we can only get as many shocks from words as we do from things and render the sequence of words as jumpy and blind as is the sequence of events, we shall have proved our competency to keep even, up-to-date, with the most recent events.

There is another cause, however, for our finding no alternative between more doing, more events, and escape into either frantic words or dead languages. Those in power are after

all afraid of ideas, of conversation. They are afraid that conversation is more powerful than the power of the events upon which they so triumphantly ride. They give out jobs to keep the rest of us busy, and they dispense indulgences, called sport and amusement. And we are afraid of losing our jobs or of missing the latest show if we idle to engage in converse. Yet there are those with a preference for speaking dead languages who tell us the root of our troubles is Puritanism!

As one too weak to dare to converse freely, I would take refuge in a plea to our overlords. After all, the assignment of meanings to what is doing and happening is not so powerful and so dangerous as you fear. It is true that ultimately you may be, nay will be, swept from the places of power and your dominion pass to others. But it will not happen because of permitting more conversation. The God of Events is himself a busy and jealous God. He loves events, and events are change. He will not tolerate constancy, and while you are mumbling about the fixed and eternal truths of our forefathers the flux of events is already undermining you. The God of Events has no intention of abdicating, least of all in favor of you who are the creatures of events. The events that will make a past event out of you are already beginning. Their efficacy will hardly be greatly increased by a little honest discourse concerning what is going on.

Meantime think of how much more interesting a world it will be to live in, even for ourselves, if only composed and articulate meanings are assigned to the happenings amid which we live. If you first permitted and then took part in a give and take of ideas, in a conversation that assigned meanings to the events which willy-nilly involve us, that ennui, that fear of the future, that now leads you to plunge further for an escape into busyness might be lessened.

Thinking about events and celebrating them in tone and color and form might become more important than being an event. It is even possible that temporary abstinence from the course of events for the sake of conversing about them might moderate their violence, and by tempering power render it

more stable. And then when the great change in the event does come, you and your children will be infinitely more prepared for it. For you will have developed a frame of mind which gives meaning to things that happen; and to find a meaning, to understand along with others, is always a contentment, an enjoyment. Events that have no attributed meanings are accidents and if they are big enough are catastrophes. By sufficient preliminary conversation you can avert a catastrophe. For nothing is a catastrophe which belongs in a composed tale of meanings.

And there always remains a possibility that an intelligent imputing of meanings is more than a personal delight and discipline. It may also be an event which affects other events propitiously. And if such should turn out to be the case, you who love your children even if you do not love all the sons of men, by encouraging conversation, encouraging thought which is more than a specialty and art which is more than an ornament, will have enabled your children to take part in some future course of events instead of being overwhelmed by them.

Why be as the dumb beasts which perish, when events so alluringly invite us to tell that story about them which wise men have called truth and art? And above all, let us not any of us imagine that it is primarily the cause of freedom which is at stake in what is called free thought and free speech. The word "free" is unnecessary; it is redundant. It is thought itself, the life of meanings, which is at stake. Apart from conversation, from discourse and communication, there is no thought and no meaning, only just events, dumb, preposterous, destructive.

2. THE MIND OF GERMANY¹

I

Many psychologists are now saying that the wish is uniformly father to the thought. Above the surface of consciousness rise intellectual structures of which we fancy ourselves the lords. Some are more spacious, others less so; some rickety, some solid. But all, we imagine, have been built by the master-builder—cold reason. But these psychologists tell us of vital instincts, obscure inclinations, imperative preferences at work below the surface of consciousness and shaping the systems of belief, seemly and unseemly, which show themselves above. As unseen forms build up islands of the seas, these hidden stirrings of hope and fear create our thoughts. These psychologists may exaggerate. But the intellectual outgivings of the present war look like a demonstration of their thesis.

Emotional perturbations are so deep and general in war that any one who keeps himself outside can behold the suborning of intelligence in process. The native partisanship of thought and belief becomes flagrant. These glory, naked and unashamed, in their simplicity of bias. Impartiality and detachment of mind are suspicious traits. A loyal and serious soul, so it seems, does not weigh evidence too closely or reach conclusions too scrupulously when his country's fate hangs in the balance. A once philosophically minded Englishman now writes "on the peacefulness of being at war." For an emotion which sweeps all before it, so undivided as to leave room for but one kind of thinking and one form of belief, affords a sweetly complete sense of certainty. In it the discriminations and doubts which

¹ From *The Atlantic Monthly*, Feb. 1916; published under the title *On Understanding the Mind of Germany*.

always accompany the efforts of a critical intelligence are submerged.

It is characteristic of emotion to develop only those ideas which support and reinforce their own operation. Their subtlest work is to produce intellectual structures which effectively mask from view whatever would trouble action were it recognized. To suggest beliefs which feed desire is a simple matter. To build up beliefs which prevent perception of what is undesirable within desire is a more complicated affair. Men are profoundly moral even in their immoralities. Especially do they in their collective and persistent activities require the support of a justifying conscience. Nothing is so paralyzing to action as prolonged doubt as to the justice of one's cause. The notion that men can act enduringly and deliberately at the expense of others, in behalf of their own advantage, just because they perceive it to be their own advantage, is a myth—in spite of its currency. Ideal ends and moral responsibilities are always invoked. And only uninstructed cynicism will assign conscious hypocrisy in explanation. Men must be stayed in their serious enterprises by moral justifications—this is a necessity which knows no law but itself. We may learn a lesson from the prevalence of the doctrine of the divine rights of kings. As long as absolute monarchies had the sanction of contemporary events, they did not appeal for justification to supernatural sanctions. Only when their rights became humanly questionable was recourse had to superhuman buttressing.

In times of peace it is possible to idealize war. Imagination, left to its own devices, forgets the disagreeable and dwells upon glory. In times of war, suffering, misery, the agonies of destruction, are too immediate and urgent to permit this course save to the hopelessly callous or the hopelessly romantic. Hence idealization is transferred to the cause for which the war is fought. Even the most righteous of wars involves many illusions of this sort; the less justifiable the war, the more surely do the emotions develop ideas and beliefs which may disguise the lack of justification. The vehement conviction of each warring nation of the absolute righteousness of its own

cause is the whistling of children in the awful unexpectedness of a graveyard. But it is this only superficially. In its depths it represents the labor of desire to procure a moral justification which will arm action. Only the most placid or the most trivial of existences is endurable without some belief in its own moral necessity. How can the horrors of war be borne without conviction of moral justification?

Each nation naturally expresses its own moral grounds in the terms which its history has made familiar and congenial. The formulæ chosen are appealing and convincing to other nations—say neutral nations—in the degree in which they are uttered in a familiar and understandable tongue. The average American understands the moral defense of Great Britain readily. It is couched in the terms which we should naturally employ in our own justification. So far as distance permits us to judge, France has been the least clamorous of all the nations at war; but her justifications, also, are uttered in a language which we understand, even if it be not so naturalized among us as the moral speech of England. But it is noteworthy that Americans—except German-Americans—who sympathize with Germany do not explain and justify her cause in the language which the Germans by preference employ. The former assign reasons of expediency and practical political necessity,—not the broad sweeping moral reasons which the latter put forth.

The case of the invasion of Belgium is signally in point. American apologists sought for technical and legal justifications—the origin of the treaty in a Prussian, not an Imperial, guaranty, and so forth. They ignored the plea of the justification by a superior national mission, by the doctrine that the day of the small nationality is past since it obstructs the required organization of humanity. The true Germans ignored the legal technicalities of their American apologists. The only point upon which the two agreed was that of the right conferred by military necessity. And this proffering of the doctrine of necessity was to most Americans a sign that the intel-

lects as well as the sympathies of their compatriots had become Germanized. In a most literal sense the mind of Germany is foreign to us; it is not to be understood without an effort.

II

Each nation, I repeat, expresses its justification through the ideas which its past history has made most intelligible to itself—in terms, that is, of its own national philosophy. The English are traditionally Protestant, evangelical, and individualistic in their consciousness. Their moral defense instinctively takes a personal, a moralistic, form. The blamelessness of their own conscience, the virtuousness of their motive—such as the defense of the sanctity of treaties and their pledged word—support them. Since their activities, as distinct from their consciousness, have been largely commercial and imperialistic, it is not surprising that the hypocrisy, the unctuous pharisaism, of the British have become proverbial among nations with another cast of thought. But since the emotion of good intent is a perfectly genuine phenomenon, the English are truly puzzled by the accusation. Nothing is more remote from their all too hearty and bluff straightforwardness than conscious double-dealing. America has been educated too largely in the English tradition to get the full force of the Continental charge of hypocrisy. But it should be possible for us to see that every nation has its peculiar self-interest, and hence its own mode of partly disguising and partly justifying the operation of that self-interest.

The devotion of the French to general ideas, to impersonal formulæ, is as marked as that of the English to rectitude of personal motive. Their justifications are congenially expressed in the ideas of reason, humanity, and civilization. The reaction of the English to these abstract notions—in the past—has been the charge of childish vanity and love of glittering rhetoric. The accusation, from the Continental side of the Channel, of perfidy was met by the counter charge, from the insular side,

of incredible levity. But an intelligent outsider will find, I think, only a divergence in the manner of seeking and finding the mental sanction required for effective action.

In any event, the English and the French have long been in contact with each other. They have learned each other's catchwords of defense and recrimination. One can hardly imagine them, so far as international intercourse is concerned, taking each other by intellectual surprise. But the self-justifying consciousness of the German was, up to the time of the war, practically an unexplored territory to the Englishman. He noted, of course, the practical activities of the former. Up to the period of the achieving of German national unity in the early seventies, nay, up to the time of the naval developments of the nineties, these activities met mainly with his acquiescence, even his approval. At all events, the activities were quite explicable to the English on the basis of principles with which they were quite familiar. They were characteristically incurious as to whether the same principles animated the German understanding of Germany's activities. They took no occasion to acquaint themselves with the bulwarks of moral explanation which had been erected in Germany since the day of the Napoleonic wars. If account was made of them, they were not taken seriously. They seemed to be innocently speculative, or an evidence of the peculiar interest of Germans in introspective metaphysics.

Hence the intellectual unpreparedness of the English for the war—their unpreparedness for understanding the meaning which the Germans assigned in justification of their activities. They had no forewarned mind about the German mind. This explains the rapid growth and spread of the Nietzschean myth. Nietzsche had urged, so it was thought, that all reference to moral ideals and sanctions was a sign and a source of weakness. Well, here was an entire people which had become exemplars of that doctrine: a people which had quite consciously thrown off, in their international politics, the last vestige of need for any moral basis and aim; a people which had deliberately adopted the doctrine of force as its own justification.

The only thing which might have given a clue to the mind of Germany—the mind, I say, not the activities—was the greatest stumbling-block. I refer to the professed idealism of Germany—what I have elsewhere called its self-conscious and self-righteous idealism. To most Englishmen who thought of this idealism at all, it seemed to be a weakness—rather amiable though futile—for an introspective and sentimental philosophy. Since the sole approach to an understanding was ignored or misconceived, there was a frantic clutching for any explanation, and a unanimous cry of relief when Nietzsche was laid hold of. That anti-Prussian individualist, that rebel against any philosophy of regimentation and subordination, figured along with Treitschke and Bernhardi as a war-god of the tribes of the Huns. That Treitschke had assumed a philosophy of the state and history distilled by Hegel and Fichte from idealistic philosophy, and given it an acrid positivistic application to contemporary affairs, was unnoted. In vain were the allusions of Bernhardi to the categorical imperative and the idealistic mission of Germany spread over his pages.

There are scores of illustrations of the hiatus between the German conception of themselves and the English reading of their mental and moral temper. *Kultur*, the catchword of the war, is as good as any. It is readily comprehensible that the English, after what seemed to them the extreme German bragadocio about superior *Kultur*, should have adopted Louvain, Rheims, and the *Lusitania* as emblems of *Kultur*. As things go in war, this was a fair hit. But they also went so far as to believe that these events meant to the Germans just what they meant to themselves: deliberate assertion that might is the only right, and a claim of absolution from duty and humanity. How far this was from the German state of mind may be seen in the following words of an influential German newspaper respecting the sinking of the *Lusitania*:

“We base that deed on the claims of the higher humanity which is the foundation of every national life. What appears inhumanity to the Americans was in the higher sense humanity. . . . National self-respect demands that a state shall not lay

aside its holy duties, even if their fulfillment seems to involve harshness or cruelty. Would that the Americans could grasp this conception of humanity."

It is not easy to take in fully the meaning of such words. Presumably a German would hardly use them save in the emotional stress of war. But only if we forget for the time being what we have heard about Nietzsche *et al.*, and put ourselves in the atmosphere of these words, can we put ourselves in the path which leads to an understanding of the German mind. For the *Kultur* for whose preservation the war is waged is (to this mind) a sacred necessity for all humanity. The ideal is not force; it is the systematic organization of all forces, natural and social, by means of devotion to science and to honest patient work, in behalf of the victory of the ideal of organization over the ideal of chaotic individualism; of science over blind muddling along; of thorough work over superficial display. To fail to employ force, of every kind and in every way, to defend such a possession would be treachery to the German ideal and hence to the cause of humanity. Such spiritual sloth may be left to other nations.

Even those of us who retain enough impartiality to recognize that efficient organization, detailed application of science, and patient work have been marked traits of German life, may fail to see that the present war is one waged in defense of these admirable qualities against the attacks of outside greed, envy, and desire for revenge. But if we are to achieve an understanding of the German mind about itself in general, and itself in this war in particular, we have to get a vision of Germans seriously and sincerely holding ideas which we can hardly present to ourselves without an element of irony and caricature. Just as we take it for granted that the French should conceive themselves as especial guardians of rationality and civilized intercourse, the English as filled with a sense of the virtuousness of their motives, so we must learn to think of the Germans as convinced of their superior idealism and universality of outlook. Just because their *Welt-Anschauung* is superior, it is a duty not so much to themselves as to humanity itself.

that they should have made every preparation, scientific and technical as well as personal, to defend it and win acknowledgement for it: such is their mind about themselves.

III

The English, I repeat, were conspicuous in unpreparedness to understand the mind of Germany. The French outcry, in spite of their greater suffering, has been restrained. Not only have the Latin races long conceived the Teutons as still only partially civilized, but the French were specifically instructed as to the German temper of mind. The defeat of 1870 had turned the mind of a generation to ideas and things German. Their lucid curiosity, their unequaled ability in *Comptes Rendus*, had borne fruit in a multitude of informing studies. A dozen, probably a score, of writings in French could be named (published mainly since 1890) for which no parallel can be found in English. In the latter tongue there are excellent political histories, admirable studies of government, administration, domestic and civic life. But it is hard to find any accounts of German ideas, of the specifically German temper of mind, which compare with a multitude of French books. If one wants to know about their national psychology, about the background and development of their beliefs in social and political philosophy, about not merely their economic activities and theories but the mental disposition which attends them, about their religious ideas, about the way in which they have conceived and written history, one goes to French studies. And one finds a record of fact, accompanied with insight into the emotional and moral temper implied in the fact. The foreigner is not well able to judge as to the military preparedness of the French; as to their intellectual preparedness there can be no doubt. The accounts are not only clear and objective; they combine with a subtle irony an equally subtle admiration for many German ways.

Only a mental unreadiness on the part of the English would have made possible the rise of the Nietzsche myth. Strange to

say this unreadiness was increased, not diminished, by the immense interest taken in professional German philosophy in the generation after 1870—the generation of revolt against the empiricism that reigned in Great Britain from Locke onwards. It is even true that to all appearances the classic idealism of Germany flourished more in England than in Germany during the decade of the nineties. Admirable books were produced about Fichte and Hegel as well as Kant. But the interest in German philosophy was of a kind to close the eyes to the characteristically German temper which gave it edge.

In part, this was merely a result of the unfortunate way in which the history of philosophical thought is too usually written. It is only too customary to discuss systems of thought apart from their social context; it is only too customary to write gravely about them as if they were like unto mathematical systems, and the only question was of their absolute truth or falsity. This habit, of course, leads to expositions which may be scholarly and technically accurate, but which ignore everything which is symptomatic of the national mind. It is a matter of indifference whether the system arose and flourished in Greece, Turkey, the moon, or Mars. But this general cause was reinforced at this juncture by a special need of English thought. To all appearances the traditional philosophy of Great Britain had more than served its time. Its empirical character was allied with a somewhat narrow individualism. In the later nineteenth century extreme individualism was a source of danger.

German philosophy was seized upon as a weapon with which to attack the former official philosophy of England. It is more than a coincidence that the reign of German idealism in Great Britain coincided with the revolt against *laissez-faire* liberalism in economics and politics, and with the growth of collectivism. In religious matters it coincided with an increasing failure of dogmatic Protestantism, combined with a desire to preserve the moral and emotional content of a faith which was no longer accepted literally. In religion the older liberalism had proved rather thin; German idealism added substance.

Consequently the English attitude was not concerned with what German idealism meant at home, but with what it could do in Great Britain. Everything which did not contribute to this end was ignored, or else treated as a mere technical blemish without serious import.

German philosophy was taken not only innocently, trustingly, but eulogistically. It supplied "organic" constructive principles with which to contend against the manifest defects of historic English particularism. The "categorical imperative" appeared in a halo of glory, due to its contrast with a mechanical profit-and-loss theory. The Hegelian conception of the state was transfigured in its contrast with a police conception of government. The German notion of history as an immanent evolution of an Absolute Idea shone in contrast with that absence of a sense of the moral value of historic continuity which John Stuart Mill noted as the weakness of his own spiritual forbears.

No atmosphere could be less conducive to an appreciation of the standing of German idealism as an instrument of national apologetics. A too critical attitude toward German thought would have weakened its fighting value in England. The obvious course was followed. German thought was abstracted wholly from its own social setting and bias. It was conceived as it would have been if it had been an indigenous product adapted to the especial needs of contemporary England. It was a balm for social wounds; a medicine for religious ills; a tool of educational and political reconstruction. No point of view could have been more unfavorable to understanding what Germany itself found in its *a priori* and absolutistic idealism and in its own philosophy of history. The continuity of the German mind of 1914 with that forming in 1814 in the struggle for national existence was lost from sight. The thinkers who should have been the ones to interpret the German mind to England were just the ones most taken by surprise. That a philosophy so obviously desirable and needed in England could suddenly appear as a weapon of offense aimed at the peace of Europe and the well-being of England

was impossible. A spiritual revolution, symbolized by the Nietzschean will to power, must have overtaken the Germany of idealistic philosophy. Mr. J. H. Muirhead, one of the English disciples of the classic idealism of Germany, has no recourse save to consider its present philosophy as "the great apostasy."

IV

It is interesting to speculate whether England has not suffered grievously because, at a turn of its social and political tide, it could find no alternatives between persisting in an out-worn native philosophy and entirely abandoning it for a foreign importation. In spite of the professional vogue of the latter, it never made its way into the popular mind. Since the eclipse of John Stuart Mill, England has had no native philosophy. Is this fact possibly connected with its muddling along? The speculation is interesting, but it belongs to another story save as it is connected with the difficulty of the English (and of Americans who have followed the English clue) in understanding the mind of Germany. In contrast with the fiction of a complete rupture between the older and the present thought, Professor Francke speaks the words of soberness and truth in his article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, when he argues for the essential continuity of German mind in the imperial Germany of the present and the cosmopolitan Germany of Kant, Schiller, and Goethe, and makes his appeal to Fichte and Hegel instead of to Nietzsche.

Continuity, observe; not identity. Continuity permits of development, even of transformation. Continuity may be understood from either end. We may employ the earlier stage to interpret the later; we may employ the later to appreciate and understand the earlier. Thus it is that the fact of continuity may seem to some the condemnation of the classic philosophy; to others the justification of the present mind of Germany. We are on safer ground when we ask after the ideas which have conferred continuity upon the German moral

consciousness, and ask what changes of color they have undergone in the century between Jena and Liége.

I find nothing to subtract from the formulæ of Professor Francke. Unconditional submission to duty, salvation through ceaseless striving of will, the moral mission of æsthetic culture—so far as they go, these seem to me the ideas which have formed the continuing mind of Germany. If anything is to be added, it is an idea which in no way conflicts with the three ideas cited. It is the idea of historicism—to employ an expressive if barbarous locution. And for present purposes it makes no difference whether one connects the idea with Herder, or Lessing, or with Fichte (in his later period) and Hegel. By historicism I mean the notion of an Ideal, a Mission, a Destiny which can be found continuously unfolding in the life of a people (at least of the German people), in whose light the events which happen are to be understood, and by faithfulness to which a people stands condemned or justified.

This fourth conception is not, however, so much an addition to the other three factors as it is an expression of the way in which they are to be understood. For during the nineteenth century the ideas which were first applied to individuals were transferred to the state as itself an individual, and so gained a new meaning. The transfer is obvious in the case of the Kantian idea of duty. With Kant duty marked a connecting link between the individual and humanity; it expressed what was truly human and thus universal in man. But "humanity" is not yet organized. There are no social institutions in which humanity, as distinct from local or national citizenship, is embodied. It expresses a mere rational ideal; something which is not realized, though it ought to be. Consequently Kant himself proclaimed that while men are to act from the motive of duty, duty is an empty notion. It has to get its filling, its specific subject-matter, from empirical circumstance.

This may sound like a mere philosophical technicality. But it turned out otherwise. Kant thought of duty as a command; as, in his own words, an imperative. The essence of morality is

obedience. That Kant thought of it as obedience to an abstract law of reason representing an ideal of an unrealized humanity, is evidence of his own noble aspirations. But human beings at large can hardly guide themselves by such remote abstractions. An identification of the essence of morality with obedience to law lends itself to an implicit acquiescence in whatever laws happen to impinge upon the individual. The modern age inherited from mediæval thought the notion of morality as obedience to a sovereign command. As late as the seventeenth century, the central question of all political and moral theory, even in England, was the legitimacy of resistance to constituted authority. In the eighteenth century, thought in England and France moved away from the mediæval notion of obedience as central in morals. Kant was a means to fastening the idea upon German thought. The fact that he gave the idea a singularly elevated tone was just what enabled the idea to survive against the forces which everywhere else had undermined the identification of morality with obedience to the command of authority.

The merging of the idea of moral obligation into that of political obedience was furthered by the Germanic exaltation of the state. When the authority which demands acquiescent obedience is thought of as "the manifestation of the divine on earth"; when, as in Professor Francke's words, the state is thought of as "an organism uniting in itself all spiritual and moral aspirations," it is only too easy to identify moral duty with political subservience. The ideal of a collective nation embodying a divine purpose in its historic development took captive the Kantian idea of duty; it replaced the endeavor of the isolated individual to realize in his own humble sphere the ideal of a law as broad as humanity. A cosmopolitan ideal, evolved in an agricultural, quasi-feudal, weak, and divided Germany, became an intensely nationalistic reality in a united, imperialistic, industrial, and prosperous Germany. Thus I think that Professor Francke is entirely right in saying that in the Germanic exaltation of the state as a supreme ethical entity, the line of moral regeneration which took its start from

Kant reached its climax. But there are also opportunities for degeneration when moral obligation is found in political subordination and subservience.

At all events, the fact that German thought still entertains a type of moral conception which has well-nigh evaporated in the cultures of other modern nationalities, throws light on the difficulties the non-German world has in understanding the language in which intellectual Germans formulate their ideas and justify their practical policies. The Germans are always saying that the American lack of sympathy with the German cause is due to the fact that we get our information from British sources, and hence do not understand the Germans. Well, it is not a matter of the source of our information, but of the source of our ideas. And it is not a matter of the past year or the past twenty years. For over two hundred years our minds have been educated in English political ideas to which German thought is foreign; for over a hundred years, our ideas have been fed upon an even more disparate social philosophy, that of the French struggle for *liberté*. There can be no disguising the fact that our American conception of freedom is incompatible with the idea of duty as that has developed in Germany. I make no attempt to decide which is right. I only say that they are so incompatible that minds nourished on one ideal cannot readily understand the type of mind nurtured by the other.

V

The second element in the continuous tradition of Germany is said to be the ideal of ceaseless, restless striving. The gospel of the strenuous life, of the value of energy of will for its own sake, has sometimes been thought to be peculiarly American. I think Professor Francke is right in believing it to be distinctively German. An American must after all have an end to call out and centre his activities. Results are needed to justify an activity. Otherwise his restless striving, his taut energy, becomes neurasthenic. I fear we are not sufficiently

particular as to the character of the end or the quality of the results. Almost anything will do, from winning a ball game, or forming the biggest business corporation in the world, to converting a community to Billy Sundayism. But some end there must be to account for the expenditure of energy. Otherwise the cult of will never lays hold of us. Consequently when we find the example of Emperor William cited as a "particularly conspicuous evidence of this spirit of striving," as an example of "universal and impassioned impulse of achievement," our reaction is cynical rather than admiring. That, we say to ourselves, is just about the sort of example we should expect to find. We have difficulty in understanding it as other than a semi-pathological love of the limelight. We may be wrong, but we cannot, it must be admitted, understand how and why we are wrong. For it is ingrained in us that some end there must be for which energy is exercised. Towards activity merely as ceaseless striving we react in what is perhaps our most characteristic national slang: Give us a rest.

To the German, on the other hand, this inability of ours is another evidence of our utilitarianism, our Philistine culture. But even Germans recognize, I think, that this idea of universal striving as an end in itself is a child of Romanticism. Similarity of words is often a bar to mutual understanding. The Germans say *Wille*; we say *will*. Hence the easy assumption of a community of meaning. But our word is affected (or infected, if you please) with the spirit of a Puritanic morality, and of struggle for political liberties and economic savings. The word suggests personal resolution and endurance in the face of disagreeable odds. But *Wille* suggests an impersonal, an absolute energy striving through personal channels for manifestation. It is affected by the Romantic movement. The conception is calculated to impart a tinge of enthusiasm to deeds otherwise prosaic; it colors with emotional universality (or mysticism) the specific jobs which have to be done. But it also is admirably calculated to serve as a protective moral device. Activities which are "all too human," activities which have a definite practical goal of advantage in view, seem to

lose all taint of self-seeking and to gain a sacred character when they are felt to be manifestations of a universal Over-will. Materialistic things look quite different when they are viewed as the necessary consequences of an idealistic devotion to the gospel of ceaseless striving; when they are looked upon as the conquest of spiritual will over matter. The doctrine lends itself, assuredly, to intellectual confusion and to self-deception.

Moreover, this conception has also been invaded by the nationalistic idea—by the conception of the German state as a peculiar incarnation of a spiritual force unfolding in history. The older Romanticism was at least confined to superior personalities striving for wide cultural achievements in their own private spheres. Transfer the habitat of spiritual energy from the strivings of the private person for the enrichment of his own life to the organized public state striving for the expansion of its own powers, and you get something like the current Teutonic apologia for the present war. I have no doubt that there are some German statesmen who know precisely what the present war is about; what particular concrete gains are at stake. But to the “intellectuals” of Germany—*vide* the manifestoes they have showered upon us—the object is that utterly Romantic thing: the expansion of *Kultur*, the spread of distinctively German ways of thinking and feeling. In short, the war is a part of the ceaseless striving for realization on the part of the *Wille* embodied in the German people. That the French and the English should have *specific* objects in view, particular advantages to gain and disadvantages to avoid, seems to many highly instructed Germans (if we may trust their language) something peculiarly base. It is no wonder that German rulers frequently speak with contempt of the political capacity of German subjects. But one must question whether there has been anything but a diversion of what might have been political capacity into the channels of Romanticism.

VI

The extraordinary revival of interest in the Middle Ages associated with Romanticism is a familiar fact. To it we owe most of our modern appreciation of the real life of that period. One may ask, however, whether we are dealing with a revival or a reversion. The affection of the Romantic spirit for the Middle Ages seems to be an expression of its own mediæval quality. I am not ambitious to characterize the spirit of Romanticism as that has shown itself in Germany. But certainly one of its marked features is an exuberance of unchastened imagination, and an introspective reveling in the emotional accompaniments of such an imagination. How largely German philosophy has sought refuge in an inner world, a world of consciousness; how largely it has made traits of this inner life a measure of reality! From the standpoint of one who is not a subject of Romanticism this means but one thing. The Romantic spirit has deliberately evaded the testing and sifting of emotions and ideas; it has declined to submit them for valuation to the tests of hard and sober fact. It has avoided the test of attempted execution in action. To those who believe that human consciousness is a wild riot of imagination until human beings act upon it and thus bring it to the test of reality, Romanticism can mean only undisciplined imagination, immaturity of mind.

It sounds silly to say that Germans, with their devotion to science and their habits of subordination to authority, have brought into the modern world of politics the untried and unchastened fancies and feelings of mediævalism. But I mean only what the Germans themselves say when they tell us that they combine with supreme discipline in the outer world of action supreme freedom in the inner world of thought. I mean what they mean when they themselves say that the German people as a people lack the political sense, the political capacity of the self-governing nations of our day. For this is in effect an admission of unripeness, of immaturity of thought with respect to the supreme concerns of human action. We

live in a period of political disillusionment. The tree of political liberty, watered with blood and tears, has brought forth many bitter fruits. In our disappointments we overlook what the struggle for self-government has done for those who have participated in it. At least it has chastened the unbridled imagination of man; it has developed a sense of realities; it has brought a certain maturity of mind as its outcome.

Now, when not only the Bernhardis but the Bismarcks and the Von Bülow's tell us that the Germans are marked by absence of political sense and capacity, that they have not the gift of self-government, that they accomplish great things only under the leadings of authority from above, what are they saying except that the Germans, with all their achievements, have missed the one great experience in which the national minds of Great Britain, France, and America have been educated and ripened? With all our defects, is any measure of technical efficiency, of comfortable ease, in a "socialized Germany," a compensation for the absence, I do not say of political democracy, but of the experience which comes to men only in a struggle to be free and responsible in their moral and social action? Compared with such freedom, the irresponsible freedom of inner consciousness seems, I repeat, an extension into a modern world of the undisciplined mind of the Middle Ages.

If there be truth in this conception,—and unless there be truth in it, the struggle for democracy lacks intellectual significance,—we have probably the root of the difficulty of mutual understanding as between the German mind and that of other peoples. Politically we do not speak the same language because we do not think the same thoughts. My final word would not be one, however, upon this discouraging note. It is rather a word of hopefulness regarding what has given Americans so much cause for perplexity—the "hyphen" problem. It is natural in a time of emotional stress, and in a time when those of German ancestry find hard things said on all sides about their ancestral land, that German-Americans should indulge in idealization of their older country, should bring forth with emphatic fervor the numerous fine things which current

criticism is ignoring, and should in their irritation seek out the weak things in their adopted land and speak with harshness of its institutions. But I cannot believe that any large number of them have remained here without being profoundly influenced by the struggle for responsible and self-respecting common management of common affairs.

War brings with it a recrudescence of the spirit of Romanticism, a reversion to the undisciplined mind, among all peoples. To be in an unsympathetic land, a land which does not understand, is a stimulus to the most tense kind of Romantic fancy. But when the emotional strain passes, there will be an equal reversion to the light of common day, with its usual tasks and the illumination of these tasks by the thought that we are all engaged together in the greatest enterprise which has ever enlisted human thought and emotion: the attainment of a common control of the common interests of beings who live together. Whether German-Americans will then attempt to educate their countrymen at home to a perception of the inherent lack in any *Kultur* of a modern state not based upon the principle of self-government, I do not know. 'Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished. But I am confident that all, except a few incurable aliens who merely happen to be physically among us, will respond with eagerness to any call which Americans who are longer acclimated may issue, to make our own experiment in responsible freedom more of a reality. And this response is, after all, the final test of loyalty to American institutions.

3. LIBERALISM IN JAPAN

I¹

One heard the word frequently from the mouths of Japanese fellow travelers as one crossed the Pacific—De-mo-kras-ie. The animated, cultivated man, who after wearing the baggiest clothes of the ship blossomed out one day in a general's uniform with rows of medals, and turned out to be one of the heroes of the Russo-Japanese war, confided in you that he was on his way back from France to explain to his countrymen the new world situation and preach the gospel of democracy. An ardent returning student told you of an interview with a distinguished American educator in which the latter had said to him that the future relations of Japan and the United States were secure if both followed the same principles, and who added on his own account, "Yes, the same principles. We have had enough exchange of compliments and fine words. We need to adopt American principles of democracy." And he avowed his intention of becoming an apostle of those principles. The day after landing, another returned student tells you that when he landed just a year before it was not safe to utter the word democracy, as it might send you to prison, but that now everybody was talking it, even coolies and ricksha-men. And the American educator who has lived in Japan fifteen years says that there has been more alteration in the spirit of Japan in the prior six months than he had seen in the whole fifteen years of residence.

But the Japanese tell you that their opinions are unstable; that they are mercurial, easily aroused to follow the last intellectual fashion; that they catch readily but superficially at the latest trend of ideas only to turn to another, even its opposite, when something more "up-to-date" comes along. So Nietzsche

¹ From *The Dial*, Oct. 4, 1919.

had given way to Eucken, the latter to James, and James to Bergson in the realm of those who coquetted with philosophy—all in the last few years. Germany had been not merely ingloriously defeated but had collapsed in internal revolution. America had come out with fine words and had surprisingly made its words good in deeds. Autocracy out of fashion, democratic styles were in. Was the change anything more than this?

As one remained and became somewhat better acquainted with the currents of thought—not an easy thing where the language is unknown and where every intellectual is a specialist and assumes similar specialization of interest on your part—one realized that the change was not so sudden as it seemed on the surface. All during the years of the most reactionary conservatism—and they were much more reactionary than the present writer at least had ever dreamed of—there existed genuinely liberal thinkers and teachers. The infiltration of the best Western ideas had been as steady if not as bulky as that of Western shoddy, physical and intellectual. The defeat of Germany had not so much brought about a sudden and superficial change as it had removed the lid. It became possible, almost popular, to say out loud what liberals had been saying quietly and steadily in the class room, or in the public press in language sufficiently veiled to pass the eye of the police. The change of fashion was a fact, was indeed a large part of the situation. But it operated mainly to depress the prestige of the reactionary bureaucrats and to increase that of the liberals so that men were willing, and even glad, to listen to them.

The seemingly abrupt alteration was in largest measure the appearance above the surface of a movement that had been long maturing—assuredly a much healthier state of affairs. All during the war lines had been drawing. Even before the final defeat of Germany there were a courageous few who dared to take the view that the war was between two systems and that Japan would remain in an anomalous position as long as she was the foe of Germany in war, but her disciple and fol-

lower in government and educational methods. On the other hand, even in the midst of war against Germany, influential voices were raised defending German institutions, German thought, and German ideals, and explaining that since Japan had made these her own and built her greatness upon them she was an enemy of Germany only in a military sense, and even that only for certain specific purposes. I was among those who heard Baron Ishii denounce German propaganda as responsible for alienation of feeling between the United States and Japan, and like many more of my countrymen I was much moved thereby. But when I reached Japan I marveled. For I found that intellectually, morally, and politically an active German propaganda had been carried on during the war by Japanese officials. I learned that in the army the conscript recruits had been systematically got together and taught the superiority of German institutions to those of the Allies, and especially the superiority of German militarism and the fact that it could not be defeated. I learned that on the very day when the armistice was declared an important intellectual figure was billed for a public lecture on "Why Germany Cannot Be Defeated."

These facts are not mentioned to rake up grounds of offense. They help explain the courage of the liberals who when the war was still undecided had said that Germany must be defeated not merely to oust her from the Far East, but because she was autocratic and militaristic, and begged the Japanese to eliminate from their own government and administrative methods all that Japan had borrowed from Germany lest Japan should in the end find herself also at odds with the whole world. And the fact that the lines had been so openly and stringently drawn made the final defeat and still more the spectacular collapse of the invulnerable state a sensational victory for the liberals against the bureaucrats. It gave liberal and democratic ideas a vogue which they would not have had if there had not been during the war itself a struggle between the partisans and the opponents of German ideals and an application of the controversy to domestic politics.

The highest wave of democratic sentiment in Japan has apparently receded since the winter and early spring months. The Japanese are quick—often too quick—and they have not failed to take home to themselves the lesson of the failure at Paris of the fine words which President Wilson flourished when he took the United States into the war. It may be that the racial discrimination issue was raised at Paris as a smoke-screen to obfuscate the Shantung question—diplomats other than Japanese have been known to raise a moral question when they wished to gain a material point. But there can be no doubt of the immense popularity of the issue in Japan. The interest was clearly in part “accelerated” by politicians of light conscience, like Marquis Okuma, but there is no question of the popularity of the response. When the newspapers gave next to no attention to other problems of the Paris Conference they gave columns to this one.

The defeat of the proposal to insert a recognition of the principle of equality of nations in the Preamble to the League Covenant was a blow to liberal thought. For it made it easy to assert that all the democratic professions of equality and humanity of the Allies during the war were part of a hypocritical propaganda. At the last, the Japanese proposal was whittled down to a Platonic and almost Pickwickian statement. The more those who opposed it believed that it was not offered in good faith but for ulterior purpose, the more willingly they should have favored it—if only as a sop to sentiment and a slave to pride. Its rejection was worse than inhumane; it was stupid. To have accepted it would have been to create good feeling and also frank and objective basis for a discussion of immigration as an economic and political question, free from entanglements with the question of racial prejudice. As it is, the two questions are still entangled, and the supporter of restricted immigration on economic grounds (and political also till Japan has radically changed its form of government) is hampered by the bad conscience that comes from giving to Japan an opportunity to inject the question of race and color discrimination into the discussion. But for present

purposes the consequence chiefly of importance is that the action of the Conference gave a great tactical advantage to the Japanese upholder of things as they were and dampened the ardor for democratic ideas.

The other leading force in giving liberal thought a temporary setback is the raising of the Chinese issue. "Patriotism" is more acute in Japan than in any country of the globe, and the press is more recklessly irresponsible than that of any other country of the globe. And the political consciousness of the people is still immature. Consequently the intelligent and critical discussion of foreign relations, hard enough in any country, is unusually difficult in Japan. In fact one of the ablest of the intellectual liberals in Japan said in spite of his democratic beliefs he dreaded the time when diplomacy should come in Japan more under popular influence, for the professional diplomats were much more enlightened, much more cosmopolitan, more sympathetic with Western ideas and ways than were the people, who are still blindly chauvinistic—as was indicated in the riots that protested against the mildness of the terms of peace with Russia—and who constantly clamor for a stronger foreign policy.

Anyhow, it was an easy matter to lead the mass of the Japanese people to think that there is a conspiracy to thwart the true national destiny of Japan in Asia and that nominally democratic countries, especially the United States, are at the bottom of this plot. And the militarist party has not been slow to point the moral or to hold up Japanese liberals as embryonic traitors who would weaken and destroy the national cause. It was not Japan that originated the motto "Our country right or wrong" or that originated the psychology which is sure that our country is always right. Consequently the Japanese liberals who wish to tell the truth about conditions in China—and there are a good number of them—at the same time temporarily handicap the liberal cause because they seem to be identified with an unpatriotic and anti-nationalistic cause.

If the situation can develop in a reasonable normal way, there is no doubt as to where ultimate triumph will lie. It

was European imperialism that taught Japan that the only way in which it could be respected was to be strong in military and naval force. Not its art nor the exquisite courtesy of its people nor its eager curiosity gave Japan the rank of one of the Big Five at Paris. And none of these things brought triumph to its diplomats there. Until the world puts less confidence in military force and deals out justice internationally on some other basis than command of force, the progress of democracy in Japan will be uncertain, because in Japan more than any other country the strength of political reactionism centers in the army, in the ideas which it breeds and in the officials who come, willingly or unwillingly, under its influence.

But, barring outside events, two great forces are working on the side of liberal ideas and institutions. One is intellectual, the other economic. Japan is trying, under the leadership of its present rulers, an impossible experiment. It recognizes its dependence on the West for material, technical, and scientific development, and welcomes the introduction of Western ideas and methods so far as they concern these things. But it is trying at the same time to preserve intact its own peculiar moral and political heritage; it is claiming superiority in these respects to anything the West can give it. It is another chosen nation, unique in origin and destiny. With extraordinary toughness and tenacity it has managed somehow to conserve the feudal and even barbarian morale and politics of the warrior, while it has borrowed wholesale the entire scientific and industrial technique of the world.

But no nation can enduringly live a double life; Japan shows everywhere the strain of this split in its life. Nor can the Japanese, even with all their power of resistance, indefinitely shut out the entrance of genuinely Western ideas and aims. These have crept in and are expelling the traditional ideas in spite of the most incredibly reactionary system of primary education the world has ever known. The first fruits of this creeping in is that release of liberal ideas which accompanied the defeat of Germany. As one of the intellectual leaders of the new Japan put it, the change that has come over Japan in the

last year is not describable in words; it is intellectual, moral, even metaphysical.

II¹

The word "metaphysical" was ventured upon in describing the intellectual change which is furthering the growth of liberalized institutions in Japan. I can imagine the scorn with which some greet the idea that intellectual changes can lead to political changes. People love to stand on their heads intellectually, and so it is that the Marxians who have given the world its best modern demonstration of the power of ideas and of intellectual leadership, are the ones who most deny that these things have any efficacy. Even the most hardened upholder of the impotency of intellectual and moral forces might however concede that *without* certain changes of mental attitude and disposition, there are certain alterations of society which cannot be accomplished, that intellectual changes are at least a negative condition, a *sine qua non*. And this concession will be met not with an admission but an assertion that it is fortunate for the prospects of liberalism in Japan that the intellectual modifications already dealt with are accompanied and reinforced by active and aggressive economic changes.

The war tremendously hastened the industrial transition in Japan. In 1918 alone the number of factories in Tokyo doubled in spite of extraordinary increases in prior years. The last five years have practically transformed Japan from an agrarian into an industrial state. For there is to-day actual shortage of farm labor in that country, although the wages of farm hands have more than doubled. The urban factories have been absorbing labor at such a rate that for the time being at least the old plea for territorial expansion to take up the growth of population does not hold. In consequence of this expedited development Japan has been plunged into the labor problem—and plunged with exceedingly little preparation.

¹ From *The Dial*, Oct. 18, 1919.

The remote and speculative observer is given to supposing that a new country which is undergoing the industrial revolution at this late date will surely learn from the experience of the other countries that passed through it earlier. Why wait for all the evils of child labor, woman's labor, long hours, unsanitary factories, congested housing, slums, and so forth to show themselves, when experience has demonstrated how surely they follow upon a *laissez-faire* policy, and also how legislation and administration may at least alleviate their worst evils? Especially would it seem as if a paternalistic government like that of Japan would do something, if only because of the general influence exercised by her model, Germany. But practically no foresight has been manifested. Certain factory laws on the Western pattern were indeed passed, but their execution was postponed for a term of years—up to twelve—on the plea of giving capital a chance to adjust itself. As a matter of fact, greed for immediate profits irrespective of ultimate results has taken possession of industrial Japan.

This individualistic force has been reinforced by what seems to me the most harmful force at work in Japan—impatient hurry to become a Great Power at once. The Japanese know very well that a modern Great Power requires developed industry and wealth. Consequently they have “drawn the great red-ink overdraft on the future.” Its statesmen have believed that the interests of the nation coincided with the get-rich-quick desires of individuals, and have not only not tried to regulate them but have encouraged them. The most enlightening answer received to the question asked by every foreign visitor as to the difference of political parties in Japan was that the party in power was the Mitsui party, while its rival was the Mitsubishi party. Japan has its “big six”—corporations which combine banking, shipping, mining, manufacturing, and continental exploitation in their various activities. Of the six, the Mitsuis and Mitsubishiis are the richest and most powerful, the others being grouped about them. By direct intermarriage as well as in countless indirect ways, these big business interests are woven into the administration of the State. In

fact, they on one side and the military and naval clans on the other *are* the State.

Perhaps the greatest enlightenment I received as to practical politics in Japan was upon being told that the big business interests did not as such interfere in the Parliamentary elections. They did not care particularly what individuals were elected, for they did business direct with the political overlords. The story of the alliance of big business and politics in Japan would require a book—not a paragraph. Hence there is not much use in citing isolated illustrative facts. But certain items in their system of taxation may be taken as typical. A private individual pays a seven per cent. income tax when his income reaches seven hundred and fifty dollars. A corporation pays only seven and a half per cent. on an income of half a million. Chapters could not say more as to where control lies in Japan. The theory is that the private individual can do little to make Japan a strong world-power. Big concentrations of capital can really push Japan ahead in building up trade and industry for world competition. And newspapers which devote columns to general denunciation of the government rarely condescend to discuss the significance of such facts as these.

During the discussions by the Japanese newspapers of the League of Nations, they were wont to say that Japan represented the cause of labor, while the Western nations, especially Great Britain and the United States, represented capitalism. But there is no modern state in which capitalism has such unresisted and almost unquestioned power as in Japan to-day. The fear of the League of Nations as an agency of capitalistic exploitations was in fact a fear of one organization of capital by another—especially with reference to the development of Siberia and China.

It was a cynical Japanese—there aren't many—who told me that Japan's factory legislation was solely for the benefit of the Westerner. Being tired of telling curious visiting foreigners that Japan had no labor laws, they put some on the statute-book and suspended their execution for the most part. The

former fact is advertised—and the latter concealed unless the visitor is unusually inquisitive. But the effect of this absence of regulation in conjunction with the rapid development of industry and trade during the past five years has been what every Westerner would have foretold. The labor crisis has arrived and it is unmitigated, acute. The allegedly more liberal Hara government at present in power has not authorized the formation of trade unions, but it has suspended the enforcement of the ban they are under. They now exist in a dim twilight zone, neither forbidden nor legalized. How numerous they are a visitor like myself has no way of knowing. One young radical Japanese told me that Japan was honeycombed with them, even while they were illegal, that even farm hands were unionizing, and that the police no longer reported them because the police had themselves been infected with "dangerous ideas"—a technical term in Japan as well as in certain respectable circles in the United States.

In intellectual circles there is animated discussion of whether Japan must in its economic development pass through the stage of antagonism of capital and labor characteristic of Western development. There is an influential section, representing the old Confucianist oligarchy, which holds that it is not necessary. They conceive that the old feudal principle of master and man, of protection and dependence, can be carried over into the modern relation of employer and employee. They do not content themselves with making appeals to the former to treat their employees better, to assume paternalistic responsibilities. There are countless societies in existence, under the control of employers, for health insurance, sick funds, promoting the welfare of laborers, and so forth. This is known technically as the principle of "kindness."

The liberals who have come most under the influence of Western ideas contend that the principle is only a belated feudal relic and is bound to fail. They hold that it is morally as well as economically necessary for the laborers to assert themselves; that they cannot develop unless they organize and win their rights for themselves, instead of accepting conces-

sions from benevolent patrons. This is known as the principle of "rights." But the feudalists of the chosen, unique-nation type counter by saying that it is only the materialism of the West that has made the development of industry take the form of struggle for liberties and rights; that the superior moral standards of the Orient are capable of applying the principle of kindness and sympathy to the growth of industrial relations and thus escaping the class war which has disgraced Western civilization. The Bolsheviks, of course, come in usefully here as well as elsewhere.

But for the moment at least the case is going against the upholders of the doctrine of "kindness." The rice riots were the signal of the beginning of labor and class-consciousness. The high cost of living is even a more acute issue in Japan than elsewhere. Japan has to import a considerable part of its food supply, and rice is not, like wheat, a world staple. It is conceivable that the future destiny of Japan turns upon this fact, for rice costs twelve times what it cost thirty years ago, and over three times what it did at the beginning of the war. Meantime there are all the usual consequences of change from the relative isolation of rural life to close contacts in cities and factories. On every side there are stories of increasing and active friction in shops and factories between foremen and laborers, and as I write there is a perfect epidemic of strikes. The rise in wages has in no sense kept pace with the increase in the cost of living; and the evidences of millionaires new-made from war profiteering abound on every hand. Japan is plunged suddenly and with practically no preparation, administrative or intellectual, into the most acute labor problem. Socialism is under the ban; a socialistic party is legally a criminal conspiracy and is treated as such. But according to all reports the interest in socialism is growing with remarkable rapidity.

In one of the private universities a teacher gave his class in advanced political economy a chance to vote as to whether or not they would take up for study Commercial Expansion, Labor Movements, or Socialism. The vote was a hundred for

the last topic, to three for the first. Considering the avidity of the Japanese for practical topics and the zeal for commercial expansion it is safe to say that before the war the figures would have been reversed.

The younger generation of students is becoming infected with radical ideas. The Imperial University is often thought to be the home of intellectual conservatism. A group of its students are publishing a journal called *Democracy*. Some of its professors are the most active members of a society called The Dawn, which is openly carrying on propaganda by public lectures for democratic ideas. Magazines with titles like *Reconstruction*, *The New Society*, are born almost every month. During the time of the previous cabinet, when police supervision was more rigid than now, a judge was convicted of *lese majeste*, because in attacking the bureaucratic militarists he had said that by coming between the people and the Emperor they tarnished the glory of the Emperor. The suggestion that the Emperor could be tarnished was enough to send him to jail, but his standing and his influence were increased by the episode. A number of like cases could be cited. There have been of late many arrests for possession and circulation of "revolutionary" literature. There are even those who prophesy a political revolution on an economic basis in Japan within the next five years. But they seem to me too sanguine.

Serious as is the situation with labor, it is even more serious with the middle class. So far the industrial revolution in Japan does not run true to form. It is not creating a bourgeoisie, but rather undermining that bourgeoisie which used to exist. The Marxian division into the proletariat and the millionaire is rapidly going on. The old hand points out to you as significant that the numerous autos seen on the streets of Tokyo are of the Rolls-Royce and Pierce-Arrow type; Fords are conspicuous by their absence. In the country districts, peasant proprietorship is on the wane; large and absentee landownership is on the increase. The average land holding is about three acres; this hardly supports a family. Since it leaves no rice to sell, the high price of rice does not help the small farmer. Conse-

quently concentration of land as well as of other forms of capital is rapidly proceeding.

Japan has had for some time an educated proletariat, which it has characteristically nicknamed the "European-clothes poor." So far as minor officials, police, clerks, and primary school teachers are concerned, this middle class has been the most staunch supporter of bureaucracy and militarism. But it recently tasted the bitterness of being a salaried class when the cost of living was leaping. Wages have increased; salaries hardly at all. The police began to agitate, and the Government did something for them; their position was too strategic to take chances. The primary school teachers called meetings for discussion in Tokyo and Yokohama; the police, acting under governmental instructions, forbade and then broke up the meetings.

A newspaper commenting on the situation asked what would be the effect upon pupils when teachers in school taught conventional ethics, while out of school the teachers went contrary to the ethics they taught? In other words, the burden of what is termed "ethics" in the primary schools is submission to authority, while out of school the teachers were guilty of going contrary to authority in agitating to force the authorities to give them a living wage. The middle class does not of course possess the weight in mass of the laboring class, but it is quite likely that, with its greater education, its weaning from the cause of autocracy to which it has been devoted will have the earlier political results.

The observer can follow the progress of the cause of democracy in Japan by certain outward signs. The first and in many ways the most superficial will be the extension of universal suffrage. The last Parliament passed a bill about doubling the electorate. It was a compromise measure that gave no satisfaction to either the conservatives or the radicals. Unless foreign relations monopolize attention, the struggle will be renewed in the next Parliament. The second sign, and a more significant one, will be a conflict, occasioned either through the extension of suffrage or some similar question, between the

lower house and the upper. For the House of Peers was deliberately invented to give the old oligarchy and the new plutocracy power to prevent extravagances in the popular direction on the part of the lower house. An even more serious sign will be the determined effort to make the ministers of war and navy real members of the Cabinet, instead of privileged appointees of the Army and Navy with independent and irresponsible jurisdiction.

How far their independence goes came out in a way which would have been most embarrassing in any country except Japan in the closing days of the last Parliament. It was necessary to get the approval of the budget of expenditures of the various governmental departments. That of the War Department called for extra wages to one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers who had been on service in Siberia. Yet the Foreign Office had had a distinct understanding with other governments that only from seven to ten thousand men, a number proportionate to the army of the other Allies, would be sent. There was a temporary excitement, the House went into secret session, the money was voted, and a few days later there appeared in the newspapers a semi-official statement that the number in Siberia had not exceeded seventy thousand. No outsider, and not many insiders, will ever know what the other eighty thousand were paid for. But the meaning of an independent minister of war in a government that is said by propagandists in foreign countries to be constitutional is measured by the fact that he could act in such contravention to the direct pledge of the minister of foreign affairs. Numerous such cases appear, especially in connection with Chinese affairs; and it is of course impossible to tell how much is collusion with a chance to prove an alibi on the part of supposedly liberal ministers, and how much is due to the undoubted power of the Minister of War (in effect the General Staff) to act without the rest of the "Government's" knowing anything about it.

Other convincing signs of the spread of democratic ideas will be a movement for responsibility of the ministry to the Parlia-

ment instead of to the Emperor—which means in effect to the Clansmen who constitute Elder Statesmen—and for real legislative initiative on the part of the Parliament. For one has to be near the scene to learn that no important bills ever even receive consideration in the Parliament unless they have received a permit from the Privy Council—a secret and irresponsible body. The canceling of the power of the police to suppress newspapers without judicial action or review, will be a most hopeful sign.

However, it is not likely that affairs will move in such a logical sequence as has been outlined. It is more likely that something will happen and a general change in the political structure take place all at once. Yet while in its effect, in its consequence, this happening will be a revolution, it is hard to imagine a happening in Japan such as we usually associate with the word "Revolution." There is some quality in the Japanese inscrutable to a foreigner which makes them at once the most rigid and the most pliable people on earth, the most self-satisfied and the most eager to learn. It is wholly conceivable that, with the development of democratic sentiment, a dramatic change may suddenly take place comparable to the transfer in the sixties of power from the old Tokugawa Shogunate to the Satsuma and Choshu clansmen, and the consequent centralized unification of Japan and the surrender of the policy of isolation.

To the student of history it now looks very much as if Japan in the seventies and eighties had been very much in flux, and as if with slight changes in the course of events Japan might then have become a genuine and not a simulated constitutional state. But unfortunately in the eighties Europe generally entered upon the imperialistic path, and in the later eighties Japan deliberately adopted from Germany a militarized state, a constitution which gave the form without the substance of a representative government, and a universal primary education calculated to produce what a young Japanese student of English called "obeyfulness," and a secondary and higher system

aiming at specialized efficiency in the service of the State. The development of liberation was put in abeyance for thirty years.

III¹

Comparisons of Japan with Germany have become common, perhaps too common. At all events, they usually fail in my judgment to point out wherein the actual and undeniable likeness lies. The similarity is not so much intrinsic and indigenous as it is imitative and acquired. In the seventies and eighties Japan was busy studying the Western world for models, as one thousand years before she had studied Korea and China. From Great Britain she borrowed the idea of navalism, merchant marine, sea commerce and sea power. From France she took the idea of centralized administration as a cure for the remaining ills of her centrifugal feudalism. From Germany she learned a technique for family law (a most important thing in transition from family organization to an individualistic basis); borrowed the aims and methods of an educational system, and the way of setting up an apparently Western or representative government which should not actually infringe in any way upon the autocratic oligarchy of the Choshu and Satsuma clan-leaders. Nor were the latter actuated wholly, nor possibly even chiefly, by personal ambitions. They were sure that only a high degree of centralized power would permit that development of army, navy, and a strong foreign policy which would save Japan from undergoing the same fate at the hands of Western powers that the rest of Asia was undergoing. And in the face of the Imperial Europe of the last generation, it would demand a boldness of idealism not possessed by the present writer to declare they were wholly wrong.

Moreover the unification of Japan was only a recently accomplished fact. The foreigner is so used to hearing of the unity and community of the life of the Far East, especially Japan, that he is likely to overlook the socially divisive force

¹ From *The Dial*, Nov. 1, 1919.

exercised by the family principle. In Japan, isolations and animosities had been acute all through the still recent feudal period. Japan had been held together only by the force of the Tokugawas, and by their skill in playing one clan off against another. In connection with the restoration of Imperial unity and the opening of Japan to the outside world, Japan needed some internal and more spiritual bond of union. This she found in going Germany one better. In her past she had had a theocratic tradition which could be revived and put at the service of centralization. Japan has now had over a generation of education in a religion of State and emperor worship. Hence a new moral and intellectual flux can never be as eager, as open to new methods and institutions, as was the Japan of fifty years ago. There is a story told in Japan which does not sound authentic but which has a certain symbolic truth about it. It is said that when Marquis Ito and his commission on a constitution were on their way back to Japan—fresh from Germany and Bismarck—they stopped in London. Ito visited Herbert Spencer, whose advice (and this is authentic enough) to Japan to keep foreign nations at arm's (and armed) length had given him great influence. And Ito, so goes the story, told the philosopher that he was taking home with him plans for a constitution, an educational system, economic development, and so forth—in fact for everything except religion; and that he was depending upon Spencer to supply Japan with plans for that necessity. In reply, Spencer is said to have stated that since Japan had had ancestor worship and since the Emperor had been for ages a religious rather than a secular figure, she did not need to look abroad for plans to construct a national religion.

This particular account of the calculated use of Shintoism as political support of militaristic autocracy may be doubted. But no student can doubt that the Elder Statesmen who in the later eighties set Japan upon its present track deliberately surrounded the Imperial dynasty with all the mystic emotional haloes and sanctions that accompany divinity and divine origin. It is not many centuries since Europe had states based

on the divine right of kings; but we have to go back to Imperial Rome to find emperors who are themselves divine and the sons of gods. A Japanese scholar told me that till the publication of the Constitution in 1889 the title Son of Heaven had been reserved for dead emperors, and that the deliberate use of religious myth for preventing the growth of democratic ideas was evident in the fact that in this document the title was for the first time applied to the living ruler. Of course I do not know whether his statement is correct, but there can be no doubt of the completeness of the fusion in the popular mind of political with religious and theocratic ideas, nor of the support the fusion gives to Japanese nationalistic sentiment as against other nations, and to the prestige and power of the ruling dynasty. And since as matter of fact the Emperor is still almost as much of a figure-head as when he was in a seclusion in Kyoto, this permeating religious sanction accrues to the benefit of the bureaucracy that actually runs things. And it is interesting to note that one wing at least of the new liberal group is endeavoring to give the religious status of the Imperial dynasty a democratic turn. They do not attack the imperial idea; the attack would not only throw them personally into prison but would render them so odious as to discredit their cause. They claim that traditionally the emperor has been the Father of the People, supremely interested in their welfare; that in the sense of government *for* the people Japan is historically a democracy; and then they attack the oligarchy which has turned Japan aside from its true basis, and which has for its own aggrandizement come between the emperor and his people.

Westerners naturally have not taken Shintoism seriously as a political instrument. They have not taken the theocratic idea seriously. They could not; it is too alien to their ways of thinking. Hence they imagine that it is not taken seriously in Japan itself. They think of it as a kind of poetic embellishment, an additional romantic touch in a romantic land. And of course it is true that educated men in Japan do not believe the political myths in any literal sense. But it is also true that

the theocratic point of view governs the consideration of all questions, and that emotions connected with it are so pervasive and intense that Japan *is* a unique country, one whose aims and methods are baffling to any foreigner. Perhaps only the foreigner who makes a study of elementary education, especially of the teaching of history and "ethics," realizes how systematic is the emperor-cult and how completely it becomes a part of the sub-conscious mental apparatus of all the pupils. Those who throw it off may be compared to the few who in Western countries in earlier days threw off, as they grew up, the theological teachings of childhood. The emotional after-effect can hardly be thrown off even then without a simultaneous casting off of patriotism and nationalistic feeling, so intimately religious has the dynastic sentiment become.

Three myths compose the larger myth. First is the notion of complete racial homogeneity, of common blood, common descent, of common relationship to the gods who established civilization in Japan and whose descendants still rule the country. This is the doctrine which practically has the most truth in it in spite of its ethnological falsity, for in the course of time the various ethnic elements have got wonderfully fused together: Japan has not been an island and an isolated one for nothing. This is also the myth which it is safest to question, for all educated people are well aware of the different types that are found in the population. But it would hardly be safe to draw any political implications or conclusions from the denial of racial unity and common relationship to the emperor. The texts in "ethics" used in the schools teach that citizens of other countries have patriotism and that they also have filial and paternal affection, but that Japan is the only country in the world where the two things absolutely coincide. And a scientific ethnology which was punctilious enough to deny an objective literal basis for this statement would find itself in trouble.

The second myth is that of the unbroken continuity of the Imperial dynasty for over twenty-five hundred years—since the first imperial God settled in Japan. As a basis for this state-

ment, children in school are gravely taught a lot of myths about the formation of Japan and its earliest history which intellectually and esthetically are not on a level with the legends of the North American Indians. Then the actual facts of history which prove anything but continuity of blood and unity of dynasty are systematically falsified. The myth of single and pure descent of the imperial house which has existed from time immemorial and which will continue to exist for ages eternal is proclaimed in the very beginning of the German-borrowed constitution of Japan and remains the cornerstone of the Japanese State. The third myth is the consummation of the other two. All that Japan is and can become she owes to the original virtues of the divine founders and to those of their divine descendants. The moral as to what the citizen of Japan owes the Imperial dynasty is obvious, and the teaching of ethics and history in the common schools takes no chances that it will not be made plain. It is not surprising that the fanatical apostles of these doctrines have more than once allowed their little charges to perish in flame and smoke while they saved the portrait of the divine emperor.

University teachers in their classrooms tell the historic truth. They fulfill orally the obligations of historic scholarship. But such higher criticism is confined to the confidence of the classroom. Martyrdom is not wooed by setting forth the facts in printed form for general consumption. Sometimes I think that the surest sign of the approach of democracy will be given when we read that a group of intellectuals have braved prison or death by setting forth to the public the truth about such matters.

I am afraid I may seem to have got completely away from my subject. I seem to be speaking not of liberalism in Japan but of the most insidious and influential type of reactionarism. But it is worth while to know the difficulties with which the growth of liberalism has to contend. The knowledge will make us more sympathetic and more patient. The liberalism is there, and it is coming to possess the present generation of university-taught men. Since I began writing, a delegation of

Japanese University students has been in Peking to express to the Chinese their entire lack of sympathy with the policy of Japan towards China, and to say that their enemy is a common one—Japanese militaristic autocracy. It is impossible for Japan to engage in trade, to exchange commodities and technical science with all the world, to take a part in world politics, and still to remain isolated from the world situation and world currents. The significance of this fact has been brought home to Japan with increasing acceleration and momentum by the war and its conclusion, and the outcome is the present spread of democracy and liberalism. The imperialistic settlement at Paris has undeniably effected a setback. Every reaction from democracy all over the world will retard the movement in Japan. But unless the world overtly and on a large scale goes back on democracy, Japan will move steadily towards democracy. And my own confidence in the resilience, adaptability, and practical intelligence of the Japanese people, as well as in a kind of social democracy which is embodied in the manners and customs of the people, makes me think the change will come without a bloody and catastrophic upheaval.

4. ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE EASTERN SEA¹

It is three days' easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtful whether anywhere in the world another journey of the same length brings with it such a complete change of political temper and belief. Certainly it is greater than the alteration perceived in journeying directly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The difference is not one in customs and modes of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the ideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the same fact: the status of Japan in the international world and especially its attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a feeling of uncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There is a subtle nervous tension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of change but not knowing where the change will take it. Liberalism is in the air, but genuine liberals are encompassed with all sorts of difficulties especially in combining their liberalism with the devotion to theocratic robes which the imperialistic militarists who rule Japan have so skilfully thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one senses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the all-pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate to its unhesitating conclusion—the domination of Chinese politics and industry with a view to its final absorption.

It is not my object to analyze the realities of the situation or to inquire whether the universal feeling in China is a collective hallucination or is grounded in fact. The phenomenon is worthy of record on its own account. Even if it be merely psychological, it is a fact which must be reckoned with in both its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. And in the first place, as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. Everybody who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of

¹ From *The New Republic*, July 16, 1919.
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reserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell you that this is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The informed know that it is an attitude shown to foreigners only because it is deeply engrained in the moral and social tradition of Japan; and that, if anything, the Japanese are more likely to be communicative—about many things at least—to a sympathetic foreigner, than to one another. The habit of reserve is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette, convention and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of strength of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected themselves to foreign influences escape it—and many of them revert. To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious people; they have the gift of doing rather than of gab.

When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist engages in unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting forth the aims and procedures of Japan, the student of politics who has been long in the East at once becomes alert, not to say suspicious. A recent illustration is so extreme that it will doubtless seem fantastic beyond belief. But the student at home will have to take these seeming fantasies seriously if he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere of China. Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses of Baron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere these have the effect of reassuring America as to any improper ambitions on the part of Japan. In China, they were taken as announcements that Japan has about completed its plans for the absorption of China, and that the lucubration preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to begin. The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels about both the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the belief in the alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what I should feel in his place. But the suspicion aroused by such statements as this and the recent interview of Foreign Minister Uchida and Baron Ishii must be noted as evidences of the universal belief in China that Japan has one mode of diplomacy for the East and another for the West, and that what is said in the West must be read in reverse in the East.

China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It is a proverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The Chinese talk more easily than they act—especially in politics. They are adepts in revealing their own shortcomings. They dissect their own weaknesses and failures with the most extraordinary reasonableness. One of the defects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes for positive action, of avoiding entering upon a course of action which might be irrevocable. One almost wonders whether their power of self-criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At all events, they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite camps there are always communications flowing. Among official enemies there are "sworn friends." In a land of perpetual compromise, etiquette as well as necessity demands that the ways for later accommodations be kept open. Consequently things which are spoken of only under the breath in Japan are shouted from the housetops in China. It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the report that influential Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese funds and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which political and economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe and America were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes the trouble to deny it, or even to discuss it. What is psychologically most impressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it is spoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day.

In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan itself, one must refer to the economic situation because of its obvious connection with the international situation. In the first place, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended. Even in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreign markets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. But there is the belief that Japan *must* do so, because only by large foreign sellings—large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people still having a low standard of life—can it purchase the raw materials—and even food—it has to have. But during the war, the de-

pendence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign market was greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though very great, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriously the internal demand for goods. Item one which awakens sympathy for Japan as being in a somewhat precarious situation.

Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itself in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (or rather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women's labor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she now counts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand, strikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc., are constantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere is unmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memory persists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directly political aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of the aspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and the growth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate those aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will it have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope that it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japan which is beginning to undergo the throes of transition.

As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling in Japan is one of the threatening danger of isolation. Germany is gone; Russia is gone. While those facts simplify matters for Japan somewhat, there is also the belief that in taking away potential allies, they have weakened Japan in the general game of balance and counterbalance of power. Particularly does the removal of imperialistic Russia relieve the threat on India which was such a factor in the willingness of Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The revelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another serious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of Japan, Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a realign-

ment of international forces in which a common understanding between Great Britain and America is a dominant factor. This factor explains, if it does not excuse, some of the querulousness and studied discourtesies with which the Japanese press for some months has treated President Wilson, the United States in general and its relation to the League of Nations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor with which the opportune question of racial discrimination was discussed. (The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense of humor. It was interesting to note the delight with which they received the utterance of the Japanese Foreign Minister, after Japanese success at Paris, that "his attention had recently been called" to various press attacks on America which he much deprecated). In any case there is no mistaking the air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends all discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, there are characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs and movement along new lines. Japan seems to be much in the same mood as that which it experienced in the early eighties before its crystallized, toward the close of that decade, its institutions through acceptance of the German constitution, militarism, educational system, and diplomatic methods. So that, once more, the observer gets the impression that substantially all of Japan's energy, abundant as that is, must be devoted to her urgent problems of readjustment.

Come to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost seems as if one were living in a dream; or as if some new Alice had ventured behind an international looking-glass wherein everything is reversed. That we in America should have little idea of the state of things and the frame of mind in China is not astonishing—especially in view of the censorship and the distraction of attention of the last few years. But that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and yet every fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite perspective, is an experience of a lifetime. Japanese liberalism? Yes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form which the longing for the miraculous *deus ex machina* takes. Perhaps a revo-

lution in Japan may intervene to save China from the fate which now hangs over her. But there is no suggestion that anything less than a complete revolution will alter or even retard the course which is attributed to Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanese business interests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany? These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen complete heir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions in Manchuria, and Outer Mongolia, and has had opportunities in Siberia thrown into her hands which she could hardly have hoped for in her most optimistic moments. And now Japan has, with the blessing of the great Powers at Paris, become also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and ambitions, with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent and corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was busy with war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan that they give way to her every wish, what is China that she can escape the doom prepared for her? That is the cry of helplessness going up all over China. And Japanese propagandists take advantage of the situation, pointing to the action of the Peace Conference as proof that the Allies care nothing for China, and that China must throw herself into the arms of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee the integrity and independence of China. And the fear that the latter must, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept this fate in order to escape something worse swims in the sinister air. It is the exact counterpart of the feeling current among the liberals in Japan that Japan has alienated China permanently when a considerate and slower course might have united the two countries. If the economic straits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has hurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings with Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the western world supposes that the military and the industrial party in Japan have opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese supremacy in the East, it is the universal opinion in China that the two

are working in complete understanding with one another, and the differences that sometimes occur between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Ministry of War (which is extra-constitutional in status) are staged for effect.

These are some of the aspects of the most complete transformation scene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. May it turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological experience! But in the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident of China—Chinese or American—with whom I have talked in the last four weeks has volunteered the belief that all the seeds of a future great war are now deeply implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they look to the League of Nations or some other force outside the immediate scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt to discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts as evidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now has its eyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its hands on Asia. Consequently America is interested in trying to foster ill-will between China and Japan. If the pro-American Japanese do not enlighten their fellow-countrymen as to the facts then America ought to return some of the propaganda that visits its shores. But every American who goes to Japan ought also to visit China—if only to complete his education.

5. JAPAN REVISITED: TWO YEARS LATER¹

While in Tokio I listened to an interesting conversation between a Japanese and a visiting Chinese educationalist. The former was a true, not a pseudo-liberal. He had been in China and had kept his eyes open. Ever since his visit he has been a critic of Japan's course in China; he admitted freely the wrong policy of his own country and the need of going further in the changes which, he said, Hara the prime minister had already entered upon and which he would extend were he not hampered and checked by the militarists. But he insisted that China and Japan were so near to each other and so intimately connected with each other, that Japan must have a relation to China different from that of any other country. For, he insisted, everything that happened in China directly influenced the well-being of Japan, while even extraordinary events there had next to no reverberations in other countries.

The reply of the Chinese was to say that Japan worried altogether too much about China and what happened there, that its anxiety was almost morbid, and that the Japanese would best serve their country by caring less about what was going on over on the mainland, and permitting the Chinese to do more of the worrying about their own affairs. And when my Japanese friend reiterated the fact that the close connection of the two countries made such indifference out of the question, our Chinese friend retorted that the Japanese would do better to pay more attention to their own problems and worry more about their own troubles; that the problems and evils of Japan were quite as serious as those of China, the only difference being that the former were covered up while the latter were exposed to all the world.

I am not sure that the retort, which with its counterattack

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 16, 1921; published under the title *Public Opinion in Japan*.

reduced the Japanese liberal to silence, was not exaggerated. But it is worth quoting as an indication of the great difference between Japanese and Chinese public opinion. Intellectually China has the advantage of a weak and corrupt government. Publicity regarding the country's evils, domestic and international, flourishes. The uniform attitude of the educated class toward their government and toward social affairs is critical. Perhaps the most significant single fact about the present culture of China is that not only the reactionary but the conservative class has no intellectual spokesman. Every thinker, every writer, every articulate conscious influence is liberal. The fact is the more striking because the reactionary and militaristic faction is in control of every branch of government save the foreign office. I do not know whether the world offers a parallel for such a combination of political power in actual control with intellectual and moral weakness, futility, non-existence. Even the traditional Confucian thought of China has no first-class representative at the present time. Confucianism is of course still strong, but its strength is that of custom, not that of thought or intellectual influence.

The leaders of the "Literary Revolution,"—the movement to substitute the words and style of the vernacular for that of the classic writings, told me that they expected to have to struggle and be highly unpopular for at least ten years. But to their surprise the movement went like wild-fire; all of the younger educated classes rallied at once to their standard. The movement has slowed up in the last year or so; but its lessened pace is due to the unconscious inertia of stubborn custom rather than to any articulate intellectual opposition or criticism. This incident seems to me typical. There seems to be no country in the world where students are so unanimously and eagerly interested as in China in what is modern and new in thought, especially about social and economic matters, nor where the arguments which can be brought in favor of the established order and the status quo have so little weight—indeed, are so unuttered.

This state of affairs suggests by contrast the obstacles with

which the development of an enlightened liberal public opinion in Japan has to contend. In Japan the government is strong, administration is centralized and organized and opinion is drilled and disciplined. As a consequence critical thought is timid and on the defensive, while the natural course is to defend the existing status and national policies. Not only is patriotism a religion, but religion is literally patriotic and nationalistic. Patriotism and institutional religion are both of them so notoriously hostile to critical thought and free discussion that it is almost impossible to picture to oneself their suppressive and silencing effect when they are combined in one. It takes more force, more moral courage to be an outspoken critic of the politics and social condition of one's nation, to be a dissenter, in Japan, than in any other country in the world.

All the more honor, then, to those liberals in Japan whose insight and courage is slowly forcing a change. We were not long in Japan upon our return trip to America and I do not profess to speak with any authority, but the change in atmosphere since we were in that country two years ago is unmistakable. The ominous hush that seemed then to have settled down is now punctuated with words spoken aloud and some of them shouted forth. Whether the number of liberal critics or their concrete influence has increased, I do not know. But it is evident that the taboo which surrounded articulate discussions of Japan's foreign policies and of fundamental domestic conditions is breaking down. I do not refer to those official apologists and semi-official propagandists who meet you more than half-way with their candid assertion that Japan is human and has made mistakes—"blunders" is the favorite word—in China, Korea and Siberia, and that till towards the end of the war the military bureaucracy had too much power, but that Japan is now engaged in remedying these mistakes as fast as she can. Regarding such talk a certain amount of cynicism is justified. It comes from those whom the *Japan Chronicle* calls tame liberals, and of whom it says in effect that while they indulge in academic criticism of the militarist party, they rush to arms the moment it is a question of a surrender of any of

the concrete advantages which the militarists have secured for Japan in China and Siberia. Reference is rather to the gradual breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, the relaxation of that tension which made allusion to certain subjects an unholy thing, and which forced one who wished to be courteous, to confine his conversations about Japan to the many things upon which one could be conscientiously complimentary.

To give a specific illustration. Two liberals of Japan without connection with each other expressed substantially the same fear regarding the Pacific Conference. They said in effect that they were afraid President Harding would not have the courage to carry the discussion of principles and policies far enough; that he would be satisfied to win a cheap victory for his party and throw a sop to the disarmament sentiment by securing an agreement for moderate limitation of arms, without bringing the whole question of China and Siberia to public attention. They were *afraid* of this result. For, they said, the hope of Japan's being able to loosen the grip of militarism upon the country lay in the growth of such an enlightened foreign public opinion about Japan as would react upon domestic public opinion.

In the language of apologetics, Japan *is* a "sensitive nation" and in spite of the mouthings of its Jingoes is extremely susceptible to the danger of isolation before the bar of the world's opinion. Now I do not think that the growth of ability to express such a critical and free opinion would have been possible on the part of moderate and truly patriotic Japanese, such as these men were, were there not in existence a marked change in Japanese public consciousness.

In the absence of adequate opportunities for study, the reasons for the changed attitude can only be roughly sketched. In a general way the greatest force is doubtless the reverberations of the war. It is conceivable that the intellectual and moral lessons of the war have been felt in the Orient in inverse ratio to actual participation in it. I should say that this is true of China, and I fancy it is true in some measure of Japan. Specifically, the whole Siberian expedition has been unpopular

from the start. It has become increasingly so as expenditures have mounted—the lowest estimate I heard was half a billion dollars—and there were no tangible results of advantage, for the taking over of Saghalien and Vladivostok has not affected the popular imagination except to create an uneasy feeling that there may be a day of reckoning ahead. Again the continuing volume of protest from China has had an effect, and the boycott, even if it turned out largely a practical failure, still gave the Japanese an opportunity furiously to think about their Chinese relations. The free growth of liberal thought in China has had some effect. The contrast of Bertrand Russell as a welcome, honored and influential figure in China, and as entering Japan only to the accompaniment of an apology from the chief of safety for permitting him to enter at all, is acutely impressed upon the minds of Japanese intellectuals. Then the inevitable growth of a scientific spirit among the highly educated is a factor. The home of the liberal movement is in the universities, the normal and lower schools not being as yet much affected; and it is said that a majority of the faculty of Political Science of the Imperial University are now active liberals. A more tangible factor is the persistence of labor troubles and the growth of a class consciousness on the part of laborers in shipyards and factories. And the steady increase of taxes due mainly to the enlarged naval budget is not without influence.

A westerner may deplore the rudimentary and distorted character of public opinion in his own country. But, after all, he is so used to the operation of regular organs of discussion that it is almost impossible for him to realize the spasmodic, immature and disorganized nature of political opinion in the Orient. Hence in judging events he fails to make proper allowances, and often finds design where there is only ignorance. In Japan the nation, the emperor, is about the only enduring and organized centre for public opinion. Naturally this fact accrues to the advantage of imperialism; there is so little of anything else about which people can feel and think in a consistent and unified way. Moreover the military-bureaucratic

party is the only organized group which has a definite and permanent policy. The present prime minister, Mr. Hara, is the first commoner to hold that office, and this fact has been advertised as the beginning of real democracy in government. But the one thing upon which observers agree is that Hara has had no policy except opportunism of a very immediate sort whether as to foreign affairs or as to the acute internal labor and industrial problems.

And if one stops to think, one will find it difficult in the present condition of Japan to construct even in imagination a coherent and unswerving working policy for a truly liberal political party in that country. An avowed liberal course would almost assuredly arouse general popular hostility. For no matter how pacific is the great mass of the Japanese people—and I think that temperamentally they are peace loving—there is no gainsaying the fact that every step in the advancement and consolidation of Japan as a political unit has come as a result of war. The war with China had the abolition of extra-territoriality as its result. The war with Russia gave to Japan Korea, a foothold in Manchuria and a standing among the powers. The last war—which some Japanese publications uniformly refer to as the Japo-German war—made her one of the five powers, besides giving her a hold on Shantung, a goodly number of Pacific islands and a big accretion of bullion and trade. In addition, the people themselves have never experienced the horrors of modern war. Add to these positive facts the outstanding fact that even a Japanese liberal has good reason to believe that in the predatory expansion of modern imperialistic Europe, her army and navy have alone saved Japan from becoming another India or China, and one begins to sense why in any crisis public opinion moves to the side of the militaristic party. Over and over again newspapers which indulge in harsh general criticisms of the military party take the side of the militarists in any concrete issue that arises—the case of Siberia being the only exception that occurs to me.

On general principles one might have thought that the economic development of Japan—her industrialism—would have

created a definite trend of opinion, formed a positive centre and organ of sentiment and thought, which in some respects would be as coherent as the imperialistic centre and organs, even if not actively opposed to it. But in Japan there is no definite line between private and government economic activity. Japan has outdone Germany in mixing governmental support and aid with all capitalistic enterprises. The big corporations engage in a combination of mining, shipping and banking activities, along with manufacturing and continental concessions, and the government, or some group of families which is influential in government, is definitely allied with the big corporations. Hence up to the present the industrialization of Japan has not created any definite trend of public opinion. There is no mercantile or financial consciousness as such. If things go on at the present rate, the laboring class will crystallize a new centre of opinion in the near future, but at present it is inchoate.

I do not know that any clear moral emerges from this survey. If there is one, it is in line with the remark made earlier about the importance of enlightened foreign publicity and opinion in its reflex influence upon Japan. Japan needs sympathy, not abuse; but it is an unkind sympathy which exerts itself in justifying the existing order, and in effect maintains the policy of secrecy which keeps evils covered up. True sympathy will pursue the opposite course of revealing the dominating hold which military bureaucracy has upon Japanese life, internal and international. This course will, however, be comparatively ineffectual in influencing the formation of public opinion in Japan unless it is united with a firm stand against every kind of racial discrimination. Young men in Japan who are genuinely hostile to existing militarism say frankly that when it comes to discriminations against the Japanese simply because they are a yellow race, they will fight to the last, even if it means uniting themselves with a militaristic party which they abhor.

It was a tragedy that the Versailles Conference could not find a formula of race equality consistent with securing to

every country the right to determine its own reception of immigrants. If the United States in the Pacific Conference really wants to lessen the hold of the militarists upon public opinion in Japan it will not wait for Japan to introduce a formula of equality of racial rights, much less turn it down when it is introduced. A slight amount of ingenuity combined with sympathy can readily find a formula which will indicate that *because* of racial equality, not in spite of it, each country has the right to decide its own policy of immigration. One can sympathize with the attitude of the Pacific Coast upon the matters of the restriction of Oriental immigration, and yet believe that every step taken by a Coast state which involves inequality of treatment for immigrants already in residence involves the danger of an ultimate explosion in the Pacific. Not that Japan would go to war about the Californian issue, but that every move that partakes of racial discrimination strengthens that public opinion which in the last resort is the reliance of the military group in Japan. The rankling sense of injustice is played upon to secure support for a big army and navy. The indirect outcome is the continuation of a predatory policy in China and Siberia. And it is the latter policy which carries with it the menace of future war. A frank facing of the question of racial equality is good diplomatic tactics. It is the poorest of policies to hand gratuitously a grievance to a potential opponent. But the issue is deeper and broader than that of diplomatic tactics or even strategy. Until the world in general and the United States in particular does the square thing about racial discrimination, the militarists will remain the formative power in Japanese public opinion. Liberal and pacific opinion will be crippled.

6. THE SIBERIAN REPUBLIC¹

Residents in Peking occasionally see a motor car moving through the streets flying a strange flag, a red flag, with a quarter which is not red but bearing a star and the letters F. E. R. The letters stand for Far Eastern Republic. It and the motor car belong to a delegation which is trying to establish commercial and incidental relations between two republics,—“so-called republics” some would add—those of China and eastern Siberia. Soon after its arrival, the Chinese government ceased to recognize any longer the Russian legation and Russian consuls, and went through the form of taking over Russian concessions where they exist in commercial ports. Many foreigners were at once alarmed. They saw the beginning of an alliance, or at least friendly relations, between China and Russia via Siberia, which latter they claimed was merely a temporary ringer for a Bolshevik state. Rumors increase every day about Bolshevism and Bolshevik propaganda in China, and the danger to the world lest China be Bolshevikized. The facts of the Siberian situation are thus of great importance in connection with the future of China.

They are also of great importance in themselves as an episode in national development. They are of direct significance in connection with Japan, for this empire holds the maritime provinces of Siberia intact including all the commercial ports, to say nothing of fisheries and valuable commercial concessions. This gives Japan command of all gateways to Siberia and Russia from the Pacific, since she already has the developed Manchurian ports. Hence the fate of the Far Eastern Republic can hardly be a trivial affair to the American manufacturer and trader. The Japanese conception of the Open Door in trade is well known from Manchurian experience.

¹ From *The New Republic*, Jan. 19, 1921.

Moreover, it is not likely that a nation like Russia will remain permanently so weak and divided that it will look with indifference upon foreign possession of sea-ports upon the Pacific for the sake of which it built the Siberian railway, and where foreign control would be a permanent national menace. Thus the Siberian situation is of interest to all who are concerned for the future peace of the world.

Yet the usual attitude to the events occurring in Siberia is one of profound indifference. So far as this indifference is due to ignorance it is easily explained. The course of affairs is confused and accurate knowledge is hard to get. All Oriental politics are baffling beyond measure to a foreigner, and Siberia is more than semi-oriental. We soon lose interest in what we cannot make head or tail of. Even foreign newspapermen do not stay long in Siberia. And if they do what they hear is mostly a mass of rumors, no sooner made than contradicted and followed by a crop of other rumors. Thus Siberia has become a happy hunting ground for the propagandists who can make and unmake "news" at will. Consequently an attempt to set forth the main, bare facts of the Siberian situation may be of some use. For even in Siberia there are some facts which give a key to understanding the development of events.

A year ago the dictator, Kolchak, received his final blow, first at Omsk, and then decisively a month later further east at Novo-Nikolaievsk. The dictator who was to be, according to propagandists of the old régime and the new finance, the liberator of Russia, was a fugitive, his armies gone over to the Reds or defeated—all save those of Kappel and Semionoff, who had Japanese support and who had discreetly remained further east where they were outside of the main fighting zone, and also where plundering was better. These last "bulwarks of civilization against the Red tide" (see any properly conservative newspaper in America for the time) unfortunately had impressed the Siberian peasants and townspeople as unmitigated robbers, oppressors and brutes. A favorite amusement was a punitive expedition against some village. The nominal reason was, of course, that the village was Bolshevik. The

actual reason was that the village refused to deliver the conscripted quota of young men for the White army, and incidentally the existence of wealth and women. Then ensued scenes of rape and rapine which equal the worst that has ever been alleged against the Reds even during the Red Terror. It is a bitter jest in Siberia that every dead Russian is a Bolshevik.

The natural result happened. Moderates turned against the brutality and voracious cupidity of the Cossack and other White leaders. They were thrown into sympathy with revolutionaries. Thousands of oppressed peasants were obliged to flee from the reactionaries, and they formed bands of soldiers, the nucleus of the so-called partisans. Many had been in the war and had retained their arms. They were joined by many deserters with their arms. By the time Kolchak was overthrown, the whole district to the south of Omsk, the Altai district, the richest farming country in Siberia, was in the hands of the partisans who had defeated several Cossack leaders, and driven their troops across the border into Mongolia, where they still remain, making trouble for the Chinese in connection with discontented Mongols and Chinese bandits. These partisan bands were also active throughout the eastern part of Russia. When once the defeat of Kolchak had ensured them against a return of the reactionaries and a new White terror, they grasped local power.

Meantime the Red troops proper had stopped their advance at Irkutsk. The Bolsheviks decided to exercise sovereignty only west of Lake Baikal. The armies which overthrew Kolchak, the third and fifth of the Russian armies, were more needed elsewhere. But they had been accompanied in their movements by a civil administration bureau which had instructed the towns captured in the methods of establishing and setting up Soviet organizations. At the same time, independently, but influenced somewhat by these models, revolutionary committees were established under non-Soviet anti-reactionary influences all through eastern Siberia. These Revcoms, as they are popularly termed, formed the civil division of the organi-

zation of which the Partisan armies were the fighting arm. The Revcoms and the soldiers elected delegates who met in March and April of this year and formally established the Far Eastern Republic with its headquarters at Verkhne-Udinsk, well to the west of eastern Siberia. Or, perhaps, it would be better to say they formed several Far Eastern republics, all claiming to represent the whole of eastern Siberia, with several headquarters of which Verkhne-Udinsk was the most radical, being nearest the Bolshevik seat of power, and Vladivostok with the most merchants and the most accessible to Japanese influence, the most conservative.

At this convention there were two parties. The extremists were for a Soviet republic directly leagued with the Russian government. The moderates held that the great need of Siberia was for peace and tranquillity that industry might be restored; and pointed out that a Soviet republic would merely further embroil Siberia in war, civil and foreign, and by stimulating further aggression against Russia proper would do real harm rather than good to Soviet Russia. The moderate revolutionaries had things their own way. From eighty to ninety per cent of the original electors were peasants, and something over three hundred of the four hundred delegates at the convention were peasants. This fact, due of course to the industrial backwardness of Siberia, undoubtedly was the chief cause of the decision against the out and out Bolsheviks. The peasants had their land and they wanted a respite of peace and work and economic prosperity. Before adjourning, the convention prepared for a Constituent Assembly which should prepare a written democratic constitution and elect permanent officials. It is now proposed to hold this Assembly early in 1921.

In addition, the convention gave the temporary officials of the Far Eastern Republic, thus called into existence, certain definite mandates. The chief were to liquidate the remainder of the reactionary White armies under Semionoff and Kappel, to secure the evacuation of Siberia by all remaining foreign troops, to unify the different governments of eastern Siberia and to establish local self-government throughout the new

republic. The White armies were not finally disposed of till the month in which this is written. The reason for the long delay was not their intrinsic power nor popular support for the Cossack-led armies. The Bolsheviks had come to an agreement with the evacuating Czechs to keep their armies one hundred versts removed in order to prevent local fights. The Partisans as the Czechs moved further east had renewed the same agreement. As a consequence Chita had remained in the hands of Semionoff who used the Czechs as a screen of defense, while the Japanese delayed the evacuation of the latter. Then Japanese soldiers came to Chita and backed up Semionoff. But even with this assistance the latter could not retain civil administration in his hands. Popular clamor forced him to surrender it. The left groups abstained from the election, however, on the ground that Semionoff's troops and the Japanese would not permit a truly representative government to be formed. Whether it was the intention of the conservatives to make this government the centre of the new buffer state (the idea of which had been accepted by the Japanese with simulated willingness after Kolchak's debacle) does not appear. Events moved too fast. During the present month the Japanese troops completed their withdrawal from Chita as well as from the Amur region. The expected—except by reactionary propagandists—happened and Semionoff's troops in a few days went the way of Kolchak's, and Semionoff and Kappel are both fugitives. The revolutionary government moved from Verkhne-Udinsk to Chita and in earnest set about the unification of the various *de facto* governments, and preparation for the Constituent Assembly elections. Neither of these things was possible as long as a reactionary and foreign controlled Chita made a wedge which divided the eastern and western parts of eastern Siberia.

One of the mandates given the provisional government was to establish first commercial and then political relations with foreign governments. China is Siberia's neighbor, and the beginning was made with China. Hence the mission to which reference was made at the outset of this essay. No one

knows just how the mission is succeeding. Undoubtedly China would like freer and better secured trade. Doubtless she would not be averse to friendly relations with a country which circumstances have made even more aggressively anti-Japanese than she is herself. But foreign diplomats have still a certain power in Peking. They are afraid of Bolshevik propaganda and influence. One nation at least is opposed to anything which will lessen the economic monopoly of foreign trade which has come to her. Thoroughly reliable authorities assert that, at the same time when clamor was most active for a complete blockade of Russia and Siberia, goods were moved freely from Japan to Siberia, labelled military stores. Traders and bankers were a regular and organized part of the Japanese army of occupation. Aside from political reasons, Japan is naturally averse to giving up a lucrative commercial monopoly. This fact may account for some of the lively foreign propaganda about the danger of China being Bolshevikised, unless Japan is permitted to exercise a strict military watch in southern and eastern Siberia and throughout Manchuria. It may account for the fact that no less a personage than the Japanese Minister in Great Britain publicly expresses his fear of the probability that China will surrender to the Bolshevik menace—a danger of which no resident in China sees the slightest sign.

The account which has been given is confined to bare outlines of admitted facts. The chief point in dispute is whether the Far Eastern Republic is established as a genuine democracy with socialistic leanings or whether it is a mere mask for Bolshevik Russia. The safest statement is probably also the truest. It was set up as a compromise and with a definite hope on the part of the extremists that a democracy would turn out to be a mask for Bolshevism, which, after foreign armies were all out, might be thrown off. But admitting the worst which can be said, which is worse than the facts, the obvious part of good policy on the part of foreign diplomacy was to look upon the experiment with good will and encourage it to become a genuine democratic republic, which instead of being infected by Russia might on the contrary serve as a stimulus to the

recovery of Russia proper. But unfortunately some fatality, like the movement of a Greek drama, seems to accompany all diplomacy in connection with the Russian situation.

Representatives of the Far Eastern Republic proclaim their desire for foreign capitalistic aid. Siberia has great natural resources and they would welcome, they say, foreign capital divorced from political ambitions. Good sense would demand that they be taken at their word. The population, weakened by war and continued senseless massacres, wants peace as the Russian population wanted it towards the end of the Great War. They would turn against internal factors that disturb peace as soon as foreign intervention completely ceased. The population is a peasant one, wanting land and individual proprietorship, not communism. The same dictates of prudence that made the Bolshevik armies stop at Lake Baikal will make Soviet Russia slow to try to conquer eastern Siberia by arms, especially when they will be fighting only their own countrymen. Only that fatal stupidity which has controlled foreign treatment of the Russian situation leads any one to think that continued Japanese occupation will be anything but a source of disorder and an invitation to the population, if it is continued long enough, to turn Bolshevik in the hope of getting Russian aid in expelling the unwelcome intruder. The real dike against the eastern advance of Bolshevism can be only a stable democratic state in eastern Siberia. Its leanings will undoubtedly be socialistic, but not communistic.

The time has not yet come for direct foreign recognition of the Far Eastern Republic. It is not enough of even a *de facto* government for that. But if a constituent assembly is elected and a constitution is adopted, and the different governments completely merge as they now seem likely to do, with the possible exception of that of Japanese-occupied Vladivostok, the time for recognition will be close at hand. But unless there is some interest taken in the Siberian situation, and unless some sympathetic knowledge of its realities as distinct from fictions of inspired propaganda obtains, there is little likelihood that the old record of tragic stupidity will be altered. Powerful

forces are shaping to claim that the result, no matter what it is outwardly, is in reality a Bolshevik victory and an increased menace to the world. The obvious moral will be that Japanese occupation of the maritime provinces must be continued with the moral assent if not active support of the other great Powers.

The step best adjusted to the situation and best calculated to secure definite knowledge would be not only to welcome a commercial mission from the Far Eastern Republic to the United States, but also to send an investigating mission of official status to Siberia. If the mission got beyond the whirl of rumors and gossip that does substitute duty for fact in some of the diplomatic circles, it could establish a basis for a definite policy. Such a policy would promote legitimate American commercial activities. But what is immensely more important, it might not only help ward off a new threat to China, but contribute to the peace of the world by preventing the development of a situation bound sometime or other to end in a red flood of blood.

7. CHINA'S NIGHTMARE¹

The world has been so satiated with extraordinary events in the last few years, that what would have been a miracle five years ago now hardly attracts attention. What a sensation would once have been created by an announcement that Russia was offering to return to China without compensation all Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, all mining and timber concessions in Manchuria or other Chinese territory; to renounce all extra-territorial rights as well as all further payments of the Boxer indemnity account! Make all the discount you wish on the ground that the offer comes from the Soviet government; and the transformation is still as extraordinary as if the Germans had without war offered France the voluntary return of Alsace-Lorraine and the return of the war indemnity of 1870. In many respects the proposal is even more sensational than that would have been; more indicative of the incredible levity of history. Twenty years ago no one doubted the intention of Russia to control the entire northern part of China and the Asiatic sea coast at least as far south as Tsingtao; and until Russia's defeat by Japan few doubted the success of her plans.

Read almost any of the books about China written twenty years ago, and you will find that you have only to substitute Japan for Russia, in order to have a fairly accurate description of the situation of to-day, so far as its spirit is concerned. Geographical details vary, but the objects and general technique of exploitation is the same. Lord Beresford visited China on a commercial mission in 1898. His report is contained in his book on *The Break-up of China*. In it he says: "I hardly ever made a suggestion to any prominent Chinese official which I thought might tend to the security of British trade and commerce, that I was not met with the question,

¹ From *The New Republic*, June 30, 1920.

'But what would Russia say to that?' or words to that effect. The idea is gaining ground all over China that Great Britain is afraid of Russia."

In the Willy-Nicky letters are found the congratulations of the Kaiser to the Tsar upon having established himself as the dominant power in Peking. In the biography of John Hay there is an account of the denials by Cassini, then Russian minister at Washington, of the report of demands made by Russia upon China which were at the expense of other nations as well as of China. The denials were positive. At the same time Hay, as Secretary of State, was in possession from three different capitals of transcripts of the demands. One might readily imagine that he was reading the diplomatic history of the twenty-one demands. Both the wholesale critics of Japan and the wholesale apologists for her would probably change their tone if they realized how closely copied after the Tsarism of Russia is the imperialism of Japan.

The imitative capacity of the Japanese is notorious. Is there anything surprising that Japan should have followed in the wake of Russia in that feature of foreign policy which is most vital to her—the control of China? I have not the slightest doubt that the great part of the militarists and bureaucrats who have dictated her Chinese policy sincerely believe, with the pattern of Russia always before their eyes, that they are conforming strictly to the proper models of western diplomacy. Wholesale bribery, secrecy, force and fraud were regular parts of the Oriental diplomacy of Russia. It is natural for Japanese officials to believe that the outcry from America or England against similar methods on the part of Japan, is purely hypocritical or else itself a part of the regular diplomatic game.

The more thoroughly the history of the international relations of China for the last twenty years is studied the more apparent is it that Japan has been the heir of Russian aims and methods as well as of, since the great war, Russian achievements. It was Russia that evolved the technique of conquest

by railway and bank. She consolidated if she did not wholly originate the sphere of influence politics with its favoritism and its dog-in-the-manger tactics. Russia discovered the value of police boxes as a means of insinuating semi-military and semi-civil administrative control in territory over which her legitimate claims, stretched to the utmost, were purely economic. Many of the twenty-one demands are almost verbatim copies of prior Russian requests, such as the exclusive right to train the army, etc. Russia evolved to the uttermost the doctrine of military occupation as a means of protecting nationals. She posed as the protector of China against "western" Powers, and prided herself (strangely enough with better reason and more success than Japan) upon understanding Chinese psychology, and knowing how to manage the Chinese. In the secret Cassini protocol made at St. Petersburg in 1896 with Li Hung Chang (the prototype of Chinese statesmen bought with foreign money) will be found the magna charta of subsequent Japanese diplomacy. It even includes a conditional provision for the Russian naval and military occupation of Kiaochou Bay.

In the earlier period of Chino-Russian-Japanese relations, that is up to the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan could use in good faith the claim of self-defense in her dealings with China. For certainly Russia with her enormous undeveloped territory had much less excuse for aggression in Korea and northern China than had Japan. Moreover, every new aggressive step of Russia in China was followed at once by demands for compensating concessions and spheres by other Powers, especially by Great Britain and France. There is every reason for thinking that Germany's claim to Kiaochou was stimulated by Russia to give a colorable pretext to her claim for Port Arthur and Dalny, while the yielding of China in both these matters was immediately followed by demands from Great Britain in the Yangtse region and from France in the south.

This was the period which gave Beresford's book its title of *Break-up*, though he himself was an ardent expositor of the

doctrine of the Open Door. And it was this situation which enabled Japan in reasonable good faith to set herself up as the defender of the integrity and sovereignty of China against European aggression. Such feelings and claims have a remarkable historic inertia. There is nothing surprising in the fact that they still persist among the mass of the Japanese people, and supply the conditions which enable Japan to continue a policy of aggressive exploitation of China with popular support and sanction. There was a time when the Japanese had every reason to feel that their future destiny depended upon getting enough power to control China as the only sure way to keep China from falling into European hands. Times have changed; the sentiment of the Japanese people lags behind the change in facts and can still be exploited by the militarist party. And in the meantime (especially after the outbreak of the great war) Japan's own policy became less and less defensive and more and more flagrantly offensive.

If there had been in the United States an adequate knowledge of Russian diplomatic methods in their Oriental aspect and in their bearing upon Japan's fortunes and her Asiatic aims and methods, American gullibility would never have fallen an easy victim to Japan's propaganda for western consumption. As it was, American ignorance secured almost universal approval for the Portsmouth treaty with its "supplementary clauses" which in spite of their innocent appearance meant that the settlement was really a truce concluded at the expense of China's rights in Manchuria.

One foreign publicist in China is inclined to hold President Roosevelt responsible for China's international ills since 1905. He takes the ground that he ought to have insisted that since the war had been practically fought on Chinese territory, China should have been a party to the settlement, and that the peace conference was the one great opportunity for effective foreign protection of China against both aggressors. As a matter of fact, the actual outcome was certainly to make both Russia and Japan interested in trading with each other at China's

expense. If it had not been for Great Britain's navy, it would doubtless have long ago led to a definite Russo-Japanese understanding regarding the division of northern China. But hindsight is proverbially easy, and it must be doubted whether President Roosevelt is to blame for a lack of foresight which no one else possessed at that date.

All this matter is by way of merely sketching the background of the next important epoch probable in Chinese foreign relations. It is not likely that China will accept the Soviet's offer in its present form. It is not probable the Allies will permit it even if China wanted to assume the risks of such a course. But none the less the offer symbolizes the opening of a new era. Even if the present Russian government is overthrown, any new government that takes its place will have every reason for coming to some good understanding with China. After all, their territories are contiguous for three thousand miles. Both countries are on a continental scale.

Japan, when all is said and done, is an island, and the history of insular conquests on a continent afford no very good augury for Japan's future success in Asia. The Siberian situation is still confused. But to all appearances the Japanese militarist party that favors a forward policy of adventure in Siberia is for the time being dominant. China can again chuckle about the Providence that always seems to come to her rescue when things are at the worst. The Russians are not pacifists; they are still expansive, and they have an enormous land hunger, due to the agrarian history of Russia. The deeper the Japanese get themselves involved in Siberia, the surer, in Chinese opinion, is her final checkmate, even though for some years she may get virtual possession of Eastern Siberia even up to Lake Baikal. There is much to be said for the belief that China's international future is to be decided in Siberia. The situation shifts rapidly.

The idea, already broached privately, of an armed conflict between Japan on one side and Russia, Korea and China on the other, may have nothing in it. But whether Russia returns

to monarchy or becomes an established republic, it seems a safe prophecy that China's Russian relations will be the ultimate decisive factor in her international status. The diversion of Japan from China into Siberia probably marks the culmination of her influence in China. It is not improbable that the last five years will soon, as history counts years, be looked back upon as the years of China's nightmare.

8. THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE¹

I

There is an oft-quoted saying of Chesterton's that a man's philosophy is the most important thing about him. He illustrates the point by saying that it is more important for a landlady to know the philosophy of life of a would-be lodger than to know his financial status. The latter may decide his ability to pay, but the former decides his willingness to make false or true representations and to carry out his agreements. The late Mr. Morgan aroused much interest when he said at Washington that he attached more importance in banking to the character of the applicants for credit than to the material securities they proffered. The remarks of Chesterton and Morgan testify to the practical importance of what in war-time we learned to call the imponderables—grit, stamina, loyalty, faith—in comparison with things so tangible that they can be counted and measured.

What is true, in this regard, of individuals is true of peoples. The spirit that countries bring to the negotiations going on in Washington, the spirit in which they will proceed to execute the decisions of the Conference, is more important than the letter of the decisions. Those who are cynical about the Conference are so because they do not believe in the underlying good faith of the governments concerned. They assume that negotiations are simply a hypocritical cover for a series of dickerings and manœuvres for special advantage, and that professions of regard for peace, justice and humanity are merely part of the traditional paraphernalia of a secret jockeying to get the better of some one else. They distrust, in short, the underlying philosophy of existing governments.

If we go deeper, we realize that many sources of discord

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and friction have their root in the fact that different peoples have different philosophies ingrained in their habits. They cannot understand one another and they misunderstand one another. It is fashionable to-day to assume that the causes of all difficulties between nations are economic. It is useful to fix attention upon these economic causes and to see what can be done in the way of adjustment. But the friction generated by economic competition and conflict would not break out into the flames of war if atmospheric conditions were not favorable. The atmosphere that makes international troubles inflammable is the product of deep-seated misunderstandings that have their origin in different philosophies of life.

If we are to take steps to dampen the atmosphere, to charge it with elements that will fire-proof international relations, we must begin with an attempt at an honest understanding of one another's philosophy of life. The difficulty is greatest between oriental and occidental peoples. There are great differences in the mental dispositions of European and American peoples; the philosophies of life of even the English and the Americans are much more unlike than they are usually assumed to be. But all such differences pale into insignificance as compared with the differences between the civilizations of the West and of Asia—between the philosophies to which these civilizations have given birth. It is proportionately hard to secure mutual understanding and respect and proportionately easy on both sides to create suspicion and fear, which slide over into hatred when the time is ripe.

The common belief at the present time that the Pacific is to be the scene of the next great world catastrophe, the fatalistic belief that conflict between the white and the yellow race is predestined, are really expressions of a sense of a deep, underlying cleft that makes mutual understanding impossible. But instead of trying to lessen the cleft by effort to understand each other, we talk about an irrepressible conflict of forces beyond human control, or else about the competition for control of the natural resources of China and the tropics. I would not minimize the danger in this competition, but it is ridiculous to

suppose that it is so great as to make the Pacific the scene of an inevitable war. If we succeed in really understanding each other, some way of coöperation for common ends can be found. If we neglect the part played by fundamental misunderstandings in developing an atmosphere of combustion, any devices that are hit upon for lessening economic friction are likely to turn out so superficial that sooner or later they will break down.

One reason why misunderstanding is so dangerous is that peoples like persons tend to judge one another on the basis of their own habits of thought and feeling. Mr. Wells recently pointed out a specific instance. He said that the Japanese, because of their docility and obedience, tend to overestimate the power of the British government to regulate the sentiments and acts of the English people, while the English, because of contrary habits, tend to exaggerate the control that Japanese popular sentiment has upon the ruling class in Japan. The practical application he made bears upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Japanese tend to overlook the fact that the Alliance might break down under strain because of pressure of popular sentiment, which would make the government unable to carry it into effect in case of Japanese trouble with the United States. The English, on the other hand, overlook the danger of the Alliance, because they imagine that in a crisis the Japanese governing class would be amenable to an alert and intelligent public opinion.

It would be easy to fill pages with instances of just such misunderstandings due to imputing to another people the motives and aims that we should have if we performed the act that the other people has performed. Japanese diplomacy, for example, is centralized, almost dictated, from Tokyo. Ours is comparatively loose. If, accordingly, an American consul in the Orient does an act—if only making a speech—more or less on his own, it is natural for Japanese to assume that he is deliberately acting upon orders from Washington in pursuance of some national policy. Americans, on the other hand, are likely to overlook the compactness and continuity

of Japanese diplomacy. Or, when they become aware of some objectionable result of diplomacy, they regard it as a sudden and treacherous coup instead of the culmination of a series of steps, which from the Japanese point of view have been already accepted and sanctioned, if only tacitly. Then the Japanese are perplexed in their turn.

Such incidents and others that might be mentioned seem trivial, taken one by one. But the total effect is by no means a trivial detail. The net result is mutual distrust, suspicion, dread. Episodes of this kind illustrate the importance of a better understanding by each nation of the psychology of other nations. The physical means of intercourse between nations by means of trade, mails and cables have got far ahead of the agencies of psychological and moral intercourse. After thousands of years of isolation, the East and the West have been thrown into intimate political and commercial contact. During the period of separation each side of the globe has developed its own peculiar ways of thinking and feeling. It is no wonder that under such circumstances the contact of East and West is so largely materialistic, economic. It is an accident, a by-product of the invention of steam and electric machinery, and, like any accident, it may turn out a catastrophe.

II

There are many questions of a directly practical nature that cannot be understood or properly handled unless the larger background be taken into account.

Why are the Chinese so unperturbed by circumstances that appear to a foreigner to menace their country with national extinction? How can they remain so calm when their country is divided within and threatened from without? Is their attitude one of callous indifference, of stupid ignorance? Or is it a sign of faith in deep-seated realities that western peoples neglect in their hurry to get results? So far as diplomatic negotiations, including those of the Washington Conference, are concerned, does the Chinese policy of watchful waiting—

with more waiting than watchfulness from a western point of view—imply indifference to their fate or weakness that makes them unable to cope with it? Or is it evidence that they are banking upon the operation of slow-moving forces that in the end will bring things their way? Surely the right answer to such questions is at least of equal importance with the particular decisions of the Conference. In the long run it is more important; for it will control the way in which the decisions work out.

Again, there is the question of China's long and obstinate resistance to modern methods of industry, to machinery, railways and large scale production and her disinclination to open up her country except because of pressure from a foreign power. This refusal, taken in connection with the desire of foreign nationals to utilize the natural resources of China and to find markets among her teeming millions, is the source of many of China's most acute difficulties. A natural question arises: Why hasn't China taken the lead in developing her own resources? Why hasn't she gone ahead much as the United States did, borrowing foreign capital, but keeping political and, in the main, economic control in her own hands? Is her course stupid inertia, a dull, obstinate clinging to the old just because it is old? Or does it show something more profound, a wise, even if largely unconscious, aversion to admitting forces that are hostile to the whole spirit of her civilization?

The right answer to these questions makes a great difference in the treatment of many concrete practical problems. If the course of China is blind and inert, there is much to be said for a combination of nations, a kind of economic-political consortium, which will force modern industrialism upon China, overcoming her obstinacy for her own good, not allowing sentimental considerations to stand too much in the way. But if there is something deeply worth while in Chinese culture, and if industrialism as it exists in the western world is a menace to what is deepest and best in Chinese culture, then the practical answer is quite different. Perhaps there will come a time

when historians will say that the course of China gave evidence of a profound instinct. Perhaps they will say it was better for the world and for China that she resisted the introduction of western, machine-made industrialism until the world and she herself were able to control its workings. If so, the entanglements and perplexities into which China has temporarily got will not be too great a price to pay for the result finally attained. Only those who are completely satisfied with the workings of the present capitalistic system can dogmatically deny this possibility.

III

It is much easier to raise these questions than to answer them. But a knowledge of Chinese civilization and of the philosophy of life expressed in it at least makes the questions more real and more pertinent. Two great philosophies of life are intimately connected with the Chinese attitude toward political and social issues—those of Laotze and Confucius. Perhaps a third should be added—that of Buddha. But the latter was not indigenous, and the first two were. Though no one can deny the immense stimulus to Chinese art and thought that came with the introduction of Buddhism from India, yet in the end its influence seems to have been transformed by Taoism and Confucianism.

The teaching of Laotze did not become classic and official in the way in which that of the Confucian school did. Yet one obtains a strong impression that fundamentally its influence upon the *people* is greater than that of Confucianism, since it colored the way in which Confucianism was received. This is no place for a technical exposition of the teaching of Laotze, the Old Master. Nor is it important for our purpose. The important thing is the doctrine of the superiority of nature to man, and the conclusion drawn, namely, the doctrine of non-doing. For active doing and striving are likely to be only an interference with nature.

The idea of non-doing can hardly be stated and explained;

it can only be felt. It is something more than mere inactivity; it is a kind of rule of moral doing, a doctrine of active patience, endurance, persistence while nature has time to do her work. Conquering by yielding is its motto. The workings of nature will in time bring to naught the artificial fussings and fumings of man. Give enough rope to the haughty and ambitious, and in the end they will surely be hung in the artificial entanglements they have themselves evolved.

There is nothing exclusively Chinese in this point of view. But no other people has become so saturated with its consequences. It is at the root of their *laissez-faire*, contented, tolerant, pacific, humorous and good-humored attitude toward life. It is also at the root of their fatalism. The teachings of Laotze have been influential because they expressed something congenial to Chinese temperament and habits of life. China is agrarian, agricultural; everybody knows that fact. But while we know it, we forget how long and how stable is their agriculture. The title of a book by an American agriculturist, *Farmers of Four Thousand Years*, is infinitely significant when we reflect upon it. Other peoples have been farmers. But by their methods they have exhausted the soil and gone down, or they have turned to other occupations, which have supplanted farming in importance. But the Chinese have gone on tilling, tilling, tilling, even, as in north China, against great odds; and their soil is still productive, as productive, probably, as ever it was.

This is an unparalleled human achievement. It helps explain the conservatism of the Chinese, their *laissez-faire* reverence for nature and their contempt for hurried and artificial devices of man's contriving. Their minds are as steeped in contact with natural processes as their bodies are apt for agricultural work. They are conservative because for thousands of years they have been conserving the resources of nature, nursing, preserving, patiently, obstinately. While western peoples have attacked, exploited and in the end wasted the soil, they have conserved it. The results are engraved upon both Chinese and western psychologies. The Chinese have learned

to wait for the fruition of slow natural processes. They cannot be hustled because in their mode of life nature cannot be hustled. Why be in a hurry when hurry only means vexation for yourself and either accomplishes nothing in nature or else interferes with its processes and so hinders the natural harvest?

It is not meant that there is nothing but good in this attitude. Virtues and defects, excellencies and weaknesses go together. Western fatalism takes the form of believing that, since what is going to happen will happen, we might in the meantime as well go our own way. It is like the fatalism of soldiers in the trenches. Oriental fatalism is directed upon the present rather than upon the future. Why do anything, why try, why put forth energy to change conditions? Non-doing runs easily into passive submission, conservatism into stubborn attachment to habitudes so fixed as to be "natural," into dread and dislike of change.

But it is meant that the Chinese philosophy of life embodies a profoundly valuable contribution to human culture and one of which a hurried, impatient, over-busied and anxious West is infinitely in need. It is also meant—and this will appear to be the more "practical" point—that this philosophy of life is so ingrained in the Chinese people that we cannot understand their way of dealing with political and social problems unless we take it into account. And if we do not understand it, we shall not be able to deal with them, in either politics or business, intelligently and successfully. To attain success, to achieve anything worth while in our relations with the Chinese we have to adopt enough of their own point of view to recognize the importance of time. We must give them time and then more time. And we must take time ourselves while we give them time.

The teachings of Laotze spring from the depths of Chinese life and in turn they have influenced that life. Much of the actual effect, as it comes home to the individual farmer, has no connection with the general theory. As a philosophy in the abstract, the farmer would not recognize or understand it. It

is associated for him with a mass of superstitions and geomantic practices. Yet even the superstitions are bound up with a general attitude toward nature. The most widely influential custom is that called *Feng-shui*, literally translated, "wind-water." The belief in *Feng-shui* is a belief in certain mystical influences connected with the land. Upon the propitious working of these forces depends the prosperity of the dead, the ancestral spirits, and of the living family. These forces are easily disturbed and their equilibrium and benign operation interfered with. This belief was an earlier obstacle to the introduction of railways and it is still a mighty obstacle in the way of opening new mines, and, in general, of introducing new industrial forces.

It is easy to dismiss the whole belief as a gross superstition, which is degrading intellectually as well as inimical to progress. But it is also easy to rationalize the doctrine. Then one would see in it a belief that the land and its energies belong to the whole succession of human beings, past generations and future. The present generation is a trustee of the family and race, of ancestry and posterity. The exploitation of the land must therefore be regulated in the interest of the whole succession. This rationalization is as extreme in one direction as the view that the Chinese system of geomancy is a degrading superstition is in the other. But the doctrine of *Feng-shui* is at least a remarkable exhibition of piety toward nature and it has been a power for conservation as well as for conservatism.

IV

The general point of view of Confucianism is the opposite of that of Taoism. It magnifies the importance of art, of culture, of humanity, of learning and moral effort. Naturally, therefore, this doctrine influenced the scholars and upper classes much as Taoism spread among the people. Yet in many respects the actual effect of Confucianism has been like that of Taoism. In inculcating reverence for the classic literature of the past as the well-spring of wisdom, it supplied intel-

lectual reasons for conservatism. In exalting moral and intellectual, as superior to physical, power, it taught patient disregard for display of military and political force, which is sure, in the end, to be brought to naught by reason.

It created that extraordinary reverence for the teacher, that conviction of his abiding influence upon the life as well as the learning of pupils, which is so remarkable a trait of Chinese life, and which helps to explain the tendency of the Chinese to rely upon pacific reason rather than upon brawling force for settlement of troubles. Is there any other people that has persistently believed that the influence of the teacher is in the end the most powerful of all social forces? What other nations are there whose heroes are moral teachers rather than revealers of supernatural affairs, priests, generals, statesmen?

Though Confucianism has had its especial career among the upper and official classes, yet its net effect has merged with the influence of Laotze to create a definite contempt for politics and an aversion to government as the West understands the term. To the Taoist, government is unnatural, an interference by men with the orderly operations of nature. The emperors, even the alien Tartars and Manchus, had to bow to this conviction. They got around the people by adopting their belief, by giving the emperor a mystic significance. He was the agent of the people in reverencing Heaven.

The emperor did not govern. He ruled by *not* governing, by not interfering with the real government, the customs of the people, which were so immemorial and so interwoven in agriculture with the operations of nature that they themselves were like the workings of nature. Tribute paid him was not so much political taxation as an expression of loyalty to the natural and moral forces that he embodied. If nature failed to function, if famines and floods recurred, if his demands became extortionate and his officers ceased to be fathers and mothers of the people, these were signs that he no longer represented Heaven. Then the people became, pending the restoration of righteous and benevolent order, the representatives of Heaven. According to Mencius (who emphasized this more democratic

side of Confucianism) the people under such circumstances had not only the right but the duty of deposing the ruling house.

V

In putting down, largely in western terms, these suggestions about the philosophy of the Chinese, one is painfully conscious of their inadequacy. But even so, they show why the Chinese maintain such confidence in the outcome of events, in spite of so much that is discouraging. China has survived many such periods. But after a while the civil power, that is, the moral and intellectual, has reasserted itself, and the stable industry of the people has again become dominant. Even now, in spite of conditions that would throw any western state into chaos, there is steady progress among the people.

In her external relations, China undoubtedly faces a new situation. It is not safe to argue that, because she has always conquered her conquerors before, she is certain to do so this time. Her conquerors before were her inferiors in everything but military power and skill. Now she deals with peoples who are her superiors in natural science and in its applications to industry and commerce. Conquest of China by economic penetration that will reduce her population to a proletariat working for foreign capitalists backed by superior military resources, is a very different thing from direct military subjugation. Yet the reasons for China's historic confidence are still not wholly shaken.

It is a common saying that China manages her international relations on the basis of an old maxim about playing the barbarians off against one another. This fact sometimes inspires a frantic appeal for all foreign nations to get together and impose their unified will upon China. Propagandists for a foreign nation often bid Americans beware of expressions of Chinese regard for the United States. They say these are only another instance of a policy based on the old maxim; and that, if it succeeds, China with a bland smile will retire again into herself and forget her affection for the United States.

This argument, taken at its worst, suggests the difficulty in the way of forming a stable combination among the Powers on the basis of material interests. It indicates that the only lasting union of Powers with respect to China must be formed upon a moral basis. A cut-throat union against China will in time bring about a cut-throat policy of the nations in the union toward one another. If the policy is tried, and, as a result of struggle among the nations, China regains her own, she will be entitled to smile at one more proof of the superiority of moral to material forces.

Finally, an understanding of the Chinese philosophy of life is not only essential to an intelligent treatment of Chinese problems, but it is of immense value to other nations. Not China alone but the world is in transition and liquidation. Psychologists talk about "projection." Persons who are irritated in themselves are always irritated about others. The principle applies in social psychology. Nations are now "projecting" their own troubles and uncertainty upon China. The result may easily be rash and inconsiderate action. An adoption of Chinese calm and patience, a willingness to take only the steps, like disarmament and abolition of special privileges, which are immediately necessary, and to wait till time has adjusted the present troubled condition, would have a wonderfully healing effect. For it is not true that Chinese difficulties have suddenly become a menace to the world's peace and prosperity. It is only true that western nations are in danger of condensing their own troubles and unloading them upon China. The philosophy of the East was never more needed by the West than in the present crisis.

9. CHINESE SOCIAL HABITS¹

I

The longer one stays in China, the more the question of what holds China back impresses itself, and the more difficult it becomes to answer. There is "if" in almost every answer which your Chinese friends give to the question; and the "if" generally only restates the difficulty.

The remark heard most often is perhaps the most superficial of all. "If we had a stable government we could do this and that." But why isn't there a stable government? Its absence is much more of an effect than a cause. The country is still divided, both north and south having their own government, and each at loggerheads with the other. Yet every Chinese friend tells you the country is united although the government is divided, and everything you can learn confirms the statement. Why do not the people then enforce their feeling and will? Japanese intrigue and interference is an obvious answer. But again you are given an effect, a symptom, instead of a cause. Others tell you that the source of the difficulty is lack of ability and experience in organization. This answer goes further below the surface. But it still needs explanation. The Chinese have both experience and ability in some kinds of organization, as the long history of the guilds and of village self-government shows. Why should they not show at least as much capacity for organization as the Japanese, who have only recently emerged from feudalism with all the personal suspicions, jealousies and class division that feudalism opposes to organization? And no one who knows the Chinese can believe that the difficulty is intellectual, that the people have not the mental gifts required in successful organization.

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To say (as is so often said) that the Chinese do not progress more systematically and rapidly because they are a conservative people is clearly repeating in other words the thing that needs to be explained. Conservative they doubtless are. But nevertheless their history is not a history of stagnation, of fixity, as we are falsely taught, but of social as well as dynastic changes. They have tried many experiments in their day. Centuries ago they had a statesman who induced the emperor to commit the kingdom to something as near to modern socialism as was possible considering the absence of steam and electricity. China has undergone as many barbarian invasions as any country in Europe. Its survival and its absorption of its invaders do not argue conservatism of the inert kind. No country whose conservatism came from sheer routine, from lack of imagination, from mental rigidity, could have maintained and extended its civilization as China has done. And experience shows that the Chinese are supple, pliant, accommodating and adaptive—neither rigid nor dull.

It may strike the western reader as simply funny, but more than one Chinese friend has assured me that it is the Japanese people who are really conservative. And they back up their assertion by evidence other than pointing to the way in which Japan has clung, through all historic vicissitudes, to a primitive theocracy. They point out, for example, that a thousand years ago the Japanese borrowed their present style of clothing and of household furnishing, of sitting and sleeping on mats, from China; that China has changed several times, moving constantly in the direction of practical utility, of ingenious adaptation of means to needs. The Chinese cuisine is another argument. It is doubtless the most extensive in the world in the variety of materials employed for food, and also the most varied in their combinations. Academic analysis may despise arguments drawn from food, clothing, shelter and furnishings. But when one notes the variety and ingenuity of the processes and appliances used in daily life and in the crafts, one is certain that the Chinese mind is naturally observant and

adaptive. But it seems unnecessary to labor the question. Many charges have been brought against the Chinese, but no one has ever accused them of stupidity. Their undoubted conservatism is something to be explained rather than an explanation of anything.

It may well be doubted whether there is any single key to the mystery. Certainly the present observer has no final solution to proffer. But there is one fact which I am quite sure must be taken into the reckoning and which counts for much. It is beyond question that many traits of the Chinese mind are the products of an extraordinary and long-continued density of populations. Psychologists have discovered, or possibly invented, a "psychology of the crowd" to account for the way men act in masses, as a mob at a lynching bee. But they have not inquired as to the effect upon the mind of constant living in close contact with large numbers, of continual living in a crowd.

Years ago an enthusiastic American teacher of the Chinese in Honolulu told me that when the Chinese acquired Anglo-Saxon initiative they would be the greatest people in the world. I wonder whether even the Anglo-Saxons would have developed or retained initiative if they had lived for centuries under conditions that gave them no room to stir about, no relief from the unremitting surveillance of their fellows? Possibly they would then have acquired a habit of thinking of their "face" before they thought of the thing to be done. Perhaps when they thought of a new thing they would have decided discretion and hesitation to be the better part of invention. If solitude or loneliness exists in China it is only among the monks who have retired into the mountain fastnesses; and until I have ocular evidence to the contrary I shall believe that even monks in China are sociable, agglutinative beings. Until the recent introduction of rapid transportation, very few Chinese ever enjoyed even the possibility of solitude that comes from being in a crowd of strangers. Imagine all elbow-room done away with, imagine millions of men living day by

day, year by year, in the presence of the same persons (a very close presence at that), and new light may be shed upon the conservatism of the Chinese people.

An English author, long resident in China, wrote a book which, aside from a wealth of picturesque incident, gossip and rumor, was a long diatribe against Young China—against, that is, the Chinese who favor the introduction of western institutions, inventions, methods. His way of arguing was sufficiently simple. China suffers from an excess of population. Great masses live just on the edge of subsistence. A flood, a disabling pestilence, a season's bad weather, plunges millions over the edge. Equilibrium is then restored. But a long succession of prosperous years produces an overpopulation which finds vent in rebellion, civil war, a killing off of a very large number, and possibly the overthrow of a dynasty. Chinese history is and must be a succession, a cycle, of such episodes. Meantime Confucian ideas, ancestor worship, family and clan organization, transmit Chinese civilization intact. This, Young China would destroy, robbing China of its moral foundations. Since it cannot alter the basic facts of the struggle for existence, Young China therefore offers nothing of value to the country.

The logic is not close-knit; *non sequiturs* abound. But it is a good example of the way in which foreigners become infected with a belief that in China things must in the future be about as they have been in the past, and that efforts to make a change only result in making things worse. In my experience, most foreigners who have been long in China and who think at all, acquire this attitude in some degree. You hear solemn warnings on every hand that this and that cannot be done, although next day you learn from some Chinese friend that it is being done and the heavens have not fallen. Many are more Confucianist—in a kind of vague belief that Confucius contributed something without which China cannot endure—than the younger generation of Chinese. After a few years some foreigners find themselves hypnotized by the thickness, the compactness, of a civilization forced upon people living closely

crowded together. They acquire the fear that if one strand is touched, the whole will unravel, and the belief that the safe thing is to leave things alone. Young American teachers and social workers, recently over from America, tell me that the older missionaries frequently admonish them against their innovating zeal, and tell them that as they grow older and wiser they will learn conservatism. Most of the older British residents are reported to have no sympathy with the Revolution, to mourn the departed days of monarchy, and to point to many increased present evils as proofs of their belief that as China has been, so she must be.

If China "gets" so many foreigners who come with the opposed tradition of the initiative of Anglo-Saxons, then what must be the case with those brought up from infancy in thick, dense, inbred civilization? Live and let live is the response to crowded conditions. If things are fairly well off, then let well enough alone. If they are evil, endure them rather than run the risk of making them worse by interference. In western countries, the doctrine of *laissez faire* has flourished because a policy of hands off was thought to encourage individual energy and enterprise. In China it flourishes because any unusual energy or enterprise on the part of anybody may work untoward results. Not to rock the boat is wisdom the world over. In a crowded country, not organized along the lines of utilization of natural resources, any innovation is likely to disturb the balance of the social boat.

The reformer does not even meet sharp, clear-cut resistance. If he did, he might be stimulated to further effort. He simply is smothered. Stalling has become a fine art. At a recent national educational conference a returned student holding an official position moved that the public middle schools (corresponding to our high schools) be made co-educational. He was inspired by sound consideration. China suffers from lack of educated women. Funds are short. The effective thing is to admit girls to the schools already existing. But the proposition was a radical innovation. Yet it was not opposed. A resolution in favor was duly passed. But at the same time it was

made subtly understood that this was done out of courtesy to the mover, and that no steps to carry the resolution into effect need be expected. This is the fate of many proposed social reforms. They are not fought, they are only swallowed. China does not stagnate, it absorbs. It takes up all the slack till there is no rope left with which to pull.

II

The weak points of a people, like those of an individual, are the defects of their qualities. Vices are not far removed from virtues; they are their reverse side. The Chinese believe themselves the politest people on earth. They are probably right in their belief. In comparison, even the best of western manners often appear either crude or else overdone, affected. Nothing can exceed the amenity of the Japanese in personal intercourse. But they learned their etiquette as well as so much else from China, and it remains somewhat formal, a cultivated art. In China the ages have toned down and mellowed the forms of intercourse till they no longer seem forms. High and low are so easy and unconstrained in their bearing toward one another, that one is tempted, in spite of scientific authority, to believe in the inheritance by later generations of the manners acquired by previous generations.

Cheerfulness and contentment amid the most trying conditions are a part of good manners. Yet there is none of that rigidity, to say nothing of glumness and fanaticism, which we ordinarily associate with stoicism or fatalism. There is no flourish of self-control which betrays that the self-control is maintained with difficulty. Fate is welcomed with a smile, perhaps a jest, not with a frown, nor yet with heroics. Such courtesy and cheerfulness are undoubtedly products of long-continued close face-to-face crowded existence. The unremitting impact of a thick civilization has impressed the folly of adding to the burdens of life by friction or repining. Politeness and cheerfulness are the lubricants by which the closeness and constancy of personal contacts are made durable. Circum-

stances admit of but two alternatives: either ruthless competition, war to the bone, or an easygoing peace. Having chosen the latter way out, the Chinese have carried it to its logical conclusion.

Yet personal consideration for others in direct face-to-face intercourse is quite compatible with what in the western world would be regarded as unfeeling cruelty and lack of active aid to others. The other day in Peking a passing carriage knocked down a man in the street, and rolled by unheeding. The man was so badly injured that he was unable to rise. No passer-by made a move; all literally passed by on the other side, until some foreigners came to the rescue. A few months ago Mr. Baillie was set upon by bandits in Manchuria. The other persons present not only offered no aid, but they ran aside and shut their eyes so that they could not be called upon to testify. The further point of this incident lies in the fact that Mr. Baillie had taken poor and miserable persons from the more crowded parts of China to Manchuria where there was plenty of land, and by colonizing them had greatly improved their conditions. These men who closed their eyes that they might not know what was going on were men whom he had aided; they were personal friends.

This does not mean that Chinese habitual politeness is insincere. I have never heard the Chinese accused of hypocrisy, though I have heard of many bitter complaints of their unwillingness to carry things through. I have never seen any one who did not regard genuine friendliness as one of the chief Chinese traits. But where there is a complete manifestation of the Malthusian theory of population, friendliness develops with great difficulty to the point of active effort to relieve suffering. Where further increase in population means increase in severity of the struggle for subsistence, aggressive benevolence is not likely to assume large proportions. On the contrary, when the cutting off of thousands by plague or flood or famine means more air to breathe and more land to cultivate for those who remain, stoic apathy is not hard to attain.

A foreigner interested in the prevention of cruelty to ani-

mals after many discouragements approached with some hopefulness a Buddhist monk. He thought that the doctrine of universal pity would have prepared the way for sympathetic reception. But his message was coldly greeted. He was told that the animals, when they were abused, were justly suffering for the sins of some ancestor and that it was not for man to interfere. Such Buddhism only formulates the fatalism which is a general natural response to surroundings.

Most of the oriental traits of lack of active sympathy and relief which missionaries have cited as due to heathenism seem to have a simpler explanation. On the other hand, western philanthropy makes a great appeal. Missionaries and Y.M.C.A. workers took a large part of the burden of recent flood-relief work. The Chinese in the devastated region who had remained calmly impervious to prior preaching, were so impressed with the exhibition of kindness that was gratuitous that they flocked into the churches. The latter had to sift and choose very carefully to keep from being themselves flooded. And this result was not a "lively expectation of favors to come." The population had been deeply touched by the unprecedented display of sympathy and help. I was told on good authority that the Governor of Shansi, the most respected provincial governor in China, said that up to the time of the outbreak of bubonic plague, he had thought that western civilization was good only for battleships and machinery. But the unpaid devotion of physicians, teachers and missionaries, at the risk of their own lives, had convinced him that there was another side to western civilization.

The incidents of personal disregard of others have the same spring as the absence of organized relief. To do anything is to assume a responsibility. To have helped the man knocked down would have done more than involve a loss of time. Those helping would have implicated themselves with the authorities. They might be accused of complicity. Mind your own business, don't interfere, leave things to those whose express business it is to look after them, is the rule of living. Don't make a nuisance of yourself by meddlesomeness, to say nothing

of getting yourself into incalculable trouble by leaving the beaten track.

Practical indifference in matters that do not directly concern one is but the obverse side of exquisite consideration in immediate personal relations. Where the latter are concerned everything suggests the superior claims of an immediate smoothing over of things rather than an adjustment on the basis of actual objective consequences. Effect on "face" is more significant than consequences upon outer facts. It is contrary to the proprieties, for instance, for a government school to accept private gifts. It reflects upon the government, which then loses "face." The head of a Peking school recently said he would accept gifts, that he was willing to sacrifice his "face" to the good of his school and the country. This was a more genuine sacrifice than westerners might believe.

III

When people live close together and cannot get away from one another, appearances, that is to say the impression made upon others, become as important as the realities, if not more so. The ulterior consequences of, let us say, a diplomatic transaction with a foreign nation seem of less consequence than the immediate conduct of negotiations in such a way as to avoid present trouble and graciously to observe all the proprieties. When evasion and delay no longer suffice, it is better to surrender and to permit the other side to be rude and brusque than to lose "face" one's self.

The Japanese knowledge of this trait accounts very considerably for their diplomatic methods with China. It is known as the policy of the strong hand. Concede anything to the Chinese and they think you are afraid of them, and they at once become presumptuous and demand more—this is a commonplace in Japanese newspaper discussion of Chinese affairs. So far as immediate dealings with officials are concerned, the Japanese seem to have decided wisely as to the methods which give results. What they failed to count upon

was the immense backwash of resentment among the people at large.

In fine, the crowded population has bred those habits of mind, which, as the common saying goes, make the Chinese individually so companionably agreeable and attractive and collectively so exasperating to the outsider. Innovation, experimentation, get automatically discouraged, not from lack of intelligence, but because intelligence is too keenly aware of the mistakes that may result, the trouble that may arise. "Keep out of trouble" comes to be the guiding principle.

In an evening pleasantly spent with ex-President Sun Yat-sen, he set forth his theory as to the slow change of China as compared with the rapid advance of Japan. It seems some old Chinese sage once said, "To know is easy; to act is difficult." The Chinese had taken this adage to heart, so Mr. Sun explained. They did not act because they were afraid of making mistakes; they wanted to be guaranteed in advance against any failure or serious trouble. The Japanese, on the other hand, realized that action was much easier than knowing; they went ahead and did things without minding mistakes and failures, trusting to a net balance on the side of achievement. I am inclined to think the old sage was influential because his teaching was reinforced by effects of the ever-close and ever-thick environment.

Only the superficial think that to give the causes of an unfortunate state of affairs is to excuse them. Any state of affairs has to be judged on the basis of the consequences it produces, not on the basis of the causes that explain its existence. But if the causes are those described, they cannot be remedied by expostulation, exhortation and preaching. A change of conditions, an alteration of the environment, is needed. This cannot take place by reducing the population, although part of Young China is now shocking archaic China by preaching birth-control.

An introduction of modern industrial methods is the only thing that will profoundly affect the environment. Utilizing energy and resources now untouched will produce an effect that

will be the same as an enlargement of the environment. Mining, railways and manufacturing based upon China's wealth of unused resources will give a new outlet for energies that now cannot be used without the risk of causing "trouble." The impersonal and indirect effects of modern production and commerce will create habits that will lessen the importance of appearances and "face," and increase the importance of objective consequences of facts. A way will be discovered with the increase of wealth and of constructive appliances to turn personal friendliness, unfailing amiability and good-humor into general channels of social service.

10. THE GROWTH OF CHINESE NATIONAL SENTIMENT¹

I

Is it possible for a Westerner to understand Chinese political psychology? Certainly not without a prior knowledge of the historic customs and institutions of China, for the institutions have shaped the mental habits, not the mind the social habits. The West approaches all political questions with ideas composed on the pattern of a national state, with its sovereignty and definite organs, political, judicial, executive and administrative, to perform specific functions. We have even made history over to fit into this pattern. We have taken European political development as a necessary standard of normal political evolution. We have made ourselves believe that all development from savagery to civilization must follow a like course and pass through similar stages. When we find societies that do not agree with this standard we blandly dismiss them as abnormalities, as survivals of backward states, or as manifestations of lack of political capacity. Approached with such preconceptions, Chinese institutions and ideas are often given up as a bad job and as a case of arrested development. In actual fact, they mark an extraordinary development in a particular direction, only one so unfamiliar to us that we dispose of them as a mass of hopeless political confusion and corruption, or a striking object of what happens when there happens to be even a high code of ethics without the blessings of a divine revelation.

The attempt to read Chinese institutions in terms of western ideas has resulted in failures of understanding and of action from the very beginnings of our contact. For example, in the

¹ From *Asia*, Dec., 1919; published under the title *Chinese National Sentiment*.

early days of intercourse there was ground of complaint of the treatment received by western shipwrecked sailors on Korean coasts. The Foreign Offices knew that there existed some tributary relation between Korea and China. They interpreted this relation of dependence, as Mr. Holcombe has pointed out, in the way familiar to them. They thought of the connection as that of feudal suzerain and vassal. Hence they demanded that China make its dependent behave. When China disclaimed authority, they thought that this was either equivalent to a renunciation of all relationship, or else a wilful piece of deceit in a characteristic endeavor to evade just responsibility. They had no precedent for a relationship which, while one of genuine dependence, was moral and advisory in nature.

The whole early history of the dealings of western nations with the Court at Peking is full of similar misconceptions. There was an undoubted monarch. The monarch was even of the despotic kind; there were none of the checks of constitutional and representative institutions familiar to the western mind. Hence all the attributes of political sovereignty, external and internal, were attributed to the Court. Here again there was no precedent for conceiving of a dynastic rule which was a combination of a primitive tribute-levying empire and an authority of a moralistic, homiletic, hortatory kind. And as we go from such external aspects to deeper conditions we find that China can be understood only in terms of the institutions and ideas which have been worked out in its own historical evolution.

The central factor in the Chinese historic political psychology is its profound indifference to everything that we associate with the State, with government. One inclines to wonder sometimes why the anarchists of the pacifist and philosophic type have not seized upon China as a working exemplification of their theories. Probably the reason is that being preoccupied with the problem of active abolition of government, they have not been able to conceive of an anarchy which should be only a profound apathy towards government. Or else they, too, have been misled by the popular association of anarchy with

extreme freedom and nobility, and could not imagine it in connection with the stagnation attributed to China.

II

According to literary records, the following verse is the oldest poem in the language—a song put into the mouth of a farmer:

“Dig your well and drink its water;
Plow your fields and eat the harvest;
What has the Emperor’s might to do with me?”

China is still agricultural, as it was in the bygone centuries. Its farmers still go about their own business of tilling and eating, marrying and giving in marriage, begetting and dying. As of old, they attend to their own affairs, and the power of Emperor or President concerns them not. Governors come and go, and fuss about their petty intrigues of glory and greed. But they do not govern the farmers, who are the mass of the population. The only governance known to them is that of nature, the rules of the immemorial change of seasons, the fateful laws of birth and death, of seed-corn and harvest, of flood and pestilence. In the words of perhaps their oftenest quoted proverb, “Heaven is high and the Emperor far away.” The implication is that earth is close and intimate, the family and village nearby.

M. Huc tells an incident that dates from 1851; it might, however, have happened at any period in the long history of China. After the recent death of the emperor, he endeavored without success to engage his fellow guests at a roadside tavern in a discussion of political prospects and possibilities. There was no response, though he exhausted his ingenuity. Finally one of the Chinese replied: “Listen to me, my friend. Why should you trouble your heart and fatigue your head with all these vain surmises? The mandarins have to attend to affairs of State; they are paid for it. Let them earn their money. But we should be great fools to torment ourselves about what

does not concern us. We should be great fools to want to do political business for nothing." And the anecdote continues: "That is very conformable to reason,' cried the rest of the company. Whereupon they pointed out to us that our tea was getting cold and our pipes were out." The State, the government, was a special business or trade, less interesting and less important for the mass of the people than ordinary affairs. It was, however, lucrative to those who specialized in it; let them carry its burdens. Meanwhile not merely the wedding and funeral, the sowing and reaping, concerned intimately the life of the people, but even the social consolations of the teacup and the tobacco-pipe were of more importance than affairs of State.

If the people were indifferent to government, the government, which in our western terminology we have to call the State, reciprocated. In theory it was the representative of Heaven, and consequently owned the earth, namely, the soil, and was the symbolic cause of its fertility, exercising a beneficial paternal influence upon the prosperity of the country. In fact, like Heaven itself, the government was high above. In earlier days Heaven may have directly intervened in the affairs of earth, but for outnumbered centuries in later days it had remained discreetly aloof, satisfied with relations long ago established and interrupting the affairs of earth only at great crises.

Except for a few purposes well understood by custom, the central government was irrelevant to the life of the people. It was a Court, and its dignity, prestige, ceremony and pleasures had to be maintained. The material side of this life required material supplies and money. The ideal life, the glory and supremacy of the reigning dynasty, could be satisfied symbolically and ceremonially, as the spirits had learned to be satisfied with symbolic money and imitations of servants, animals and food. The primary material function of government was then to receive a tribute from the products of the earth, partly in kind, partly in money. The amount was not onerous, and long custom had converted the tax into part of the regular

order of nature, though, like the crops and other phenomena of nature, it was subject to unexpected ups and downs.

The moral and ceremonial sovereignty was incarnated in the officialdom of viceroys, governors, heralds and other functionaries, who represented the Imperial Court, and who communicated to the people its mandates and exhortations, composed in the best literary style and manifesting the continuous benevolent solicitude of the representative of Heaven for their morals. These morals were, in turn, the source of the prosperity of the country and of the stability of the Empire. These officials also had to lead a life of a certain symbolic grandeur and glory which cost money, but taxation was kept within limits prescribed by custom, and as a rule the burden was not heavy. Pains were taken that it should fall upon the well-to-do as far as possible, thus serving the double end of keeping down the power of possible rivals and of not arousing the disfavor of the masses.

It is possible to trace in the old Chinese theory of politics the survivals of an original theocracy. But in China, even more than in Europe in its most deistic days, God, or Heaven, was remote, contenting itself with a general benevolent oversight. Its lordship was of an absentee nature. And the Court which represented Heaven was contented to imitate the latter's non-interference with the details and customs of life.

The result was that for all practical purposes each province was an independent state, composed, in turn, of a large number of petty republics called villages. In 1900 an English writer, made competent by long residence and intimate experience, wrote: "Each of China's eighteen provinces is a complete state in itself. Each province has its own army, navy, system of taxation and its own social customs. In connection only with the salt trade and the navy certain concessions have to be made to one another under a certain modicum of imperial control." These independent units are traditionally called provinces. But, as the quotation shows, they might have been called principalities, save that they had no orderly lineage of princes. China was not even a confedera-

tion, much less a national state or an imperial state, in the sense which history has given those terms in the West.

Again we have no precedents by which to interpret and understand such a situation. We are acquainted with empires that left local customs undisturbed and that contented themselves with levying tribute and exacting booty. But they were military powers, and always existed in unstable equilibrium. They never became so interwoven with local custom as to be a part of the established order of nature and able to dispense with military support. But China has worked out a scheme of remarkable static equilibrium—the most stable known to history.

The political life of China went on essentially undisturbed, even though rebellions overthrew dynasties. Such rebellions were themselves as much a part of the established order of Heaven or Nature as was an occasional flood or plague. All such crises had their natural causes and were proper and normal, however uncomfortable or destructive they might be. The texture of life was unchanged; it continued to exhibit the same patterns. The equilibrium was a human and internal one, a moral one, not one maintained by external pressure or military force.

The actual government of China was a system of nicely calculated personal and group pressures and pulls, exactions and "squeezes," neatly balanced against one another, of assertions and yieldings, of experiments to see how far a certain demand could be forced, and of yielding when the exorbitance of the demand called out an equal counter-pressure. Long before the time of Sir Isaac Newton, China worked out a demonstration in the field of politics, of the law that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions. It exemplified the working of the principle in every aspect of human association.

Such a social system implies a high state of civilization. It produces civilized persons almost automatically. For the essence of civility, or of civilization, is the ability to live consciously along with others, aware of their expectations, demands and rights, of the pressure they can put upon one,

while also conscious of just how far one can go in response in exerting pressure upon others. The Chinese, as long as they were left undisturbed by other peoples, had all the complex elements of the social equation figured out with unparalleled exactness. Their social calculus, integral and differential, exceeded anything elsewhere in existence. This fact, and this fact only, accounts for the endurance of China for almost four thousand years of recorded history.

III

Then there came the eruption of forces from the outside which were radically new, which were unprecedented, for which the social calculus provided no rules. They were not, strictly speaking, human; they were physical forces of a strange and incalculable kind—battleships, artillery, railways, strange machines and chemicals.

At first China was complacent. It remembered the numerous eruptions and invasions which had broken into its system in the past, and recalled how they had been subdued by absorption, how they had been gradually worked into the patterns of adjustments, demands, concessions, compromises and intercourses which constitute China. But gradually it became evident that old formulae would not apply, that a radically new force had been introduced. And it gradually became apparent that the new physical agencies and forces which were so irresistible were themselves the tools and designs of an unaccustomed social and political order. China, a civilization, was confronted by a civilization which was organized as China was not, into national states. The consequences of this contact are written in every problem, internal as well as external, that occupies China to-day.

There is a story of an intelligent Chinese who asked a foreigner to explain to him the nature and amount of the indemnity exacted from China by Japan after the successful war waged by the latter about the Korean question. After hearing the explanation he reflected a while to take in the full force

of the matter, and then remarked in a contented way, "Well, that is the Manchus' affair; it doesn't concern us. They will have to pay, not we." The remark appears to indicate not merely the extraordinary indifference to politics already spoken of, but an equally extraordinary political stupidity.

But it is stupidity only to the mind built after the pattern of western political institutions. From the standpoint of Chinese customs the remark was intelligent. Relations with foreign states were the business of the Imperial Court. And any expenses consequent upon such relations had to be met out of the purse of that Court. In the established system of taxation and revenues, the funds accruing from the tariff on imports from foreign countries belonged to the Imperial Treasury. It was nobody's business what the Court did with them. It was a logical conclusion that any debit item was also the exclusive affair of the ruling dynasty.

The logic was good. But it was based upon the past, upon premises that no longer hold good. The Japanese Indemnity was followed by the Boxer Indemnity. The whole revenue system was thrown out of balance. The long-established Imperial balance of expenditures and receipts was destroyed. Yet any radical change in the established system of taxation was practically out of the question, entirely out of the question in any immediate or abrupt way such as the situation required. It would have wrenched the whole social system out of order.

Even such changes as had to be introduced had a large part to play in the dissatisfaction with the Manchu dynasty, which led to its overthrow. There was not merely the ordinary opposition felt anywhere to a marked increase in taxation. There was not merely the interference with custom which for immemorial ages had set limits in the game of exactions and resistance. There was an indissoluble association of taxation with the peculiar prerogatives of the Imperial Court, none too popular at best. There was an equally fixed association of increased taxes with "squeezes" on the part of officialdom, with corruption which was not exactly corruption if kept within certain

limits of percentages, but which was intolerable when it surpassed them.

The internal system of taxation, adequate to all internal emergencies, was not elastic in the face of the externally induced crisis. Foreign loans had to be resorted to. The remedy increased the disease. It gave the opportunity for more and more intervention from without; it invited a multiplication of precisely those dependencies upon foreign power which were the original root, of the difficulty. And gradually the entire internal equilibrium has been upset in consequence of the contact with foreign powers. It cannot be regained without a radical transformation of China's historic political system. It has to nationalize itself in some fashion in order to meet the conditions imposed by its intercourse with other peoples who are organized into national states. What is true of the matter of taxation and revenues is true of almost every phase of Chinese life. Public finance but gives a typical example.

IV

There has been discussion of whether the Chinese have national loyalty, whether they have patriotism. Here also our words in their accustomed meanings betray us. In its literal sense the word "nation" is connected in derivation with the word for birth. In the sense of community thus implied, the Chinese are certainly a nation. But in its acquired historical meaning, nation means a people with a certain political organization, a people claiming or possessing sovereignty of a centralized sort over a certain territory. And this is what the Chinese have not, but have to acquire in the face of sharp demands from foreign nations. It is contrary to their own social inertia and momentum, which has been acquired in minute and complicated ways through centuries of adjustments.

Patriotism means love of country. In the sense of love of their earth, their native soil, the Chinese are perhaps the most patriotic of all existing peoples. The love may not be acute

as with the Japanese, as ardent as with the Poles, but it is interwoven with every detail of life. It is not so much a sentiment, a fact of consciousness, as an unbreakable habit of life. Attachment to soil and birthplace is quite a different thing from an effectively organized allegiance to the State, that political entity which is constituted by political means rather than by matter-of-course habits of daily life and intercourse.

It is customary to try to escape from the dilemma of a spontaneous, pervasive and unquestioned love of country that exists without the familiar manifestations of public spirit and political nationalism, by saying that the Chinese have a strong sense and pride of race which does for them what patriotism does for western peoples. Literally, this will hardly work. The Chinese regard themselves as five races, not one, as their flag testifies. In a certain genuine sense the Chinese are profoundly indifferent to race and racial distinctions. They have not been infected as have the Europeans and Japanese with the ethnological virus. While the Revolution was expedited by the fact that the Manchu dynasty was foreign, yet this ground of objection had had no effect for over two hundred years. It became significant only after western contact had aroused nationalistic feeling.

What the Chinese abundantly possess is community of life, a sense of unity of civilization, of immemorial continuity of customs and ideals. The consciousness of a unity of pattern woven through the whole fabric of their existence never leaves them. To be a Chinese is not to be of a certain race nor to yield allegiance to a certain national state. It is to share with countless millions of others certain ways of feeling and thinking, fraught with innumerable memories and expectations because of long-established modes of adjustment and intercourse.

This consciousness becomes loyalty, patriotism, in our sense in just the degree in which it gets transferred to the idea of a national state made after the model familiar to us, a state with an army and navy, a system of regular taxation and public revenue, an organized system of legislation, judiciary and ad-

ministration, a subordination of all local powers to a central power, and all the other paraphernalia of sovereignty which we take for granted. It is not easy to transform a traditional feeling into nationalism, and then attach it to an object which is largely non-existent, an object of faith rather than of sight.

For this reason nationalistic sentiment has tended to take an anti-foreign color among the Chinese. In spite of the Boxer outbreak and other violent demonstrations against aliens, it may be doubted whether there has been a strong hostility against the foreigner as such. The Chinese, one surmises, are rather unusually tolerant. Their amiable live-and-let-live policy is applied all around. Their normal attitude is that of indifference to strangers rather than of aggressive antagonism.

But conditions were such that about the only way in which they could show their devotion to their own civilization was negative. It was the outsider who was disturbing it. The Chinese lacked the positive organs of national life through which to resist foreign encroachments. Their loyalty to their own customs was therefore bound, one might say, to take the irregular and disorderly form of attack upon foreign residents. There are few who think that the Boxer days are likely to recur. The Chinese are intelligent, and they learned the hopelessness of holding their own by such methods. But it is still true that their national feeling can be aroused and concentrated more readily for purposes of resistance and opposition to foreign nations than for constructive purposes.

There are fine illustrations of this fact in recent Chinese international relations. There can be little doubt that the Government had officially instructed its delegates to the Peace Conference in Versailles to sign the treaty, recognizing though it did the Japanese appropriation of German rights in Shantung. National sentiment was, however, tremendously aroused. If Japan had set out to instigate a new national spirit which should overwhelm the old local provincialisms, she could not have proceeded in a more effectual way to accomplish the purpose. The people took the matter out of the

hands of the Government. By cablegrams to Paris, by telegraph to Peking, by mass-meetings and agitations, finally by a strike of students and then of the mercantile guilds in the larger cities, they made it clear that national sentiment would regard as traitors all those who should take part in signing the treaty. It was an extraordinarily impressive exhibition of the existence and the power of national feeling in China. It was all the more impressive because it had to work without organized governmental agencies, and, indeed, against the resistance of deeply-intrenched pro-Japanese officialdom.

If there still remained anywhere those who doubted the strength and pervasiveness of Chinese patriotism, the demonstration was a final and convincing lesson. But it took a great crisis of foreign menace to focus the feeling; Japan in the last two years has done for China what otherwise might have taken a generation more. But when the immediate task of preventing the signing of the treaty that gave away Chinese rights was performed, the feeling lapsed. Perhaps it remains equally intense, but it has lost in sureness of direction. The outward means and the established habits of thought required for positive determination of constructive national policies are still inchoate.

v

Every one knows that the chief instrumentality of foreign encroachment in China has been finance. Russia first conceived the policy of conquest by bank and railway, and other nations joined in. Japan, with her usual alertness, saw the point, and with her usual energy acted upon her perception. The question of finance remains pivotal in any positive national policy for China. Even if China had the capital to take care of her own developments, and she certainly has more than she has used, the denationalized customs work against loaning it to the Government. And lack of trust in the competency and honesty of the officials reinforces the other influences that tell against extending domestic credit for public needs. Clearly, an international financial consortium which should

loan money to China in bulk without assigning in return special concessions and spheres of influence to any particular nation is the obvious solution. But it is extremely difficult to arouse any popular interest in this matter. It is, so to speak, too positive and too specialized. On the contrary, it is comparatively easy for interested parties to stir up opposition. They have only to keep saying that this is a move on the part of foreign powers to get complete subjugation of China, and national feeling is excited in the negative direction. The alternative, namely, foreign loans from separate powers, in fact, Japan claiming specific rights and privileges in return, is not faced except by the more enlightened.

The masses trust to a *laissez-faire*, happy-go-lucky policy of meeting each stringency as it arises, rather than of committing the country to some comprehensive scheme which, because of the organization involved in it, makes the fact of foreign influence obvious. Habituated to dealing with obstacles and dangers in a piecemeal way, playing off one force against another with great skill, the natural dread that all feel towards the unknown is felt towards organization on a large scale. And the fact that the organization is one on the part of foreign nationalism makes it appear particularly dreadful. And who can blame China in view of its past experiences with foreign influence? There is even now a small section which quite sincerely argues that it would be better to let Japan have Tsing-tao than to make it an international settlement.

The situation is critical. The fear of coming against an organization of foreign nations was sufficient recently to defeat, at least for the time being, the proposition to unify the railways of China. Ultimately it would mean the development of a large national system under exclusive Chinese control. But for the time being it involved a certain amount of international control. Foreign nations interested in maintaining separate spheres were naturally hostile. But their easiest way of working was not to offer public opposition, but to play secretly, through domestic agencies profiting by the existing state of affairs, upon the national fears of China. The same forces are

already at work attacking the proposed international consortium and may wreck it. In fact, they will almost certainly succeed in delaying it until it becomes a matter of dire necessity. Yet it seems almost axiomatic that as long as China is dependent upon foreign loans it is much better for her to be dependent upon a combination of powers that have agreed to forego special privileges, and who will have to use their funds to build up China as a whole, than upon single separate powers that loan money only in response for special concessions and command of strategic points. These points are strategic not only economically, but in a political and military way.

It seems at first sight very unreasonable that China should prefer to continue a system, or lack of system, which has brought her to the present pass. And it is unreasonable. But we need to understand that China has now reached a point of intense national feeling and a position where she can act with assurance as a nation. Feeling is feeling. It is comparatively easy to arouse national aspiration and national fears. It is not so easy to secure a national understanding of and agreement for any comprehensive or constructive plan of operations. And the reason is obvious, for there are no national institutions, no national organs, to supply the material of understanding and afford the basis of enduring faith and confidence. This union of intense national sentiment, with absence or lack of channels and organs of national action, describes the dilemma in which China finds itself to-day, both internally and externally.

It is especially important that the United States should sympathetically comprehend the situation. Just now there is a warm wave of pro-American feelings, especially outside of the governmental circles that have become involved in Japanese intrigues. It is genuine. Yet it is largely a rebound from the prevalent anti-Japanese feelings. It is in any case a national feeling, not a national idea. It will be subjected in the future to the forces which always operate to make feeling, as distinct from thought, a fluctuating affair. Because of past history and because of economic interests, the United States

stands against the policy of partitioning China, whether overtly or by means of spheres of influence and special interests. That is all to the good with respect to China's feeling towards us. She also stands, as in the case of unifying railways and combined financial aid, for organized international assistance. With an ordinary amount of decency and good will, this policy should build up China rapidly and get her to the point where she can dispense with foreign control.

But for reasons just explained, China will hesitate and object and postpone. She may conceivably completely balk, and prefer to continue the policy of playing one nation off against another, in spite of the fact that that will mean for the time being an increase of Japanese control. It is most important that America should understand the causes of this attitude and should be patient and persistent in its policy, instead of being swayed by an emotional gust of revulsion at "ingratitude."

Revulsion and withdrawal of active interest on our part, because our advances and plans do not meet with an immediate and hearty approval, will only play into the hands of those countries who desire special and selfish rights in China, and who for this reason, and because of lack of faith in the political capacity of the Chinese, always carry in the back of their heads a scheme of ultimate partition and subjection. We need to realize that it is just because the Chinese have great political capacity that the problem of national redirection is difficult and slow. For this capacity has been committed to definite lines which are contrary to those that fit into the present situation. It will help an intelligent sympathy to remember that China has not advanced on the path of modern political nationalism to the point where national feeling is warm and intense, but where definite organs of national thought and action are only in the early stage of formation.

II. CONDITIONS FOR CHINA'S NATIONHOOD¹

China certainly is not a nation as we know nations in Europe. It is sprawling, not compact. It is as diversified as Europe, if not more so, instead of being homogeneous like Switzerland or France. Every one has heard of students from the north and south who talk to one another in English so as to be understood. But there are populous parts of China where a native has to go only a few miles to fail to understand the language of his compatriots. As for political self-consciousness, let the following true story serve. Students went from Shanghai to a neighboring village at the beginning of the anti-Japanese agitation a year and a half ago. The villagers listened patiently to their impassioned pleas for an interest in the policies of Peking dominated by "traitors," and for a patriotic boycott of Japan. Then they said in effect: "This is very well for you. You are Chinese. But we are Jonesvillians. These things are not our business." And this was not in the hinterland but close to the most developed coast city.

Yet if any would argue alone or chiefly to the future from such facts, he would certainly go wrong. Not because they are not massively representative, but because things are in flux. It is not safe to prophesy where they are going. But they are going somewhere, so that a Chinese politician who goes steadily contrary to the interests of China as a nation is sure of overthrow sooner or later. Even a Chinese within China cannot safely base his actions upon the state of things which is correctly represented above. Yet it would be equally unsafe to argue for the existence of a persistently influential minority from the fact of the thousands of telegrams sent to Paris in protest against signing a treaty that had within it the Shantung clause, or from the fact that a cabinet dominated by

¹ From *The New Republic*, Jan. 12, 1921; published under the title *Is China a Nation?*

pro-Japanese politicians, and in control of finance and the army, simply did not dare enter into direct negotiations with Japan about Shantung. In a crisis there may be a minority so substantial as to be dominating. But only in a crisis.

Is China a nation? No, not as we estimate nations. But is China *becoming* a nation, and how long will it take? These are the open questions. Any one who could answer them definitely could read the future of the Far East like a book. But no one can answer them definitely. In this suspense and uncertainty lies the momentous interest of the situation. When did nations begin to be, anyway? How long has France been a compact and homogeneous nation? Italy, Germany? What forces made them nations? And what is going to be the future of the national state outside of China? What is the future of internationalism? Our whole concept of a nation is of such recent origin that it is not surprising that it does not fit in any exact way into Chinese conditions. And possibly the days in which political nationality is most fully established are also the days of its beginning to decline. The last suggestion may be wild. But it suggests that the world as well as China is in flux, and that answers to the questions whether and when China is to be a nation, and what kind of a nation it is to be, cannot be found till we know also what is going to happen in Russia, and Europe generally.

At present, to continue the negative side of the affair, there is little public spirit in China. Family and locality spirit give China its strength for its old traditional ends and its weakness for contemporary conditions and for international relations. Even among the politicians factional spirit is much stronger than public or national spirit—and this is a weakness alike for traditional and new objects. A big army eats up public revenues and makes China increasingly dependent upon foreign loans and subject to the foreign spirit of interference. It is of no use for national aggression and of next to none for national defense. It is of use for graft, for personal ambitions and factional strife. China has all the disadvantages of both extreme centralization and extreme states rights, and few of the ad-

vantages of either. There is not only a division between north and south, but a cross division in both the north and south, and in addition a multitude of cross currents of provincial isolations and ambitions.

And yet was the United States a nation in the critical years after 1785? Was there not a bitter civil war only sixty years ago, and did not Gladstone announce that Jefferson Davis had created a new nation? Are all questions of national unity and states rights yet settled? Not many centuries ago European politicians took funds from foreign governments to strengthen the hands of their own factions, and upon occasion foreign interference was invited or welcomed for furtherance of party or religious strife. The respective claims of State and Church are hardly fully adjusted to-day while up till recently a church located outside the nation claimed and secured powers of intervention. This is a complication which China is at least spared.

I have recently read the words of an intelligent English visitor in America to the effect that the diversity of unfused populations and traditions is such that the United States is one country only in the sense in which the continent of Europe is one. And at about the same time H. G. Wells, using a different criterion, that of freedom and ease of movement and transportation, was saying that the United States was such a complete empire within itself that we could not speak of it and of France as nations in the same sense of the word nation. Such miscellaneous citations warn us that we cannot use the conception of nation in any but a fluid sense, even in western affairs. They indicate the difficulty in making hard and fast statements about Chinese national unity.

When we turn from political to economic affairs, our habitual western ideas are even less applicable. Their irrelevancy makes it impossible intelligently to describe Chinese conditions, or even grasp them intelligently. In the familiar sense of the word, there is *no* bourgeoisie in China. There used to be a gentry with considerable unwritten power, but for the time being at least it is practically non-existent. The

merchant class is traditionally outside of political concerns, and has not as yet developed any political or social class consciousness, though some signs of its beginnings were evidenced in connection with the recent boycott. Even in the West one has considerable difficulty in placing the farmers in the bourgeoisie-proletariat terminology (one is tempted to say patter). And how is a class of peasant proprietors who form not merely the vast mass of a people but its economic and moral backbone, who are traditionally and in present esteem, *the respectable part of the population, next to the scholars*, to be classified under our western notions?

Even in the West the point of these distinctions is the product of the industrial revolution. And in China the industrial revolution has still to occur. China is a much better place to study European history of a few centuries ago than to apply the concepts and classifications of present political and economic science. The visitor spends his time learning, if he learns anything about China, *not* to think of what he sees in terms of the ideas he uses as a matter of course at home. The result is naturally obscurity rather than light. But it may be questioned whether the most enlightening thing he can do for others who are interested in China is not to share with them his discovery that China can be known only in terms of itself, and older European history. Yet one must repeat that China is changing rapidly; and that it is as foolish to go on thinking of it in terms of old dynastic China—as Mr. Bland for example insists we must do—as it is to interpret it by pigeonholing its facts in western conceptions. China *is* another world politically and economically speaking, a large and persistent world, and a world bound no one knows just where. It is the combination of these facts that give it its overpowering intellectual interest for an observer of the affairs of humanity.

The question of China's nationhood, as one writer has observed, "is not an idle one. China is the stock example of survival by submission. If she is a nation in the European or Balkan sense, it is obvious that Japan cannot sit upon her

chest forever. If not, the nation that organizes her industries and education may be able to swallow her, for political and economic purposes, more completely than England swallowed India—swallowed, if not digested. Or the old inertia of size and patience may prevail, and the Japanese be swallowed and digested like their predecessors."

These remarks are pertinent, and they enter into the constant query of the foreign observer in China. And yet he can hardly go further than noting the problem, noting the flux of events, and some of the factors that may turn its direction. It is not safe, for one thing, to argue that because China has absorbed all previous invaders that she will end by incorporating into herself future intruders. Her previous conquerors were northern barbarians upon a lower plane of civilization. What would have happened if they had brought with them a superior technique of industry and administration no one knows. Marquis Okuma is reported to have accounted for China's long story of independent existence on the ground that she had no railways. At first sight this may seem to resemble the child's statement that pins save persons' lives, because persons don't swallow them. But it suggests the radically different character of ancient and modern invasions. The latter centre about exploitation of previously unused economic resources. A country that had possession of China's ports, railways, mines and communications would have China in subjection. The wiser the invading country, the less would she assume the burdens of civil administration beyond necessary policing. She would act as permanent exploiting capitalist using the natural resources of unskilled labor of the country to serve her own ends. In addition she would doubtless try to conscript native man-power for her armies. Generally speaking, the natives would act as coolies, the foreigners as upper class personages. Under such conditions, success or non-success in cultural assimilation would amount to little.

But as soon as such things are said, the mind at once recalls that improvement of internal communication and transportation has been a chief factor in developing countries into po-

litical units, while oppression from without has been the other great factor. The same forces are operating in China and will continue to operate. Nationalistic feeling as it now exists is largely the product of reaction against foreign encroachments. It is strongest on the seaboard not merely because industrial development is most advanced there, but because the aggressions of foreigners have been most felt at that point. Effort to take advantage of absence of national unity to subject a country is likely to end in creating a national consciousness. Korea is a striking example. Politically corrupt and divided, with no national political consciousness, less than a generation of alien rule combined with industrial and educational changes designed wholly to subserve the interests of the foreign power, have almost converted Korea into a second Ireland. History seems to show that nations are hardened into being under influences intended to subvert nationality. China is not likely to be an exception. While it is not a nation "in being," events are probably evoking a nation "in becoming." And the process is hastened by efforts to prevent it. At the same time no report is honest which does not state that almost any faction in any part of China, north or south, will surrender national rights to a foreign country in return for factional aid against its internal foes.

One other factor in probable evolution should be mentioned. For a long time, the great Powers, with the exception of the United States, proceeded upon the assumption that China was bound to be disintegrated, and that the policy of each foreign nation was to get its fair share of the spoils. This statement may be too strong. But at least the working assumption was that whenever any disintegration occurred, surrender to one nation must be compensated for, at China's expense, by concessions to others. The World War made conditions such that other nations could not compete with Japan in this game. It is fairly clear now that the disintegration of China would be almost exclusively to Japan's advantage. Hence a great access of benevolent interest on the part of other Powers in China's national integrity. China's historic foreign policy has been to

play one Power off against another. Now she is aided by a tendency of all the Powers to give her at least passive assistance against Japanese encroachments. The formation of the consortium with its abolition of distinctive spheres of foreign influence, the question of the re-affirmation or abrogation of the British-Japanese Alliance, the Shantung affair, acquire their meaning in this context. The as yet unsolved question is what Japan can by promise or threat offer by way of compensation to other great Powers to induce them to give her a freer hand in China.

An American educator long resident in central China remarked to me that China was trying to crowd into a half century literary, religious, economic, scientific and political revolutions which it had taken the western world centuries to accomplish. The remark indicates the difficulty in making predictions and in offering definite descriptions. In spite of the inertia and stability that still dominate the vast rural districts, in spite of non-fulfillment of specific past prophecies of changing China, China is in a state of flux. The accumulated effect of thousands of petty changes due to contact with western methods and ideas, has been to create a new mind in the educated class. This fact is at present more important than any single big external change or external failure to change that can be singled out. It will take a long time for this new mind to work itself out in definite achievement or even to trace definitely perceptible lines of progress. But these conditions which make intelligent description so difficult are those which lend China its absorbing interest.

12. JUSTICE AND LAW IN CHINA¹

I

To the student of political and social development, China presents a most exciting intellectual situation. He has read in books the account of the slow evolution of law and orderly governmental institutions. He finds in China an object lesson in what he has read. We take for granted the existence of government as an agency for enforcing justice between men and for protecting personal rights. We depend upon regular and orderly legal and judicial procedure to settle disputes as we take for granted the atmosphere we breathe. In China life goes on practically without such support and guarantees. And yet in the ordinary life of the people peace and order reign.

If you read the books written about China, you find the Chinese often spoken of as the "most law-abiding people in the world." Struck by this fact, the traveler often neglects to go behind it. He fails to note that this law-abidingness constantly shows itself in contempt for everything that we in the West associate with law, that it goes on largely without courts, without legal and judicial forms and officers; that, in fact, the Chinese regularly do what the West regards as the essence of lawlessness—enforce the law through private agencies and arrangements. In many things the one who is regarded as breaking the real law, the controlling custom, is the one who appeals to the "law"—that is, to governmental agencies and officers. A few incidents of recent history may illustrate the point.

The Peking Government University students started the agitation last May which grew into that organized movement which in the end compelled the dismissal of some pro-Japanese members of the cabinet and forced the refusal to sign the peace

¹ From *Asia*, April, 1920; published under the title *The New Leaven in Chinese Politics*.

treaty. The movement started with a procession. The parade passed by the house of an offensive member who was ordinarily referred to as "traitor." And the Chinese equivalent of the word traitor literally means thief-who-sells-his-country. In a fit of absent-mindedness the policeman on guard opened the gate into the compound. The leading students took this as a hint or an invitation. They rushed in. During the following scrimmage, the offender was beaten severely and his house was set afire.

This incident is now ancient history. What is not so well known is that public opinion compelled the release of the students who were arrested. To have tried and condemned them for crime would have had more serious consequences than the government dared face. The heads of the schools gave assurance the students would not engage in further disorder; and they were let go, nominally subject to summons later. But when in the autumn the government, having recovered its nerve somewhat, made a demand upon the heads of the schools to submit the students for trial, their action was regarded as a breach of faith. When the school officials replied that the students had not returned to their respective schools, nothing further happened. There was a general feeling that the summons for trial did not represent the real wish of the officials, but was taken because of pressure exercised by some vengeful person.

To western eyes, accustomed to the forms of regular hearings and trials, such a method seems lawless. In China, however, the moral sense of the community would have been shocked by a purely legal treatment. What in western law is compounded felony is frequently a virtue in China. The incident also illustrates the principle of corporate solidarity and responsibility which plays such a large part in Chinese consciousness. The school group to which the students belonged assumed liability for their future conduct, and gave guarantees for their proper behavior.

As the Peking students were the authors of the movement, they were regarded as its chief abettors. It was desirable for the militaristic reactionaries to discredit them. A meeting of

a few actual students, together with some old students and some who intended entering the University, was planned. Resolutions had been prepared which stated that a few noisy, self-seeking students, anxious for notoriety, had fostered the whole movement, coercing their weaker fellows. The resolutions declared, in the alleged name of a thousand students, that the real student body was opposed to the whole agitation. The liberal students got wind of this meeting, entered with a rush, took the thirty dissenters prisoner, obtained from them a written statement of the instigation of the meeting by the reactionary clique, and then locked them up as a punishment. When they were released from confinement by the police, warrants were sworn out and the ringleaders of the invading liberal students were arrested. Great indignation was aroused by this act, which was regarded as highly unsportsmanlike—not playing the game. An educational leader, a returned student, said to me that officials had no business interfering in a matter that concerned only the students.

Yet this seeming absence of public law—this apparent lack of concern for the public interest in peace and orderly procedure—does not mean that opinion would support any individual in starting out to redress his own wrongs. It means that troubles of importance are regarded as between groups, and to be settled between them and by their own initiative.

It is easy to imagine the denunciation of lawlessness that a report of such acts may excite in clubs and editorial rooms. They are here related, however, neither to condemn nor to approve. They are illustrative incidents, fairly typical. They show that the entire legal and judicial background which we take for granted in the West is rudimentary in China. Law and justice, as they should be, are not deliberately challenged in such episodes. There is merely a recurrence to traditional methods of settling disputes. The incidents are also instructive because they suggest the underlying cause. There is no confidence in government, no trust in the honesty, impartiality or intelligence of the officials of the State. Families, villages, clans—every organized group—has more confidence in

the willingness of an opposed group to come to some sort of reasonable settlement than it has in the good faith or the wisdom of the official group.

II

The following incident illustrates one reason for the lack of confidence in the government. One of the new liberal weeklies in Peking was a thorn in the side of the reactionary officials. Not that it was a political journal, but it was an organ of free discussion; it was connected through its editorial staff with the intellectual element in the Government University which the reactionaries feared, and it was serving as a model for starting similar journals all over the country. The gendarmerie in Shanghai complained to the Provincial Military Governor in Nanking that the journal was creating unrest. Bolshevism has become the technical term in China as well as elsewhere for any criticism of authority. The Military Governor reported this statement to the Minister of War in Peking, who reported it to his colleague the Minister of Justice, who reported it to the local police, who took possession of the newspaper office and shut down the paper.

Note the official House That Jack Built, and the impossibility of locating responsibility anywhere in any way that would secure the shadow of legal redress. Vagueness, overlapping authority, and consequent evasion and shifting of responsibility are typical of inherited governmental methods. Back of the incident lies, of course, the fact that government in China is still largely personal—a matter of edicts, mandates, decrees, rather than of either common or statute law. If we in the West sometimes suffer from the extreme to which the separation of administrative from legislative and judicial powers has gone, a slight study of oriental methods will reveal the conditions which created the demand for that separation.

A few days ago, for example, the Minister of Justice in the Peking Cabinet issued a decree that all printed matter whatsoever must be submitted to the police for censorship before

publication. There was no crisis, political or military. There was no legislative enabling act. It suited his personal wishes and his factional plans. The order was calmly received with the comment that it would be obeyed in Peking, because the government controlled the Pekingese police, but no attention would be paid to it in the rest of China. In many cases, the Republic's writ does not run beyond the city walls of the capital.

III

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the acute problems of Chinese existence and reconstruction are due to the fact that methods which worked well enough in the past are now sharply challenged by the changes that have linked China up to the rest of the world. China faces a world that is differently organized from itself in almost every regard; a world, for example, that prizes the forms of justice even when it neglects its substance; a world in which governmental action is the source and standard of redress of wrongs and protection of rights. The habitual method of China, though it has accomplished a great measure of law-abidingness among the Chinese in their own affairs, appears from without as total absence of law, when foreign relations come under consideration.

This is true of China's relations to practically all foreign nations. But Japan lies closest and has the most numerous and varied contacts, and hence has the most sources of complaint. She has borrowed and improved the technique of other nations in making these causes of friction the basis for demands for all sorts of concessions and encroachments, to the constant bewilderment and growing resentment of China. In enforcing the boycott against Japan, for example, the student unions have frequently taken matters into their own hands. They have raided stores in which Japanese goods are sold, carried the stocks off and burned them. When these things are reported in Japan, there is no scrupulous care taken to say that the goods are always the property of Chinese dealers, and that the Japanese themselves are not interfered with.

A succession of such incidents skilfully handled by the Japanese government through the press has bred among the mass of the Japanese people a sincere belief that the Chinese people are lawless, irresponsible and aggressively bumptious in all their dealings with the Japanese, who, considering their provocations, have acted with great forbearance. Thus the Imperial Government assembles behind it the public opinion that is necessary to support a policy of aggression. The feeling that China is in a general state of lawlessness is used, for example, as a reason for keeping Shantung.

The matter is further complicated by the large measure of autonomy enjoyed by the provinces, which historically are principalities rather than provinces. In spite of nominal changes, the situation is not essentially different to-day. The railways and telegraphs have brought about greater unity; but on the other hand the system of military governors, one for each province, has in some respects increased the effective display of States' rights.

During the last few months there have been repeated rumors of the secession of the three Manchurian provinces, of the Southern provinces, and of the Yangtze provinces. These rumors, like the threats of governors here and there to withdraw when matters are not going to suit them, are largely part of the game for political prestige and power. But we know in the United States how our measure of independent action on the part of one state in the Union may complicate foreign relations. Given a greater measure of independence and a weak central state, it is easy to see how many cases of foreign friction may arise which give excuse for an aggressive policy.

Moreover, there is a constant temptation for an unscrupulous foreign power to carry on intrigues and bargains with provincial officials and politicians at the expense of the National State. The recent history of China is largely a history of this sort of foreign intervention, which naturally adds to dissension and confusion and weakens the national government still more. Whether justly or not, the Chinese believe that militaristic Japan has deliberately fomented every movement

that would keep China divided. As I write, rumors are current of an attempt to restore the monarchy with Japanese backing.

The bearing of neglect of legal process and judicial forms upon the problem of extra-territoriality is obvious. At present, if commercial and other relations between China and foreign powers are to continue, some kind of extra-territoriality is a necessity, and this involves the existence of "concessions." Nevertheless, their existence is galling to national pride. Returned students have brought the idea and the word "sovereignty" home with them. No word issues more trippingly from the lips.

Yet the existing system has its present advantages for the Chinese themselves. The concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin, which are under foreign jurisdiction, are veritable cities of refuge for Chinese liberals and for political malcontents. As censorship and suppression of newspapers have increased under the present reactionary Ministry of Justice, there is a marked tendency for newspapers to form corporations under nominal foreign ownership and with foreign charters in order to get legal protection. Progressive Chinese business houses flock to the concessions. At present, without the Chinese element they would be mere shells. It is said that ninety per cent of the population of the International Settlement in Shanghai is Chinese and that Chinese pay eighty per cent of its taxes. Tares proverbially grow with the wheat. Corrupt officials protect their funds from confiscation by keeping them in foreign banks. As you ride through the Tientsin concessions, you have pointed out to you the houses of various provincial governors and officials who have thoughtfully provided a place of safety against the inevitable, though postponed, tide of popular indignation.

A Chinese friend said to me that one of the next patriotic movements on the part of the Chinese would be a wholesale exodus from foreign concessions. Except for investors in foreign real estate, it will be amusing to watch when it occurs. The concessions will be left a mere shell. The foreign interest

in the maintenance of concessions would completely disappear in this contingency were there some other way of maintaining consular jurisdiction.

IV

I would not give the impression that nothing is going to change the legal situation. The contrary is the case. There is a competent law codification bureau, presided over by a Chinese scholar whose works on some aspects of European law are standard texts in foreign law schools. A modern system is building up. An effort is being made to secure well trained judges and to reform and standardize judicial procedure. The desire for the abolition of extra-territoriality is hastening the change. But it is one thing to introduce formal changes and another to change the habitudes of the people. Contempt for politics and disregard of governmental jurisdiction in adjusting social and commercial disputes will die hard.

It is to be doubted whether China will ever make the complete surrender to legalism and formalism that western nations have done. This may be one of the contributions of China to the world. There is little taste even among the advanced elements, for example, for a purely indirect and representative system of legislation and determination of policy. Repeatedly in the last few months popular opinion has taken things into its own hands and, by public assemblies and by circular telegrams, forced the policy of the government in diplomatic matters. The personal touch and the immediate influence of popular will are needed. As compared with the West, the sphere of discretion will always be large in contrast with that of set forms. Western legalism will be short-circuited. Along with apathy on the part of the populace at large to political matters, there is extraordinary readiness to deal with such questions as a large number are interested in, without going through the intermediaries of political formality.

The liberals in the existing national Senate and House of Representatives make no pretense of attending meetings and

trying to influence action by discussion and voting. They make a direct appeal to the country. And in effect this means appeal to a great variety of local organizations: provincial educational associations to reach scholars and students, industrial and mercantile guilds, chambers of commerce (whose powers are much larger than those of like bodies in our country), voluntary unions and societies, religious and other.

It is not at all impossible that, in its future evolution, China will depart widely from western constitutional and representative models and strike out a system combining direct expression of popular will by local group-organizations and guilds with a large measure of personal discretion in the hands of administrative officials as long as the latter give general satisfaction. Personal government by decrees, mandates and arbitrary seizures and imprisonments will give way. Its place will be taken by personal administration such as already exists in the railway, post office, customs, salt administration, etc., rather than by formal legislation where the nature of the constructive work to be done furnishes standards and tests.

V

Roughly speaking, the visitor in China is likely to find himself in three successive stages. The first is impatience with irregularities, incompetence and corruptions, and a demand for immediate and sweeping reforms. Longer stay convinces him of the deep roots of many of the objectionable things, and gives him a new lesson in the meaning of the words "évolution" and "development." Many foreigners get stranded in this stage. Under the guise of favoring natural and slow evolution, they become opponents of all things and of any development. They even oppose the spread of popular education, saying it will rob the Chinese of their traditional contentment, patience and docile industry, rendering them uneasy and insubordinate. In everything they point to the evils that may accompany a transitional stage of development. They throw their weight, for example, against every movement for the emancipation of

women from a servile status. They enlarge upon the dignity and power some women enjoy within the household and expatriate upon the evils that will arise from a relaxation of present taboos, when neither the old code nor that existing in western countries will apply. Many western business men especially deplore the attempts of missionaries to introduce new ideas.

But the visitor who does not get arrested in this second stage emerges where he no longer expects immediate sweeping changes, nor carps at the evils of the present in comparison with an idealized picture of the traditional past. Below the surface he sees the signs of an intellectual reawakening. He feels that while now the endeavors for a new life are scattered, yet they are so numerous and so genuine that in time they will accumulate and coalesce. He finds himself in sympathy with Young China. For Young China also passed through a state of optimism and belief in wholesale change; a subsequent stage of disillusionment and pessimism; and, in a third stage, has now settled down to constructive efforts along lines of education, industry and social reorganization.

In politics, Young China aims at the institution of government by and of law. It contemplates the abolition of personal government with its arbitrariness, corruption and incompetence. But it realizes that political development is mainly indirect; that it comes in consequence of the growth of science, industry and commerce, and of the new human relations and responsibilities they produce; that it springs from education, from the enlightenment of the people, and from special training in the knowledge and technical skill required in the administration of a modern state.

The more one sees, the more one is convinced that many of the worst evils of present political China are the result of pure ignorance. One realizes how the delicate and multifarious business of the modern state is dependent upon knowledge and habits of mind that have grown up slowly and that are now counted upon as a matter of course. China is only beginning to acquire this special experience and knowledge.

Old officials brought up in the ancient traditions, and new

officials brought up in no traditions at all, but who manage to force themselves into power in a period of political break-up, will gradually pass off the scene. At present the older types of scholars, cultivated, experienced in the archaic tradition, are usually hesitant, if not supine. They are largely puppets in the hands of vigorous men who have found their way into politics from the army, or from the ranks of bandits; men without education, who know for a large part no law but that of their own appetite, and who lack both general education and education in the management of the complex affairs of the contemporary state.

But in the schools of the country, in the Student Movement, now grown politically self-conscious, are the forces making for a future politics of a different sort.

13. YOUNG CHINA AND OLD¹

I

There exists on the globe—the real globe, not the papier-mâché one—a country with a population of perhaps one-sixth of this world's inhabitants. The history of this country extends over four thousand years. Nowhere else does the earth show such a record of continuity and stability. Yet the story is not one of monotony or stagnation. Within its continuity there is at least as much variety and change as in the history of Europe for the two thousand years preceding the seventeenth century. Invention, industrial art, philosophy, poetry and painting of the first order adorn the civilization of this country. At no other time and in no other place have moral ideas, apart from ecclesiastic reinforcement and theological support, been so widely disseminated. Over a thousand years ago, this country gave morals, literature, art and the elements of culture to a neighbor that now ranks among the “Great Five” of modern nations.

Outside of farming, its social order was never very efficient. With an exceedingly small number of exceptions its rulers were corrupt and incompetent. But it got along somehow; it endured. It maintained itself with so little government, in any modern sense of the word, that it is surprising that anarchists have not taken it as their stock example of what can be done on a no-government basis. But it got along in seclusion. Sea, desert and mountains hemmed it in. It was sufficient unto itself, complacent in a conceit of superiority bred of isolation.

But at last the industrial revolution made its barriers of no avail. Steam and electricity eliminated distance. The country found itself confronted with forces with which it was utterly

¹ From *Asia*, May, 1921; published under the title *Old China and New.*

unable to cope. Century-old weaknesses were no longer mere domestic incidents. They were a menace of destruction within and an invitation to imperial wolves from without. Contact with new forces produced flagrant exhibition of all accumulated defects and corruptions while at the same time a new and better organized civilization brought with it strange and irresistible temptations to new evils.

In writing of this country—China—faced as it is with the most difficult problem of reconstruction any civilization has ever known, Mr. J. O. P. Bland selects a small group of individuals as being personally responsible for most of its woes. The group he selects to bear the burden of responsibility he calls “Young China,” specifically those men who have experienced the destructive effects of western education. And to meet all evils, Mr. Bland has a panacea. It is international foreign control of governmental finance.

To any one with a slight knowledge of the facts of the situation, combined with the rudiments of a social imagination, this bare statement makes superfluous any detailed reply to Mr. Bland, although it will be necessary to point out in the course of this article some specific misstatements. An independent analysis of the elements of the problem of transition and transformation in China is, however, on its own account, well worth making. Simply as an intellectual spectacle, a scene for study and surmise, for investigation and speculation, there is nothing in the world to-day—not even Europe in the throes of reconstruction—that equals China. History records no parallel.

Can an old, vast, peculiar, exclusive, self-sufficing civilization be born again? Made over it must be, or it cannot endure. Yet it must accomplish the making over in the face of facts and forces profoundly alien to it, physically, politically, industrially, intellectually, spiritually. All of the forces are strange, unprecedented. Many of them—aggressively hostile—are directed by those who seek to batten upon China’s decay. Much in her past, in her traditional customs, actually lames her in her effort to cope with new conditions. It puts great obstacles in the way of every endeavor to brace herself to her task, so

that one meritorious attempt after another lapses into impotency. There are many good things in the old order, just as there are many in the tentative new one. But there is a social as well as a physical chemistry in accordance with which elements good in themselves give rise to explosive or poisonous compounds.

History may be ransacked to furnish a situation that so stirs interest, that keeps a spectator so wavering between hope and fear and that presents so baffling a face to every attempt to find a solution. One is constantly reminded of the Chinese puzzles of one's childhood, in which the complexity and variety of interlocking parts seemed to defy every attempt to form a coherent whole. There was a clue, a method for those puzzles, and perhaps a way that leads to successful solution of the enormous present puzzle may yet be found.

It is no wonder that wherever a few are gathered together in China the favorite indoor sport is "saving China." But after, whether at the same time or on different occasions, the whole gamut from optimism to pessimism has been struck, the honest-minded give it up as a problem far beyond the size of their intellects. "*If this*" and "*If that*" are the last word. Many have their favorite "*if's*": *if* there were a strong central government—which there never was, even in the palmiest days of absolutism; *if* there were honest officials—which harks back to the mythical days of Yao and Shun. And now a new "*if*." *If* the pestilential returned students would cease from troubling and China's financial administration could be reorganized by new Sir Robert Harts and Sir Richard Danes, all would be well. Model China after the Salt Gabelle and her troubles are ended.

But the task of reorganization, of transformation, of union of old and new, is so vast, so appalling in its complexity, that neither any wholesale forecast of the future nor any simple remedy is worth the paper it is written on. The things that are certain, are few. Either failure or success will entail tremendous consequences for the rest of the world, so that no one can afford to be indifferent.

A great number of specific enterprises and experiments, converging to a common end, will have to be undertaken. There is no situation in the world more calculated to justify distrust of panaceas and wholesale remedies. The moves to be made are of all sorts. Many are external, technical, changes in administration, adoption of modern ways of managing affairs. In certain moments of depression, one can picture the enormous benefit that would accrue from a simple regard for arithmetic and for modern systems of accounting and auditing. But unless China is to be rent asunder, even more than its neighbor, Japan, is spiritually rent to-day, changes of thought, of belief, of outlook on the world must come too. A new mind must be created. And the most important permanent result of all external administrative changes, whether in government or in industry, will be their effect upon the creation of a new mind and a new morale.

II

Among the external changes needed is one in public finance. Thanks to her own ineptitude, combined with the greed of some foreign nations and the stupidity of others, the government of China is helplessly dependent upon foreign loans, which are accumulating a burden of interest to be met only by new loans. In China there is wealth in some quarters. But the home security is so poor that the merchants will not invest their money unless it be under the protection of foreign governments. And rich officials will not invest because they obtain their riches by investing foreign loans—in their own pockets. International control is necessary not merely as a means of securing Chinese capital for China but also as the only thing that will prevent the further disintegration of China by a system of concessions and spheres of influence and the pawning of natural resources to this nation or that. No unprejudiced observer has any doubt about these facts.

But even superficially there is no sense in regarding this plan to secure international control of finance as antagonistic to the

tendencies represented by the student movement in China. On the contrary, the leaders in explaining the plan to their countrymen, provided it is really drawn in the interest of the development of China and not of foreign financiers, must come from this movement. Mr. Lamont, who is probably quite as much interested in the success of the Consortium as is Mr. Bland, found it worth while, when in China, to give many hours to students and their leaders among teachers, for the sake of removing misconceptions and enlisting coöperation.

It is common honesty to say, however, that there is still much skepticism in China about the whole scheme. But any fair person will also acknowledge that the prior history of China's financial dealings with foreign bankers is conducive to the Missouri attitude. Mr. Bland's denial of any Japanese influence or bias in his recent writings must be accepted at its full value. But to attribute Chinese opposition to the Consortium to the student movement and to pass over in silence the extraordinary campaign carried on in China by Japanese agencies in league with Chinese venal politicians and newspapers—a campaign still waged in November, 1920—is precisely the sort of thing that awakens suspicion. Mr. Lamont's statement on the nature of the propaganda against the Consortium is too full and explicit to leave any doubt as to where responsibility lies.

Let there be no mistake about one thing. The charges of corruption and intrigue that Mr. Bland brings against Chinese politicians and the statements he makes about the strictly factional character of civil strife in China, the absence of underlying principles, the greed for place and power—in fact, for money—are the a-b-c's, the platitudes of the situation. If he had stayed more than a few weeks in his hurried trip through a few of the coast towns, he could have found material for a far blacker and more disheartening picture than he has painted. In official circles, the present situation regarding the terrible famine, for example, is sickening beyond measure. Indifference and apathy joined to squeeze, intrigue for position and prestige combined with profiteering and exploitation of the

starving, land-grabbing from honest and industrious peasants by black-hearted officials, refusal, on the ground that worse than useless soldiers must be transported, to provide cars to carry grain supplied by philanthropists—these are some of the outstanding facts. The question is not about the facts, but about their cause and remedy.

In spite of his desire to leave the impression that the situation is somehow due to "Young China," even Mr. Bland cannot avoid recognizing that all this is in accord with the traditions of Chinese officialdom. Whether things are worse than in the bad days of the Manchus, or only about as bad as things were then, it is impossible to say dogmatically. Many think them worse. Others think the appearance of greater evil is due to the fact that some degree of publicity has invaded China and the stirred cesspool spreads more noisome odors. In many respects, however, modern business conditions give new opportunities, and officialdom is no slower to grasp new chances than it is to take profit from old sources. The fact is that the state of affairs is so bad that it is hard to imagine it any worse.

It constitutes a part, a considerable part, of that problem of reorganization, of transformation from the old to the new, to which reference has been made. It affords a striking example of what can happen when Old China is projected into the situation produced not by any one set of persons in China, but by the new world forces that have taken China unawares and unprepared. Of old, intrigues and corruptions only affected China domestically. Now they imperil her national being—as is evidenced by the record of \$200,000,000 borrowed from Japan by venal politicians in two years, without any public value received, and at the loss of immense resources mortgaged in return. But the point is that this evil is due to Old China, not new, Old China wallowing unashamed in the trough of new opportunities.

Everything said about the effect of financial maladministration in keeping China back is true. The loss of public revenues is serious in itself. But this is a mild evil compared with the encouragement of selling out or giving away the natural re-

sources of China to foreigners who have political as well as economic designs on China. And this is what happened under the direct auspices of the followers, disciples and lieutenants of the late Yuan Shi-kai—that “strongest, ablest and wisest” of recent Chinese statesmen! It is mild in comparison with the retardation of legitimate industry, commerce and railway development, due to the levylings of irresponsible officials in search of still more millions. It is mild in comparison with the spread of corruption from the official class to the mercantile class, which has dealings with the government and which is becoming infected with a like greed for money and a like unscrupulousness as to how it is got—an evil so serious that it may, if it goes on, empty of meaning the old saying about the Chinaman’s word being as good as his bond. It is mild in comparison with the development, as an aid in money-getting, of a vast horde of undisciplined soldiers, forming habits of idleness, engaged in looting, depriving large sections in the north of needed agricultural labor, spreading venereal disease wherever they go, changing themselves upon a moment’s notice from soldiery to bandits and back again.

No intelligent person in China believes that reform in financial administration is going to come from within. Some kind of international foreign control of finance is not only a financial necessity, but a political, industrial and moral necessity. No true liberal in America will, if he is wise, oppose the scheme *per se*. But he will, if he is wise, scrutinize its terms most carefully and insist upon real justice and honesty. A recent minister of finance borrowed money just before settling-day. Credit was bad enough, heaven knows! But the minister and his friends instituted banks, from which to borrow money at eighty per cent in order to pay interest on what they had previously stolen. Then, to make sure the interest would continue to be paid, they sold the notes to a foreign (not Japanese) bank that has foreign governmental support. The incident illustrates the need of financial supervision. But it also indicates that foreign financiers are not proof against taking part in shady transactions when the profit is good.

III

It is significant that the charges that Mr. Bland so freely brings against the student movement are precisely the reports with which the officials of the Anfu stripe, who were in power during his visit, made thick the air of Peking. Officialdom knew what it was about. It knew that the patriotic movement was directed primarily against it. It knew also every resource of the clever Chinese politician in circulating reports to discredit the potential threat to its corrupt control. Mr. Bland was not the only foreigner to accept these reports at their face value. In spite of his evident knowledge of their corruption and utter unreliability, he believed them in this instance because they fitted in with his antecedent prejudices. Although this new movement came from students who had never been out of China, Mr. Bland's acquaintance with the situation was so superficial that he identified the new student movement with the returned student movement he had previously known and damned. So he fell an easy victim to the very wiles he so profusely exposes upon other occasions.

And in this connection it may not be amiss to state the real origin of the term "Young China." The Young China party was consciously modeled after Mazzini's Young Italy party. As that strove to create a new Italy, so those who rallied about the cry of "Young China" asserted, not the existence of Young China, but the necessity of rejuvenating Old China, unless China itself was to disappear. And though they have not as yet succeeded in their efforts, every passing day makes it clear that they diagnosed the case aright.

Mr. Bland's lack of familiarity with the new student movement may be measured by the fact that he says that Young China's "indignation has never yet been publicly directed against the growing rapacity of the metropolitan and provincial officials." As a matter of fact, the present student movement began on May 4 last year with precisely a protest against these officials and ended in the dismissal from the cabinet of three of its most corrupt members. It would have gone further

if the military force of Peking and other places, provincial as well as metropolitan, had not crowded jails with students, closed their offices with brutal force, spied upon their every activity, filled their ranks with *agents provocateurs* and bribed freely the weaker among them. The story that Mr. Bland quotes with much relish of \$200,000 given by one set of politicians to the Student Union of Tientsin to aid them in their movement against Peking officials at least proves that Mr. Bland knew better when he says the students have never turned upon their own officials. But in truth this is only one of the stories that were circulated by the officials in power to discredit the movement. "Documentary evidence" to the contrary—which Mr. Bland has seen—was forged by this crowd as part of their game. This does not mean that politicians among the outs did not try to use the movement, or that the students made no mistakes or were wholly free from corrupt elements. But upon the whole, considering the inexperience of those engaged in it, the movement was surprisingly well managed and showed a power of organization that augurs well for the future.

These facts are pertinent to the practical situation. In aid of the Consortium, as well as of other reforms, the students should be enlisted against the resistance, active and (still more dangerous) passive, of officialdom. Their patriotism is easily aroused to take a negative form, especially in view of the predatory career of foreign powers in China in the past. But they are the one self-conscious class in China wholly awake to the ills that flow from the recent system of "government." They are the enemies, natural and avowed, of both existing and would-be officials. They have seen Chinese officials before this time take advantage, to the detriment of the country, of the cupidity of foreigners, of their ignorance and their desire for immediate results. They have seen highly disinterested foreign professions in the past used as cloaks for rapacious encroachments upon Chinese resources and sovereignty. They are naturally apprehensive lest any new scheme be manipulated by officials (whose wiles they understand better than any

foreigner understands them) into new means of confirming their power and wealth while at the same time increasing the bondage of China.

But they also know how desperate the situation is, and in American leadership they have a faith that they have not in that of other foreign powers. What they fear is that, as in some previous cases, American energy and American intelligence will not, when it comes to execution, be equal to American good intentions. They fear that American leadership will be nominal rather than effectual; that something will be "put over on" American ideas by the combined efforts of Chinese corrupt officials and non-disinterested foreign finance. It is therefore a most practical feature in the situation that pains be taken, not only that American ideas really rule the Consortium, but that every effort be made to make it clear to the intellectual leaders of public opinion that such is the fact. The evil of such outpourings as those of Mr. Bland is that they obscure this fact, and, by relying upon just the element that cannot be trusted and alienating the only element that can be employed to develop a sympathetic public opinion in China, they prejudice the success of the entire movement. The growing support of public opinion is essential to a reform anything more than superficial and external.

But, though reform of financial administration is indispensable and can be secured only through foreign control over a period of years, it is only one of a multitude of factors in the change of Old China into a China adapted to modern conditions. New China is not a fad or device of a few half-baked enthusiasts. It is a necessity unless China is to rot, and unless its rotting carcass is to become in the end a menace to the peace of the world. The notion that, by the mere introduction of western economy, China can be "saved," while it retains the old morality, the old set of ideas, the old Confucianism—or what genuine Confucianism had been petrified into—and the old family system, is the most utopian of sentimental idealisms. Economic and financial reform, unless it is accompanied by the growth of new ideals of culture, ethics and family life (which

constitute the real meaning of the so-called student movement of to-day), will merely shift the sore spots. It will remedy some evils and create others. Taken by itself it is a valuable practical measure. But it is the height of absurdity to use it as a stick with which to beat the aspirations of men and women, old as well as young, for new beliefs, new ideas, new methods of thought, new social and natural science—in short, for a New and Young China.

Years ago there were many Chinese who sincerely thought that the evils from which China suffered and the dangers that threatened her were due to the Manchu régime and would be remedied by the introduction of a republican form of government. Some doubtless favored the change from motives of self-interest. If there were none such, then the Chinese are more different from Westerners than I think they are. But with the mass of republicans it was a sincere belief, born of hope and inexperience. It is a matter of pathos and not one for ridicule. Probably even more numerous now than were the republicans in the old days are those who think that existing evils are due to the Republic and who would welcome a return to monarchy—just as great numbers twenty years ago thought the removal of the foreigner would heal all evils and so tried the Boxer panacea. If an attempt is made to restore monarchy, these will be disillusioned as others have been of their panaceas. But what shall we say of an experienced Westerner who still seeks for a cure-all and who says, "Introduce foreign international control of finance, and all will be well"? It is not surprising that such a one is skeptical of the value of foreign education.

There is in China a considerable class of foreigners, especially in the outports and political centers, who are frankly attached to Old China. The reasons are complex. In part they realize its virtues, and in other part they subconsciously rely upon its weaknesses to serve their own comfort and convenience. Such persons usually deprecate the efforts of missionaries and foreign educators, not usually because they are theoretically opposed to Christianity, but because the intro-

duction of new ideas is disturbing to what they esteem and profit by. They also see new evils coming into China and a decay of some of its old virtues. Not having sufficient social and historical grasp to trace these changes to their source and see how inevitable they are in a period of social transition, they attribute all disintegration to the influence of foreign learning and ideas, introduced by missionaries and returned students. Leave Old China alone culturally and morally, they say in effect. It had its vices, but it had its stable virtues, and if the tares are uprooted, the grain also will be destroyed. Change China only in business and material ways. Give it the benefit of railways, mills, telegraphs, reformed currency, good financial administration; give it the external technique of western civilization free from disturbing western culture, and all will be well.

This view, widely current, is as superficial as it is plausible. It is not worth while to argue whether a change merely industrial is desirable. For it is impossible. Even if it were abstractly desirable, it is sentimentally utopian, in spite of its professed allegiance to hard business facts. What is really undermining the family system, which was the basis of Old China? The teachings of returned students? The desire of a small number to select their own life companions, thereby breaking down parental authority; to have educated women as their wives, thereby revolutionizing China by changing the traditional status of women? No. These things are, at most, symptoms, not causes. The real cause is precisely the modern methods born of the industrial revolution, which fatuous observers would introduce while they dream of leaving old institutions unchanged. The railway and the factory system are undermining the family system. They will continue to do so, even if every student take the vow of eternal silence.

Here is a village in the province of Chekiang, an actual, not an imaginary, one. For thirty generations the same families have lived and died there. They have been the leading spirits in maintaining farming, industry and social order and peace. The town was a center of scholars and literary men of

the old, dignified, leisurely sort. There was little poverty and much prosperity. Now ancestral homes and temples are in a state of decay. The leading men, whose presence assured light, order and welfare are not there. Farming is degenerating. Even education has gone backward in quality, if not in amount. The lower classes are more restless and disorderly, as well as poorer, than they used to be. The influence of returned students? Precisely as much and as little as is a somewhat similar decay in parts of New England.

The town has no railway nor mills. But it is not far from Hangchow and from Shanghai. The abler and more enterprising men, representatives of the solidarity of the old family system, have moved away to places where there is more life and opportunity. This one is in Peking, that one in Shanghai, the other in Hangchow. Some are teaching; some are in banks; some are interested in foreign trade, some in developing cotton mills. They are adopting new professions, establishing new relationships, forming new families in new places. It is difficult to be patient with the notion that the industrial revolution can come in China without exercising just such far-reaching political, moral, domestic and intellectual changes as it has wrought in Europe. Europe had its eighteenth century of "enlightenment," its attack upon the old, its subversive thought and action. And China is beginning to have its century of change, involving destruction, even of good things, as well as introduction of new, good things. How shall we regard men who, in the face of this inevitable transformation, can think only of a few individuals, and who place all blame on the personal beliefs and activities of these few?

Even the greatest reactionary can hardly expect to introduce the railway and the mechanical technique of modern industry, and at the same time prevent the introduction of scientific ideas and methods. A few weeks ago there was a total eclipse of the moon. It was celebrated with the usual salute of gongs and fire-crackers to prevent the heavenly dog from swallowing the moon. What is the attitude of the small boy and girl who have studied even elementary geography toward the activities

of their elders? They are normal enough youngsters to enjoy the racket, but they hardly learn from the ceremony respect for the intelligence and beliefs of their ancestry. The boy learns a little about elementary chemistry, if not in school, then in the modern shop. His belief in ghosts, which is emotionally and intellectually associated with his ancestral worship, is surely modified, and with its modification goes less rigorous adherence to the traditional moral code.

These things are rudimentary. But they have a bearing on not only the whole topic of the so-called student movement, but even upon such a practical detail as foreign financial control. It is not necessary to try to assess the respective benefits and evils of the changes going on. It is enough that there are evils and dangers accompanying the transition, with its relaxation of old disciplines and codes. If schemes of reform are limited to financial and economic measures, these evils and dangers may only be increased. They can be remedied and the balance be made to fall heavily on the side of genuine progress, only as financial reform is accompanied by an intellectual and cultural renewal such as lies close to the heart of the student movement in China.

Financial reorganization, under international control, will save enormous sums of money. These funds will go largely into railways and highroads and into mills and factories. It takes an unthinking optimist to imagine that along with undoubted benefits there will be no spread of new evils, and no further loosening of old ties. Only a comic opera can do justice to the theme of those who say, "Restore Old China," and, when asked how it is to be done, reply, "By building railways and introducing factories." The decay of the traditional family system will be hastened. With factories, sexual morality will go on the down-grade. Respect for the old and for custom will decrease. Love of money will get new opportunities for expression. Men will lose the chief old moral restraint, which came from lifelong living in the immediate presence of members of the family and clan, to whom every personal act was public and who exercised unremitting pressure of approba-

tion and reproof. Labor difficulties will increase. Child labor is already increasing, and the taking of women from the home. Workmen and employers traditionally in close personal contact will become separated and divided in thought and sentiment. All of these things will surely come along with effective international control and reform of financial administration and the consequent diversion of funds into new means of communication and production.

These new evils do not, to be sure, preclude new great benefits or furnish any grounds for relaxing efforts at financial reform. But they suggest the utter ineptitude of schemes that depend wholly upon measures of financial reform, even admitting that they are carried out with complete wisdom, disinterestedness and honesty—as of course they will not be. They indicate that the leaders of the new culture movement in China who are interested in social, domestic and intellectual transformations are wiser, in the midst of all of their confusion, uncertainty and inevitable blundering, than are foreign critics who advise them to leave Old China morally and culturally alone and devote their energies to technical improvements.

14. NEW CULTURE IN CHINA¹

I

A Chinese friend, to whom I owe so much that he would be justified in arresting me for intellectual theft, has summarized for me the stages of foreign influence in China. At first, new military devices were thought to be the secret of western power. According to tradition, earlier divinities had come to China borne by the waves or riding a white horse. Some divinity must be associated with all organized power; and now "Christ was riding on a cannon-ball" to China. This is not a literary phrase; it was the common man's literal belief. So an arsenal was built in Shanghai, and then gunboats. The guns wouldn't go off, or they exploded. The men-of-war were sunk by the Japanese navy in the Chino-Japanese War.

Then the weakness of China was attributed to her outworn form of government. Reform was to come by political means. A republic was to be constructed instead of a navy, as easily and in as short a time. But the republic hardly came off either. At this period, some foreigners made up their minds about Chinese ideas of reform and they have never changed their notion since. They labeled this political movement, "Young China" and have stuck right there. Meanwhile the thought of China has moved on; the representatives of this movement and their successors are now almost like fossil reminders of an olden time. The period is hardly ten years distant, but thoughts, if not things, change with such rapidity in China that one is hard pressed to keep up—and unfortunately many foreigners make little effort to do so.

The third period is that of reliance upon technical improvements. After all, the artillery and the naval equipment of the West are due to applied science, to engineering. So the distinguishing feature of western civilization, the one to be imi-

¹ From *Asia*, July, 1921.

tated, was thought to be neither military nor political but economic. Civil and mechanical engineers were to be the saviors of the country. Railways, factories, steam and electricity were to enable the old country to compete with new nations on even terms. But somehow this movement ran up against all sorts of obstacles; progress was slow; it brought new dangers and evils.

Soon there was a wave of moral reform. Thousands of societies were organized for the cure of this, that and the other evil. This was the time of the anti-foot-binding societies, of anti-opium movements, of anti-gambling associations, of remodeling of the old system of education and so on through the list. Though Christian influence counted for much in the initiation of these reforms, they were mostly carried on in a Confucian revival.

Then came a conviction that underlying ideas must be changed, that democracy was a matter of beliefs, of outlook upon life, of habits of mind, and not merely a matter of forms of government. Democracy clearly demanded universal education, the extension of schools to all the people and a change from literary learning to something connected with civic and social action. It was the tradition that what was written must be written in the vocabulary, forms and cherished expressions of hundreds of years ago, in a language that bears little relationship to the spoken language of to-day. But the people could never be reached until the written language was simplified and made more accessible. And the language of speech must also be used in writing in order that modern ideas might get adequate expression. A scholar of the old school remarked to me in Hangchow, a center of the older culture, that no one knew how many valuable ideas had been lost to China in the past few hundred years because those who thought them could not make them known, for lack of command of the cumbrous and artificial medium of writing. So there grew up, about two years ago, the so-called literary revolution—an attempt to write and publish in the vernacular and also to familiarize Chinese readers with what is distinctive in the trend of mod-

ern western literature, from free verse to Thomas Hardy, Bernard Shaw, Ibsen and Maeterlinck. I know of one school that criticized its foreign teacher of literature as not up-to-date, because he used Shakespeare and Dickens while they wanted H. G. Wells and Strindberg! They even suggested that he take a vacation, go home and catch up! He had become, they said, too "Chinified" and conservative.

The matter of content, of ideas, soon became more important than that of language and style. The new ideas were turned full against ancient institutions. The family system came in for full measure of criticism, and this not only from the point of view of the traditional western idea of family life, but from that of *The Doll's House* and the most advanced western radical thought. Socialistic literature, anarchism, Marx and Kropotkin ran like wild-fire through reading circles. Tolstoi became perhaps the most read of foreign writers. Thus was evolved a new formula: China could not be changed without a social transformation based upon a transformation of ideas. The political revolution was a failure, because it was external, formal, touching the mechanism of social action but not affecting conceptions of life, which really control society.

And now there are signs that the next stage will be an interest in scientific method. It is recognized that technology and other branches of applied science are dependent upon science as a method of thought, observation, registration, criticism, experiment, judgment and reasoning. The idea is gaining ground that the real supremacy of the West is based, not on anything specifically western, to be borrowed and imitated, but on something universal, a method of investigation and of the testing of knowledge, which the West hit upon and used a few centuries in advance of the Orient.

These latter ideas underlie what may be literally translated from the Chinese as "the new culture movement." Concretely and practically it is associated with the student revolt that began on May 4, 1919. Some foreigners think of the latter as simply a new form of political movement. They have been encouraged in this belief by Chinese politicians and by con-

servatives, most of whom doubtless believed it was a purely political movement. Anything of a cultural and social nature is too far removed from their own lives and thought to be conceivable. But though it directed its outward manifestations against a group of corrupt politicians, and though it was stimulated by the failure of Chinese claims at Versailles, on account of commitments made by these politicians, for value received, to the Japanese, it was in its deeper aspect a protest against all politicians and against all further reliance upon politics as a direct means of social reform. The teachers and writers who are guiding the movement lose no opportunity to teach that the regeneration of China must come by other means, that no fundamental political reform is now possible in China, and that, when it comes, it will come as natural fruit of intellectual changes worked out in social, non-political ways. And the great mass of the student body in the higher schools of China is now virtually pledged to abstinence from official life. Doubtless many will fall by the way in the future. They will not be able to resist the lure of an easy living and of power. But the anti-political bias is pretty firmly established.

II

This sketch, hurried and superficial as it is, suggests a number of comments. In the first place, the movement, though instigated by foreign contacts, which is only to say, after all, by contacts with the distinctively modern world, has become more and more characteristically Chinese. The movement of May 4 was directly undertaken by Chinese students, not only without the instigation of returned students, but against their advice. It was spontaneous and native. The movement for a reform of language would hardly have been started without foreign influence, but it is naturally a movement conducted by Chinese, for specifically Chinese ends, and it has precedents in Chinese history. The subsidiary movement toward phonetic script has been encouraged largely by missionaries, and so one hears more about it in western newspapers. Even the

anti-political movement, the belief that reform is conditional upon scientific and social changes, is in a way a return to Chinese modes of thinking, a recovery of an old Chinese idea, plus an assertion that the power of that idea was not exhausted and terminated by Confucianism. It has now to be worked out in adaptation to new conditions, even if it involves the overthrow of Confucian forms of belief and conduct. Another obvious feature of the evolution is that it shows steady progress from the superficial to the fundamental.

The comments just made take the movement at its best, in its spirit. From the point of view of results concretely attained by it, they involve an undoubted idealization of its development. Each old stage has left behind it a deposit, a stratification. "Young China" is at best an ambiguous term. It lumps into a single mass representatives of each of the phases described—military, political, economic, technological, ethical, literary, social, etc. By selecting certain individuals from each of these strata, one may, with some degree of truth, bring almost any charge against "Young China." Naturally, in other words, there is confusion, uncertainty, mutual criticism and hostility among the various tendencies. Most of the returned students of some years ago are opposed to the present anti-political movement and to the literary revolution. Many are still in a nationalistic stage where they rely upon some change to be wrought miraculously in the army and the government. More are distinctly in the technical stage, believing that if they could get the engineering jobs for which they have trained themselves, China would begin to move—as it doubtless would, to some degree.

One more discrimination has to be made. Although cultivated Japanese as well as politicians like Marquis Okuma have long proclaimed the right and duty of Japan to lead China, to be the mediator in introducing western culture into Asia (including India, where they look upon the English as alien interlopers), few Americans have taken seriously the dependence of China upon Japan in just these ways. I have seen books on the development of modern Chinese education

which do not mention Japan, which attribute the renovation of the Chinese system to American influence, and which leave the impression that it is modeled upon the American common school system. As a matter of fact, it is modeled administratively wholly after the Japanese system, which, so far as western influence enters in, is based on the German system, with factors borrowed from French centralization. I have visited nine provinces and seen the educational leaders in the capitals where the higher schools are concentrated. There are but two cities, Peking and Nanking, where, in the government schools, direct western influence begins to approach the Japanese, either in methods or in personnel. To talk about returned students and fail to discriminate between those from Japan and those from Europe and America is to confuse everything touched by the discussion.

This is not said by way of criticism of Japanese-trained returned students. I believe that, in spite of the too bitter rivalry between them and other Chinese students educated abroad (partly a matter of the ever present "rice-bowl" question), the great mass of Japanese-trained students are doing the best they can, according to their light, for China. The exceptions are enormous, for they include some of the politicians and military men who have been doing their worst during the past few years for China, and who have provoked a large measure of the present universal condemnation of Japan and things Japanese.

The point is that western ideas from the West itself and via Japan are two such different things that only confusion ensues when representatives of both schools are massed, as Mr. Bland constantly combines them, under the name of "Young China." The defeat of Russia by Japan created a vogue for Japan that no western country has ever begun to touch. Here was another oriental nation, using Chinese characters and deriving its civilization from China, which had conquered the dreaded foe, the West, in the person of mighty Russia. No wonder thousands flocked to Japan to study and most reformers took their models from Japan. By far the greater number of the

revolutionary leaders who formed the Republic were Japanese or had lived in Japan as refugees and imbibed its culture as they never assimilated that of the West. The Manchu dynasty was doomed in any case. Full fifty years before the Revolution, the Taiping rebellion would probably have put an end to it, if foreign aid had not come to the support of the throne. The direct cause of its final downfall was the defeat of Russia by Japan. The historic parallel is the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan and the imperial restoration. By an accident, historically speaking, the change in China eventuated in a republic. Its main object, aside from getting rid of a foreign dynasty, was to modernize China as Japan had been modernized. "Young China" at this period meant Japanized Chinese.

What the new leaders brought to the situation was western ideas via Japanese utilization of them. And this meant in effect *not* a new culture, but a utilization of western technique in military, technological and administrative affairs in the interest of old culture. The Japanese have persistently taught, doubtless sincerely, that western civilization is essentially materialistic, while oriental culture is idealistic and spiritual in basis and aims. They have held that the West obtained its temporary supremacy merely by artillery and machines. Hence it must be fought by adoption of its own devices, while old oriental ideas and ideals are retained intact. Most of the Chinese who studied in Japan returned to China with this idea of the materialistic, technological nature of western civilization firmly fixed in their heads. It fell in with the conceit of their own superiority, which was so common and amusing a feature of all the earlier intercourse of the West with the Orient. All that China needed to learn from America and Europe was technical science and its applications.

III

"Young China" is thus a diversified and fluent term. Among those popularly labeled with that name by western writers

there are all kinds of contradictory aspirations. But the two things that stand out to-day as active and dominant features of the situation are the need of reform in culture as an antecedent of other reforms, and a tendency for leadership to revert to those who are distinctively Chinese in their attitude, as over against those who would introduce and copy foreign methods, whether from the West or from Japan.

The two traits seem to contradict each other. How can reversion to Chinese leadership coincide with attack upon Chinese customs and habits of mind? How can it coincide with a realization that the real source of western superiority is found, not in external technique, but in intellectual and moral matters? Well, history is never logical, and many movements are practically effectual in proportion to their logical inconsistency. But so far as an answer exists it is found in the fact, already alluded to, that the idea of the supremacy of intellectual and moral factors over all others is itself a native Chinese idea. It is much more Chinese than the idea that salvation can be found by introducing guns and factories and technical administrative improvements. It implies also that the real breakdown in Chinese national life is moral and intellectual. It implies a demand for new ways of thinking. Some of the new leaders might assert that they are truer to Confucianism in attacking it—as they mostly do—than others are in clinging to it. For the real idea, the vital idea in Confucius, they may say, is belief in the primacy of ideas, of knowledge, and in the influence of education to spread these ideas. But the ideas that are now petrified into Confucianism are not fitted to modern conditions. The breakdown in Chinese national life is proof of their inefficacy according to the standard of Confucianism itself. And Confucian education had become aristocratic, for the few only. Hence the need for a new culture, in which what is best in western thought is to be freely adopted—but adapted to Chinese conditions, employed as an instrumentality in building up a rejuvenated Chinese culture.

The program is an ambitious one. It may seem to many much more pretentious, much less hopeful, than an attempt to

borrow specific devices from the West. To many foreigners on the ground, it certainly seems a deviation from the real path of Chinese reform, which they hold to be the adoption of Christianity. But its relation to Christianity bears out the account here given of it. Some of its leaders are as non-Christian as they are anti-Confucian. They do not attack Christianity. They are merely indifferent to it. Others, especially in active educational work, are Christians. But I have generally found that these men are profoundly indifferent not only to denominational and dogmatic Christianity, but to everything except the social aspect of Christianity. They do not even take the trouble to call themselves liberals in religious belief. They approach Christianity from such an angle that they are indifferent to the distinction between conservative and liberal in belief. In effect they assert their claim to develop a distinctively Chinese Christianity. And though the movement toward an independent Chinese Church has not as yet gone far, it is likely to be a large feature of the future.

It would be foolish to say that any great number of the students and teachers influenced by the new culture movements are wholly conscious of the underlying philosophy that has just been expounded. This is confined as yet to a small group of leaders. The movement is for the most part still a feeling rather than an idea. It is also accompanied by the extravagances and confusion, the undigested medley of wisdom and nonsense that inevitably mark so ambitious a movement in its early stages. By making a clever selection of extracts from the writings put forth in its name one could easily hold up the whole movement to ridicule, as less than half-baked, as an uncritical and more or less hysterical mixture of unrelated ideas and miscellaneous pieces of western science and thought. Or a selection of writings could be made which would show it to be dangerous to society, to the peace of the world. Japanese writers who have paid attention to it have mostly held it up as a subversive radicalism and have attributed it to Bolshevik propaganda. But in the nine provinces I have visited, I have yet to find a single trace of direct Russian influence. Indi-

rectly the Russian upheaval has of course had a tremendous influence as a ferment, but far subordinate to that of the World War, and even to President Wilson's ideas of democracy and self-determination. For the new culture movement, though it cares nothing for what is politely called a republic in present China, is enthusiastically stirred by democratic ideals, and is starting out with the premise that democracy must be realized in education and in industry before it can be realized politically. For Bolshevism in the technical sense there is no preparation and no aptitude in China. But it is conceivable that military misrule, oppression and corruption will, if they continue till they directly touch the peasants, produce a chaos of rebellion that adherents of the existing order will certainly label Bolshevism.

IV

After the upheaval of May 4, the student unions started periodicals all over China. It is significant that at this moment of the height of the revolt against corrupt and traitorous officials and also of the Japanese boycott, these topics were secondary in the students' journals. The journals were written in *Pei-wha*, the vernacular already referred to, and were ardent in advocacy of its use. Their burden was the need of educational change; attacks upon the family system; discussion of socialism; of democratic ideas; of all kinds of utopias, such as taking away children from their parents and giving them to public authorities to be reared, the abolition of all national and even provincial government and the reduction of China to a state of self-governing communes. Naturally there was much effervescence along with the fermentation. Lacking definite background of experience, the students thought all ideas and proposals much alike, provided only they were new and involved getting away from old customs and traditions.

In one prominent provincial city, some teachers in a normal school joined with a youth of seventeen in advocating free love as a remedy and substitute for the family system, com-

munal rearing of children, abolition of all private property, the election of teachers by students as a form of democracy, the abolition of examinations as a relic of autocracy. Since the articles were written in the vernacular, an alarmed provincial governor, scared by the noise made by this blowing off of steam, closed the school and wrote to Peking, demanding that future use of the vernacular be prohibited by law. But some official had enough of the saving grace of common sense to remark that these dangerous thoughts would then be written in the old literary language, and then it would be necessary in consistency to forbid its use, too. Practically speaking, these ideas were about as dangerous as those set forth in schoolboys' debating clubs would be in any country. Yet they are important symptoms and potentially they involve a menace, not to the peace of society, but to those who profit by the evils of the established order. It is significant that in my whole experience I have not found one of these extremists who had been trained in America or England. They are almost without exception persons who have been educated in China and who speak and read only Chinese. They can easily quote sanction for their extreme ideas from old Chinese writings and legends. The few exceptions were students trained in France, who had adopted as congenial to the anarchistic vein in Chinese thought certain ideas coming from the French Revolution.

In Nanking last spring some students were kind enough to make out for me a list of journals, mostly founded within the previous year and a half, to advocate the principles of the new culture. A cursory reading of the titles and professed objects of these periodicals confirms what has been said. The organ of this particular group of students gives the key-note of the whole undertaking. The journal is called *Youth and Society*. Its motto, with true Chinese balance of phrasing, is, "To make society youthful and youth social." *The Dawn, New Voice of Society, The New Individual, The Citizen, The Warm Tide, Young China, The Young World, The New Group, The New Life, Upward, Construction, Learning and Labor and Truth* are other typical names. And among the objects professed

occur almost with monotony such phrases as "to reform the nation and society, physically and socially"; "to investigate society"; "to study social and economic problems and introduce new ideas"; "to introduce new thoughts to the citizen and uplift his personality while promoting home industries"—the last phrase of course an echo of the boycott; "to arouse the workingman and reform society"; "to promote popular education and save society"—this by a journal called *Save the Country*; "to promote the new culture and develop thinking and pure science"; "to bring about a development of learning so as to apply the idea of research and criticism to the reform of society"; "to study society and introduce western ideas"; "to reform society in the light of scientific ideas"; "to introduce new thoughts to the world, and to apply an optimistic but critical attitude to the reconstruction of society." Many of these papers were of course as ephemeral as all of them are ambitious. But they illustrate the spirit of the movement as hardly anything else could. The list would not be complete without the mention of journals like *The New Woman*, the object of which is "to arouse women as a means to reforming society," and *The Woman's Bell*, the aim of which is "to educate women and enable them to take part in the progress of society." In fact, in the journals as a whole, the three most discussed topics are reform of the family system, the emancipation of women and the labor question, all of them in connection with educational reform. The three parent journals, which continue to exercise the greatest influence, and so are peculiarly the organs of the new culture movement, are called *Youth*, *The Renaissance* and *Emancipation and Reconstruction*.

It must not be gathered that the whole activity has been literary and theoretical. For the first time in Chinese history, the educated youth have given themselves to what at home we term social service.

I suppose most foreigners approach China with an antecedent belief in its essential conservatism, its aversion to change. The conservatism is unquestionably there. But so also is a

predilection for change. And the scene shifts so often as to be dizzying to observe. Teachers complain of the "bumptious" insubordination of students—not a new complaint in China, where students have prerogatives in respect to their own discipline most disconcerting to visitors from free America. They complain also of instability of mind, which leads students to rush enthusiastically into a new cause only in a few months to lose interest and turn to some newer thing. The symptom is characteristic of conditions outside of schools. It is to be regretted. But it is genuine evidence of a general state of transition, with the hesitation, uncertainty and openness to novel stimuli that such periods are bound to exhibit. On the other hand, there is a maturity of interest far beyond that which marks American students of the same years. High-school boys and girls listen soberly and intelligently to lectures on subjects that would create nothing but bored restlessness in an American school. There is an eager thirst for ideas—beyond anything existing, I am convinced, in the youth of any other country on earth. At present the zeal for ideas outruns persistence in getting knowledge with which to back up the ideas. But it supplies an extraordinary vitality to the growing desire for knowledge and scientific method. It means that knowledge is being acquired, not as a technical device nor as a conventional badge of culture, but for social application. If the students in any higher school in China are asked why they are taking a particular course, the greater number will answer, "To help our country" or "To promote the reform of society." Discount the superficiality with which many make this reply and there still remains a substantial basis for hope for the future.

v

After a few months in China, a visitor will take an oath, if he is wise, never to indulge in prediction. For prophecy is sure to be dictated by hope or fear rather than adequate facts. Flesh is weak, however, and loves to pass upon the present in terms of the future. The observer will consequently fall into

the vice he abjures—as I have occasionally done—to his own prompt undoing. Yet, moving between the thin, but exciting, ice of prediction and the safe, dull ground of sure fact, one may assert that, with all its crudities and vacillations, the new culture movement provides one of the firmest bases for hope for the future of China. It cannot take the place of better means of communication—railways and highways—without which the country will not be unified and hence will not be strong. But in China there is need, too, for a unified mind, and that is impossible without the new intellectual movement. It also makes a great deal of difference whether the mind when unified looks to the past or is in sympathy with modern thought in the rest of the world. A China unified according to the scheme that Japan successfully adopted would be no less isolated than Japan has turned out to be, and more menacing to the world. China needs schools; it needs, and needs badly, universal elementary education. But it makes a great deal of difference what these schools teach and what their spirit and aim is—as German and Japanese universal education both prove.

Chinese educated youth cannot permanently forswear their interest in direct political action. Their attention needs to be devoted more than it has been to detailed, practical economic questions, to currency reform, public finance and problems of taxation, to foreign loans and the Consortium. One finds schools where foreign-educated students are teaching theoretical political economy from books based on the assumption of competition, machine production and capitalistic accumulation, which have no more to do with the surrounding industry—strictly local as it is, and carried on by hand-work according to custom and for a static market—than has lunar astronomy. Or one finds the interest centering in socialism even when there is next to no problem of distribution of wealth (except checking the rapacity of officialdom) and when the problem of increased productivity for labor is acute. But China is after all in the early stage of the industrial revolution, and, if it is not to repeat the experience of the rest of

the world, with all the evils and dangers of the warfare of capital and labor, with sweated industries, child and woman labor, oppression by capital and sabotage by the worker, if it is going to profit by the nineteenth-century experience of the rest of the world, it has to come to the problem prepared. And not even the most extravagant speculations of the present will, when brought to earth by the demands made by actual conditions, prove wholly useless as preparatory equipment.

China has the alternatives of perishing, to the disturbance of the world, as well as itself, or of condensing into a century or so the intellectual, scientific, industrial, political and religious progress for which the rest of the world has taken several centuries. It cannot, like the United States, make the change with plenty of elbow-room, but must accomplish it in a civilization crowded with traditions and superstitions as well as with people. Young China, especially Youngest China, shows an appreciation of this fact. There are hours when, stimulated by contact with what is best in the movement, I am willing to predict that it will succeed and, in succeeding with its own problems, will also give to the world things of new and permanent value. There are other times, when, after contact with the darker features of the situation, I wonder that the supporters of the cause do not all lose hope and pessimistically surrender. It is easy to see why some give up effort and devote themselves to making the best of a bad situation by feathering their own nests. At the end, one comes back to the sobriety, the industry, the fundamental solidity of the average common man. These qualities have weathered many previous storms. They will pull China through this one if they are redirected according to the demands and conditions of that modern world that has thrust itself so irresistibly and so disturbingly upon China. The new culture movement is a significant phase of the attempt to supply the direction so profoundly needed.

15. TRANSFORMING THE MIND OF CHINA¹

The beginning of the modern age in China dates from that bloody episode, the Boxer Convulsion. Its outbreak signalized the supreme endeavor of old China to have done once for all with the unwelcome intruder, so that it might return untroubled to its self-sufficiency. Its close marked the recognition that the old China was doomed, and that henceforth China must live its life in the presence of the forces of western life, forces intellectual, moral, economic, financial, political. With its usual patience China set out to adapt itself to the inevitable. But in this case, something more than a patient passivity was necessary. China learned in 1900 that she had to adjust herself to the requirements imposed by the activities of western peoples. Every year since then she has been learning that this adjustment can be effected only by a readjustment of her own age-long customs, that she has to change her historic mind and not merely a few of her practices. Twenty years have passed and the drama does not seem to be advancing. China seems to be marking time. As with the drama of the Chinese stage, the main story is apparently lost in a mass of changing incidents and excitements that lack movement, climax and plot.

But the foreign interpreter comes to the scene with a mind adapted to the quick tempo of the West. He expects to see a drama unfold after the pattern of the movie. He is not used to history enacted on the scale of that of China. When he hastily concludes that nothing is doing, or rather that although something new and unexpected happens every day, everything is moving in an aimless circle, he forgets that twenty years is but a passing moment in a history that has already occupied its four thousand years. How can a civilization that has taken four thousand years to evolve, that has crept about and ab-

¹ From *Asia*, Nov., 1919.

sorbed every obstacle hitherto encountered, that has countless inner folds of accumulated experience within itself, quickly find itself in new courses? We talk glibly about the importance of the problem of the Pacific, and even the schoolboy can quote Seward, Hay and Taft. But what do we suppose this problem to be? One that concerns a superficial waste of mobile waters? No, the real problem of the Pacific is the problem of the transformation of the mind of China, of the capacity of the oldest and most complicated civilization of the globe to remake itself into the new forms required by the impact of immense alien forces.

Analogies, especially when they are obvious, are as deceptive in the field of political thinking as they long ago proved in natural science. The tempting comparison of the future of China, in its reaction to western ideas and institutions, to the record of Japan is misleading. The difference of scale between a small island and a vast continental territory makes the correspondence impossible. China emerged from feudalism two thousand years ago, but without at the same time becoming a national state in the sense familiar to us. Japan's emergence coincided with its opening to the West, so that its internal condition and the external pressure from other nations enabled it to take the form of an absolute state (with certain constitutional trimmings) externally similar to states produced in the evolution out of feudalism of modern Europe. The development of a strong centralized state, with unified administration and militaristic protection, was as easy for Japan as it is difficult for China. More fundamental is the difference in national psychology. Something over a thousand years ago Japan took on Chinese civilization via Korea and yet remained essentially Japanese. For the past sixty years it has been taking on western civilization. Yet the writers and thinkers most characteristically Japanese tell you that Japan is not westernized in heart or mind. Though it borrows wholesale western technique in science, industry, administration, war and diplomacy, it borrows them with the deliberate intention of thereby strengthening the resisting power of its own traditional policies. It

acknowledges without reserve the superiority of western methods, but these superior methods are to be used to maintain eastern ideals intrinsically superior to the foreign. This may seem to the foreigner an evidence of the conceit often associated with Japan, but the retort is easy: Is the European complacent conviction of superiority anything more than the conceit of prejudice? At all events, this doubleness of Japanese life, its combination of traditional aims and moral ways with the externals of foreign skill and specialized knowledge, accounts for the impression of duplicity which so many carry away from contact with contemporary Japan.

It is to be doubted whether such a dualism, such inconsistency of inner and outer life, can be long kept up. Yet its successful achievements marks the record of Japan in its relations to western civilization. And it is precisely this sort of thing which cannot happen in China. She has evolved, not borrowed, her civilization. She has no great knack of successful borrowing. Her problem is one of transformation, of making over from within. Educated Chinese will already tell you that if you wish intact survivals of old China, you must go to Japan—and Japanese tell you much the same thing, though with quite a different accent and import. The visitor is struck by the fact that it is in the public buildings and schools of Japan, not of China, that the eye everywhere sees the old Confucianist mottoes, especially those of the reactionary and authoritative type. China with all its backwardness and its confusion and weakness is more permeated to-day with western contemporary thought than is Japan. There is some significance in the fact that while the circulation of President Wilson's war speeches was legally forbidden in Japan, they have furnished for the past two years China's best seller. There will be many to say that Japan's retention of the ideas that she took from China in the best days of the latter's history, and then protected against deterioration, is the cause of Japan's strength, and that China's decay is precisely because she has permitted the infiltration of ideals and ideas that are foreign and consequently destructive. This may be true. I

am not here concerned to deny it. In any case, it illustrates our proposition: China must run a course radically different from that of Japan.

There will either be decay and disintegration, or thorough-going inner transformation. There will not be adoption of western external methods for immediate practical ends, because the Chinese genius does not lie in that direction.

Japan's influence upon China has been enormous. The westerner who has not studied the situation is quite unaware of the extent to which China after the Russo-Japanese war in particular took over Japanese administrative and educational methods. But it is already obvious that they are not working here as they worked in Japan. A large part of the present intellectual and moral crisis in China is due to reaction against this factor in Chinese life. Doubtless it is artificially strengthened just now by immediate political causes. But beneath this surface there is a general intellectual ferment, and a belief that China must resort not to Japanese copies of western forms, but to the original sources of western moral and intellectual inspiration. And the recourse is not for the sake of getting models to pattern herself after, but to get ideas, intellectual capital, with which to renovate her own institutions.

National conceit, national vanity, is a sealed book to the outsider. We are sure that our own is only just pride and self-respect, and that the foreigner's is either ridiculous or a mark of offensive contempt and dangerous hostility to our own cherished ways of life. But dubious as is generalization on such matters, one is struck by certain differences in the group self-consciousness of Japan and China. Its quality is perhaps suggested in certain comments which they pass not infrequently upon each other. A Japanese will tell you that the Chinese do not care what other persons think of them. A Chinese says that Japan has no sense of its "face." The two criticisms are enough alike to be intriguing. But it may be suggested in explanation that Chinese complacency is the deeper seated and hence is not so acute. It is fundamental and taken for granted. It does not need to be asserted in special instances.

As long as the Chinese retain unimpaired their own judgment of themselves, their own reputation with themselves, their face is saved, and what others think is negligible. On the other hand, it is humiliating to them to borrow as Japan does. It would be a confession of absence of inner resources. When Japan engages foreign experts, she is interested in results, and so gives them a free hand till she has learned what they have to give. China engages the foreign expert—and then courteously shelves him. The difference is typical of a difference in attitude toward western life. It is a large part of the cause of Japan's rapid progress and of China's backwardness. The Japanese naturally places himself in the stead of the western spectator and is acutely conscious of the criticisms the beholder might pass upon what he sees. He tries to make over the spectacle to satisfy the demands of the western onlooker. He reserves his deeper pride for his national ideals. The Chinese scarcely cares what the foreigner may think of what he sees. He even brings the skeletons in his closet cheerfully forward for the visitor to gaze at. The complacency or conceit involved in this attitude has enormously retarded the advance of China. It has made for a conservative hugging of old traditions, and a belief in the inherent superiority of Chinese civilization in all respects to that of foreign barbarians. But it has also engendered a power of objective criticism and self-analysis which is rarely met in Japan. The educated Chinese who dissects the institutions and customs of his own country does it with a calm objectivity which is unsurpassable. And the basic reason, I think, is the same national pride. His institutions may not stand the criticism very well, but the people who produced these institutions are intrinsically invulnerable. They produced them, and when they get around to it they will create some new ones better adapted to the conditions of present life. The faith of the Chinese in the final outcome of their country, no matter what the despair about the current state of things, reminds an American of a similar faith abounding in his own country.

We are brought around to our main contention. China's

slackness with respect to borrowing the technique of the West in civil administration, public sanitation, taxation, education, manufacturing, etc., is quite compatible with an effort on her part to bring about a thoroughgoing transformation of her institutions through contact with western civilization. In this remaking she will appropriate rather than borrow. She will attempt to penetrate to the principles, the ideas, the intelligence, from which western progress has emanated, and to work out her own salvation through the use of her own renewed and quickened national mind. The task is an enormous one. Time is of the essence of the performance. Just because the task is to effect an inner modification rather than an outward adjustment, its execution will take a long time. Will the forces that are playing upon China from without, forces that have contemplated its territorial disintegration, that are desirous of dominating its policies and exploiting in their own behalf its natural resources, permit a normal evolution? Will they stand by to assist, or will they invade and irritate and deflect and thwart till there is a final climax of no one knows what tragic catastrophe? These are some of the elements in the great drama now enacting.

The baffling and "mysterious" character of China to the West is genuine enough. But it does not seem to be due to any peculiarly dark and subtle psychology. Human nature as one meets it in China seems to be unusually human, if one may say so. There is more of it in quantity and it is open to view, not secreted. But the social mind, the political mind, has been subjected for centuries to institutions which are not only foreign to present western customs, but which have no historic precedent. Neither our political science nor our history supplies any system of classification for understanding the most characteristic phenomena of Chinese institutions. This is the fact which makes the workings of the Chinese mind inscrutable to the uninitiated foreigner, and which makes it necessary to describe so many things in contradictory linguistic terms. The civilization itself is not contradictory, but in its own self-consistency it includes things which in western life have been

sharply opposed. Then there are intermediate forms, political missing links, which to our grasp must prove elusive; they are vague because we have no comparable forms by which to define and interpret them. Yet the Chinese mind thinks, of course, as naturally in terms of its customs and conventions as we think in ours. We merely forget that we think in terms of customs and traditions which habituation has ingrained; we fancy that we think in terms of mind, pure and simple. Taking our mental habits as the norms of mind, we find the ways of thinking that do not conform to it abnormal, mysterious and tricky. We can get the key to mental operations only by studying social antecedents and environment, and this truth holds pre-eminently in an old civilization like the Chinese. We have to understand beliefs and traditions to understand acts, and we have to understand historic institutions to understand beliefs.

The story of the difficulties that had to be overcome in the introduction of railways into China is perhaps the best known of Chinese incidents. But it bears retelling because it affords a typical illustration of the fact that the chief obstacle in the effective contact of West and East is intellectual and moral. Opposition to railways was not a matter of routine conservatism, blind sluggish opposition to the new just because it was new. The Chinese have the normal amount of curiosity, and perhaps even more than the normal amount of practical sense of the advantage to be gained by a novelty which does not conflict with traditional beliefs. A difficulty presented itself in getting a clear right of way for railways, on account of the graves, which, from the western standpoint, are scattered at random. But from the Chinese standpoint, they are located with the utmost science, and to disturb them is to throw out of balance the whole system of environmental influences that affect health and good crops. Moreover, the graves are the center of the system of ancestral worship, and that is the center of civic organization. The tale might have been invented to show how completely the forces to be reckoned with are intellectual and moral, and how completely they are bound up

with the structure of life. Without a change of national mind it is hopeless to suppose that China can go forward prosperously because of intercourse with the West.

It is a rash enterprise to form a generalization about the factors of the Chinese popular psychology that count most, whether positively or negatively, in the task of regenerating China. But the strong points of a people, as of individual character, lie close to its weak ones. So perhaps it is safe to say that the promise of China's rebirth into full membership in the modern world is found in its democratic habits of life and thought, provided we add to the statement another: the peculiar quality of this democracy also forms the strongest obstacle to the making over of China in its confrontation by a waiting, restless and greedy world. For while China is morally and intellectually a democracy of a paternalistic type, she lacks the specific organs by which alone a democracy can effectively sustain itself either internally or internationally. China is in a dilemma whose seriousness can hardly be exaggerated. Her habitual decentralization, her centrifugal localisms, operate against her becoming a nationalistic entity with the institutions of public revenue, unitary public order, defence, legislation and diplomacy that are imperatively needed. Yet her deepest traditions, her most established ways of feeling and thinking, her essential democracy, cluster about the local units, the village and its neighbors. The superimposition of a national state, without corresponding transformation of local institutions (or better without an evolution of the spirit of local democracies into national scope) gives us just what we now have in China: A nominal republic governed by a military clique, maintained in part by foreign loans made in response to a bartering away of national property and power, and in part by bargainings with provincial leaders whose power rests upon their control of an army and the ability this control gives them to levy on industry and wealth. In fact, we have a state which, if it were taken statically, if it were frozen, would reproduce the evils of the old despotism with new ones.

added, and which can be saved only because it has released popular forces that make for something better. But it remains to organize these popular forces, to give them play, to build for them regular channels of operation.

Up to the present western thought has confined itself to the more obvious, the more structural, factors of the problem. These are naturally the problems most familiar in occidental political life. They are such things as the adjustment of the power and authority of the central government to that of local and regional governments; the problem of the relations of the executive and legislative forces in the government; the revision of legal procedure and law to eliminate arbitrariness and personal discretion. But after all, such matters are symptoms, effects. To try to reorganize China by beginning with them is like solving an engineering problem by skilful juggling. The real problem is how the democratic spirit historically manifest in the absence of classes, the prevalence of social and civil equality, the control of individuals and groups by moral rather than physical force—that is, by instruction, advice and public opinion rather than definitive legal methods—can find an organized expression of itself. And the problem, I repeat, is unusually difficult because traditionally, in the habits of beliefs as well as of action, these forces out of which the transformation of China must grow are opposed to organization on a nation-wide scale.

Take a conspicuous example. To maintain itself as a nation among other nations of the contemporary world, China needs a system of national finance, of national taxation and revenues. But the effort to institute such a system does not merely meet a void. It has to meet deeply entrenched local customs, so firmly established that to interfere with them may mean the overthrow of all central government. To put another system of taxation into force requires the operation of the very national organs which depend upon a national system of public revenues. This is a fair example of the vicious circles that circumscribe all short-cut systems of reform in China. It is an

other evidence that the development must be a transforming growth from within, rather than either an external superimposition or a borrowing from foreign sources.

There are many, including a rather surprising number of Chinese as well as foreigners, who think that China can get set on her feet and become able to move for herself only by undergoing a period of foreign guardianship or trusteeship. The feeling is sedulously fostered by some persons in a neighboring island, and there is some undoubted response in China, though much less than there would be had the point of view not been unduly identified with the point of a bayonet. There are others who look to some western democracy or to the League of Nations to exercise the needed guardianship. We may waive the question whether at the present time there exists in the world a sufficient amount of disinterested intelligence to perform such a job of trusteeship. We stay on safe ground if we confine ourselves to saying that to be successful such a guardian would have to confine his efforts to stimulating, encouraging and expediting the democratic forces acting from within. And since such a task is almost entirely intellectual and moral, the guardianship is not necessary provided that China can be guaranteed time of growth protected from external attempts at disintegration. All that is necessary is a sufficient international decency and sufficient enlightened selfishness to give China the *ad interim* protection. She may have to sink deeper yet into the slough of confusion before she can get upon firm ground and move about freely. There is only harm in underestimating the seriousness of the task.

The evolution of Japan, as I have already said, offers no fair precedent. The problem is even more perplexing than that of the change of feudal into modern Europe. For medieval Europe was not civilized in the sense in which old China is civilized. There was not the inertia and weight of institutions wrapped up in the deepest feelings and most profound thoughts of the people that is found in China. Moreover, the European transition could take its own time to work itself out.

That of China has to be accomplished in the face of the impatient, mobile western world, which, if it brings aid, also brings a voracious appetite. To the outward eye roaming in search of the romantic and picturesque, China is likely to prove a disappointment. To the eye of the mind it presents the most entralling drama now anywhere enacting.

16. AMERICA AND CHINA

I¹

The average American probably regards the past course of the United States in China with complacency, and imagines that we have won a like admiration from the Chinese. Even the casual newspaper reader knows of the return of the Boxer indemnity, and supposes in a hazy way that our declaration in behalf of the Open Door in China succeeded in arresting the partitioning of China. The better informed reader takes pride in the consistently enlightened diplomacy of the United States exemplified in Cushing, Burlinghame and Hay, and the insistence upon comparatively mild measures after the Boxer revolt had been put down. Our entire course, we readily fancy, is one that has secured for us the grateful confidence and respect of the Chinese. Our treatment of Chinese immigrants on the Pacific coast and our exclusion act may occur to us, but we quickly put such disagreeable thoughts out of mind as so much past history.

It is worth while to ask how far our notion of the Chinese attitude towards us corresponds with the facts. Or if this way of putting the matter implies a false assumption regarding the universality of public opinion in China, then what is the attitude of an influential section of public men, and what are the grounds upon which it is based? The result of the inquiry even if unflattering will be a necessary preliminary to the conception of a proper policy for the future. To give the uncomplimentary answer in a few words, our prior behavior has left with many Chinese, especially those who have not been in the United States, the impression that we are not, in our foreign dealings, a very practical people; that we lack alertness, quick-

¹ From *The New Republic*, Dec. 3, 1919; published under the title *The American Opportunity in China*.

ness of decision in emergencies, promptness of action, and especially persistence. And all this even where our own interests are at stake. We are thought of as, upon the whole, a well disposed people, but somewhat ineffectual in action. Even gratitude for our refusal to enter into the game of grabbing China is colored by a suspicion that perhaps we lacked the energy and skill to engage successfully in the game.

The immediate background of this feeling is connected with the contest of Japan and the United States in the past two and a half years for prestige and moral authority, a rather passive contest, to be sure, as far as the United States is concerned. Some parts of the record have a definite bearing on the obstacles that are in the way of a successful American policy in the Far East. The expressed objectives and ideals of the United States in entering the war and the vigor with which we went in aroused the greatest enthusiasm in a certain section of Chinese public men. For a time it looked as if there were to be a powerful liberal party with pro-Americanism for one of the most important planks in its platform. Enthusiasm for the Allied cause ran high. Even the militarists who are now in control were anti-Japanese in the early months of 1917. Eloquent testimony is given by the fact that diplomatic relations were broken off with Germany without consultation with any of the Japanese representatives. In fact the Japanese minister being out of China at that time, Japan did not know of the event until it was an accomplished fact. There was then much zeal for an active participation of Chinese troops on the western front. The militarists wanted it because of the training that the army would get; the liberals because they were pro-Ally and pro-democracy; all because they saw the advantage for China of a share in the international negotiations at the end of the war. Plans were made to use the seized interned German ships for transporting troops. But the Allies were short of shipping and parcelled out the ships themselves. If American diplomacy made any effort to help the Chinese carry out their own plans, it was either defeated or no knowledge of the effort came to the ears of the Chinese.

Then China needed money, and needed it badly. She needed money not only for internal reorganization but for active participation in the war. The United States was making regular advances to the other Allies. China wanted a loan and got nothing. The Japanese overwhelmed her with financial proffers. Current gossip insists that more or less of the funds stuck in the pockets of corrupt Chinese officials. But in the larger sense the accuracy of this allegation is negligible. The outstanding fact is that Japan came forward when the United States did not. From this time dates the hold of Japan upon Chinese official circles. Another fact cooled the ardor of even the military people for an active share in the war.

After August of 1917, the military fortunes of the Allies sank to their lowest. Many Japanese leaders became convinced that German victory was either inevitable or that the war would end in a deadlock which would be almost equivalent to German victory. Responsible statesmen, men who had been prime ministers and heads of the foreign office, publicly stated that while Japan would be faithful to her allies throughout the war, an international realignment was almost certain after the war. Japan had already undertaken the necessary rapprochement with Russia, obviously undertaken in part with a view to resisting the growth of American influence in the Far East. Where would China be after the war in the case of an alliance offensive and defensive between Japan and Russia and Germany? It was obvious prudence for her to tread softly and give no offence to the powers which in the near future were likely to dominate the Far East. It is, I am convinced, impossible to exaggerate the influence of this factor in determining the present position of forces. For while the forecast did not come out according to specifications, in the meantime a situation was created which was pro-Japanese and indifferent to America. Even recently the man who is credited with being the head of the pro-Japanese military party in the government circles (and who is known as an incorruptible man) said that China had to be pro-Japanese, because Japan was so powerful

in army and navy and also so near by. "If the Pacific shrinks to a pond we shall be pro-American."

This is the concrete background upon which to project more general considerations regarding Chinese opinion of American policy. While Americans commence their account with, say, the benevolent return of the Boxer indemnity, the Chinese are likely to recall that as a positive force the United States opened its Far Eastern career with proposals for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, and then met a defeat at the hands of Russia and Japan. This in itself was nothing very important. All countries receive diplomatic checks. But as it looks to the Chinese, after proposing a large scheme and meeting initial rebuffs, the American government neither made use of its check to secure a compensating advance elsewhere, nor did it try other means to maintain the principle it had laid down.

The affair of the Hankow-Peking railway strikes them also as an example of the tendency of the American government to conceive rather grandiose schemes and then fall down or withdraw when resistance is encountered. Through the American Red Cross valuable flood relief work was done. But there was also a large engineering plan for the regulation of the waterways. After an original flourish, that too dissolved. The Siems-Carey railway projects may not be a case in point, for they may be in a state of suspended animation rather than of death. But the fact remains that the United States is the only great power that has nothing to show in China in achievement on a large scale. Or rather our one decided achievement is in the educational line where confessedly we are far ahead. But this success is not of a kind to be impressive when it comes to determination of international affairs. The cases given must stand as samples of the facts that have led educated and influential Chinese to feel that America could not be seriously counted upon. The Chinese have not, like some other nations, set us down as bluffers. But the cases mentioned together with our failure to do much except utter words in behalf of the

“Open Door,” have led to the feeling that we readily emit large and good schemes, but are ineffectual when it comes to the test of action. The Chinese do not carry sentiment into practical matters. They judge by results not by intentions. In contrast with ourselves, they have found the Japanese constantly on the job, never allowing anything to get by, taking advantage of every opening, stimulated by obstacles only to renewed or redirected effort, quick, patient, persistent, unremitting. If Japan had not blundered hugely in estimating Chinese national sentiment, China might already have put its foreign policies mainly into the hands of Japan. For if China has to depend upon some outside power, there was much to say for relying, even at great cost to itself, upon a nation that was acute, vigorous, vigilant, and that never abandoned a plan after it started to realize it. To the Americans, Baron Shibusawa’s proposal for Japanese-American cooperation in China, the United States to furnish the money and Japan the brains, did not seem altogether tactful in form of expression. But it is not likely that the great Japanese financier-philanthropist meant to imply that universally speaking Japanese intelligence is superior. He spoke rather on the basis of the fact that the Japanese have used their brains actively and persistently in pushing their policies in China, and Americans have not.

Now, of course, the reply to all this from an American standpoint is easy. We have never had large enough interests in the Far East to make it worth while to keep our attention and energy concentrated. We have never, beyond the Monroe Doctrine, gone in for a continuous foreign policy, as have other great powers. We have had so many other profitable ways of investing capital that it paid better to switch off to any other scheme than to bother too long in putting through a railway or other plan in the face of constant irritating and delaying obstacles. And in addition it is to our credit that we have never had the close alliance of business enterprise and governmental action which has characterized the policy of every other great power in dealing with economically backward countries and with China. From the American standpoint, excuses, and good

ones, are as plenty as blackberries. But after all, as has been indicated, justifications and reasons do not concern the Chinese when it comes to their formulation of policy in foreign relations. They are interested in past results, in the actual outcome, as a means of forecasting the probable course of the future.

The war has now conclusively demonstrated that the United States can act promptly, efficiently and on a large scale in its foreign affairs. Unfortunately the contrast between President Wilson's words and the concrete results of the Peace Conference—a contrast that circumstances make glaringly conspicuous in China—tends to restore the older idea about the United States. Yet not wholly; there is a new interest and a new expectation on the part of important leaders while the masses of people look pathetically toward us for their redemption. The historic friendliness of sentiment toward the United States is so reinforced that it is an asset of great potentiality. The problem is the practical one of turning it to account by a constructive policy in action. It cannot be said that there is any single specific political act which is absolutely indispensable. But there is a line of action which would be fatal, at least for a considerable time. After so much talk about Shantung, to allow matters to go by default, or to permit them to drift, would be to confirm the worst opinions about the instability and futility of our policies. Some kind of definite course, persistently followed up, is a necessity unless China is to fall into practical vassalage to another nation. For help from without China must have. While the peace settlement has made the political international issue most acute for the moment, the financial and industrial question is the important one in the long run. Here lies the great chance of the United States. The introduction of a unified comprehensive currency system, a unified comprehensive railway system, improved modern harbors and terminal facilities, the reconstruction of the inland water-way system to improve transportation and avoid destructive floods—these are samples of the important tasks that must be undertaken. At the present time the United States is

the only country that combines the requisite capital, engineering ability and executive talent.

The important thing is that by undertaking big things on a large scale the United States will get around much of the competition that breeds irritation and suspicion. If the scale is big enough, there will be no competition. Japan is not prepared to take hold of these matters on a large scale. A negative policy that can be interpreted as putting obstacles in the way of the legitimate development of Japan is fraught with dangers. To concentrate upon big enterprises in a constructive way will leave Japan plenty of opportunities, while it will once and for all avert the possibility of rendering China a virtual subject of Japan—a danger which the best friends of Japan must admit to be real as long as the militaristic-bureaucratic element continues to dominate her policies. The serious source of evil in the present situation is the likelihood that the United States will have sufficient interest in the Far East to talk a great deal, to act in minor ways but upon the whole in ways which can be construed with more or less justice as having for their main object to thwart the ambitions of other countries, especially Japan.

It is not necessary to say that the next few years are crucial. In China as elsewhere reconstruction is imminent, but for the time being things are in solution. Distance has its disadvantages in all the lesser relations. But it can be made an advantage if the attention of America is fixed on large scale undertakings. A considerable part of past friction in accomplishing things under foreign direction in China is due to failure to secure the administrative cooperation of the Chinese. American enterprise should be reasonably free from the temptation to fill such positions with economic carpet-baggers. The Chinese students who have studied and who are studying in America supply a definite nucleus for administrative cooperation. If there are not enough such trained persons among the Chinese then business plans should include an extension of educational facilities to train the required number. The great stumbling-block of the past, the lack of active alliance between

business interests and political governmental authority, can also be converted into a positive asset. The Chinese, like the Americans, have the tradition of industrial self-help; they are constitutionally averse to governmental activities. To get around the government, with its almost unbreakable traditions of procrastination, obstruction and corruption is an advance step. And this can largely be effected by enlisting the cooperation of Chinese voluntaryism. It cannot be done however by sending subordinates to carry out plans made without Chinese consultation. Leaders must come whom Chinese leaders recognize as their equals and who are intellectually prepared to deal with Chinese leaders as equals. And the plans must be on such a scale that it is evident while ample security and reasonable profit are given foreign investors the outcome will be to make China the mistress of her own economic destinies. When this is accomplished, she will have no difficulty in looking out for herself politically. Just because the controlling factor in the policies of other nations has been to cultivate the economic subjection of China, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to pursue the opposite course. Has it the imagination and the energy?

II¹

A Chinese student who is now in this country and who was an active leader in the Students' Revolt in 1918 in Peking, recently remarked to me that the conduct of the Chinese official delegation in Washington had led him to reflect upon Chinese higher education. Or rather, he thought their course was a reflection of Chinese education in certain of its phases. He regarded the delegation as having failed essentially in their task. He recognized that conditions in China and also the exigencies of American politics—or what the American representatives took to be such—had a large share in the failure of China to accomplish her aims. But he said there was another

¹ From *The New Republic*, March 1, 1922; published under the title *America and Chinese Education*.

failure for which the Chinese delegates were responsible: there had been at Washington no representative voicing of existent Chinese national sentiment. Certain practical failures might be conceded to be inevitable; but there was only one explanation of the failure to express the active contemporary attitude of the Chinese people, and that was found in unrepresentative qualities in the delegates.

So far his view of the situation is of primary and practical interest to the Chinese. It concerns Americans only as they are sympathetic with China and desirous of seeing her just aspirations properly expressed. But the connection of the fact he cites—if it be a fact—with the state of the higher education of the Chinese touches us closely. All three of the delegates are American educated; two of them studied in missionary institutions conducted by Americans in China before they came to America to study. And these two—the diplomats of the delegation—are those whose methods have been most unsatisfactory to Chinese at home and in this country. The third member, the one who had not come under missionary auspices in his preparatory education in China, is the one who is regarded as most nearly representative of present day China. Now the educational conclusion which the student-leader had drawn was that American missionary education has failed to develop independent, energetic thought and character among even its most distinguished graduates. It has produced rather a subservient intellectual type, one which he characterized as slavish.

The literal correctness of his premises and his conclusions need not be categorically affirmed. It is easy to deny the premises, or to hold that they are too slight to bear the burden of the conclusion. There are not many non-Chinese who know enough to judge the situation and I do not count myself among the few who can judge. But one thing can be positively affirmed. The view in question expresses a belief that is widely and increasingly held in China. It contains elements that are of prime importance. It suggests the attitude of the Young China of to-day as distinct from that Young China which

figures in the writings of men like Mr. J. O. P. Bland, who if not important in himself is important as the spokesman of a definite class of foreigners in China who have been the most influential persons in purveying information and forming foreign opinion about China.

The Young China of which the Bland School speaks consists of a group of foreign educated men, of whom the two diplomats of the official delegation at the Washington Conference are good representatives. Young China viewed from this angle means men who have gone into politics, domestic and diplomatic, with Western, usually American, preconceptions, and who have tried to force Western, usually American, political conceptions and methods upon China. They have failed, failed tragically, it is said, because of the intrinsic unfitness of their conceptions and methods to change immemorial traditions and customs and ingrained racial traits of the Chinese people—immemorial, atavistic and racial are the literary slogans of this school of foreign commentators on China. The failure goes back to the well-meaning efforts of missionaries who have bungled because of their ignorant attempts to foist alien ways of thought and of political action upon China. With this condemnation of Young China and its foreign sponsors goes a condemnation of all attempts of China to become republican in government and to transform its culture.

I do not know to what extent this picture ever truly represented a Young China. But events move rapidly in China, and certainly the Young China of to-day has nothing in common with this picture. Present Young China is bent upon a genuine transformation of Chinese culture—sometimes a revolutionary breaking with the past, but in any case a transformation. It is democratic, but its democracy is social and industrial; there is little faith in political action, and not much interest in governmental changes except as they may naturally reflect changes in habits of mind. There is in it little sympathy with missionary efforts, not because they represent the West, but because it is believed that they do *not* represent what China most needs from the West, namely, scientific method and aggressive

freedom and independence of inquiry, criticism and action. Hence the remark quoted earlier about the cause of the failure of Chinese diplomacy in Washington and its root in the weakness of the education given by Americans in China.

In wanting a transformation of their country, the Young Chinese have no thought of a Westernized China, a China which repeats and imitates Europe or America. They want Western knowledge and Western methods which they themselves can independently employ to develop and sustain a China which is itself and not a copy of something else. They are touchingly grateful to any foreigner who gives anything which can be construed as aid in this process. They are profoundly resentful of all efforts which condescendingly hold up Western institutions, political, religious, educational, as models to be humbly accepted and submissively repeated. They are acutely aware that the spirit of imitation at the expense of initiative and independence of thought has been the chief cause of China's retrogression, and they do not propose to shift the model; they intend to transform the spirit.

There is nothing which one hears so often from the lips of the representatives of Young China of to-day as that education is the sole means of reconstructing China. There is no other topic which is so much discussed. There is an enormous interest in making over the traditional family system, in overthrowing militarism, in extension of local self-government, but always the discussion comes back to education, to teachers and students, as the central agency in promoting other reforms. This fact makes the question of the quality and direction of American influence in Chinese education a matter of more than academic concern. The difficulties in the way of a practical extension and regeneration of Chinese education are all but insuperable. Discussion often ends in an impasse: no political reform of China without education; but no development of schools as long as military men and corrupt officials divert funds and oppose schools from motives of self-interest. Here are all the materials of a tragedy of the first magnitude.

Apart from the question of education what is done and what

is not done in Washington is of secondary moment. It makes vital the matter of American influence. There is a great and growing philanthropic interest in America for China. It shows itself in support of educational schemes and in generous relief funds. It is not motivated to any considerable extent by economic considerations, by expectation of business profits, nor by political expediencies. It is motivated largely by religious considerations. It is well intentioned, but the intentions are not always enlightened in conception nor in execution. It was not a disgruntled foreigner nor a jealous, anti-foreign Chinese who told me that American missionary colleges in China had largely simply transplanted the American college curriculum and American conceptions of "discipline"; and that instead of turning out graduates who could become leaders in developing the industries of China on an independent Chinese basis, it had turned out men who when they went into industry took subordinate positions in foreign managed industries, because of their training especially in the English language. There is no difference in effect between this statement and that quoted at the beginning of this article about fostering the dependent, the slavish, mind and character. And a missionary actively engaged in educational work was its author. American influence in Chinese education should have something better to do than to train commercial, political and religious compradores.

Something can be done by encouraging such American managed institutions as are trying to develop a better type of school; by freeing those men who against the petty opposition and nagging they now meet from reactionaries are adapting their curricula and methods to Chinese conditions. There are a few institutions in China where the Chinese members of the faculty are put on the same plane of salary, of social dignity and administrative importance as the foreigners. Let the philanthropically inclined whose philanthropy is something more than a cloak for fanatic meddlesomeness or selfishness select these institutions for aid. Not many know that at present some American millions of a special fund are being spent in China for converting souls; that they go only to those

who have the most dogmatic and reactionary theological views, and that the pressure of these funds is used to repress the liberal element and to put liberal institutions in bad repute as well as in financial straits. That is a shameful business from any point of view, and it ought to be met by a generous and wise business. China does not need copies of American colleges, but it does still need colleges supported by foreign funds and in part manned by well trained foreigners who are capable of understanding Chinese needs, alert, agile, sympathetic in their efforts to meet them.

But of course the chief work must be done in distinctively Chinese institutions, staffed mainly and managed wholly by Chinese. Instead of carping at missionaries we should remember that they have been almost the only ones in the past with a motive force strong enough to lead them to take an active interest in Chinese education. It would seem as if the time had come when there are some persons of means whose social and human interest, independent of religious considerations, might show itself in upbuilding native schools. Above all else, these schools need modern laboratories and libraries and well trained men of the first rank who can train Chinese on the spot to the use of the best methods in the social arts and the natural and mathematical sciences. Such men could train not only students but younger teachers who are not as yet thoroughly equipped and who too often are suffering from lack of intellectual contact. First class men who go to China in this spirit with nothing to "put over" except their knowledge, their methods and their skill will meet with a wonderful response. Somewhere in America there must be men of means who can give their money and men of science who can contribute their services in this spirit. Their work will not be done for the sake of the prestige or commerce of the United States but it will be done for the sake of that troubled world of which China and the United States are integral parts. Build up a China of men and women of trained independent thought and character, and there will be no Far Eastern "problems" such as now vex us; there will be no need of conferences to discuss—and dis-

guise—the “Problems of the Pacific.” American influence in Chinese education will then be wholly a real good instead of a mixed and dubious blessing.

III¹

During the great famine in China I happened to be present when a number of Americans in Peking were discussing the relations of the United States and China. One of them, a business man, was complaining of the great difficulty in getting Americans to invest their money in China for industrial and commercial purposes. He started from the fact that an engineering scheme which would have been of undoubted benefit to China, since it involved a reclamation project that would prevent floods, had failed because of the refusal of Americans to put in their money, although a fair return would have been assured. He contrasted this holding back with the amount of money which had just been voluntarily contributed by benevolence for the relief of famine sufferers. The amount given was several millions more than the amount which had been refused as a loan. He asserted, and not wholly in a whimsical spirit, that the only way to finance China’s needs in the United States was to appeal to the churches and philanthropically inclined persons on the basis of benevolence, not profit.

I have often thought that his remarks furnished, in a way, a symbol of the underlying relations of the two countries. Of course there are American business relations with China, and some of them have a good deal at stake. And yet they are hardly typical of the situation. In a true sense, our concern with China is parental rather than economic. All parental sentiments are somewhat mixed: they usually contain an economic factor; there is the hope that the children may be of assistance later on. Yet expectation of financial gain is not the essence of parental feeling.

The largest American investments both of human beings and

¹ From *The Survey Graphic*, May, 1926; published under the title *America and the Far East*.

of capital in China are in missions, education and philanthropy. Europeans, accustomed to continental methods, usually take it as a matter of course that these developments were made designedly with commercial or political ends in view. In fact, Americans are not infrequently complimented by Europeans upon the far-sighted shrewdness with which our country has laid its plans in the Far East. To those who know the real history of events this implication is absurd. But nonetheless a definite situation has been created; our relations with China are primarily cultural. We have gone there with ideas and ideals, with sentiments and aspirations; we have presented a certain type of culture to China as a model to be imitated. As far as we have gone at all, we have gone *in loco parentis*, with advice, with instruction, with example and precept. Like a good parent we would have brought up China in the way in which she should go. There is a genial and generous aspect to all this. But nonetheless it has created a situation, and that situation is fraught with danger.

Our diplomatic and political rôle has been largely paternal. From the time of Burlinghame down we have been, as far as we have been anything, protective. The doctrine of the Open Door, of maintaining the territorial integrity of China, ran with our own interests. The remission of the Boxer indemnity for educational purposes is known to all, but John Hay undoubtedly rendered a greater service to China in limiting the claims and exactions of European nations; as far as any one person outside of China saved China from division it was John Hay. We have not done as much positively as we pride ourselves upon; but from the negative side, by absence of aggression, by smoothing things down when we could without great trouble to ourselves, we have played a paternal rôle.

Such a part arouses expectations which are not always to be met. Expectations may be unreasonable and yet their not being met may arouse disappointment and resentment. There is something of this sort in the temper of China towards us to-day: a feeling that we have aroused false hopes only to neglect the fulfilment of obligations involved in the arousal.

On the other side, parents are rarely able to free themselves from the notion that gratitude is due them; failure to receive it passes readily into anger and dislike. Unless this country has more than the average amount of parental understanding, it may soon be charging China with ingratitude.

The more serious danger, however, springs from the fact that China is rapidly growing up. In sentiment, if not in effective action, it is attaining its majority. It will henceforth resent more and more any assumption of parental tutelage even of a professedly benevolent kind. Signs of the resentment are already apparent. Missions and even schools are no longer welcome if they assume an air of superiority either about what they have to offer or about their administration. The Chinese feel that a new day for them has arrived and that foreigners, even those with the best of intentions, must accommodate themselves to it. They are free in their imputation of bad motives whenever foreign interests do not respond. Politically also, the Chinese no longer wish for any foreign guardianship. If this country should not take the lead in relieving them of judicial and tariff tutelage, what we may have done in the past will be quickly forgotten.

There is a crisis in most families when those who have been under care and protection grow to the point of asserting their independence. It is the same in the family of nations. Obviously primary responsibility rests with the mature and experienced. In the next ten years we shall probably need much patience, tolerance, understanding and good-will to alter our traditional parental attitude (colored as it has been by a temper of patronage, conscious or unconscious) into one of respect and esteem for a cultural equal. If we cannot successfully make the change, the relationship of this country with the entire Far East will take a decided turn for the worse.

17. THE WHITE PERIL¹

I

A month or two ago reports emanating from Germany told of alleged secret clauses in the Russo-Japanese treaty, according to which the two countries had made a combination against Europe and the United States in respect to Asia in general and China in particular. It even went into detail as to the number of Chinese soldiers that were to be trained for the army of the combination. It is not difficult to imagine behind this report the desire of some German to arouse apprehension in our minds lest Germany, rebuffed by continued ill-treatment from the western world, should finally throw in her lot with an Asiatic combination. The late Kaiser's evocation of the Yellow Peril was met, even before the War, in the minds of some Americans at least, by the spectre of a German-Russian-Japanese combination, often with China thrown in, to add bulk to the ghost.

Within the last few days cable tolls have been paid to make known to us at considerable length the speech of a French public man who prophesied the next great war, more terrible than any which had yet happened. This war is to be between Asia and the rest of the world, the United States meeting the brunt of the attack. As the speech was made and reported at just the time when, according to other reports, the French government was frowning upon another Washington disarmament conference, it is hardly cynical to suppose that this particular spectacle of horror was painted to wean the American mind from interest in premature disarmament, and to suggest that in the venture we might need assistance from French arms.

A few weeks ago, in the debate in the English Parliament on the Singapore fortification matter, a representative of the

¹ From *The New Republic*, April 22, 1925; published under the title *Highly-Colored White Lies*.

Cabinet, in response to a query from MacDonald, is reported to have said in effect that citizens of the United States would probably look with favor upon making Singapore a strong naval base, because of the influence of its proximity to the Philippines in case of war between the United States and Japan. Considering the offense such a remark was bound to give to Japan, the late ally of Great Britain, it is hardly likely that this indiscretion was intended merely to placate sentiment in this country with respect to the Singapore measure. The secretary who made the statement could hardly have failed to know that the remark would be taken throughout Asia, including India as well as Japan and China, to mean that there is an understanding or entente of some kind between Great Britain and America with reference to Asiatic affairs. It is reasonable to infer that was the impression he meant to create by his remark.

Let it not be thought that these three European countries are more at fault in this matter than we ourselves. Representatives of interests of our navy have systematically been doing what they can to create in our minds a fear of Japan. They have fostered every suspicion and every alarm that could possibly lodge and take root among us. They, too, have talked about the prospective union of Japan and Russia; they have not hesitated to try to disturb our historic friendly feeling toward China by silly stories about the Bolshevikizing of China and its prospective union with Soviet interests against the rest of the world. In private, if not in public, they cause it to be understood that Japanese agents are busy in India, encouraging and subsidizing the independent nationalistic movement there with a view to getting the assistance of the man power of India in the future struggle with the United States.

A few weeks ago cartoons in an American paper depicted two alternative scenes. Either this country must line up actively with the European powers, taking a responsible interest in their affairs, really uniting with them in forming their international policy, or we shall finally be united with them in slavery under the heel of yellow and brown races. It is easy

to see the motives back of the other highly colored propaganda. This particular case looks like a gratuitous attack of foolishness, since even the most fanatic devotee of our entrance into the League of Nations could hardly have thought of this argument. Nevertheless it is but one of many signs of the attempt to create the belief that at some time or other and probably reasonably soon there is going to be an armed conflict either between all the colored races and the white, or else between the United States and some of the colored races. A version of the future conflict which is a slight variant of the color scheme is the prophecy of union of all the Moslem peoples in a war for extermination on one side or the other against the Christian peoples. One reads outgivings of this sort occasionally from official followers of Christ.

It is easy to say that intelligent people pay no attention to such reports. That is precisely what makes them dangerous. Any one who will keep track of the statements and rumors of which those cited are but casual samples, will be surprised and perhaps appalled to discover how numerous and varied they are, and what a constant stream of them runs into men's minds. The very stupidity which causes sensible persons to neglect them or turn aside in disgust gives them an entrance into the minds of many whose knowledge of foreign affairs is next to nothing. It is of no use to point out to these persons that the interests of Japan and Russia in Asia are as antagonistic as ever they were, and that even now the activities of the Soviet government, which has retained the old imperialism of the Tsar plus a new efficiency, is creating friction with both Japan and China in outer and inner Mongolia respectively. It is useless to point out that China is historically and constitutionally afraid of both Russia and Japan, and plays one off against the other as the situation dictates. It is of no use to point out that India is going to be more than occupied for generations with her own internal problems equally whether she remains a British dependency or becomes independent. And it is equally useless to point out that the so-called Moslem world is a medley of particularistic and centrifugal tribes, petty states and inter-

ests which nothing short of a miracle will bring into a semblance of unity. It is equally useless to point out the industrial impotency of the people who are combined to make up the scarecrow. Ignorance is invincible.

It is consequently more than useless to point out that these reports calculated to arouse dread of an Asiatic menace in general and a Japanese one in particular, come from opposite sources and are moved by inconsistent springs. For the few who discount them on that account there are thousands who are moved by the consensus of their result. For they all tend toward a single outcome in practice, no matter how logically contradictory they are to one another. The springs of public opinion are being poisoned at their source. The Nordic and race myth is meantime coöperating to the same result. While comparatively insignificant in its direct influence, because it is confined to a small group—the professional intellectuals—it nevertheless may have serious weight in the end just because it reinforces the prejudiced sentiments of an ignorant mass.

Possibly it might arouse suspicions of another and more useful sort to note that in all this flood of rumors, coming from so many different sources, it is the United States which is elected to stand in the van of the inevitable conflict. The inevitable race conflict is a romantic myth without the attractiveness of most romance. But its consequences are definite and concrete and the United States is the chief sufferer. Few Americans probably even know of the Supreme Court decision making it impossible for East Indians to become naturalized in this country. Fewer still know of the activities of our government, seemingly under the special instigation of the patriotic Mr. Beck, to make the decision retroactive by cancelling the citizenship of the small number previously naturalized, leaving them literally without a country. Millions, however, know the fact in India, and our educational and other influence has received a tremendous blow in that country in consequence.

Our Senate with its rude slap at Japanese pride has prevented two or three hundred Japanese a year from migrating to this country. In consequence, American business interests

have suffered greatly in loss of contracts in Japan, while, an affair of infinitely greater importance, the growth of democratic ideas in Japan, the one thing calculated to increase American prestige there, has undergone its chief setback, and the anti-American influence of the imperialistic and bureaucratic class has received a reinforcement which it most welcomes.

It is too much to say that Chinese sentiment has as yet turned definitely against us, but it is known to all in contact with the Chinese educated classes, whether at home or among the student body in this country, that many Chinese are beginning seriously to ask whether the United States is going back on its traditional policy of friendly detachment, and is approaching a union or understanding with European policies of economic and political aggression.

Simply from the standpoint of self-interest, we need to ask whether it is not time to call a halt to the circulation and influence of these silly reports and prophecies. And from the larger standpoint of the influence of the United States in the world in making for peace and good will among nations, it is imperative to give heed to the question. It will be a tragic pity if the thoughts and activities of those among us who conceive themselves peculiarly internationally minded become so fixed on the European situation, and upon the importance of counteracting isolationist policies in that quarter, that they become blind and indifferent to the change that is steadily going on in American sentiment with reference to our relations to the continent of Asia. There among the reawakening peoples is a natural and legitimate field for the exercise of whatever is sound in historic American ideas and ideals: and there it is where our power for good is being most systematically undermined.

II¹

If it were not a fact and a fact of a kind more or less familiar, the Conference now in solemn conclave in Peking

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 11, 1925.

would be incredible. The orthodox axiom of all "sound political science" is national sovereignty; in practice no phase of political independence is more jealously guarded than the right to control taxation and to levy tariffs, whether for revenue or for the rearing of infant industries. In session in Peking are representatives of the three great democracies of the world, Great Britain, the United States and France, each professing unqualified faith in the right of independent nations to self-government. In addition there is a wide-spread hostility to everything which smacks of "internationalism"; for are not the "Reds" internationalists, and are not the Reds a menace? From these premises, one would hardly conclude that the Conference in Peking sits as an international assembly held to take part in governing China; that it arrogates to itself one of the most "sacred" functions of sovereignty, that of fixing the tariff on foreign goods, and that it has no notion of yielding any more to the expressed desire and purpose of China concerning its own affairs than it shall find necessary in order to avoid serious trouble.

It is doubtless highly theoretical to call attention to such flagrant discrepancies between political theory and practice. Nevertheless it may be one way to induce the American public to visualize the Chinese scene, and to realize that the State Department of the United States has soon to decide whether it will continue to engage in the regulation of the internal affairs of China, contrary to the practically united will of the Chinese people, or whether it will have the courage and initiative to act in not merely a democratic but a decent way in permitting financial self-government to the Chinese government.

There is no reason to doubt the kind sentiments of the State Department; in all probability it means well by China, and its expressions of goodwill are not hypocritical camouflage. But the Department is influenced by precedent, by routine, by the etiquette of diplomacy which might more easily fear a breach of manners toward other nations than a breach of justice towards China. And it is also exposed to direct and more or less

powerful influence from business interests that want in behalf of their own pockets to keep the tariff of China on foreign goods at the lowest possible point.

Is it too much to hope that the general public shall have an active concern in the decisions which are to be made, and shall bring greater pressure to bear upon the State Department to act in a fair, humane and democratic way, than self-interest and hidden groups bring to bear in the opposite direction? It is futile to lecture the general public on its responsibilities in this matter; it is fed up with foreign responsibilities and wants to be left alone. But it may do no harm to assert with all possible emphasis that in China at present the American people is on trial, and that the attitude taken toward tariff autonomy by the United States will determine for long years the attitude taken by the Chinese towards us.

Are our professions of goodwill to China sincere? Are our assertions of greater disinterestedness than animates other nations genuine? Or are they a combination of Pharisaism, sentimentality and highfaluting talk? That is the issue in the minds of most Chinese, and the way the American people meets the tariff question may determine for a generation the moral and political alignment of the Chinese people to western civilization in general and to American ideas and institutions in particular.

Needless to say the illogical position of interference of democratic nations, themselves highly nationalistic, and mostly addicted to protective tariffs, with the internal affairs of China grew up gradually for historic reasons, and so was tolerated until it became familiar and a vested interest.

At the outset, the Chinese people were indifferent, and it is almost correct to say that the Chinese government invited the interference. In the past, it has not worked altogether badly; considerable good came of it. If international conferences to help regulate the affairs of individual nations were the rule and not an exception confined to countries so weak that they can be safely meddled with, there might even be something to say for continuing the practice in China. But the past is not the

present, and present China is bent upon a radical break with the past in all that concerns its own management of its own affairs. The danger is that diplomats will not face the reality and extent of this change, and will palter, compromise, truckle over details, do as little as they possibly can, and trust to future events to be able to get away with their evasion of the issue.

It is not too much to say that unless the International Conference takes action which looks in a definite and stated way towards the resumption of Chinese tariff autonomy, not at some vague future time when all shall be well with the government of China but at a specified date under specified conditions, public opinion in China will force any Chinese government that may exist to resume tariff autonomy in defiance of the powers, and that at no distant date. To put the matter at its lowest level, it might be as well to make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating events get the credit for a just and sensible act.

It is understood that the powers are willing to permit China to level duties up to ten or fifteen percent. Japan is reported to have sprung a surprise by volunteering at the first meeting to agree to a raise up to twelve and a half percent. One feels helpless to comment adequately upon the situation. If the imagination will only work and think of a similar conference called to pass upon the affairs of France or Italy, or the United States, or even of a third-rate European power, there will be no need for any comment; a sense of the indignation and resentment of an awakened China and of the danger of giving cause for its continued growth, will take care of the affair.

But it is more than the amount of tariff which China is to be permitted to levy that is under consideration. It is also proposed to decide for China what China shall do with the moneys when they are raised. There is a story that the assent of Japan to the American proposal of a Conference was secured by a tacit agreement that the United States would join in urging that the added funds be employed to pay off the Nishahara loans by Japan. The story may well be false—but it may also

have a grain of fact in it. Doubtless China should meet her foreign obligations. But in view of the fact that these loans were made at a time when the Anfu pro-Japanese party was in power at Peking and are universally regarded as part of the betrayal of China to foreign interests, it is obvious that the popularity and prestige of the Conference will not be increased by any such proposals.

And this situation illustrates the danger which now attends upon every pretension of foreign powers to decide China's domestic affairs for her. Some decisions as to the use to be made by China of additional funds would be less unpopular than some others, but any attempt to decide and to enforce decision, anything more than advice which in the present entangled condition of Chinese finance is legitimate, will surely make trouble instead of alleviating an already troubled situation.

It is trite to say that in the present condition of the world nations can no longer do the sort of thing which once they did as a matter of course and with impunity. But that trite fact is the essence of the Chinese situation. The only question is whether it is to be recognized only by small bits, grudgingly, and by yielding to trouble only after it has broken out, or whether it will be recognized at once in its full force and wholeheartedly. If the United States shows a disposition to compromise, to postpone, to take half steps and quarter steps, to evade, to depend upon time-honored formulæ that have nothing to do with the present situation, the case, difficult enough at best as between the powers, is lost in advance. If it leads with a definite and thoroughgoing policy of which financial autonomy for China is a central feature, something definite will be accomplished.

The American public should bear in mind that there is no question of even what is called national honor and prestige at stake. There is only a vested interest. Reduced to its lowest terms, the question for American citizens to form a judgment upon is whether they wish the power of the United States government to be used to promote, at the expense of China and of the good relations of China and the United States, the pe-

cuniary interests of a small group of manufacturers, merchants, commission agents and exporters. They are doubtless all enthusiastic high-tariff men at home, but they want to retain a cheap and easy hold on Chinese markets by keeping down the rate of duty. At bottom, this is what the solemn and dignified International Conference at Peking is about, in spite of the fact that it is possible to overlay this ground-work with many important but irrelevant matters. The issue is simple enough so that even a people sick of foreign questions and policies should be able to pass upon it, and do so with promptness and efficacy. Do we wish China to be treated as a free and self-respecting people should be treated or as a market upon which to dump goods for the pecuniary profit of a small number?

III¹

General Crozier has furnished us with an interesting essay on the conditions in China which make it difficult for that country to establish a unified, stable and efficient Government. He has supplemented this account with a briefer essay on the comparative ease with which military conquest of that country could be accomplished. The two statements form the foundation for what is in effect a plea for intervention in China to be undertaken by preferably concerted action of several Great Powers. This intervention is to be wholly altruistic in character, based on desire to help China find her own unity, assist her in development of civil law and administration, free her from the rapacious interference by militarists and officials leagued with them, and is to terminate in turning over a smoothly running Government to the Chinese people. It reads like a dream. If tried, it might turn out a nightmare.

His account of conditions in China, even if once substantially correct as far as it goes, leaves out a fundamentally important fact. He fails to give weight to the extraordinary

¹ From *Current History*, May, 1928; published under the title *Intervention a Challenge to Nationalism*; being a reply to Major General (Retired U.S.A.) William Crozier's article in the same issue.

development of national sentiment in recent years in estimating the probable reception of benevolent intervention by the Chinese. I should not have believed it possible for anyone to write about Chinese political affairs and make as little reference as he has done to this feature of the situation. It is quite true that national sentiment is not sufficiently strong or well organized to create a unified Government. It may well be years before that goal is reached. But it is powerful enough to bring to naught any such scheme as that proposed by General Crozier.

The probability and the effectiveness of organized resistance to a Government resting upon foreign force is immensely under-estimated. It is true the Chinese still lack ability in positive and constructive combination. They have, however, an enormous capacity for negative organization, for resistance. The agitation against foreign interferences carried on in the last few years has already aroused that power into action. Increase of interference would render it an irresistible force. The Chinese are factional; but foreign intervention would weld them into a solid unit, as long as the foreigner was there. General Crozier thinks, apparently on the basis of reports from Hongkong, that they could not successfully unite for even a boycott without assistance from governmental powers, which naturally could not be had with the Government in the hands of foreign agents. Well, I happened to be in China eight years ago at the time the boycott against the Japanese was started. It was started by students. Instead of having support from the Government, the latter was pro-Japanese and set out to suppress the movement by force. In a few short weeks the Cabinet was overthrown; and it is commonly understood that the boycott was so harmful to Japanese interests that it is responsible for the change in Japan's attitude toward China.

Since then things have moved fast and far. The merchants, as well as students, are now organized, while in all industrial centres the workingmen are an organized power. Quite aside from boycotts and means of passive resistance, the proposed scheme of government would be brought to naught by Chinese

non-cooperation. Its success would depend upon enlisting Chinese so that they might be educated in modern administrative and legal procedures. The only Chinese that would engage in service in a Government conducted by foreigners, having armed support, would be from the corrupt, self-seeking class. These would be regarded as traitors by their countrymen. The foreign Government would be a mere shell. It might last for years and the Chinese be no nearer self-government than they are to-day. In fact, with the irritation and hatred it would produce, and a union on the basis of hostility to the foreigner, the last state would be worse than the first.

General Crozier has himself stated so candidly the difficulties in the way of cooperative foreign intervention and of establishing an honest and intelligent Government really managed for the sake of the Chinese people, that it is not necessary to say much about that phase of the matter. As General Crozier says: "The only justification we admit for making use of our strength is the defense of our interests, of the lives and property of our nationals." He regards this as selfish. But it is the only recognized ground, and it is so because the political sense of nations knows how fantastic is the idea of a genuinely benevolent, self-denying, intelligent intervention. At that, interventions already conducted have too often been the causes of predatory aggression and exploitation of peoples subject to it. In the world in which we live General Crozier's ideal of a union of great and imperialistic Powers having the sole purpose of assisting another nation, a nation so unlike in customs and traditions as is China, is a dream.

It took centuries for Western nations to emerge from political conditions not unlike those of China into our present semblance of honest and efficient self-government. It will take time for China to make the transition. She needs our help. But it must come by patience, sympathy and educative effort, and the slow processes of commerce and exchange of ideas, not by a foreign rule imposed by military force.

18. YOUNG TURKEY AND THE CALIPHATE¹

In Shaw's *St. Joan*, the French ecclesiastic prophetically lists as one item in the heroine's heresy, a something that might be called nationalism: a devotion to the State which will interfere with men's loyalty to the Church. Shaw was probably thinking of western Europe and the Christian Church. But the recent history of Turkey shows that his wisdom includes also the Moslems of eastern Europe. For here too the claims of religion and of the national state have met, and patriotism has proved stronger than religious sentiment. After many centuries, the story of the separation of State and Church is written to the final chapter; the world's last great theocracy—if one omits Japan for the moment—has become a laicized republic.

In the United States and in western Europe the abolition of the Caliphate, the closing of the mosque schools and the assumption of the revenues of the pious Moslem foundations aroused misgivings as well as amazement. Was not the new republic going too fast? Would not the populace, faithful to religion, be alienated from political leaders capable of such a revolutionary act? Had not the Angora government lightly thrown away its greatest resource with its domestic Mohammedan population and a large, if not chief, asset in foreign politics, by cutting itself loose from its religious connection?

Upon the ground, in Constantinople, perhaps the most surprising thing is the total absence of all such misgivings and queries. The move appears a simple, natural, inevitable thing. It presents itself as an integral and necessary step in the process of forming a national state after the western model. To question it would be to question the whole course of Euro-

¹ From *The New Republic*, Sept. 17, 1924; published under the title *Secularizing a Theocracy*, with sub-title as above.

pean history for the last three centuries. What has been effected in the rest of Europe is now taking place in the former Ottoman empire. That is all there is to the affair; if the change to a secular national state is final for the rest of Europe, it is as final for Turkey. It is a stage in one of those revolutions which do not go backward.

Indeed, it is this impression of the inevitability of the change which makes it somewhat difficult to start a discussion of the matter or get particular information. When there is no question there is no answer. The process of transforming an old mediæval empire into a modern national state modelled after the western pattern, is taking its sure if slow and tortuous way; there is nothing more to say.

It began in the minds of educated persons years before the revolution of 1908; the granting of the Constitution was but the first outward signal of the movement. The great War, following after the other wars, has quickened the rate of change and affected the form which it has taken; fundamentally however there is but one single and continuous evolution. If the Sultanate had not engaged in treacherous dealings with the foreign powers that occupied Constantinople, the new national state might conceivably have taken the form of a constitutional monarchy instead of a republic. If the Caliphate which remained after the Sultan was deprived of political power had not become a centre of intrigues on the part of foreign powers, there might possibly have developed an innocuous connection of Church and State after the model of England. But in essence the change was destined; and the events of the War, of the period of Allied occupation and the victory over Greece only determined the particular form which it assumed.

As so often happens, the domestic view of the events which have taken place is the foreign view—only precisely reversed. Outside of Turkey and among foreigners one hears the question raised whether the possession of the Caliphate by Turkey was not a potential source of strength to Turkey in northern Africa, Arabia, India and the rest of the Moslem world; whether it was not an asset in dealing with countries like

France and Great Britain that have large Moslem populations which need to be placated. But all the Turks with whom I have conversed on the matter regard the connection as a liability, not an asset. It was simply a standing invitation to foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, to use the Caliph as a cat's-paw in their rivalries with one another. Devotion to the Caliphate was doubtless not increased by the fact that Pan-islamism and the attempt to use leadership of the Moslem world as a political asset were the work of the hated tyrant Abdul Hamid; since before his day the combined Sultan-Caliph was the chief of the Mohammedan religion only in the Pickwickian sense in which the King of England is the head of the Church of England.

Something of the same sort holds good on the internal side. The progressive Turks hold that the alliance of the Church and State was the stronghold of reactionary political influence. A stranger like myself is no judge of the correctness of the statement, but the history of the rest of the world hardly renders it credible. As long as the Caliph was there the Moslem teacher-preachers—they are not priests—through the country had a fictitious power, and were the natural agents of reactionary intrigues. In a secularized republic, they have only the prestige and influence which their personal character and intelligence wins for them. According to the accounts given me, the unholy alliance of Church and State also encouraged foreign intrigue, as pressure or corruption at the top was disseminated throughout the provinces by means of the subordinate religious teachers. I have been told that during the time of occupation one foreign nation deliberately proposed that all primary education whatever should be placed and kept in the hands of the ecclesiastic teachers. I have no way of verifying the story. But the fact that it is current in Turkish quarters is significant in itself. For it contains that sense of the intimate union between foreign intrigue, reactionary intellectual and moral ideas, and the Caliphate which animates the present leaders of Turkey.

Foreigners will hardly credit the tale, but, ironic as it sounds,

it is a common conviction among liberal Turks that their efforts to westernize and modernize Turkey have been constantly resisted and whenever possible thwarted by the representatives of the European powers. And it is part of this common conviction that fear lest a modernized Turkey produce a Turkish nation not subject to foreign domination, has led representatives of the western powers constantly to give their support to reactionary clergy as one of the best means of keeping Turkey ignorant, backward and consequently weak. In any case, enlightened Turks believe that just as other nations in passing from mediævalism to modernity have secularized schools and laicized the State, so must Turkey. And to them that is the whole of the matter about which westerners have made so much ado.

It is said of course that this view represents only Constantinople and the views of a small group who have been in Europe either as exiles under the whole régime or as students during the early part of the new régime. There is no doubt of the strength of the influence proceeding from France and from the anti-clericalism connected therewith. In a certain sense, the whole modern political movement in Turkey strikes one as just a belated offspring of the principles of '89. But I have found only unanimity of assertion that the peasants of the interior of Asiatic Turkey have taken the expulsion of the Caliph and the closing of the mosque schools without resentment. In part this is laid to their docility, their fatalism in the presence of any *fait accompli*. In part, it is said to be due to the growing realization of the futility of the instruction given in these schools; a memoriter training in reading and writing the Koran which led to nothing, save the possibility of becoming in turn a teacher of the same subjects; in part to resentment against the fact that the Caliphate was during the period of foreign occupation the tool of foreign invaders. But more generally, if also more vaguely, it is due to the fact that the succession of wars has left what remains of Turkey—for the first time in four centuries a homogeneous and compact people—with a new spirit, a spirit which has touched even re-

mote peasants. They wish above all else a free and independent Turkey; they are nationalists to the extreme; and they are convinced that a free Turkey and a modernized Turkey are one and the same.

Of course it falls at first strangely upon the ears when one is told that Turkey is not only not fanatic, but is not even very religious. A certain incredulity is evoked. But after a time one begins to wonder whether perhaps the contrary view so current in Christian lands is not a survival of ancient lore and legend combined with the exigencies of religious proselytism and political propaganda. One listens with growing respect to the calm statement by the rector of the rejuvenated national university: "There are two Turkeys; the real Turkey, and that existing in the imagination of foreigners."

And the reading of history has a tendency to convince one that the religious persecutions and massacres with which we are so tragically familiar had their origin in that baleful fusion of race, religion and politics which is the curse of the Near East, rather than in religious fanaticism pure and simple. If such be the case, the present régime, in separating their own Church and State and thereby acquiring the right to demand that other countries also sever their political policies from their religious beliefs and cults, is taking the first effective step taken in 1200 years (since these political-racial-religious feuds long antedate the arrival of the Turk in Europe) to establish the rule of tolerance and liberty. Nationalism has its evils, but its loyalties are at least less dreadful than those of dogmatic religious differences.

When then one reads a telegraphic item from Constantinople regarding some difficulty into which some foreign school, French, Italian or American, has fallen, one should supply a context. In the first place, the Turks have the very best of reasons to be suspicious of the admixture of foreign politics and foreign religions, and in the second place, they are applying to themselves the same regulations they apply to others in forbidding dogmatic religious inculcations and in closing schools having a definite religious basis. Indeed, as the government

recently reminded the French, in reply to a protest regarding the closing of Catholic schools which refused to abide by the rules for strictly lay education, the French were asking for privileges for their schools in Turkey which had long been forbidden by law in France itself. This does not mean that all religious instruction is forbidden. On the contrary, the curriculum of the Turkish public schools includes for the present at least two hours a week of religious instruction in the Koran—and all foreign communities are allowed to give such religious instruction as they wish to their own co-religionists. But anything which smells even remotely of proselytizing is rigorously forbidden. And if Turkish authorities made sensitive and sore by what seems to them persistent foreign favoritism to Greeks and Armenians at the expense of Turkish political independence and unity, sometimes act abruptly, it is not for a hundred percent American, or for any other nationalist, to be too quick or too loud in condemnation.

And while the Near East is the part of the world where above all others it behooves the foreigner, especially the newcomer, to listen and not have opinions and views of his own, of one thing even the transient visitor may be quite sure. Any marked change in the present régime of Turkey, other than its own natural evolution, would be a calamity from the standpoint of all those who have a philanthropic and educational interest in the country, even if they are discontented with the present situation. For it would signify an arrest of a movement which is in the direction of progress and light; it would mean a return to corruption, intrigue, ignorance, confusion, and their attendant animosities and intolerances. It would be a horrid thing if a too vivid memory of old histories led well-intentioned foreigners to withhold their sympathies from just those forces in Turkey which are bound to put an end to mediæval Turkey.

19. ANGORA, THE NEW¹

It is not only in Europe that there is bewilderment at the decision of the new rulers of Turkey to abandon the secular capital of historic empires, situated as if nature herself had destined it to be queen of empires in order to found a new capital some hundreds of miles in the interior of Asia. Astonishment and resentment are felt also in Constantinople, perhaps more in Constantinople than elsewhere. In addition to the amazement attendant upon ceasing to be for the first time in almost fifteen centuries the mistress, spiritual and temporal, of a large part of the world, there is the disdain which the cultivated capital always feels for the rude province. That during a period of military stress and during a period of occupation of Constantinople by foreign forces, the country should find the seat of its recuperation in the remote interior is understandable. But that when this period was finished, the new leaders should continue seriously to turn their backs on a city which with Rome and Peking is one of the great capitals of the world, is incredible.

The railway journey does not lessen the wonder. After passing through western Anatolia, a country beautiful and picturesque by turns, the train mounts the central great plateau. The region is like nothing more than some of our far western plateaus, modified by the foot hills of the Rockies: treeless as far as the eye can reach; occasional herds of sheep and cattle; here and there grain fields which testify to a precarious "dry farming"; almost no houses, the occasional village, small and tucked away in a ravine in the side of some hill, eroded as if to serve as a geological model for a class of students in physical geography. One tries to imagine an emergency which should cause the permanent removal of our seat

¹ From *The New Republic*, Oct. 15, 1924.

of government from Washington to some frontier town in Wyoming—realizing, however, that the analogy hardly holds, since Washington is a parvenu compared with that city which has passed through the hands of many peoples, but has always remained the imperial city of the ruling nation or race of the time.

After only a few hours in Angora, the mood changes. Scenically it puts forth its own charm, different as it is from that union of sea, straits and varied hills that makes Constantinople unique. Its charm is more oriental; it speaks definitely the language of Asia without a European accent. The city sits on a hill which has that air which compels one to think and say Acropolis; this Acropolis dominates the sweep of hilly plains that have the effect of merging into infinite space—an effect confirmed by luminous dust which glorifies as well as obscures. And historically the site has much to say for itself, uttering its message with more obviousness and with less dependence upon an imagination fed by historic lore than Constantinople. For nowhere in Constantinople is there a classic ruin so striking—one cannot say complete—as that of the temple built by the provincials in honor of Cæsar Augustus; the old walls while not extensive are much more massive than those of the city of the Bosphorus. As one rides around the city-acropolis in the valley which girds it, the walls dominate the scene instead of having to be traced by a voyage of archæological exploration. There is the old column of a later Roman empire, its capital being now the abode of an enormous stork's nest—a feature of the landscape which if present plans succeed and Angora becomes in deed as well as in name the centre of a rejuvenated nation will before many years be part of the familiar stock of the tourist picture post-cards.

When the eye turns from the obviously visible to the written record Angora appears anything but a remote and dilapidated Asiatic village. It contains everything of historic significance which marks any town of Asia Minor save the early science and philosophy of some of the Greek coast colonies, and perhaps has accumulated a greater variety of significant episodes

and vicissitudes in its past than any other one city. It testifies in turn to invading Gauls, Alexander the Great, St. Paul, or the author of the epistle to the Galatians, Mithridates and Pompey, Saracens and Crusaders, and the fierce Tamerlane, as well as to later Moslem conquerors. The time of its greatest glory was that of the Roman empire when according to archæologists it was the most elaborate and most beautiful, architecturally, of all provincial cities in Europe or Asia. Such historic reminiscences are of some present significance, for they are evidence of the central position of Angora, a meeting place for movements of men and goods between the Black Sea and Cilicia and Syria north and south, and between Persia and Constantinople east and west. This central location is given on the spot as the chief reason for making it the new capital; military safety and liberation from the dangers of foreign intrigue at Constantinople being secondary. From here it is said, "it is easy to watch over the whole of Asia Minor, to keep in touch with its needs, to respond to the requirements of the people. Constantinople is too far to one side. One ignores or forgets there the real state of the country and its necessities."

However, it is not the historic memories which make the great appeal in Angora, and which go far to induce the visitor to believe that the instincts of the new leaders are truer than the sophisticated wisdom of Constantinople. These associations blend with the bold and picturesque beauty of the place simply to reinforce the sense of the adventurous and pioneer spirit which the activities of the present create. In comparison with the efforts being put forth, Constantinople seems not old but tired; here we get the impression that man and nature have met neither in harsh hostility nor in a surrender of man to nature, but in a challenge to athletic combat. The very immensity of the task, its seeming hopelessness, have awakened new and fresh vigor. We readily abandon ourselves to a mood in which everything that greets the eye becomes symbolic. The carriage bumps over rocks and plows through sands on roads the like of which exist only in Asia. Then one

comes upon stretches paved with well cut and well laid stone blocks, or solidly macadamized; one sees scores of men laboring in the gravel of the river preparing the materials for miles of modern highway which are in course of construction. Carts with solid wooden wheels swerve to let motor cars pass. Robust, well set up soldiers with modern equipment pass with energetic step; small boys high on donkeys with panniers on either side mix with gray bearded, turbaned Turks sitting on their donkeys with a benign gravity as if the lofty saddles were thrones.

In addition to the hundreds working on highways, there are hundreds making an extension of the railway, and other hundreds engaged in constructing new houses for this old town which has suddenly doubled its population and multiplied its importance. Between old stone walls above, going back to early centuries of our era and adobe houses on a lower level, the most conspicuous buildings are two modern primary school buildings, one named for Mustapha Kemal and the other for his wife. By the side of men laboring with an activity which for the Orient is almost feverish, there are scores of men and women sitting idly in the sun, hardly sparing the energy even for gossip, gazing into immemorial vacancy with minds which appear as ancient and as vacant. Women wash their clothes by the brook, heating the water in great copper kettles which they have brought on their backs, set on hearths which they have improvised from the stones of the rivulet. Across the valley from the massive and sharply cut ascent on which stands the old city lies a gently sloping hill, which we are told is the site of the future city. Representatives of an American firm are now in the town discussing with the government the terms of the contract for making this city new with modern water supply, trams, streets, public buildings, private residences. There are certain hitches, the matter is not yet decided; but sooner or later, if not by this firm, then in some way or other, a new city, the capital of a new Turkey will rise there, the emblem of a risen Turkey.

Amid this strange union of the oldest and the newest in the

world, there grows the feeling of something familiar—something akin to the work of the pioneer and the frontier in America. And unbidden the conclusion is formed in the mind that however it may be with others, it is not for one whose ancestors left a civilized and formed country to go out into the wilderness and build a new country to question what the present leaders of Turkey are doing. Whether the outcome is failure or success—adventure, energy, determination and hope attend the undertaking. There are various kinds of old age. And if the age for which Constantinople stands is that of decay, of a world steeped in the belief that as things have been so must they ever be, it may be that those are right who say that the old age of Anatolia is one which conserves the pristine virtues of an unspoiled peasantry, as energetic in the civil arts of peace as they are vigorous and enduring in a war for independence.

At all events, I shall try to preserve that feeling which came upon me in the first hours of seeing Angora that its selection as a capital and the will to build far away from the memories and traditions of Constantinople a new centre of government is an heroic venture, symbolizing faith in the possibilities of the Asiatic peasant. One can hear about and read about this faith in Constantinople, but one cannot get its reality there. The impression may turn out only a dream. But in a Europe where most dreams are but nightmares, I claim for myself the right to cherish this particular dream as long as it is possible to keep it alive. It is paradoxical that it should be necessary for a nation to go into Asia in order to make sure that it is to be Europeanized. But the leaders at least wish that Turkey be Europeanized in their own way and for their own benefit. And history itself is an incredible paradox, of which the mingling of old and new in Angora is but a symbol.

20. THE TURKISH TRAGEDY¹

The tragedy in Turkey is more extensive than the sad plight of minorities. Those who have the patience to refrain in the Near East from a premature partisanship are likely soon to arrive at a state of mind in which all parties are so much to blame that the question of assigning responsibility is at most one of quantities and proportions. But a deeper and fuller acquaintance with the sufferings of all these peoples brings with it a revulsion. One becomes disgusted with the whole affair of guilt. Pity for all populations, minority and majority alike, engulfs all other sentiments—except that of indignation against the foreign powers which have so unremittingly and so cruelly utilized the woes of their puppets for their own ends.

The situation in Turkey with respect to Turks, Armenians and Greeks alike meets all the terms of the classic definition of tragedy, the tragedy of fate. A curse has been laid upon all populations and all have moved forward blindly to suffer their doom.

It is a tragedy with only victims, not heroes, no matter how heroic individuals may have been. There are villains, but they are muffled figures appearing upon the open stage only for fleeting glimpses. They are the Great Powers, among which it is surely not invidious to select Russia and Great Britain by name. It is easy to become a fatalist in the presence of the history of Asia Minor and the Balkans; any one who would write history in terms of Providence is well advised to keep clear of these territories.

We were in Brusa, the seat of the Ottoman power before the capture of Constantinople, one of the most beautiful and in natural promise most prosperous of the cities of Anatolian Turkey. As we walked the streets we passed alternately by

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 12, 1924.

the closed shops and houses formerly kept by Greeks and Armenians who are now dead or deported in exchange for Turks in Greece, and by the ruins of buildings of the Turkish population burnt by the Greeks in their retreat. We saw business houses which had changed hands back and forth, the Greeks seizing the property of Turkish merchants and compelling the latter to flee the city when they were in power, and Turkish merchants in present possession of trades and commercial institutions formerly belonging to Greeks. There was a jumble with no outstanding fact except that of general suffering and ruin. It struck me as a symbol of the whole situation, only on a smaller scale and with less bloodshed and rapine than is found in most parts of the Anatolian territory.

The valley of "Green Brusa" was full of flourishing tobacco crops. Even they had a voice speaking indirectly of misery. A few years ago no tobacco was grown in this region. It was introduced by the Turks expelled from Macedonia now precariously occupied by the Greeks—precariously because Serbs and Bulgars both claim it in the name of nationalism—with Turks nourishing resentment in memory of their long and industrious residence from which they have been violently expelled. Thus the flourishing tobacco told the same tale as the declining silk-cocoon business, the latter languishing because it was the industry of Greeks now forced to remove. I know nothing which speaks more urgently of the common tragedy than the fact that the cruel exchange of populations by the half million, this uprooting of men, women and children transferring them to places where they do not want to go and where they are not wanted, has seemed to honest and kind persons the only hope for the avoidance of future atrocities.

Brusa serves also as a symbol of another phase of the situation. We passed through the Jewish quarter, and found the Jews still in possession of their homes and property, the more flourishing perhaps because of the total absence of their former commercial competitors, the Greeks and Armenians. Unbidden the thought comes to mind: Happy the minority which has had no Christian nation to protect it! And one re-

calls that the Jews took up their abode in "fanatic" Turkey when they were expelled from Europe, especially Spain, by saintly Christians, and they have lived here for some centuries in at least as much tranquillity and liberty as their fellow Turkish subjects, all being exposed alike to the rapacity of their common rulers. To one brought up, as most Americans have been, in the Gladstonian and foreign-missionary tradition, the condition of the Jews in Turkey is almost a mathematical demonstration that religious differences have had an influence in the tragedy of Turkey only as they were combined with aspirations for a political separation which every nation in the world would have treated as treasonable. One readily reaches the conclusion that the Jews in Turkey were fortunate that a Zionist state had not been built up which should feel strong enough to intervene in Turkish politics and stimulate a separatist movement and political revolt. In contrast, the fate of the Greeks and Armenians, the tools of nationalistic and imperialistic ambitions of foreign powers, makes one realize how accursed has been the minority population that had the protection of a Christian foreign power.

Unfortunately the end is not yet, even with the completed exchange of populations, and the accompanying misery of peoples at least temporarily homeless, often unacquainted with the language of their home-kin, with thousands of orphans and beggared refugees, as numerous among the Turks as among the Armenians and Greeks, even if our Christian benevolence, still under the influence of foreign political propaganda, does not hear so much about or experience the same solicitude for Turkish woes. The end is not yet because, in the case of the Armenians at least, the great powers have not even yet become willing to refrain from experimenting at their expense. One can hardly blame the Greeks in their unsettled and unstable condition for asking that a considerable portion of the deported Armenians be again deported, this time from Greek soil. But what shall we say when we read that already at Geneva a plea has been made for the creation of the Armenian "home" in Caucasian Turkey—a home that would require protection by

some foreign power and be the prelude to new armed conflicts and ultimate atrocities? Few Americans who mourn, and justly, the miseries of the Armenians, are aware that till the rise of nationalistic ambitions, beginning with the 'seventies, the Armenians were the favored portion of the population of Turkey, or that in the Great War, they traitorously turned Turkish cities over to the Russian invader; that they boasted of having raised an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men to fight a civil war, and that they burned at least a hundred Turkish villages and exterminated their population. I do not mention these things by way of appraising or extenuating blame because the story of provocations and reprisals is as futile as it is endless; but it indicates what happened in the past to both Armenian and Turkish populations when the minority element was taken under the protecting care of a foreign Christian power, and what will recur if the Armenians should be organized into a buffer state. Nor is it likely to be better in "little Armenia," if the Armenians of Latin Catholic persuasion are deposited between the Turks to the north and Syria to the south, which is, according to newspaper reports, to be the French policy in connection with their mandated territory.

If human wit is baffled in seeking constructive measures which shall transform the tragic scene into one of happiness, history at least makes clear a negative lesson. Nothing but evil to all parties has come in the past or will come in the future from the attempts of foreign nations to utilize the national aspirations of minority populations in order to advance their own political interests, while they then conceal and justify their villainous courses by appeal to religion. After all the Turks are here; there is a wide territory in which they form an undisputed majority; for centuries the land has been their own; the sentiments have gathered about it that always attend long habitation. Whether we like it or not, other elements in the population must accommodate themselves to this dominant element, as surely as, say, immigrants in America have to adjust their political aspirations and nationalistic pref-

erences to the fact of a unified national state. If a fiftieth of the energy, money and planning that has been given to fostering antagonisms among the populations had been given to searching out terms upon which the populations could live peaceably together without the disruption of Turkey, the situation to-day would be enormously better than it is. Whether the European great powers have learned the lesson that their protection and aid is a fatal and tragic gift, there is no way of knowing. But it is at least time that Americans ceased to be deceived by propaganda in behalf of policies which are now demonstrated to bring death and destruction impartially to all elements, and which are nauseating precisely in the degree that they are smeared over with sentiments alleged to be derived from religion. Finally, if slowly, the Turks also have been converted to nationalism. The disease exists in a virulent form at just this moment. It will abate or be exacerbated in just the degree in which the Turkish nation is accepted in good faith as an accomplished fact by other nations, or in which the old tradition of intervention, intrigue and incitation persists. In the latter case, the bloody tragedy of Turkey and the Balkans will continue to unroll.

21. THE PROBLEM OF TURKEY¹

During the early part of one's stay in Turkey, one is haunted by the feeling that there is a thin but impenetrable veil between his vision and the realities of the country. There is an almost physical impulsion to hunt for some slight rents that may serve as a peephole, as there is a physical irritation at not being able to find it. What lies open to the eye is confused, obscure, ambiguous, inconsistent. One cannot escape the idea that close-by there exists a vantage point from which the facts would assume order and significance. And the resulting exasperation is increased rather than diminished by the realization that perhaps there is no veil, no concealed meaning; that the uncertainty lies in the elements of the situation.

One day a Turkish friend remarked that life in Turkey since the great war had been very hard; that it was almost impossible for a person with enough education to be aware of what was going on not to be a pessimist; that he was doubtful, although himself a teacher, whether the extension of education under existing conditions was desirable since the only happy persons were the fishermen and peasants who did not know enough to take cognizance of anything but their immediate surroundings and acts. "We are living in a fog. In no respect do we know what is going to happen, any more than we know how to bring to pass the things we wish to have happen. It is hard living when everything around one is so obscure that one cannot see his road six paces in advance!"

I do not know that this conversation gives the complete explanation of the perplexity of a visitor. But it so fell in with the trend of additional knowledge and observations that it seemed to be much nearer the heart of the situation than are the cock-sure ascriptions of inexplicable and self-contradictory

¹ From *The New Republic*, Jan. 7, 1925.

events to some definite policy on the part of those in control of Turkey's destiny. During the years of the war of independence the course of action was clear, once a few determined teachers like Mustapha Kemal had described and proclaimed it. To expel the invader, to abandon all ambitions which interfered with the unity and independence of Turkey, to assert, against every other nation, *a l'outrance*, the will of Turkey to be its own independent master in its own abode; such a course of action was as clear as it was urgent. But the achievement of this primary task brought to the fore all the elements of inner weakness and confusion, the heritage from the old absolutism of irresponsible religious and political power.

To the outsider accustomed to think of the war as now six years in the past, it comes as a shock to assist, as we have been doing the last few weeks, in celebrations of anniversaries of the events of the year 1922 which brought the three-and-a-half years' war-after-the-war to a close. And the reminder of the nearness of the war struggle, a struggle literally for existence carried on against seemingly hopeless odds, renders one aware that the war-psychology, which has been growing dim with us and which we are glad to forget, still hangs on in Turkey. Indeed, during the first of these two post-war years, until the second conference of Lausanne, it was not certain whether the war might not be renewed. Hence it seemed necessary for Turkey to keep alive enough of the war spirit to meet the threatening emergency. When we think how much longer than one year the suspicions, animosities and fears of the war-mind persisted among us, in spite of our infinitely greater remoteness from the scene of combat and destruction; when we think of the stupid and shameful things we did under the dominion of this hang-over, we can perhaps begin to appreciate the state of mind which leads the Turks at present to do things which show both dislike of the foreigner and a short-sighted sense of their own interests.

Dread and dislike are always intensified by uncertainty and its accompanying impotency. The foreigner has much to answer for in Turkey, and this fact induces undiscriminating hos-

tility to the foreigner as if he were a single collective entity, an antagonism shown in ways which are often more damaging to Turks than to those at whom they are directed. These acts are not so much the manifestations of a definite and consistent policy as they are expressions of an emotional condition that has nothing to do with that policy: as when the charge is brought against an American school that its buildings are painted blue and white—the Greek colors—or against a teacher in an American school that he spoke more highly of ancient Byzantine architecture in Constantinople than of later Turkish architecture—an appreciation which proves that he is dangerously pro-Greek! It is useless and harmful, I think, to seek for deeper motives behind such acts than such as actuated inflamed American patriots in the years immediately after the war.

Given a period of internal tranquillity and such acts will cease as the emotions from which they spring subside. But the intrinsic uncertainty and obscurity to which they afford a momentary relief will not pass so readily. In certain respects, Turkey at present is more stable, both internally and externally, than any one of its Balkan neighbors. But the transformation of a military and theocratic despotism, whose interests required that its subjects be more barbarous than civilized, into a secular democratic state, a transformation undertaken in the midst of a terrible exhaustion following upon almost fifteen years of uninterrupted foreign wars, is no easy task.

Ever since the president of the new republic took up his seemingly hopeless task, he has been distinguished for a certain realistic facing of facts. In such speeches of his as I have been able to read in translations no note recurs so often as the warning against entertaining illusions. In a speech which he made recently at the anniversary of the expulsion of the Greeks from Brusa he said that much as the Turks had suffered from foreign foes, their greatest sufferings had been inflicted upon them from within and by their own rulers; and that the woes from which Turkey was now suffering were due to the fact that their ancient rulers had not been able or willing to lead

their people into the society of civilized nations. In another recent speech, made at the laying of the corner-stone of a memorial to The Unknown Soldier on the ground of the final decisive battle of August, 1922, he said that difficult as was the struggle against the invading foe, that fight was much easier than the economic and social battle which must be won if Turkey was to become an integral part of the civilized world.

The two sayings define the problem of Turkey in its larger outlines. The Turkish state has been a military state in which the fighting spirit was stimulated and sustained by an unquestioned identification of the ambition of the ruler with the requirements of a blind religious faith. The power, the superiority, of the Ottoman Empire was one of arms, and its administration always relied upon the force of arms, fused with religious faith, to make good all its other defects. Now that the nation of Turkey has consigned the Ottoman Empire in both its political and theocratic phases to a grave from which there is no resurrection, it finds itself held back by the very traditions, military and theocratic, out of which it is struggling to escape. Is it any wonder that action is inconsistent, that tendencies are ambiguous, and that a fog hangs over the situation? No person of any intelligence expects such a problem to be resolved in the twinkling of an eye. But also no informed person has any doubt about the sincerity of those engaged in the struggle to effect the alteration. Their sincerity, one may say, is an accentuation of the problem; if they were not so sincere, their task would not be so hard. Of success or failure no mortal can speak with complacency, but I am sorry for those who have no inkling of the heroism of the effort that is being made.

The economic aspect of the problem is marked by the same inner perplexity. Turkey was long by turns the spoiled darling and the hapless victim of the European great powers. Money was loaned to her recklessly in hope of returns to come from concessions granted with equal recklessness. Turkey never had to face the questions of natural economy which

every self-respecting independent nation has to deal with. Well might she exclaim that the way of the transgressor is made easy, while that of the repentant prodigal nation is lonely and hard. Owing to the constant quest of foreign nations for concessions, Turkey, in the person of its authorities, has a somewhat exaggerated idea of the value of its natural resources and has still a tendency to seek some magic source for wealth, an arbitrary protective tariff and the elimination of the foreigner from industry and commerce being much in favor just now. It professes, and sincerely I personally believe, a great desire for foreign aid both in technical skill and in capital. But its inexperience in economic matters and its too great experience of foreign wiles, combine to render it unwilling to meet the conditions under which alone it is possible to secure capital and skill. If this meant a mere postponement of industrial development, it would not be serious. But Turkey is in a severe economic crisis which almost threatens the disappearance of the middle class. Its two greatest immediate needs, schools and a competent and honest civil administration, will require a marked economic revival.

Silly as is the comparison of the problem of Turkey with that of China, it is impossible for one who has known something of both countries to abstain from making it. The quantitative disparity, the slight population of Turkey compared with that of China, is in some degree offset by the strategic position occupied by Turkey, as the bridge between Europe and Asia, and between northern Russian Europe and the south. Both have the same problem of transformation, a change which can be effected only from within however much it may be required by external relations. But Turkey has a military and religious tradition which China lacks, while China possesses skill in industry and trade which is lacking in Turkey. The military prowess of Turkey has made it possible for her to protect her independence in the final crisis as it was not possible for pacific China. But the struggle for economic development and for culture in art, science and philosophy may well prove more taxing for Turkey than for China. The ultimate

ground for confidence is in the fact that the Turks have that intangible something which we call character. They have virility, sobriety of outlook and sincerity of purpose.

The handicap imposed upon them by the old régime is enormous. It is double: part of it is real in the heritage of ignorance and of lack of economic ability; part of it consists in the reputation which Turkey acquired and which, by foreign ignorance and by the design of interested foreign powers, leads other nations to deny to present-day Turkey a genuine change of spirit and aim. If refusal to admit the reality of the change persists the refusal may do much to prevent Turkey from receiving the assistance it needs to make the change effective and permanent. In that case the belief of liberal Turks that the most powerful enemies of the modernization of Turkey have been the professedly modern and democratic states of Europe, will receive another confirmation.

22. AMERICA AND TURKEY¹

Undoubtedly the direct American interest in Turkey centers in the numerous and important educational institutions which American religious bodies have founded in that country. An American concerned about the fortunes of these schools is likely to think of the action of the Turkish government (too often of an arbitrary nature) as if American schools exhausted the problem of Turkey with respect to foreign schools. The Turk on the contrary thinks of American schools in terms of his experience with a variety of other foreign schools which far outnumber the American. Hence a growth of misunderstandings on both sides. I want in this article to say something about the larger educational problem within which the question of American schools has to be placed.

In the first place, by far the greater number of foreign schools in Turkey have been Armenian and Greek; these schools of course have been religious or parochial ones. In the case of Greek schools in particular, the school teacher has been in the past, along with the priest, the propagandist of "The Greek Idea"—namely a new Greek state, including a large part of Asia Minor as well as all of Macedonia, and having Constantinople as its capital. Armenian schools with Armenian churches were the chief instruments in getting and nurturing Armenian nationalism. It is not surprising therefore that the Turks are antecedently disposed to approach the question of all foreign schools with suspicion as to their bias. There is a presumption that any foreign school has designs which are hostile to Turkish nationalism. And while they are willing to acquit American schools of political designs, it is hard for them to free their minds from the idea that they have some concealed purpose—a feeling strengthened by the fact

¹ From *The New Republic*, Dec. 3, 1924.

that these schools were started under religious auspices which in Turkish experience have always been anti-Turkish. At first hearing, it is strange to learn that in most respects the still remaining Greek and Armenian schools face a simpler problem than other foreign schools. But the explanation is easy. They have as pupils only their own nationals; they are "community" schools, and Turkey is habituated to the idea of foreign communities retaining their own language, religion, and customs. There is no danger of religious proselytism, for they have no Moslem students; their teachers are examined and receive their licenses to teach from the Turkish ministry of education; their courses of study and methods are supervised and controlled. Moreover the spirit of Greek and Armenian nationalism within Turkey is now so broken that there is no immediate fear of its revival.

Next in importance and also outnumbering the American schools are those of French origin. Before the war there were over a million pupils in the empire of Turkey in schools under French management, and over two million persons a year secured relief or assistance in French hospitals, clinics and charitable institutions. These institutions, even though under private and religious control, were subsidized liberally by the French governmental funds. Europeans in general as well as the Turks take it for granted that educational and religious enterprises have economical and political ends to subserve, and are frankly incredulous of American claims that our schools have no such aims. French influence was increased by the fact that the chief and for a long time, under Abdul Hamid, the only Turkish public secondary school had a French director, gave all its courses of instruction in the French language, and, although a Turkish governmental school, was liberally subsidized by the French government. Even now, although the French directorate and even sub-directorate have been abolished by the new Turkish nationalism, and only sciences are taught in French, the French government pays the salaries of teachers of the French language. This school, the Galata-Serail, has been, I should say, the chief single influence in dis-

seminating western and liberal ideas among the Turks, and has played an honorable rôle in the formation of the New Turkey. Yet its whole record is such as to strengthen in the minds of the Turks the belief that any educational undertaking supported in Turkey by foreigners has political motives and governmental direction back of it.

But, of course, the chief factor in determining the political slant of French educational and religious activities has been the claim of France since the middle of the sixteenth century to be the protector of all non-Moslem religious interests in the Near East, a claim once recognized officially by Turkey, and, after it had been reduced to a protectorate of Roman Catholic interests, confirmed by the Pope. This claim, it is hardly too much to say, has been the cornerstone of French diplomacy in the Near East, and since it has been supported by French cabinets that were openly anti-clerical in domestic affairs, it has correspondingly strengthened the Turkish belief that no foreign cultural undertaking is simply educational or philanthropic in nature. Of late, the situation is complicated by increasing rivalry between France and Italy. As a French writer naïvely expresses it, when Catholic interests in Turkey which are under French auspices receive a check, the papacy in its religious character is grieved but in its Italian aspect rejoices. It is openly asserted that French schools, even those conducted by clerics, are more devoted to propaganda of French "culture" than of Catholic religion. It is rumored that the Roman church is quite willing to get rid of the embarrassing union of French ambitions with religious aims, and would be glad to come to an agreement with the Turkish government that Catholic schools confine themselves to teaching those who are already of the Catholic persuasion. On the other hand, the Turks were suspicious of the distinctively Italian schools which had been opened along the Anatolian littoral. When they closed them the Italian authorities were told that since they claimed their aims were purely humanitarian, they might open schools in the interior, but not in any district which at any

previous time had been claimed as an Italian sphere of influence.

This inadequate sketch should at least make it clear that the Turks approach the question of the activities of American educational institutions with adverse preconceptions which have a certain amount of justification in experience with the schools of foreign nationalities, even though experience with American schools themselves offers less justification than those of other countries. But, while Americans are acquitted of aggressive political ambitions, there is not the same assurance about the religious character of their schools. And although the Moslem is such a hopeless case from the standpoint of proselytism and conversion that missionary schools have for many years done nothing in that direction, this very fact has created an additional source of friction. The outstanding fact in the record of American schools in Turkey is that they have devoted themselves chiefly to the education of Armenians, Greeks and Bulgarians, in other words to those elements of the population which were always the tacit and often the open enemies of Turkey. It was humanly impossible that, as Turkish nationalism developed and finally won a military triumph, the memory of this fact should not make the Turkish government doubtful about the value to the nation of American schools, while it rendered the Turk oversensitive to any sign on the part of any American teacher of favoritism to any anti-Turkish national group.

Given the fact that these schools were conducted under missionary auspices and with religious aims, and given the obduracy of the Moslem believer to conversion, this state of affairs could hardly have been avoided, so that appraisal of praise or blame for what has happened in the past is not worth while. But there is a problem which in my judgment is fundamental for the future and which must be faced. It may be stated as a dilemma. If the religious purpose is to continue to dominate American schools or even to color them in any marked way (and the same thing holds of the Y.M.C.A. and

the Y.W.C.A.) American institutions will continue to deal mainly with non-Turkish elements in the population, and hence remain an essentially alien and suspected factor in the Turkish body politic. On the other hand, these institutions can play an immensely useful rôle in the modernization of Turkey on condition that they devote themselves primarily to education of Turkish young men and women—a condition which definitely means the complete subordination of Christian religious aims, and the surrender of the schools, in spirit as well as in outward form, to secular, social and scientific methods. I may of course have a wrong understanding of the situation, but to the best of my belief this dilemma is a flat one. Any failure to meet it or effort to straddle it will result in continued friction between American and Turkish interests, and will vitiate the service which American ideas and ideals are capable of rendering at a critical juncture to the experiment of transforming Turkey. And it hardly need be said that the success or failure of this experiment, in view of the consequences both in the Near East and in the Moslem world, is of immense import to the future peace of the world.

A Turkish—and of course Moslem—graduate of an American school in Turkey said to me that if in the two generations of its existence in Turkey that particular higher institution had turned out four hundred men trained to be leaders in Turkish schools and civil administration, Turkey would soon be made over. He made the point of his remark clearer by saying that if this school had, through its graduates, done as much for Turkey as it had done for the neighboring state of Bulgaria, the whole social and economic outlook of Turkey would be radically different to what it actually is. In many ways, he went on to say, the very fact that American schools had done so much more for minority elements in the population than they had done for the Turkish had worked harm to both the minority and the Turkish elements. It was an indispensable condition of peace, mutual understanding and harmony that all factors in the population should either have remained on the same level of ignorance or else should have progressed together.

But American schools had developed democratic ideals among the Greeks and Armenians in Turkey, had given them modern ideas, aroused their initiative and equipped them with the tools of modern life, while the Turks had been left practically in their mediæval state of mind.

The result was two-fold. The Greeks and Armenians were naturally stimulated to work for their political independence, which in turn created the hostility of the Turks, and the Turks, seeing themselves outstripped in industry and commerce because of the modern education of Greeks and Armenians, were roused to envy and hatred which easily were fanned into the flames of war and massacre. I shall not forget the earnestness with which he assured me that if all the factors in the population had remained in the same condition of ignorance and backwardness, the various nationalities would still be getting along reasonably well together.

The point was made without resentment. I have never seen any persons as objective as are educated Turks in discussing their wrongs, a fact connected possibly with their fatalistic philosophy. It was made in connection with a discussion of what these schools are to be and do in the future, and in that reference it is most significant. If American schools in Turkey, because they have been founded under missionary auspices, are bound to perpetuate the old distinction between Christian and non-Christian and to be anti-Turk because they are pro-Christian, I cannot see that they will accomplish a great deal for Turkey, and it is reasonably certain that they will be points of diplomatic friction, with a tendency, as far as it goes, to strain political and economic relations between the United States and Turkey. On the other hand, what these schools have done in the way of enlightening and liberating non-Turkish elements is sufficient proof of what they can do for Turkey if they make it their main business to discover and educate, irrespective of religious belief, the able Turkish young men and women who are to be the intellectual and social leaders of future Turkey.

23. CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO¹

The events constituting the conflict of church and government in Mexico have been so fully reported in the press that there is little which a newcomer on the ground, like myself, can add. Politics and religion are the two subjects, in any case, which one cannot help approaching with a certain amount of *parti pris*. In this particular case one can receive about as many diverse accounts of the motives which explain the conduct of either side, and as many different prognostications as to the future, as the number of persons with whom one converses. However, there has gradually formed in my mind a certain deposit of impressions regarding the present situation and its probable movement, which I shall expose, with the understanding that it is simply a matter of certain net impressions which have emerged from the confusion and conflict of opinions, and not a claim to reveal any inner truths or hidden facts.

In the first place, the technical cause of the strike of the church is of greater importance than has been attached to it in most of the accounts which I have run across in the papers of the United States. On July 3, President Calles issued a series of regulations, giving effect, via the penal code, to the provisions of the constitution of 1917. Most of these rules were not only restatements, verbally exact, of the terms of the constitution, but they also related to accomplished facts, adding only definite penalties for cases of violation. Such accomplished facts included the dissolution of monastic orders; the denial of the right of incorporation or legal "personality" to religious bodies; the exclusion of all foreigners from the right to exercise religious functions and to teach religion in schools; the title in the state, of all properties of religious bodies

¹ From *The New Republic*, Aug. 25, 1926.

(churches and objects of art, jewels, etc., in them, as well as real estate); the limitation of all religious services to the interior of churches; the denial of the right to wear a distinctive religious garb or emblems outside of churches; the denial to the clergy of the right to engage in politics, to comment on political affairs (also denied to religious periodicals), and the complete laicizing of *primary* education, whether in public or private schools.

This legislation, embodied as already stated in the organic law of Carranza's time which put in legal form the achievements of the revolution, and itself consummated the revolution of Juarez in 1857, is obviously drastic and thorough. Equally obvious to the eye of one acquainted with history, the constitution marked a stadium in the struggle of church and state which has been going on for several centuries in all modern nations, and which has ended in all European states in the definite subordination of the church to civil authority. What is distinctive in the Mexican laws is the extreme thoroughness with which anti-clerical legislation has been carried out. Upon this legislation itself I do not propose to comment; one's attitude toward it will depend upon one's social and political philosophy, and one's view of the nature of religion, and its connection with organized political life. The usual defense of its unusually drastic character, as compared with that of even most other anti-clerical legislation, is of course the monopolistic character of the past history of the church, its almost universal association with anti-republican tendencies, and the hold of the priests upon the ignorant rural Indian population, by which was directed its intellectual, political and economic as well as its religious activity, without any corresponding contribution to education or well-being. To this has to be added, the distinct anti-foreign phase of the nationalistic side of the revolution; the claim is made that the exploitation of the natives by the clergy, economic and political, has been greatly increased and exasperated by the presence of foreign bishops and priests, especially Spanish and Italian. This fact, or alleged fact, has a bearing, as will be indicated shortly, upon

the rules and penalties which are the immediate cause of the present clerical strike.

The constitution also contained a provision, which had not previously been put into effect, that all priests and preachers should register, stating the particular church building with which their ministrations were connected, and that the registration should be vouched for by ten citizens of the locality. The regulations of July 3 set August 1 as the date by which this registration should be accomplished, assigning heavy penalties for clergy who should officiate after that date without having registered. Technically the abandonment by the clergy of all religious rites and offices, including preaching and the sacraments, turns upon this one regulation. The clergy were forbidden from above to register; and, as the method by which they would then be protected for civil penalties for failure to register, were authorized to suspend all offices.

When one inquires into the reasons and motives for this attitude on the part of the archbishops, one plunges into the arena of rumor, not to say gossip. The reason officially assigned is that this move, coming after all the other restrictions put upon the church, was of so definitely an anti-religious nature as to render it impossible for the church to exercise its God-given functions; that the regulations in their totality were contrary to divine and "natural" law, and hence null. Rumors of an extreme character are to the effect that it was hoped to create the impression that the state had itself closed the churches, thereby arousing a popular reaction which would weaken if not overthrow the government; the more moderate theory is that it was intended to create a popular reaction which would demand and secure from the federal congress and the state legislative bodies an amendment of the constitution. If the first expectation was entertained events have definitely negated it; upon this score, the government has won a complete victory; barring a few sporadic incidents complete order has been obtained, and the position of the government of President Calles was never stronger, perhaps never so strong. The more moderate expectation takes us into the region of prophecy; I

can only register my impression that it is extremely unlikely to be fulfilled.

The position of the government is simple. The provision for registration is in the constitution; hence the resistance of the clergy is but another manifestation that the church still regards itself as superior to civil law. The registration is held to be a necessary consequence of the nationalization of ecclesiastical properties. Granted this premise, the state must know who is responsible for the care and preservation of the buildings and their treasures. Furthermore such registration is the only means by which clergy of foreign birth can be prevented from returning and resuming their activities. My own guess is this anti-foreign bias, so marked in all revolutionary "backward" countries, is the factor which counts most. On the surface there is now a complete deadlock; there are rumors of an adjustment already on foot, but they spread one day to be denied the next. To one accustomed to the legalistic procedures of the Anglo-Saxon world, it seems as if the issue could be settled and church offices resumed only by a complete surrender on one side or the other. But here in Mexico some acquainted with the native psychology say that it will be settled rather by a gradual filtration of parish priests. There are already a few cases of individual submission to the law.

There has been a schismatic movement to form a Mexican Catholic church in contradistinction to the Roman Catholic church. So far it is largely abortive. But state control of church properties gives the government some leverage. The church cannot educate the people to do without its services; there are some good reasons for thinking that the pressure of the mass of the faithful will be directed toward ensuring the resumption of the services of the church rather than toward any change of the constitution. There is no organized public opinion in Mexico; and personal opinion as to the attitude of the mass of inert and ignorant peasants varies with the attitude of the one who gives the judgment. But the church can hardly escape paying the penalty for the continued ignorance and lack of initiative which it has tolerated if not cultivated. In

short, such popular organization as exists is with the government and not with the church; and this fact, as far as it goes, is the sole basis for predicting the future.

The regulations in question were issued by the President. This fact is eloquent as to political conditions. Congress even when in session does not make the important laws. It authorizes the President to issue what are in effect decrees putting the constitution into effect in this and that respect. Mexico is a republic, but effective democratic government is largely in the future. There is something humorous in the attitude of those, among whom are many foreigners including American fellow-countrymen, who sigh for the "strong-man" government of Diaz. There is a strong-man government in existence, but it operates mostly against foreign interests instead of in their behalf, as was the case with Diaz. The only well organized force in the country, outside of the army, is the labor unions, and they are officially behind the government; the demonstration and parade of August 1 proved that fact. The power of the army in politics has been much curbed, and even if there were generals willing to advance their own prospects by rebelling against the government, which is the usual method of starting revolutions, they are, by common consent, practically powerless as long as the embargo of the United States against arms remains in force.

But in my opinion "liberals" in other countries can hardly appeal to existing democratic liberalism in Mexico in support of the policy of the government. The fact of the case is that the revolution in Mexico is not completed. There is not a single manifesto which does not refer to the Principles of the Revolution; it is from the standpoint of completing the revolution that events in Mexico must be judged, not from that of legalities and methods of countries where political and social institutions are stabilized. This fact accounts for the great diversity of judgment on the present crisis which one finds among intelligent people. If upon the whole they think the revolution is a good thing for Mexico, they support the government's side though regretting the harshness with which

some of its measures have been executed. If they dislike the revolution, they are quite sure that the present struggle originated from anti-religious rather than political motives. Under these circumstances, one with only a short and superficial acquaintance with Mexican conditions is perhaps entitled to fall back on general historical knowledge, and see in the conflict a belated chapter in the secular struggle of church and state for superior political authority, complicated, as it has so often been in the past, with anti-foreign sentiment. From this standpoint, one may also prophesy on general historic grounds, not on the basis of knowledge of local conditions, what the outcome will be, the victory of the national state. Again, following history, the conclusion would be that Catholics as a whole will in the end, though the end may be remote in Mexico, be better off than when they had too easy and too monopolistic a possession of the field.

24. THE NEW AND OLD IN MEXICO¹

It is possible that little things, things apparently insignificant, will count for more in the future of Mexico than sensational affairs which newspapers have headlined. During the early days of August, when excitement was at its height, the walls of Mexico blossomed out with posters, large and small, instructing the population to wash their hands before eating. They were issued by the bureau of propaganda of the Department of Public Health. They are one symptom among many of an intensive and systematic campaign to improve the physical and hygienic habits of the people. The rector of the University, himself a physician, lectures regularly to the inspectors of primary schools in the federal district upon social hygiene. Home visitors are already at work in connection with the schools, and the federal normal school has a two years' course to train these go-betweens, whose duties are largely centered upon improving conditions of health. School medical inspection has been instituted. City schools are being provided with open-air swimming pools. Old residents say that one of the most striking changes is in the interest in outdoor sports. Before the revolution the common people were hardly permitted to enter Chapultepec Park, which is certainly one of the most beautiful in the world; now it has many children's playgrounds which are in constant use. During this autumn, Olympic games for Central America will be held in Mexico City.

An interesting manifestation of transitional movements is the growth of "new thought." There is in Mexico City a centre of the Impersonal Life. For the benefit of those as ignorant as I was, it may be said that the movement originated in a book with that title published in Akron, O. Whether it reached

¹ From *The New Republic*, Oct. 20, 1926; published under the title *From a Mexican Notebook*.

Mexico along with automobile tires I do not know. But purely by means of a translation—of which over twenty thousand copies have now been sold—it made its way, and there is now a centre of the faith with four thousand adherents, holding two meetings a week. The members have come mostly from the educated classes, who have deserted the church, and have now filled the religious void with “new thought.” My statement in answer to a question that I had never happened to hear of the book or the movement in the United States was received with obvious scepticism. The inquirer, himself a physician, was prepared to hear that I was the author of the book. The book-stores are filled with translations of different types of occult literature. Probably more copies of Orison Swett Marden than of any other American author are sold in Mexico—except Nick Carter. One of the two leading dailies of Mexico City recently published an article on North American culture in which after a reference to Emerson it was pointed out that Marden’s is to-day *the* philosophy of the United States.

Mexico is the land of contradictions. This fact, so baffling that it keeps the visitor in an unrelieved state of foggy confusion, is at the same time the most natural of all its phenomena. The newest and the oldest exist side by side without mixing and also inextricably combined. The result is the Mexico of to-day; if I seek a single adjective by which to describe it, “incredible” is the word that comes to mind. Fifteen years ago farm labor was in a state of complete serfdom, in fact a slavery as effective as that of Negroes in the United States before the Civil War. Industrial labor was unorganized and oppressed. To-day Mexico has, on the statute books, the most advanced labor legislation of any contemporary state; and the “syndicates” are the greatest single power in the land. The streets blaze forth the signs of the offices of the different unions more prominently than in any place I have ever visited. Five years ago the marchers in a May Day procession in Mexico City could be counted in the hundreds; now they amount to fifty or sixty thousand.

Human life is cheap; men with full cartridge belts and re-

volvers are seen everywhere on the street and in trains. A few weeks ago several politicians were shot at crowded mid-day in the street which is Mexico's union of Broadway and Fifth Avenue. But any accident in a mine must be reported at once to the government bureau in Mexico City, and if it is serious enough to result in any miners being taken to the hospital, word of it must be telegraphed. The coexistence of customs that antedate the coming of the Spaniards, that express early colonial institutions, and that mark the most radical of contemporary movements, intellectual and economic, accounts for the totally contradictory statements about every phase of Mexican life with which the visitor is flooded; it makes impossible any generalization except that regarding the combination of the most stiff-necked conservatism and the most unrestrained and radical experimentalism.

One of the picturesque elements of contemporary Mexican life is the religious life of the natives, where Catholic rites have been superimposed upon pre-conquest creeds and cults. A resident in the state of Oaxaca told me of seeing an altar on the top of a mountain to the god of rain where, just before the coming of the rainy season, pilgrims poured the blood of turkeys upon the ground and offered the breasts on the altar. These same peasants pour an offering of soup upon the newly plowed grounds just before planting, and make a similar offering after the harvest is gathered. And Oaxaca is not the most primitive state of Mexico. A professor in the University in Mexico City tells of being invited to the opening of a rural school in the mountains not far from Mexico City. In response to inquiries, the mayor, an Indian, informed him that he was a socialist and was also taking part in the ceremony of the adoration of the Virgin which was going on. Asked for an explanation of the seeming anomaly, the village chief replied that he was a socialist because the government had made the village a Pueblo—that is, granted it self-government—while he was adoring the Virgin because the charter arrived on the saint's day. A not dissimilar story concerns the revival of

worship of the old god of rain after a drought, where the rites were terminated with the advice of the old idol to purchase a new robe for the Virgin in the parish church. Priests are nowhere as numerous as are churches, and in many remote districts the churches are in the charge of locally elected major-domos, who conduct services except during the annual or semi-annual visit of a priest.

Some of the most beautiful pottery of the country is made in an Indian village of a few thousand inhabitants about ten miles out of Guadalajara. The entire family works together in the industry, squatting on the ground for the shaping and painting; the methods are those of centuries ago; not even a potter's wheel is used. The patterns, while not identical with the primitive, are genuinely indigenous, observing a traditional type with spontaneous individual inventions. The school authorities had the sense to remove formal instruction in drawing from the schools when they found the taught designs were being copied. But half-way between this town and Guadalajara there is another pottery centre where the stores are filled—together with some specimens of Tonalá work—with all the monstrosities of commercialized European and North American "art." Unfortunately, but naturally, in the minds of the well-to-do, the native pottery with its extraordinarily beautiful rhythms of pattern and color is associated with the life of the peons; conspicuous consumption favors the use of artistic monstrosities. With the rise of the standard of living among the common people, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the native arts. Fortunately enlightened educators, including the section of the federal department of education for indigenous culture, are working against the tide; whether with success remains to be determined.

Among the contradictions of Mexico is the union of anti-foreign, and anti-American, feeling with the disposition to imitate foreign things and methods, especially those of the United States. In some sense, the "Americanization" of the country appears to be an inevitable process, both for good and for evil.

The Ford car and the movie are already working a revolution. English is practically the only foreign language taught in the schools, including even the national military school. The large emigration from Mexico into the United States is having a reflex effect. Increasing numbers of Mexican youth are sent to the United States for their schooling. In regard to large classes of goods, those from the United States control the markets, even in remote districts, and pervasively affect the habits of the people.

The close contact of the most industrially advanced country of the world with an industrially backward country but one possessed of enormous natural resources, the contact of a people having an industrialized, Anglo-Saxon psychology with a people of Latin psychology (in so far as it is not pre-colonial) is charged with high explosives. But the most definite impression of the many confused and uncertain impressions I carry away is that slow permeation is so inevitable, under existing conditions of industry, commerce, travel and other means of distributing goods and ideas, that its great enemies are those who, impatient for immediate profit and judging affairs only from the standpoint of their own economic and legal psychology, would hasten the process. Their attitude and operations in the past are the chief cause of the deliberate efforts of the revolutionary government to handicap the economic invasion of the United States. Every activity on their part which looks even remotely and indirectly toward our intervention or even interference, only delays the natural process. It also increases, under the title of "stabilizing Mexican conditions," the inherent instability of the country. An ironical element of the situation is that those business interests which at home clamor for the free play of "natural" economic law and forces and which deplore governmental action, in Mexico distrust this factor and clamor for political and diplomatic action.

Finally, while one hears denunciation of the Mexican government from American business men, especially those engaged in mining and oil, what they say about Mexican "bolshevism"

is mild in comparison with their language about the activity—or inactivity—of our own State Department. Judging from their attitude, those in our country who are interested in maintaining good relations between the two countries have more cause for gratitude to our own government than they are aware of.

25. MEXICO'S EDUCATIONAL RENAISSANCE¹

Mexicans interested in education are given to calling attention to the fact that President Calles began his career as a rural school teacher. In one of his earlier political announcements he summed up his program in two policies: economic liberation, and the development of public education. Most foreign residents are perforce familiar with the operations of the first factor in the program—which they usually call Bolshevism; not many have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the second.

At the outset, we may dispose of the formal features of the situation. The schools are of three categories: federal, state and municipal. The latter are decreasing, being taken over by the states, while federal activity is growing more rapidly than state; moreover, the figures regarding the latter are well kept and accessible, while statistics for state schools are often not organized, nor easily attainable. Elementary education covers six years, of which the first four are, legally, compulsory. Actually about four children out of ten of the school population are in public schools. There are no statistics for private schools, but, before the closing of the Catholic institutions it is a fair guess that about one-half of the children were in some school.

In the federal district, the government is spending four times as much as was spent in the heyday of the Diaz régime; in some of the larger towns, there are not as yet, owing to the destructions of the revolutionary period, as many state and municipal schools as in 1910. Five open-air schools have been started in Mexico City and suburbs during the present year, where 800 to 1,000 children are cared for at an expense for the plant of from ten to twenty thousand dollars. This type of

¹ From *The New Republic*, Sept. 22, 1926.

school, the creation of the present school administration, under Doctor Puig, is artistic, hygienic and well adapted to the climate, and the low expense will make possible the provision of accommodation for all children of required school age in the federal district in a short time.

Until recently there was no secondary education in Mexico excepting the schools which prepared for the university; four high schools have been opened recently and are crowded. There is also a federal normal school, housed and equipped in a way equal to any in the world, with five thousand pupils of both sexes, including children in the practice school. A regional normal school for each state is planned. The flourishing National University has ten thousand students, a large number being women; its Rector, Doctor Pruneda, is much interested in exchange of students and teachers, and during a visit to the United States in the coming autumn will arrange for such exchanges with our own country, a consummation which is to be hoped for. As it is, the University maintains, under the direction of Doctor Montaño, a truly unique summer school for North Americans (one learns in a Spanish-American country to temper the arrogance of our ordinary "American"), attended during the past summer by more than three hundred persons, mainly teachers, from the United States.

The most interesting as well as the most important educational development is, however, the rural schools: which means, of course, those for native Indians. This is the cherished preoccupation of the present régime; it signifies a revolution rather than renaissance. It is not only a revolution for Mexico, but in some respects one of the most important social experiments undertaken anywhere in the world. For it marks a deliberate and systematic attempt to incorporate in the social body the Indians who form 80 percent of the total population. Previous to the revolution, this numerically preponderant element was not only neglected, but despised. Those who attack the revolution complacently ignore the fact that it was the inevitable outcome of this policy of contemptuous disregard for the mass of the people, a disregard which affected

every phase of life: educational, for example, since the Diaz administration did not establish a single rural school for Indians. In spite of the difficulty in securing teachers, there are now 2,600 such schools, 1,000 of which were opened during the last year, which it is hoped to raise to 2,000 during the coming year. It is estimated that if ten years of tranquillity are secured, there will be schools for the entire school population, and illiteracy, as far as the new generation is concerned, will be wiped out.

This educational revolution not only represents an effort to incorporate the indigenous population into the social life and intellectual culture of Mexico as a whole, but it is also an indispensable means of political integration for the country. Nothing in Mexico can be understood without bearing in mind that until a few years ago the Indians were economically enslaved, intellectually disinherited and politically eliminated. Even the present church-state crisis roots, at many points, in this fact. Because of the absence of rural schools, the only common force which touched the life of all the people was the church; and it is putting it moderately to say that the influence of the clergy did not make for social and political integration. The fact that the country priests have used their enormous influence over the souls of their parishes to oppose the establishment of rural schools has been at least one factor in causing the drastic decree for the laicizing of all primary schools.

The difficulties in creating a moral and political entity out of Mexico are so enormous that they often seem insuperable; one most readily pictures the general state of the country by thinking of early colonial days in the United States, with a comparatively small number of settlements of a high civilization surrounded by Indian peoples with whom they have but superficial contact. The fact that the Mexican Indians have a settled agricultural life, a much higher culture and greater resistance than our own Indians but increases the difficulty of the situation. Add to this fact that the Indians are anything but homogeneous among themselves, divided into some thirty different tribes, intensely self-centred, jealous of their autonomy,

prizing an isolation which is accentuated by geographical conditions, and we begin to have a faint idea of the problem which the revolutionary government is facing as systematically as all previous régimes dodged it. It is evidence of the still superficial character of our democratic ideas that the average foreign resident in Mexico, including those from the United States, assumes that the problem is incapable of solution, and that the only way out is "strong" oligarchical rule. One might think that the gallant attempt of the revolutionary government would win recognition if but for its gallantry, even from those who think the cause is doomed, but the sporting instinct of the average Anglo-Saxon (happily there are exceptions) appears to be as specialized as is his democratic creed.

Much more interesting than statistics are the spirit and aims which animate these rural schools. Mr. Saenz, the first sub-secretary of education (who once taught in the Lincoln School in New York), stated in a lecture recently at the University of Chicago that "nowhere have I seen better examples of a socialized school than in some of these rural schools in Mexico." I am willing to go further and say that there is no educational movement in the world which exhibits more of the spirit of intimate union of school activities with those of the community than is found in this Mexican development. I have long had a pet idea that "backward" countries have a great chance educationally; that when they once start in the school-road they are less hampered by tradition and institutionalism than are countries where schools are held by customs which have hardened through the years. But I have to confess that I have never found much evidence in support of this belief that new countries, educationally new, can start afresh, with the most enlightened theories and practices of the most educationally advanced countries. The spirit and aims of Indian rural schools as well as of the North School of Mexico revived my faith.

Much of the actual work is, it goes without saying, crude, as crude as are the conditions under which it is done. But it is the crudeness of vitality, of growth, not of smug conventions.

Whether or not it is the uprooting effect of long continued revolutions I do not know; but along with the bad effects of so many and so rapid social dislocations, there is evident everywhere a marked spirit of experimentation, a willingness "to try anything once," and most things more than once. Given the good start which now exists, the great need is continuity of policy, and it is seriously to be hoped that changes of political administration will not lead to abrupt shifts of educational plan.

Neither as to buildings, course of study nor preparation of teachers has the mistake of over-elaborateness been made. Of the thousand federal rural schools opened during the last year almost every one was furnished without cost to the nation by the people of the locality, mainly by the parents who wanted their children to have the opportunities at present denied them. To judge from those which I saw in the state of Tlaxcala, they are mainly old buildings, sometimes churches, sometimes houses, which had been ruined and were restored for school use. In an Indian village not far from Mexico City, the six grades were housed in six different adobe dwelling-houses offered by the parents in lieu of any available building. Every school has a garden attached, and it is characteristic of the æsthetic temperament of the Indian that although the vegetable section may be neglected, the flower garden is sure to be gay and well cared for.

The simplicity of the buildings and the genial climate make for a simple curriculum: reading, writing and, when necessary, the speaking of Spanish as a matter of course; some "figuring," local geography, national history with emphasis upon the heroes of Independence and the Revolution, and then for the remainder, industrial education, chiefly agricultural, and such home industries, weaving, pottery, etc., as are characteristic of the neighborhood. (It is part of the general "socialistic" policy of the present government to foster the development of "small industries," carried on in the home, and coöperatively managed, as an offset to the invasion of large, capitalistic and

therefore for the most part foreign industries.) In many places there is much attention to music and to design in the plastic arts, for both of which things the Indians display a marked genius. As a rule, if what we saw may be depended upon as evidence, the designs in the small rural schools were much better, even though the work was crude, than in the industrial schools of the city, where department store art has made a lamentable invasion. If the rural schools can succeed in preserving the native arts, æsthetic traditions and patterns, protecting them from the influence of machine-made industry, they will in that respect alone render a great service to civilization. Fortunately the influence of Vasconcelos, the former minister of education, and of Doctor Gamio, the distinguished anthropologist, were strongly employed for the maintenance of the indigenous arts and crafts. At the present time the National University has a woman, herself a cultivated musician, constantly occupied in traveling throughout the country collecting the folk-songs, words and music, in which Mexico is rich almost without parallel in contemporary countries.

As for instruction, the leading idea is that any teacher is better than none, provided there is a native man or woman who can read and write and is devoted. For the most part, they receive their professional instruction after they begin teaching. One of the most interesting features of teacher training is the "cultural missions." The "missionaries" (this is their title) go to some country town, gather the rural teachers of the immediate district, and for three weeks the staff gives intensive instruction. The work is not theoretical pedagogy. There is always an instructor in physical training (almost every school in Mexico, no matter how remote, now has a playground and a basketball field). A social worker is present, usually a woman, who gives instruction in hygiene, first aid, vaccination, and the rudiments of the care of children, etc. There are also a teacher of chorus singing, a specialist in hand industries, instructed to employ as far as possible local materials, and finally, a specialist in school organization and

methods of teaching. The task of the latter is, however, chiefly to coördinate the academic teaching of the schools with agricultural and manual industries.

During the last school year, the missionaries worked in six states, and next year's budget carries an increase of half a million pesos for extension of the work. At the same time, the federal bureau is sending small libraries as fast as possible to all schools, and the aim is to make each one the centre of a new life for its neighborhood, intellectual, recreational and economic. Night schools are held in each building, to which come young men and women who are at work during the day; their eagerness to learn is symbolized in the fact that they walk miles to reach the place of instruction, each one bringing a candle by whose glimmering light the studying is done. And the Indian teachers work practically all day and then again in the evening for a wage of four pesos a day.

The ruling educational catch-word is *escuela de acción*. It is a common complaint that the graduates of the former schools have marvelous memories, but no initiative and little independent responsibility. This fact has been cited to me scores of times as a convincing indication of the limits of the mentality of the Mexican. I am sceptical in advance of all such psychological generalizations; as long as pupils were dealing with traditional studies in the traditional way, the material was so isolated from their experience that memory was their sole reliance. Now that "activity"—not always to be sure with adequate organization or intellectual content—is the guiding principle, and the "project method" is all but officially adopted as the basis of the school program, there is sure to be a change. Practice falls short of ideals, and the program is much better executed in some places than in others. But I believe that the brightest spot in the Mexico of to-day is its educational activity. There is vitality, energy, sacrificial devotion, the desire to put into operation what is best approved in contemporary theory, and above all, the will to use whatever is at hand.

We in the United States who have pursued such a different policy with our Indian population are under an obligation to

understand and to sympathize. The policy of incorporating the Indians into modern life is of such extraordinary difficulty, its execution demands so much time, peace and tranquillity, that any action on our part which puts added obstacles in its way is simply criminal. One can sympathize with foreigners in Mexico who find that their legal rights are not assured; yet from the standpoint of business in the long run as well as from that of human development, vested legalities are secondary to the creation of an integrated people. Foreign interference in any and every form means immediate increased instability and this unsettlement means in turn the prolongation of those internal divisions which have been the curse of Mexico; it means a deliberate cultivation of all seeds of turbulence, confusion and chaos.

26. MEXICO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE¹

In common, I imagine, with large numbers of my fellow countrymen, I had long entertained in a vague way the notion that imperialism is a more or less consciously adopted policy. The idea was not clearly formulated, but at the back of my head was the supposition that nations are imperialistic because they want and choose to be, in view of advantages they think will result. A visit to Mexico, a country in which American imperialism is in the making, knocked that notion out of my head. The descent to this particular Avernus is unusually easy. Given, on one hand, a nation that has capital and technical skill, engineering and financial, to export, plus manufacturers in need of raw material, especially iron and oil, and, on the other hand, an industrially backward country with large natural resources and a government which is either inefficient or unstable, or both, and it does not require intention or desire to involve the first nation in imperialistic policies. Even widespread popular desire to the contrary is no serious obstacle. The natural movement of business enterprise, combined with Anglo-American legalistic notions of contracts and their sanctity, and the international custom which obtains as to the duty of a nation to protect the property of its nationals, suffices to bring about imperialistic undertakings.

Imperialism is a result, not a purpose or plan. It can be prevented only by regulating the conditions out of which it proceeds. And one of the things which most stands in the way of taking regulatory measures is precisely the consciousness on the part of the public that it is innocent of imperialistic desires. It feels aggrieved when it is accused of any such purpose, then resentful, and is confusedly hurried into dan-

¹ From *The New Republic*, March 23, 1927; published under the title *Imperialism Is Easy*.

gerous antagonisms, before it perceives what is happening. The charge of imperialistic desires sound strange to the group of men who have created the situation in which they appeal to their home country for intervention. All they want, as they indignantly assert, is protection of life and property. If their own government cannot afford that protection, what is it good for anyway?

In Mexico, and presumably in other Latin-American states, conditions are exacerbated by the extended meaning which has been given the Monroe Doctrine. In this widened meaning it has become one of the chief causes of the growing imperialism of the United States. Investors and concession holders from European countries are estopped from appealing to their own countries for intervention to give them protection. Pressure is consequently brought to bear upon the United States. Unless we act, we are a dog in a manger. We won't do anything ourselves, and we won't let anybody else do anything. Thus the United States has become a kind of trustee for the business interests of other countries. As one consequence, the animosity which might otherwise be distributed among a number of countries is consolidated, and then directed at the United States. About the most promising thing which could happen would be for our people to realize, with vividness, the Spanish-American view of the Monroe Doctrine. We still, for the most part, pat ourselves upon the back complacently for upholding it. We think of it as a benevolent measure for which all Central and South America is, or should be, grateful to us. We do not take into account the change of conditions in these states; their growth in power and national consciousness, which makes them resent being treated as infants under our tutelage. We are not aware of the change in conditions brought about by our development into a nation possessed of enormous capital seeking investment, a fact which makes the countries to the south much more afraid of us than they are of Europe. In consequence, the sacred doctrine has become entangled with all the forces which plunge us into imperialistic dangers.

The average citizen of the United States has little knowledge of the extent of American business and financial interests in Mexico. It does not occur to him that, from the standpoint of intelligent Mexicans, that country is, or was, in great danger of becoming an economic dependency of this country. As things went under the Diaz régime, the Mexicans might have awakened some morning and found their natural resources, agricultural and grazing lands, mines and oil wells, mainly in the hands of foreigners, largely Americans, and managed for the profit of investors from foreign countries. I well remember how one indignant legal representative of American business concessionaires contrasted the present régime with that of Diaz. He said: "Diaz had a standing order that any complaint from any American citizen was to be settled the same day it was made." This was his naïve tribute to the Diaz administration. In contrast with it, the Calles régime naturally appears to Americans with investments as something unspeakable.

I would not say that it gives no cause for legal complaint; I would not say that it does not afford many an occasion for protest. From the Mexican standpoint, the government is fighting for control of its own country, as much as if it were at war, and too scrupulous a regard for legal technicalities might mean defeat. An unusually frank Mexican ex-official said to an American business man: "Of course, we have to handicap you by legislation and administration in every way we can. You are much abler and more experienced in business than we are; if we don't even up some other way, you will soon own the whole country." Such things indicate the ease with which the relations of an industrially advanced and a backward country ultimately drift into situations where the vested legal rights which have grown up are confronted by a vigorous national sentiment, and can hardly be maintained without appeal for governmental intervention.

The ease with which imperialism follows economic exploitation is indicated by the almost unanimous sentiment of Americans resident in Mexico, including those who do not own con-

cessions and who are not directly affected by the new laws. They would deny, and as far as their conscious intent is concerned, deny sincerely, for the most part, any imperialistic taint. What they want is simply "protection" for American rights. Judging from conversations, the objects of their dislike stand in about the following order: in the first rank, they are irritated with Americans having no business interests, who come down there for a few weeks, talk with plausible Mexicans, and, with the usual prejudice against "Wall Street," go away more or less pro-Mexican. Locally, such visitors would be gladly consigned to a lethal chamber. They are said to be completely ignorant, and yet they assume to know more about the right relations between Mexico and the United States than "we do who have lived here many years, and know the facts about the persecution of Americans and the disregard for their rights." President Wilson was not one of this class, but he succeeded in winning the equal dislike of American residents and of Mexicans, of the latter by his action, and of the former by his talk against concessionaires, a talk which "encouraged Mexican Bolshevism."

Next in order comes irritation with the American State Department, based on the fact that while "it is always writing notes, it never does anything." There is little doubt on the Mexican side of the line as to what "doing something" means. Super-patriots, on this side, may suppose that it signifies a show of force such as has taken place in Nicaragua. On the spot, they know that it means not only war and continued guerrilla strife, but taking control of the government, and managing Mexican affairs for a number of years. To be sure, there is the usual pious talk, also quite sincere as far as the consciousness of many Americans is concerned. We should, of course, set up a model of administration, multiply schools, and after we have shown the Mexicans how a state should be managed, should turn it over to them, in good running order. It is not difficult for the American who has been expatriated for a number of years to idealize the honesty and efficiency of our own government, in contrast with the corruption, ineffi-

ciency and, above all, instability, which have obtained in Mexico. The favorite idea, which is even shared, it is rumored, in diplomatic quarters, is that Great Britain and the United States shall unite in this benevolent undertaking. Was this in Mr. Hearst's mind when he made his recent touching appeal for closer coöperation between this country and Great Britain?

An American oil man, who knows his Mexico well, one of the adventurous type which is personally more attractive than the smug legalistic, told us that they did not ask for the support of the State Department; all they wanted was to be let alone. He said, as an indication of how well they could take care of themselves, that at one time all was in readiness for three independent states in Mexico, one including Vera Cruz, another Tampico, and a third the lands in the north, next to the American border, where immigrants from this side had settled. At Tampico, he said, 2,000 American workmen, engaged in the oil industry, were furnished with rifles. There was perhaps some romantic exaggeration in the tale, but there was also a residuum of fact. Of course, these revolutions were not to be undertaken by Americans, but by dissatisfied Mexicans. Unfortunately, the State Department said No.

Third in the order of dislike, as far as talk goes, comes the Calles government.

Below this state of mind, instances of which might be given indefinitely, is the conflict between Anglo-American institutional psychology, especially with reference to charters, contracts and other legal points, and the Spanish-Latin temper. The two mix no better than oil and water, and unfortunately there is no great disposition to discover and use any emulgents. As usually happens with small colonies in a foreign country, the native "Anglo-Saxon" psychology stiffens up, instead of relaxing. The years of civil war, of chaos and destruction, which Mexico has gone through, make it easy for outsiders to maintain an attitude of superiority and aloofness. The supposed principle of international law by which it is the duty, rather than simply the right, of a nation to come to the protection of the rights of its nationals when they are disre-

garded, makes the conflict of interests and of traditions a serious menace to peace. Our constitutional system is an additional source of danger. Congress must be consulted before war can be declared. But the President is the Commander of the Army and Navy, and it is only too easy to create a situation after which the cry "stand by the President," and then "stand by the country," is overwhelming.

Public opinion has spoken with unusual force and promptitude against interference in Mexico. But the causes of the difficulty, the underlying forces which make for imperialistic ventures, are enduring. They will outlast peaceful escape from the present crisis, supposing we do escape. Public sentiment, to be permanently effective, must do more than protest. It must find expression in a permanent change of our habits. For at present, both economic conditions and political arrangements and traditions combine to make imperialism easy. How many American citizens are ready for an official restatement of the Monroe Doctrine? How many are willing to commit the country officially to the statement that American citizens who invest in backward foreign countries do so at their own risk?

27. LENINGRAD GIVES THE CLUE¹

The alteration of Petrograd into Leningrad is without question a symbol, but the mind wavers in deciding of what. At times, it seems to mark a consummation, a kind of completed transmigration of souls. Upon other occasions, one can imagine it a species of mordant irony. For one can picture an enemy of the present régime finding malicious satisfaction in the baptism of this shabby, down-at-heels city with the name of Lenin; its decadent, almost decaying, quality would strike him as sufficient commentary on the Bolshevik claim of having ushered in a new and better world. But one also understands that more than the name of Peter was stamped upon the city which his energetic will evoked. Everything in it speaks of his creative restlessness. Perhaps Peter, the Tsar, was, after all, what he is often called, the First of the Bolsheviks, and Lenin is his true successor and heir.

At all events, in spite of the unkempt town, whose stuccoed walls, with their peeling paint, are a splendid dress in rags, one has the impression of movement, vitality, energy. The people go about as if some mighty and oppressive load had been removed, as if they were newly awakened to the consciousness of released energies. I am told that when Anatole France visited Russia he refused to collect statistics, accumulate data, investigate "conditions." He walked the streets to derive his ideas from the gestures and the faces of the folk. Never having been in the country before, I have no standard of comparison with what was immediately seen. Nevertheless, one has seen the common people of other countries, and I find it impossible to believe that the communicated sense of a new life was an illusion. I am willing to believe what I have

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 14, 1928; this and the succeeding articles on Russia published under the general title *Impressions of Soviet Russia*.

read, that there is a multitude of men and women in Russia who live in immured and depressed misery, just as there is a multitude in exile. But this other multitude that walks the streets, gathers in parks, clubs, theaters, frequents museums, is also a reality, as is their unbowed, unapologetic mien. The idea forces itself upon one that perhaps the first reality is of the past, an incident of a revolution, and the second reality is of the present and future, the essence of the Revolution in its release of courage, energy and confidence in life.

My mind was in a whirl of new impressions in those early days in Leningrad. Readjustment was difficult, and I lived somewhat dazed. But gradually there emerged one definite impression that has stayed with me and has been confirmed by subsequent experiences. I have heard altogether too much about Communism, about the Third International, and altogether too little about the Revolution; too much about the Bolsheviks, even though the final revolution was accomplished by their initiation. I now realize that any student of history ought to be aware that the forces released by revolution are not functions, in any mathematical sense, of the efforts, much less the opinions and hopes, of those who set the train of events in motion. In irritation at not having applied this obvious historic truth to an understanding of what is taking place in Russia, I would have shifted the blame of my misapprehension to others—I felt resentment at those adherents and eulogists as well as critics and enemies who, I felt, had misled me with constant talk and writing about Bolshevism and Communism, leaving me ignorant of the more basic fact of a revolution—one which may be hinted at, but not described, by calling it psychic and moral rather than merely political and economic, a revolution in the attitude of people toward the needs and possibilities of life. In this reaction I am perhaps inclined to underestimate the importance of the theories and expectations which operated to pull the trigger that released suppressed energies. I am still at a loss in trying to formulate the exact importance of the communistic formulæ and the Bolshevik ideals in the present life of the country; but I am in-

clined to think that not only the present state of Communism (that of non-existence in any literal sense), but even its future is of less account than is the fact of this achieved revolution of heart and mind, this liberation of a people to consciousness of themselves as a determining power in the shaping of their ultimate fate.

Such a conclusion may seem absurd. It will certainly be as offensive to those to whom Marxian orthodoxy constitutes the whole significance of the Russian Revolution as to those who have imbibed the conventional notion of Bolshevik Russia. Yet with no desire to minimize the import of the fate of Bolshevik Marxianism for Russia and for the whole world, my conviction is unshaken that this phase of affairs is secondary in importance to something else that can only be termed a revolution. That the existing state of affairs is not Communism but a transition to it; that in the dialectic of history the function of Bolshevism is to annul itself; that the dictatorship of the proletariat is but an aspect of class-war, the anti-thesis to the thesis of the dictatorship of bourgeois capitalism existing in other countries; that it is destined to disappear in a new synthesis, are things the Communists themselves tell us. The present state is one of transition; that fact is so obvious that one has no difficulty in accepting it. That it is necessarily a state of transition to the exact goal prescribed by the Marxian philosophy of history is a tenet that, in face of the new energies that have been aroused, smells of outworn absolutistic metaphysics and bygone theories of straight-line, one-way "evolution."

But there is one impression more vivid than this one. It is, of course, conceivable that Communism in some form may be the issue of the present "transition," slight as are the evidences of its present existence. But the feeling is forced upon one that, if it does finally emerge, it will not be because of the elaborate and now stereotyped formulæ of Marxian philosophy, but because something of that sort is congenial to a people that a revolution has awakened to themselves, and that it will emerge in a form dictated by their own desires. If it fails,

it will fail because energies the Revolution has aroused are too spontaneous to accommodate themselves to formulæ framed on the basis of conditions that are irrelevant—except on the supposition of a single and necessary “law” of historical change.

In any case, Communism, if one judges from impressions that lie on the surface in Leningrad, lies in some remote future. It is not merely that even the leaders regard the present status as only an initial step, hardly complete even as a first step, but that the prevailing economy is so distinctly a money economy to all outward appearances. We used to speculate what would have been our impression if we had arrived in Leningrad with no knowledge of past events and no antecedent expectations as to its economic status. It was, of course, impossible to denude the mind sufficiently of prior prepossessions to answer the query. But I had a strong feeling that, while I should have been conscious of a real psychological and moral difference from the rest of the world, the economic scene would not have seemed especially unlike that of any European country that has not yet recovered from the impoverishment of war, foreign and civil, blockade and famine.

At first, the impression was one of poverty, though not of dire want; rather a feeling that perhaps there was something to be said for all being poor alike, as if the only communism were that of sharing a common lot. But it did not require much time to enable the eye to make distinctions. One readily discriminated, by means of attire and bearing, at least four classes, or perhaps one should say grades, of the kind one meets in any large city of the world. The extremes are not so marked, especially on the side of luxury and display. The classes shade into one another more than one would find to be the case in New York or London. But the distinctions are there. Although fairly long lines are seen waiting at some shops, especially where food is sold, there are no marked signs of distress; the people are well nourished; theaters, restaurants, parks and places of amusement are thronged—and their prices are not cheap. The store windows are filled with the same kind of goods one sees anywhere—though usually of the

quality associated with cheap bazaars—children's toys and cheap jewelry drawing the larger crowds at the windows, here as elsewhere. What money there is—and, as I have said, in quality if not quantity there is a purely money economy—is evidently in easy circulation.

I have confined myself to the impressions of the early days, at least to those which subsequent events deepened and confirmed, and to impressions that came directly and upon the surface, unaffected by questions, explanations and discussion. Special knowledge, gained later by more definite inquiry, put some of the earlier impressions in a modified light. Thus one learned that the chief reason why people spend money so freely, and on amusements as well as necessities, is because the entire political control is directed against personal accumulation, so that money counts as a means of direct and present enjoyment, not as a tool of future action. Similarly, as one goes below the surface, one's first impressions of the similarity of the economic system to that of any impoverished country is modified by knowledge that, while the régime is distinctly capitalistic, it is one of government rather than private capitalism. Yet these subsequent modifications converted impressions into ideas rather than annulled the first impressions themselves. The net result for me was that a definite reversal of perspective in preconceptions was effected. The sense of a vast human revolution that has brought with it—or rather that consists of—an outburst of vitality, courage, confidence in life has come to the front. The notion that the Revolution is essentially economic and industrial has in the same degree moved to the background—not that it is, even as far as it has already gone, insignificant, but that it now appears, not as the cause of the human, the psychological, revolution, but as an incident of it. Possibly it is only because of dullness that I did not reason out this conclusion at home. Looking back and judging in the light of history, it is perhaps just what one should have expected. But since the clamor of economic emphasis, coming, as I have said, from both defenders and enemies of the Bolshevik scheme, may have confused others as it

certainly confused me, I can hardly do better than record the impression, as overwhelming as it was unexpected, that the outstanding fact in Russia is a revolution, involving a release of human powers on such an unprecedented scale that it is of incalculable significance not only for that country, but for the world.¹

¹ Comments made since the original appearance of these sentences have shown me that my remarks upon the subordinate character of the economic phase of the revolution are too sweeping. I should not think of denying that the political aspect of the economic revolution in elevating labor, especially the interests of the factory workers, from the bottom of the social scale to the top is an integral factor in the psychological and moral transformation.—J. D.

28. A COUNTRY IN A STATE OF FLUX¹

I have tried to give some account of the total feeling aroused in me by the face of Russian life as I saw it in Leningrad. It ought to be easier (and probably more instructive) to forego the attempt to convey a single inclusive impression, in order to record, in separate fashion, ideas or emotions aroused by this or that particular contact. But the accomplishment of this latter task is made difficult by the fact that, without a prolonged stay, wide contacts and a knowledge of the language, accurate information is hard to come by. One gets about as many views as there are persons one converses with, even about things that might be supposed to be matters of fact; or else one finds questions evaded in an embarrassed way. (For some reason, this latter statement is much truer of experiences in Leningrad than in Moscow. Some things mentioned only in a whisper in the former city were loudly proclaimed in the latter; the atmosphere of avoidance changed to that of welcoming discussion. I do not know why this should have been so, but perhaps the pall of the past with its ruthlessness still hangs over one city, while the energy that looks to the future is centered in the other.)

For example, although one's chief concern is not with economic conditions, one naturally has a certain curiosity about that aspect of affairs, and asks questions. Here are a multitude of shops, selling to customers, to all appearances, for money and a money profit like similar shops in other parts of the world. How are they stocked and managed? How many are government-owned; how many are coöperative and what is the relation of the coöperative undertakings to the State? How many are private enterprises? How is honest public accountability secured? What is the technique for regulat-

¹ From *The New Republic*, Nov. 21, 1928.

ing the temptation to profiteer on the side? The questions seem natural and innocent. But it was not easy to find their answers, nor did the answers, when given, agree very well with one another. In part, the explanation is simple enough; I did not apply to persons who were sufficiently interested to be well informed; any traveler knows how easy it is anywhere in the world to amass misinformation. But along with this fact and behind it there was a cause that seems to me of general significance, one that should be known and reckoned with in any attempt at appraisal of Russian affairs. Its nature may be illustrated by an answer that was often given me at first in reply to questions about the nature of coöperative stores; namely, that they were in effect merely government shops under another name. Later on, through access to more authoritative sources, I learned that the fact of the case was quite to the contrary; not only has the coöperative movement grown eight-fold since its very promising beginnings before the War, but its management is primarily of the autonomous, classic Rochdale type.¹ From a certain point of view, perhaps one more important than that which I entertained during my visit, a report upon the development and prospects of coöperative undertakings in present-day Russia would be more significant than anything I have to say. But I am not an economist, and my purpose in alluding to this matter is not that of giving economic information. What I learned from my experience in this matter (rendered typical by a variety of similar experiences) is the necessity of giving an exact dating to every statement made about conditions in Soviet Russia. For there is every reason to believe that the misinformation I received about the status of coöperative undertakings in Russia was not only honestly given, but was based on recollection of conditions that obtained several years ago. For there was a time when the whole industrial structure of Russia was so disorganized, from the World War, the blockade and civil war, that the government practically took over the management of

¹ This refers to the internal management of the coöperatives. Ultimate price-control is of course in the hands of the government.—J. D.

the coöperatives. (Even of this period it is important to know that the latter jealously safeguarded in legal form their autonomy by formally voting, as if they were their own independent decisions, the measures forced upon them by the government.) This state of affairs no longer exists: on the contrary, the free and democratically conducted coöperative movement has assumed a new vitality—subject, of course, to control of prices by the State. But ideas and beliefs formed during that period got into circulation and persist. Were I not convinced that the instance is typical, so typical that a large part of what passes for knowledge about Soviet Russia is in fact only reminiscence of what was the condition at some time during some phase of affairs, I should not dwell upon it at such length.

This necessity for exact dating of every statement made about Russian conditions, if one is to have any criterion of its value, is indicative of a fact—or a force—that to my mind is much more significant than most of the “facts”—even when they are really facts—that are most widely diffused. For they indicate the extent to which Russia is in a state of flux, of rapid alterations, even oscillations. If I learned nothing else, I learned to be immensely suspicious of all generalized views about Russia; even if they accord with the state of affairs in 1922 or 1925, they may have little relevancy to 1928, and perhaps be of only antiquarian meaning by 1933. As foreigners resident in the country frequently put it to me, Russia lives in all its internal problems and policies from hand to mouth; only in foreign politics is there consistency and unity. In the mouths of those sympathetic with what is going on in Russia, the formula had a commendatory implication; the flux was a sign that those who are managing affairs have an attitude of realistic adaptation to actual conditions and needs. In the mouths of the unsympathetic, the phrase implied incapacity on the part of the rulers, in that they had no fixed mind of their own, even on important matters. But the fact of change, whether favorably or unfavorably interpreted, remained outstanding and unchallenged. In view

of current notions (which I confess I shared before my visit) about the rigidity of affairs in Russia, I am convinced that this fact of change and flux needs all the emphasis that can possibly be given it.

While my preconception as to the rigidity of affairs in Russia was the one which turned out most contrary to facts, it may not be one that is widely shared. But there are other preconceptions—most of which I am happy to say I did not share—which seem after a visit even more absurd. One of them is indicated by the question so often asked both before and after the visit: How did the party dare to go to Russia?—as if life there were rude, disorderly and insecure. One hesitates to speak of this notion to an intelligent public, but I have found it so widely current that I am sure that testimony to the orderly and safe character of life in Russia would be met with incredulity by much more than half of the European as well as the American public. In spite of secret police, inquisitions, arrests and deportations of *Nepmen* and *Kulaks*, exiling of party opponents—including divergent elements in the party—life for the masses goes on with regularity, safety and decorum. If I wished to be invidious, I could mention other countries in Eastern Europe in which it is much more annoying to travel. There is no country in Europe in which the external routine of life is more settled and secure. Even the “wild children” who have formed the staple of so many tales have now disappeared from the streets of the large cities.

Another warning that appears humorous in retrospect is that so often given by kindly friends, against being fooled by being taken to see show places. It is hard to exercise imagination in one environment about conditions in a remote and strange country; but it now seems as if it would not have required great imagination to realize that the Russians had enough to do on their own account without bothering to set up show establishments to impress a few hundred—or even thousand—tourists. The places and institutions that were “shown” us—and the Leningrad Society for Cultural Relations had prepared a most interesting program of sight-seeing—were show-

places in the sense that they were well worthy of being shown. I hope they were the best of their kind, so as to be representative of what the new régime is trying to do; there is enough mediocrity everywhere without traveling thousands of miles to see it. But they exist for themselves, either because of historic conditions, like the old palaces and treasures, or because of present urgent needs. Some of the resorts for workers' vacation periods on the island in the Neva River had a somewhat perfunctory air; the old palatial residence, now used as a workers' summer clubhouse, seemed to have no special active functions. The much advertised "Wall-newspaper" seemed, when its contents were translated, much like what would elsewhere have been less ambitiously called a bulletin board. But such episodes only brought out by contrast the vitality of other institutions, and the gay spontaneity of the "Wall-newspapers" in the children's colonies and homes.

Of the "sights" contained in the official program, the one enduringly impressed in memory is a visit to a children's colony in a former Grand Duke's summer palace in Peterhof—up the Neva from Leningrad. The place marks the nearest approach of the White Armies to Leningrad; the buildings were more or less ruined in the warfare, and are not yet wholly restored, since the teachers and children must do the work; there is still need in some quarters for hot water and whitewash. Two-thirds of the children are former "wild children," orphans, refugees, etc., taken from the streets. There is nothing surprising, not to say unique, in the existence of orphan asylums. I do not cite the presence of this one as evidence of any special care taken of the young by the Bolshevik government. But taken as evidence of the native capacity of the Russian stock, it was more impressive than my command of words permits me to record. I have never seen anywhere in the world such a large proportion of intelligent, happy, and intelligently occupied children. They were not lined up for inspection. We walked about the grounds and found them engaged in their various summer occupations, gardening, bee-keeping, repairing buildings, growing flowers in a conservatory (built and now

managed by a group of particularly tough boys who began by destroying everything in sight), making simple tools and agricultural implements, etc. Not what they were doing, but their manner and attitude is, however, what stays with me—I cannot convey it; I lack the necessary literary skill. But the net impression will always remain. If the children had come from the most advantageously situated families, the scene would have been a remarkable one, unprecedented in my experience. When their almost unimaginable earlier history and background were taken into account, the effect was to leave me with the profoundest admiration for the capacities of the people from which they sprang, and an unshakable belief in what they can accomplish. I am aware that there is a marked disproportion between the breadth of my conclusion and the narrowness of the experience upon which it rests. But the latter did not remain isolated; though it never recurred in the same fullness, it was renewed in every institution of children and youth which I visited. And in any case, I feel bound to let the statement stand; its seemingly exaggerated quality will at least testify to the depth of the impression I received of the intrinsic capacity of the Russian people, of the release the Revolution has effected, of the intelligence and sympathetic art with which the new conditions are being taken advantage of educationally by some of the wisest and most devoted men and women it has ever been my fortune to meet.

Since I am dealing only with impressions received at first hand and not with information proceeding from systematic inquiries, I shall conclude with selecting two other impressions, each of which happened to arise apart from any official guidance. The hours of several days of leisure time before the arrival of the party of fellow American educators in Leningrad were spent in the Hermitage. Of this museum as a treasure house of European painting it is unnecessary to speak. Not so of the human visitors, groups of peasants, working men, grown men and women much more than youth, who came in bands of from thirty to fifty, each with a leader eager and alert. Every day we met these bands, twenty or thirty different ones. The

like of it is not to be seen anywhere else in the world. And this experience was not isolated. It was repeated in every museum, artistic, scientific, historical, we visited. The wondering question that arose in me the first day, whether there was not a phase of the Revolution, and a most important one, which had not before dawned upon me, became, as time went on, almost an obsession. Perhaps the most significant thing in Russia, after all, is not the effort at economic transformation, but the will to use an economic change as the means of developing a popular cultivation, especially an esthetic one, such as the world has never known.

I can easily imagine the incredulity such a statement arouses in the minds of those fed only by accounts of destructive Bolshevik activities. But I am bound in honesty to record the *bouleversement* of the popular foreign impression which took place in my own case. This new educative struggle may not succeed; it has to face enormous obstacles; it has been too much infected with propagandist tendencies. But in my opinion the latter will gradually die of inanition in the degree in which Soviet Russia feels free and secure in working out its own destiny. The main effort is nobly heroic, evincing a faith in human nature which is democratic beyond the ambitions of the democracies of the past.

The other impression I would record came from a non-official visit to a House of Popular Culture. Here was a fine new building in the factory quarter, surrounded by recreation grounds, provided with one large theater, four smaller assembly halls, fifty rooms for club meetings, recreation and games, headquarters for trade unions, costing two million dollars, frequented daily—or rather, nightly—by five thousand persons as a daily average. Built and controlled, perhaps, by the government? No, but by the voluntary efforts of the trade unions, who tax themselves two percent of their wages to afford their collective life these facilities. The House is staffed and managed by its own elected officers. The contrast with the comparative inactivity of our own working men and with the quasi-philanthropic quality of similar enterprises in my own

country left a painful impression. It is true that this House—there is already another similar one in Leningrad—has no intrinsic and necessary connection with communistic theory and practice. The like of it, *might* exist in any large modern industrial center. But there is the fact that the like of it does *not* exist in the other and more highly developed industrial centers. There it is in Leningrad, as it is not there in Chicago or New York;¹ and there it is in a society supposedly rigidly managed by the State on the basis of dogmatic theory, as an evidence of the vitality of organized voluntary initiative and coöperative effort. What does this mean? If I knew the answer, perhaps I should have the beginning of an understanding of what is really going on in Soviet Russia.

¹ The Amalgamated Center in Chicago should perhaps be excepted.—J. D.

29. A NEW WORLD IN THE MAKING¹

Two remarks were frequently heard in Leningrad. One was that that city was an outpost of Europe, rather than truly Russian; the other was that Moscow is authentic Russia and is semi-oriental. I should not venture to put my brief experience against these statements, but it may be of some use to tell wherein it differed. Leningrad, while in no sense oriental, hardly struck me as European and present-day Moscow, at least, appeared ultra-western. As to the first city, its architects were indeed imported from Italy, and perhaps intended to reproduce a European city. But if so, the spirit of the place entered their minds and took control of their hands and they constructed something of which they had no prescience. And the *genius loci*, the lustrous sky, the illimitable horizon, the extravagant and tempestuous climate, did not remind me of any Europe previously known. As to Moscow, while there is something semi-oriental in its physical structure and while orientals throng portions of the city, its psychic aspect and figure are far from what is associated with the slow-moving and ancient East. For in spirit and intent, Moscow is new, nervously active, mobile; newer, it seemed to me, than any city in our own country, even than a frontier town.

Of the two cities, it was Leningrad that seemed ancient. Of course, history tells a different story, and if I were writing as an historian or antiquarian, I should speak differently. But if one takes Moscow immediately, as it presents itself to the eye and communicates itself to the nerves, it is a place of constant, restless movement, to the point of tension, which imparts the sense of a creative energy that is concerned only with the future. In contrast, Leningrad speaks, even mournfully, of the past. We all know a certain legend appropriate to the lips

¹ From *The Republic*, Nov. 21, 1928.

and pen of the European visitor to America: here is a land inhabited by a strangely young folk, with the buoyancy, energy, naïveté and immaturity of youth and inexperience. That is the way Moscow impressed me, and very much more so than my own country. There, indeed, was a life full of hope, of confidence, almost hyperactive, naïve at times and on some subjects incredibly so, having the courage that achieves much because it springs from that ignorance of youth that is not held back by fears born from too many memories. Freed from the load of subjection to the past, it seems charged with the ardor of creating a new world. At one point the comparison fails. Running through the *élan*, there is a tempering sense of the infinite difficulty of the task which had been undertaken (I speak of the educational leaders with whom alone we had contact). It cannot be said that they are depressed, but they appear, along with all their hopeful enthusiasm, as if borne on contending currents that make it uncertain whether they will come to the port they envisage, or be overwhelmed. The union of spontaneity and humor with fundamental seriousness may or may not be a Russian trait; it certainly marked the men and women who are carrying the load of creating, by means of education, a new mentality in the Russian people.

Our stay in Moscow thus differed markedly from the Leningrad visit. The latter was more of the nature of sightseeing carried on under most favorable auspices, leaving us to form our own ideas from what we saw and had contact with. But Moscow is more than a political center. It is the heart of the energies that go pulsing throughout all Russia, that Russia which includes so much of Asia as well as of Europe. Hence it was that in Moscow one had the feeling as one visited various institutions that one was coming into intimate contact, almost a vicarious share, in a creative labor, in a world in the making. It was as if, after having seen in Leningrad monuments of the past and some products of the present, we were now suddenly let into the operative process itself. Naturally the new experience modified as well as deepened the Leningrad

impressions that I have already recorded. The deepening was of the sense of energy and vigor released by the Revolution; the modification was a sense of the planned constructive endeavor which the new régime is giving this liberated energy.

I am only too conscious, as I write, how strangely fantastic the idea of hope and creation in connection with Bolshevik Russia must appear to those whose beliefs about it were fixed, not to be changed, some seven or eight years ago. I certainly was not prepared for what I saw; it came as a shock. The question that has most often been asked me (along with the question whether there is any freedom there), is whether there is anything constructive going on. The currency of the question indicated the hold that the reports of the destructive character of Bolshevism still have upon the public imagination, and perhaps increases the obligation incumbent upon one who has experienced a different face to events, to record the effect of that experience. So, before speaking of the more positively significant aspect of constructive effort, it may be worth while to say (what, indeed, so many visitors have already stated) that in the great cities, what impresses one is the conserving, rather than the destructive, character of the Revolution. There is much more in the England that has come to us from Henry the Eighth of the sort that is associated with Bolshevik rage than there is in Moscow and Leningrad. Having just come from England and with the memories of ruin and vandalism fresh in mind, I often wished that there might be prepared for the special benefit of the die-hard Anglo-Saxon mind (which is American as well as British) an inventory of the comparative destruction of art and architecture in the revolutions of the two countries. One positive sign of interest in conservation is the enormous enlargement and multiplication of museums that has occurred in Russia. For the establishment of museums and the pious care of historic and artistic treasures are not the sort of thing that prevails where the spirit of destruction is supreme. There are now almost a hundred museums in Moscow alone, and through the country, in provincial towns, they have multiplied under the present régime.

more than five times, while the efforts to render their treasures accessible and useful to the people have kept pace with the numerical increase.

Contrary, again, to the popular myth, this work of conservation has included the temples of the Orthodox Church and their art treasures. All that has been said of the anti-clerical and atheistic tendencies of the Bolshevik is true enough. But the churches and their contents that were of artistic worth are not only intact, but taken care of with scrupulous and even scientific zeal. It is true that many have been converted into museums, but to all appearances there are still enough to meet the needs of would-be worshipers. The collections of ikons in museums in Leningrad and Moscow are an experience which repays the lover of art for a voyage to these cities. In the Kremlin the aid of experts, antiquarians, scholars of history, chemists has been enlisted in beginning the work of highly important restoration. There was, indeed, a "restoration," of the type with which one is too familiar, undertaken in the old régime; the lovely primitives of the frescoes were, for example, gaudily repainted by "artists" of a higher-grade house-painting sort. This work is now undoing; meretricious ornaments, the product of a combination of superstition, too much money and execrable taste, are stripped off. When the work is completed, the Bolshevik régime, in spite of seemingly more urgent demands on time and money, will have recovered in its pristine charm one of the great historic monuments of the world.

Were it not for the popular impression of Bolshevik Russia as given over to mad destructiveness, such things would perhaps be worthy only of passing note. But as things stand, they take on a significance which is typical. They are symbolic not only of constructive activity, but of the direction in which, to my mind, this work of construction is vital: the formation of a popular culture impregnated with esthetic quality. It is no accident that Lunacharsky, to whom, most of all, the careful conservation of the historic and artistic treasures of Russia is due, is the Commissar of Education. For while a

revival of interest in artistic production, literary, musical, plastic, is characteristic of progressive schools all over the world, there is no country, unless it be possibly Mexico, where the esthetic aim and quality so dominates all things educational as in Russia to-day. It pervades not only the schools, but that which, for the lack of a better word, one must call "adult education"—ludicrously insufficient as is that term, in the meaning it derives from activities in our own country, to convey the organized widespread diffusion and expansion taking place in the country of "destructive" Bolshevism. There is a peculiar tone of irony that hangs over all the preconceptions about Russia that one finds current, and which one has come unconsciously more or less to share. But perhaps the contrast between the popular notion of universal absorption in materialistic economy and the actual facts of devotion to creation of living art and to universal participation in the processes and the products of art strikes the ironic note most intensely.

I write, as perhaps I should remind the reader more frequently, from the angle of educational endeavor; I can speak of Russia with any degree of confidence only as the animating purpose and life of that country are reflected in its educational leaders and the work they are attempting. The reader will naturally ask a question which I have often addressed to myself: How far is the impression gained in this particular reflection a just one with reference to the spirit and aim of Soviet Russia as a whole? That one gets from this particular point of view an idea of that spirit and aim in its best and most attractive, because most constructive, aspect, I freely recognize. But while conceding that the picture formed in this particular reflection is purer and clearer than one could or would get from studying the political or the economic phases of life, I must also record my conviction that it is fundamentally a truer picture as well. It is, of course, impossible for me to cite objective evidence that would justify the reader in sharing this conviction. I may, however, indicate the nature of the grounds upon which there gradually grew up in my own

mind the belief that one can appreciate the inner meaning of the new Russian life more intimately and justly by contact with educational effort than with specific political and industrial conditions.

Some of the grounds may be classed as negative: the failure of what I have read, when written from an exclusively political and economic point of view, to convey a sense of reality in comparison with what was personally felt and seen from the educational side. The books contain, some of them, much more information than I shall ever possess; they are written, some of them, by men who know the Russian language and who have had wide contacts. If, then, I indulge in the presumption of trusting my own impressions rather than their reports in some vital matters, it is not because I think they have—again, some of them—wilfully falsified; nor, indeed, because of what they say, but rather because of what they do not say, what they have left out, and which I am sure is there. Consequently, these works affect me as marked by a certain vacuity, an emptiness due to an insensitiveness to what is most vitally significant. They present static cross-sections isolated from the movement which alone gives them meaning.

These remarks are doubtless too indefinite, too much at large, to be illuminating. Possibly they may gain definiteness by reference to a particular book, and I select Kalgren's *Bolshevist Russia*. There is no doubt of the competency of the author's knowledge of the language, or his assiduity in collecting data; I do not question the honesty of his aims; the authenticity of most of his material is vouched for by the fact that it is derived from Bolshevik sources. Why not, then, accept his almost wholly unfavorable conclusions? In part because the book does not sufficiently date its material; it does not indicate the special context of time and conditions under which the evils reported occurred. But in greater part because I fail utterly to get from the book the sense of the quality of moving events which contact with these events gives. In consequence, admitting that all of the evils complained of existed at some time and place, and that many of them still exist, the

total effect is dead, empty, evacuated of vital significance. Take, as one instance, the very fact that Bolshevik sources are themselves drawn upon for the mass of damning facts. The net effect of this material is one thing when taken by itself, as a pile of ultimate isolated facts which are self-explanatory. It is quite another thing when taken as evidence of a characteristic tendency. For when one looks for some positive and ruling endeavor with which the collection and publication of this condemnatory data is connected, one finds himself in the presence of a deliberate and systematic effort at exploration and self-examination which is unparalleled in other countries. And in turn one finds this movement to be connected with a belief in the reality of a science of society, as a basis for diagnosis of social ills and projection of constructive change. One may not believe in the alleged "science," but disbelief does not alter the fact that one gets a dead and distorted idea from the report of isolated facts, however authentic, until they have been brought into relation with the intellectual movement of self-criticism of which they are a part.

The positive reason for attaching primary significance to this intellectual movement, and for thinking of it as educational, is the fact that by the necessities of the case the central problem of the Soviet leaders is the production of a new mentality, a new "ideology," to employ one of the three or four words that one hears the most frequently. There can be no doubt of the tenacity with which the dogma of "economic determinism" is held to it; it is an article of faith that the content and temper of ideas and beliefs which currently prevail are fixed by economic institutions and processes. But it is not true that the prevalent Marxian economic materialism denies efficacy to ideas and beliefs—to the current "ideology," whatever that is. On the contrary, it is held that, while originally this is an effect of economic causes, it becomes in time itself a secondary cause which operates "reciprocally." Hence, from the Communist standpoint, the problem is not only that of replacing capitalistic by collectivistic economic institutions, but also one of substituting a collective mentality for the indi-

vidualistic psychology inherited from the "*bourjui*" epoch—a psychology which is still ingrained in most of the peasants and most of the intellectuals as well as in the trading class itself. Thus the movement is caught in a circular predicament, only it would be officially described as an instance and proof of "dialectic." *Ultimate* popular ideology is to be determined by communistic institutions; but meantime the success of their efforts to introduce these institutions is dependent upon ability to create a new mentality, a new psychological attitude. And obviously this latter problem is essentially one of education. It accounts for the extraordinary importance assumed in the present phase of Russian life by educational agencies. And in accounting for their importance, it enables one to use them as a magnifying glass of great penetrating power by which to read the spirit of events in their constructive phase.

An incidental confirmation of the central position, during the present state of "transition," of educational agencies is the omnipresence of propaganda. The present age is, of course, everywhere one in which propaganda has assumed the rôle of a governing power. But nowhere else in the world is employment of it as a tool of control so constant, consistent and systematic as in Russia at present. Indeed, it has taken on such importance and social dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in another social medium, the correct meaning. For we instinctively associate propaganda with the accomplishing of some special ends, more or less private to a particular class or group, and correspondingly concealed from others. But in Russia the propaganda is in behalf of a burning public faith. One may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in the object of their faith, but their sincerity is beyond question. To them the end for which propaganda is employed is not a private or even a class gain, but is the universal good of universal humanity. In consequence, propaganda is education and education is propaganda. They are more than confounded; they are identified.

When I speak, then, of educational agencies, I mean something much wider than the operation of the school system.

Of the latter as such, I hope to write something later. But here I am concerned with it only as a part of the evidence that the essential constructive work of present-day—or “transitional”—Russia is intrinsically educational. In this particular aspect, the work of the schools finds its meaning expressed in words one often hears: “Nothing can be done with the older generation as a whole. Its ‘ideology’ was fixed by the older régime; we can only wait for them to die. Our positive hope is in the younger generation.” But the office of the schools in creating a new “ideology” cannot be understood in isolation; it is part of a “reciprocal” operation. Political and economic changes and measures are themselves, during the present period, essentially educational; they are conceived of not only as preparing the external conditions for an ulterior Communistic régime, but even more as creating an atmosphere, an environment, favorable to a collectivistic mentality. The mass of the people is to learn the meaning of Communism not so much by induction into Marxian doctrines—although there is plenty of that in the schools—but by what is done for the mass in freeing their life, in giving them a sense of security, safety, in opening to them access to recreation, leisure, new enjoyments and new cultivations of all sorts. The most effective propaganda, as the most effective education, is found to be that of deeds which raise the level of popular life, making it fuller and richer, while associating the gains as indissolubly as possible with a “collective” mentality.

I may perhaps best sum up the difference between my Leningrad and Moscow impressions by saying that in the latter place the notion of the present as a “transition” took on a new significance. My feeling when I left Leningrad, put baldly, was that the Revolution was a great success, while Communism was a frost. My experience in Moscow did not alter the latter impression to the extent of convincing me that there is in practice any more actual Communism than I had supposed that there was. But those experiences convinced me that there is an enormous constructive effort taking place in the creation of a new collective mentality; a new morality I should call it,

were it not for the aversion of Soviet leaders to all moral terminology; and that this endeavor is actually succeeding to a considerable degree—to just what extent, I cannot, of course, measure.

Thus the "transition" appears to be in considerable degree a fact. Towards what it is a transition seems to me, however, a still wholly undetermined matter. To the orthodox Marxian, the goal is, of course, certain; it is just the Communistic institutions his special philosophy of history requires. But personally, I am strongly of the impression that the more successful are the efforts to create a new mentality and a new morality of a coöperative social type, the more dubious is the nature of the goal that will be attained. For, I am wholly inclined to believe, this new attitude of mind, in just the degree in which it is really new and revolutionary, will create its own future society according to its own desires and purposes. This future society will undoubtedly be highly unlike the régime characteristic of the western world of private capital and individual profit. But I think the chances are that it will be equally unlike the society which orthodox Marxian formulæ call for.

I hope the tone of what I have written makes it clear that I am dealing with impressions rather than with matters capable of any objective proof. I can readily understand that I may put a higher estimate on the value and validity of my personal impressions than I can expect any one else to do. But even if my impressions are not only inadequate, which they are sure to be, but also quite wrong, I feel bound to record the one impression which my contacts in Moscow wrote most indelibly in my mind: the final significance of what is taking place in Russia is not to be grasped in political or economic terms, but is found in change, of incalculable importance, in the mental and moral disposition of a people, an educational transformation. This impression, I fear, deviates widely from the belief of both the devotees and the enemies of the Bolshevik régime. But it is stamped in my mind and I must record it for what it is.

30. WHAT ARE THE RUSSIAN SCHOOLS DOING? ¹

I have just given some reasons for believing that in the "transitional" state of Russia chief significance attaches to the mental and moral (*pace* the Marxians) change that is taking place; that while in the end this transformation is supposed to be a means to economic and political change, for the present it is the other way around. This consideration is equivalent to saying that the import of all institutions is educational in the broad sense—that of their effects upon disposition and attitude. Their function is to create habits so that persons will act coöperatively and collectively as readily as now in capitalistic countries they act "individualistically." The same consideration defines the importance and the purpose of the narrower educational agencies, the schools. They represent a direct and concentrated effort to obtain the effect which other institutions develop in a diffused and roundabout manner. The schools are, in current phrase, the "ideological arm of the Revolution." In consequence, the activities of the schools dovetail in the most extraordinary way, both in administrative organization and in aim and spirit, into all other social agencies and interests.

The connection that exists in the minds of Soviet educators between the formation of attitudes and dispositions by domestic, industrial and political institutions and by the school may perhaps be indicated by reference to the account given, by one of the leaders of the new education, of his own development. His efforts at educational reform date back to the early years of this century, when he joined with a fellow Russian (who had been connected with the University Settlement in New York City) in conducting a social settlement in the working men's quarter in Moscow. Naturally they were compelled

¹ From *The New Republic*, Dec. 5, 1928.

to operate along non-political lines and in the neutral fields of children's clubs, recreation, health, etc.; in fact, in the familiar fields of our own settlements of the distinctively philanthropic type. Even so, they met with constant opposition and embarrassment from the old régime. For example, the educator who told this story was one of the first to introduce football into Russia; in consequence, he spent several months in jail. For the authorities were convinced that there could be only one object in playing the game: namely, to train young men so that they could throw bombs more accurately! (Incidentally, I may remark that the spread of sports and games is one of the characteristic features of existing social life; one Sunday afternoon, for example, we attended a trotting match sponsored by the horse-breeding department of the government commissariat of agriculture, and a soccer match, each having an audience of fifteen to twenty thousand persons.) In 1911, wishing a broader field, he started an educational experimental station in the country, some eighty or a hundred miles distant from Moscow, getting assistance from well-to-do Russians of liberal temper. This school, so I was informed, was based on a combination of Tolstoy's version of Rousseau's doctrine of freedom and the idea of the educational value of productive work derived from American sources.

The story thus far is of some historical significance in indicating some of the causal factors in the present Soviet educational system. But its chief value depends upon a further development; especially the effect upon the minds of educational reformers of the constant opposition of established authority to even the most moderate and non-political efforts at educational reform and amelioration of the condition of the working population. The educator of whom I am speaking began as a liberal reformer, not a radical but a constitutional democrat. He worked in the faith and hope that the school, through giving a new type of education, might peacefully and gradually produce the required transformations in other institutions. His pilgrim's progress from reforming pedagogue to convinced communist affords a symbol of the social phase of the entire

Soviet educational movement. In the first place, there was the striking and unescapable fact that those reforming and progressive endeavors which were hampered in every possible way by the Tsar's régime were actively and officially promoted by the Bolshevik régime, a fact that certainly influenced many liberal intellectuals to lend their coöperation to the Bolshevik government. One of them, not a party member, told me that he thought those intellectuals who had refused to coöperate wherever they could with the new government had made a tragic mistake; they had nullified their own power and had deprived Russia of assistance just when it was most needed. As for himself, he had found that the present government cleared the way for just the causes he had had at heart in the old régime, and whose progress had always been hopelessly compromised by its opposition; and that, although he was not a communist, he found his advice and even his criticism welcomed, as soon as the authorities recognized that he was sincerely trying to coöperate. And I may add that, while my experience was limited, I saw liberal intellectuals who had pursued both the policy he deplored and the one he recommended. There is no more unhappy and futile class on earth than the first, and none more fully alive and happy—in spite of narrowly restricted economic conditions, living quarters, salaries, etc.—than the second.

This first consideration, the almost unimaginable contrast between the career and fate of social aspirations under the old régime and under the Soviet government, is something to which I, at least, had not given due weight in my prior estimates of Bolshevik Russia. And I imagine there are many who, while they are aware in a general way of the repressive and despotic character of the Tsar's government, unconsciously form their appraisal of the present Russian system by putting it in contrast with an imaginary democratic system. They forget that for the Russian millions the contrast is with the system of which alone they have had actual experience. The Russian system of government at the present time is like that

to which the population has been accustomed for centuries, namely, a personal system; like the old system, it has many repressive traits. But viewed in the only way which the experience of the masses makes possible for them, it is one that has opened to them doors that were formerly shut and bolted; it is as interested in giving them access to sources of happiness as the only other government with which they have any acquaintance was to keep them in misery. This fact, and not that of espionage and police restriction, however excessive the latter may be, explains the stability of the present government, in spite of the comparatively small number of communists in the country. It relegates to the realm of pure fantasy those policies for dealing with Russia that are based on the notion that the present government is bound to fall from internal causes if only it can be sufficiently boycotted and isolated externally. I know of nothing that is more indicative of the state of illusion in which it is possible for isolated groups to live than the fact that, of five or six Russian dailies published by the *émigrés* in Paris, three are devoted to restoration of the monarchy.

I have become involved in a diversion, though one naturally suggested by the marvelous development of progressive educational ideas and practices under the fostering care of the Bolshevik government—and I am speaking of what I have seen and not just been told about. However, the second factor that operated in the transformation of the educator (whose history I regard as typical and symbolic) takes us out of the region of reforming and progressive ideas into that of communism proper. It is the factor that would, I am sure, be emphasized by every communist educator rather than that which I have just mentioned. The frustration of educational aims by economic conditions occupied a much larger place in the story of the pilgrim's progress from pedagogy to communism than did explicit and definite political and governmental opposition. In fact, the latter was mentioned only as an inevitable by-product of the former. There are, as he puts it, two educations, the greater and the smaller. The lesser is given by the school;

the larger, and the one finally influential, is given by the actual conditions of life, especially those of the family and neighborhood. And according to his own story, this educator found that the work he was trying to do in the school, even under the relatively very favorable conditions of his experimental school, was undone by the educative—or miseducative—formation of disposition and mental habit proceeding from the environment. Hence he became convinced that the social medium and the progressive school must work together, must operate in harmony, reinforcing each other, if the aim of the progressive school was not to be constantly undermined and dissipated; with the growth of this conviction he became insensibly a communist. He became convinced that the central force in undoing the work of socialized reform he was trying to achieve by means of school agencies was precisely the egoistic and private ideals and methods inculcated by the institution of private property, profit and acquisitive possession.

The story is instructive because of its typically symbolic character; if it were expanded, it would also lead into an account of the definite content of Soviet school activities in the concrete. For as far as the influence of this particular educator is concerned (and it extends very far), the subject-matter, the methods of teaching, and the spirit of school administration and discipline are all treated as ways of producing harmony of operation between concrete social conditions—taking into account their local diversity—and school procedures. My contacts were not sufficiently prolonged to enable me, even if space permitted, to give an adequate report of the structure and technique of this work of harmonization. But its general spirit may at least be suggested. During the transitional régime, the school cannot count upon the larger education to create in any single and whole-hearted way the required collective and coöperative mentality. The traditional customs and institutions of the peasant, his small tracts, his three-system farming, the influence of home and Church, all work automatically to create in him an individualistic ideology. In

spite of the greater inclination of the city worker towards collectivism, even his social environment works adversely in many respects. Hence the great task of the school is to counteract and transform those domestic and neighborhood tendencies that are still so strong, even in a nominally collectivistic régime.

In order to accomplish this end, the teachers must in the first place know with great detail and accuracy just what the conditions are to which pupils are subject in the home, and thus be able to interpret the habits and acts of the pupil in the school in the light of his environing conditions—and this, not just in some general way, but as definitely as a skilled physician diagnoses in the light of their causes the diseased conditions with which he is dealing. So this educator described his philosophy as "Social Behaviorism." Whatever he saw, a mode of farming, farm implements, style of home construction, domestic industry, church building, etc., led him to ask for its probable effect upon the behavior of those who were subject to its influence. On the other hand the teacher strove to learn, whenever he was confronted with any mode of undesirable behavior on the part of a pupil, how to trace it back to its definite social causation. Such an idea, however illuminating in the abstract, would, of course, remain barren without some technique to carry it into effect. And one of the most interesting pedagogical innovations with which I am acquainted is the technique which has been worked out for enabling teachers to discover the actual conditions that influence pupils in their out-of-school life; and I hope some one with more time than I had at command will before long set forth the method in detail. Here I can only say that it involves, among other things, discussions in connection with history and geography, the themes of written work, the compositions of pupils, and also a detailed study throughout the year of home and family budgets. Quite apart from any economic theory, communistic or individualistic, the results are already of great pedagogical value, and promise to provide a new and fruitful method of sociological research.

The knowledge thus gained of home conditions and their effect upon behavior (and I may say in passing that this social behaviorism seems to me much more promising intellectually than any exclusively physiological behaviorism can ever prove to be) is preliminary to the development of methods which will enable schools to react favorably upon the undesirable conditions discovered, and to reinforce such desirable agencies as exist. Here, of course, is the point at which the socially constructive work of the school comes in. A little something will be said about this later in detail, when I come to speak of the idea of "socially useful" work as a criterion for deciding upon the value of "projects"—for Soviet education is committed to the "project method." But aside from its practical working out, it is also interesting in that it locates one of the burning points of present Russian pedagogical theoretical education. For there is still a school that holds that educational principles can be derived from psychology and biology—although the weight of citations from Marx is now eclipsing their influence—and that correct educational methods are bound to produce the desired effect independently of concrete knowledge of domestic and local environment.

I have dwelt too long on certain general considerations, at the expense of any account of what schools are actually doing and how they are doing it. My excuse is that, in relation to the entire Russian situation, it is these generic points of social aspiration and contact that are significant. That which distinguishes the Soviet schools both from other national systems and from the progressive schools of other countries (with which they have much in common) is precisely the conscious control of every educational procedure by reference to a single and comprehensive social purpose. It is this reference that accounts for the social interlocking to which I referred at the outset. The point may be illustrated by the bearing of school activity upon the family institution as that is conceived by the orthodox Marxian socialists. That thorough-going collectivists regard the traditional family as exclusive and isolating in effect and hence as hostile to a truly communal life, is too

familiar to require rehearsal. Apart, however, from the effect of the oft-recited Bolshevik modifications of marriage and divorce, the institution of the family is being sapped indirectly rather than by frontal attack; its historic supports, economic and ecclesiastical, are weakened. For example, the limitation of living quarters, enforced in Russia as in other countries by the War, is deliberately taken advantage of to create social combinations wider than that of the family and that cut across its ties. There is no word one hears oftener than *Gruppe*, and all sorts of groups are instituted that militate against the primary social importance of the family unit. In consequence, to any one who looks at the matter cold-bloodedly, free from sentimental associations clustering about the historic family institution, a most interesting sociological experimentation is taking place, the effect of which should do something to determine how far the bonds that hold the traditional family together are intrinsic and how far due to extraneous causes; and how far the family in its accustomed form is a truly socializing agency and how far a breeder of non-social interests.

Our special concern here is with the rôle of the schools in building up forces and factors whose natural effect is to undermine the importance and uniqueness of family life. It is obvious to any observer that in every western country the increase of importance of public schools has been at least coincident with a relaxation of older family ties. What is going on in Russia appears to be a planned acceleration of this process. For example, the earliest section of the school system, dealing with children from three to seven, aims, in the cities, to keep children under its charge six, eight and ten hours per day, and in ultimate ideal (although far from present fact) this procedure is to be universal and compulsory. When it is carried out, the effect on family life is too evident to need to be dwelt upon—although at present even in Moscow only one-tenth of the children of this age are in such schools. Nor does the invasion of family life stop at this point in dealing with young children. There are in contemplation summer colonies in the country, corresponding to our fresh-

air homes for children from slums, in which children from these all-day "kindergarten" schools will spend a large part of the summer months. Some of the summer colonies are already in existence; those visited compare favorably with similar institutions anywhere, with respect to food, hygiene, medical attention and daily nurture. Now, it would be too much to say that these institutions are deliberately planned with sole reference to their disintegrating effect upon family life; there are doubtless other more conspicuous causes. They are part of a whole network of agencies by means of which the Soviet government is showing its special care for the laboring class in order to gain its political support, and to give a working object-lesson in the value of a communistic scheme. One derives from this, as from many other social undertakings, the impression that the Soviet authorities are trying to forestall, in a deliberately planned and wholesale manner, those consequences of industrialization which in other countries have crept upon society piece-meal and unconsciously. For every large industrial center in any western country shows that in fact the effect of machine industrialization has been to disintegrate the traditional family. From this point of view, the Russian government is doing on a large scale what private philanthropy has done in our cities by means of *crèches*, etc. But even when these allowances are made, it remains true that we have here a striking exemplification of the conscious and systematic utilization of the school in behalf of a definite social policy. There are many elements of propaganda connected with this policy, and many of them obnoxious to me personally. But the broad effort to employ the education of the young as a means of realizing certain social purposes cannot be dismissed as propaganda without relegating to that category all endeavor at deliberate social control.

Reference to this phase of Soviet education may perhaps be suitably concluded by a quotation from Lenin that has become a part of the canonical scriptures of Bolshevik educational literature. For it indicates that, were it necessary, offi-

cial authority could be cited for the seemingly extreme statements I have made about the central position of the schools in the production of a communist ideology as a condition of the successful operation of communist institutions. "The school, apart from life, apart from politics, is a lie, a hypocrisy. Bourgeois society indulged in this lie, covering up the fact that it was using the schools as a means of domination, by declaring that the school was politically neutral, and in the service of all. We must declare openly what it concealed, namely, the political function of the school. While the object of our previous struggle was to overthrow the bourgeoisie, the aim of the new generation is much more complex: It is to construct communist society."

31. NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW ERA¹

The idea of a school in which pupils, and therefore, studies and methods, are connected with social life, instead of being isolated, is one familiar in educational theory. In some form, it is the idea that underlies all attempts at thorough-going educational reform. What is characteristic of Soviet education is not, therefore, the idea of a dovetailing of school activities into out-of-school social activities, but the fact that for the first time in history there is an educational system officially organized on the basis of this principle. Instead of being exemplified, as it is with ourselves, in a few scattering schools that are private enterprises, it has the weight and authority of the whole régime behind it. In trying to satisfy my mind as to how and why it was that the educational leaders have been able in so short a time to develop a working model of this sort of education, with so little precedent upon which to fall back, I was forced to the conclusion that the secret lay in the fact that they could give to the economic and industrial phase of social life the central place it actually occupies in present life. In that fact lies the great advantage the Revolution has conferred upon educational reformers in Russia, in comparison with those in the rest of the world. I do not see how any honest educational reformer in western countries can deny that the greatest practical obstacle in the way of introducing into schools that connection with social life which he regards as desirable is the great part played by personal competition and desire for private profit in our economic life. This fact almost makes it necessary that in important respects school activities should be protected from social contacts and connections, instead of being organized to create them. The Russian educational situation is enough to convert one to the idea that only

¹ From *The New Republic*, Dec. 12, 1928.

in a society based upon the coöperative principle can the ideals of educational reformers be adequately carried into operation.

The central place of economic connections in the dovetailing of school work with social life outside the school is explicitly stated in the official documents of Commissar Lunacharsky. He writes: "The two chief present problems of social education are: (1) The development of public economy with reference to Socialist reconstruction in general and the efficiency of labor in particular; (2) the development of the population in the spirit of communism." The aims of education are set forth as follows: "(1) The union of general culture with efficiency of labor and power to share in public life; (2) supply of the actual needs of national economy by preparation of workers in different branches and categories of qualifications; (3) meeting the need of different localities and different kinds of workers."

Like all formal statements, these propositions have to be understood in the light of the practices by which they are carried into effect. So interpreted, the fact that among the aims the "union of general culture with efficiency of labor" precedes that of supply of special needs through preparation of workers assumes a significance that might not otherwise be apparent. For perhaps the striking thing in the system is that it is not vocational, in the narrow sense those words often have with us, namely, the technical training of specialized workers. On the contrary, such training is everywhere postponed and subordinated to the requirements of general culture, which is, however, itself conceived of in a socially industrial sense; that is to say, as discovery and development of the capacities that enable an individual to carry on in a coöperative way, work that is socially useful, "socially useful" being conceived in the generous sense of whatever makes human life fuller and richer. Perhaps the easiest way to grasp the spirit of the industrial connections of school work with general social activities is to take the utterances of our own Manufacturers' Association on the same topic and then reverse them. Preparation for special

occupations is deferred to the stage of special schools called *Technicums*, which can be entered only after seven years of the public "unified" school have been completed. These schools are called "polytechnic," but the word is a misleading one in its ordinary English associations. For with us it signifies a school in which individual pupils can select and pursue any one of a considerable number of technologies, while in the Russian system it signifies a school in which pupils, instead of receiving a "mono-technical" training, are instructed in the matters which are fundamental to a number of special industrial techniques. In other words, even in the definitely vocational schools, specialized training for a particular calling is postponed until the latest years, after a general technological and scientific-social foundation has been laid.

As far as could be determined, there are two causes for the adoption of this broad conception of industrial education, in identification with the general culture appropriate to a coöperatively conducted society. One is the state of progressive educational theory in other countries, especially in the United States, during the early formative years after the Revolution. For a leading principle of this advanced doctrine was that participation in productive work is the chief stimulus and guide to self-educative activity on the part of pupils, since such productive work is both in accord with the natural or psychological process of learning; and also provides the most direct road to connecting the school with social life, because of the part played by occupations in the latter. Some of the liberal Russian educators were carrying on private experimental schools on this basis before the Revolution; the doctrine had the prestige of being the most advanced among educational philosophies, and it answered to immediate Russian necessities.

Thus from an early period the idea of the "school of work" (*Arbeit-schule, école du travail, escuela d'acci'on*) was quite central in post-revolutionary school undertakings. And a main feature of this doctrine was that, while productive work is educative *par excellence*, it must be taken in a broad social sense,

and as a means of creating a new social order and not simply as an accommodation to the existing economic régime.

This factor, however, accounts only for the earlier period of the growth of Soviet education, say, up to 1922 or 1923, a period when American influence, along with that of Tolstoy, was upon the whole predominant. Then there came in a reaction, from a Marxian standpoint. The reaction, however, did not take the form of discarding the notion of productive work as central in schools. It only gave the idea a definitely socialistic form by interpreting the idea of work on the basis of the new estate of the worker brought about by the proletarian revolution. The change was a more or less gradual one, and even now there is hardly a complete transition or fusion. But the spirit of the change is well indicated in the words of one of the leaders of educational thought: "A school is a true school of work in the degree in which it prepares the students to appreciate and share in the ideology of the workers—whether country or city." And by the worker is here meant, of course, the worker made conscious of his position and function by means of the Revolution. This transformation of the earlier "bourgeois reforming idea" through emphasis upon the ideology of the labor movement thus continued and reinforced the earlier emphasis upon the general idea of the connection of the school with industry.

This report is necessarily confined to a statement of general principles: the skeleton would gain flesh and blood if space permitted an account of the multifarious threads by which the connection between the schools and coöperatively organized society is maintained. In lieu of this account I can only pay my tribute to the liberating effect of active participation in social life upon the attitude of students. Those whom I met had a vitality and a kind of confidence in life—not to be confused with mere self-confidence—that afforded one of the most stimulating experiences of my life. Their spirit was well reflected in the inscription which a boy of fourteen wrote upon

the back of a painting he presented me with. He was in one of the schools in which the idea just set forth is most completely and intelligently carried out, and he wrote that the picture was given in memory of the "school that opened my eyes." All that I had ever, on theoretical grounds, believed as to the extent to which the dull and dispirited attitude of the average school is due to isolation of school from life was more than confirmed by what I saw of the opposite in Russian schools.

There are three or four special points that call for notice in the identification established between cultural and industrial education. One of them is suggested by the official statement regarding the meeting by the schools of local conditions and needs. Soviet education has not made the mistake of confusing unity of education with uniformity: on the contrary, centralization is limited to the matter of ultimate aim and spirit, while in detail diversification is permitted, or rather encouraged. Each province has its own experimental school, that supplements the work of the central or federal experimental stations, by studying local resources, materials and problems with a view to adapting school work to them. The primary principle of method officially laid down is that, in every topic, work by pupils is to begin with observation of their own environment, natural and social. (The best museum of natural and social materials for pedagogical purposes I have ever seen is in a country district outside of Leningrad, constructed on the basis of a complete exhibit of local fauna, flora, mineralogy, etc., and local antiquities and history, made by pupils' excursions under the direction of their teachers.)

This principle of making connections with social life on the basis of starting from the immediate environment is exemplified on its broadest scale in the educational work done with the minority populations of Russia—of which there are some fifty different nationalities. The idea of cultural autonomy that underlies political federation is made a reality in the schools. Before the Revolution, many, most of them had no schools, and a considerable number of them not even a written language. In about ten years, through enlisting the efforts of

anthropologists and linguistic scholars—in which branch of science Russia has always been strong—all the different languages have been reduced to written form, textbooks in the local language provided, each adapted to local environment and industrial habits, and at least the beginnings of a school system introduced. Aside from immediate educational results, one is impressed with the idea that the scrupulous regard for cultural independence characteristic of the Soviet régime is one of the chief causes of its stability, in view of the non-Communist beliefs of most of these populations. Going a little further, one may say that the freedom from race- and color-prejudice characteristic of the régime is one of the greatest assets in Bolshevik propaganda among Asiatic peoples. The most effective way to counteract the influence of that propaganda would be for western nations to abandon their superiority-complex in dealing with Asiatic populations, and thereby deprive Bolshevism of its contention that capitalism, imperialistic exploitation and race prejudice are so inseparably conjoined that the sole relief of native peoples from them lies in adoption of communism under Russian auspices.

The central place of human labor in the educational scheme is made manifest in the plan for the selection and organization of subject-matter, or the studies of the curriculum. This principle is officially designated the “complex system.” Details appropriately belong in a special educational journal, but in general the system means, on the negative side, the abandonment of splitting up subject-matter into isolated “studies,” such as form the program in the conventional school, and finding the matter of study in some total phase of human life—including nature in the relations it sustains to the life of man in society. Employing the words of the official statement: “At the basis of the whole program is found the study of human work and its organization: the point of departure is the study of this work as found in its local manifestations.” Observations of the latter are, however, to be developed by “recourse to the experience of humanity—that is, books, so that the local

phenomena may be connected with national and international industrial life."

It is worthy of note that, in order to carry out this conception of the proper subject-matter of study, it is necessary for the teachers themselves to become students, for they must conceive of the traditional subject-matter from a new point of view. They are compelled, in order to be successful, both to study their local environment and to become familiar with the detailed economic plans of the central government. For example, the greatest importance is attached in the educational scheme to natural science and what we call nature-study. But according to the ruling principle, this material must not be treated as so much isolated stuff to be learned by itself, but be considered in the ways in which it actually enters into human life by means of utilization of natural resources and energies in industry for social purposes. Aside from the vitalization of physical knowledge supplied by thus putting it in its human context, this method of presentation compels teachers to be cognizant of the *Gosplan*—that is, the detailed projects, looking ahead over a series of years, of the government for the economic development of the country. An educator from a bourgeois country may well envy the added dignity that comes to the function of the teacher when he is taken into partnership in plans for the social development of his country. Such an one can hardly avoid asking himself whether this partnership is possible only in a country where industry is a public function rather than a private undertaking; he may not find any sure answer to the question, but the continued presence of the query in his mind will surely serve as an eye-opening stimulus.

In American literature regarding Soviet education, "the complex system" is often identified with the "project method" as that has developed in our own country. In so far as both procedures get away from starting with fixed lessons in isolated studies, and substitute for them an endeavor to bring students through their own activity into contact with some relatively total slice of life or nature, there is ground for the identifica-

tion. By and large, however, it is misleading, and for two reasons. In the first place, the complex method involves a unified intellectual scheme of organization: it centers, as already noted, about the study of human work in its connection on one side with natural materials and energies, and on the other side with social and political history and institutions. From this intellectual background, it results that, while Russian educators acknowledge here—as in many other things—an original indebtedness to American theory, they criticize many of the “projects” employed in our schools as casual and as trivial, because they do not belong to any general social aim, nor have definite social consequences in their train.

To them, an educative “project” is the means by which the principle of some “complex” or unified whole of social subject-matter is realized. Its criterion of value is its contribution to some “socially useful work.” Actual projects vary according to special conditions, urban or rural, and particular needs and deficiencies of the local environment. In general, they include contributions to improvement of sanitation and hygienic conditions (in which respects there is an active campaign carried on, modelled largely upon American techniques), assisting in the campaign against illiteracy; reading newspapers and books to the illiterate; helping in clubs, excursions, etc., with younger children; assisting ignorant adults to understand the policies of local Soviets so that they can take part in them intelligently; engaging in communist propaganda, and, on the industrial side, taking some part in a multitude of diverse activities calculated to improve economic conditions. In a rural school that was visited, for example, students carried on what in a conventional school would be the separate studies of botany and entomology by cultivating flowers, food-plants, fruits, etc., under experimental conditions, observing the relation to them of insects, noxious and helpful, and then making known the results to their parents and other farmers, distributing improved strains of seed, etc. In each case, the aim is that sooner or later the work shall terminate in some actual participation in the larger social life, if only by young children carrying flowers to an

invalid or to their parents. In one of the city schools where this work has been longest carried on, I saw, for example, interesting charts that showed the transformation of detailed hygienic and living conditions of the homes in a working men's quarter effected through a period of ten years by the boys and girls of the school.

A word regarding the system of administration and discipline of Soviet schools perhaps finds its natural place in this connection. During a certain period, the idea of freedom and student control tended to run riot. But apparently the idea of "auto-organization" (which is fundamental in the official scheme) has now been worked out in a positive form, so that, upon the whole, the excesses of the earlier period are obsolescent. The connection with what has just been said lies in the fact that as far as possible the organizations of pupils that are relied upon to achieve self-discipline are not created for the sake of school "government," but grow out of the carrying on of some line of work needed in the school itself, or in the neighborhood. Here, too, while the idea of self-government developed in American schools was the originally stimulating factor, the ordinary American practice is criticized as involving too much imitation of adult political forms (instead of growing out of the students' own social relationships), and hence as being artificial and external. In view of the prevailing idea of other countries as to the total lack of freedom and total disregard of democratic methods in Bolshevik Russia, it is disconcerting, to say the least, to any one who has shared in that belief, to find Russian school children much more democratically organized than are our own; and to note that they are receiving through the system of school administration a training that fits them, much more systematically than is attempted in our professedly democratic country, for later active participation in the self-direction of both local communities and industries.

Fairness demands that I should say in conclusion that the educational system so inadequately described exists at present

qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Statistically considered, its realization is still highly restricted—although not surprisingly so when one considers both the external difficulties of war, famine, poverty, teachers trained in alien ideas and ideals, and the internal difficulties of initiating and developing an educational system on a new social basis. Indeed, considering these difficulties, one is rather amazed at the progress already made; for, while limited in actual range, the scheme is in no sense on paper. It is a going concern; a self-moving organism. While an American visitor may feel a certain patriotic pride in noting in how many respects an initial impulse came from some progressive school in our own country, he is at once humiliated and stimulated to new endeavor to see how much more organically that idea is incorporated in the Russian system than in our own. Even if he does not agree with the assertion of communist educators that the progressive ideals of liberal educators can actually be carried out only in a country that is undergoing an economic revolution in the socialist direction, he will be forced into searchings of heart and mind that are needed and wholesome. In any case, if his experience is at all like mine, he will deeply regret those artificial barriers and that barricade of false reports that now isolates American teachers from that educational system in which our professed progressive democratic ideas are most completely embodied, and from which accordingly we might, if we would, learn much more than from the system of any other country. I understand now as I never did before the criticisms of some foreign visitors, especially from France, that condemn Soviet Russia for entering too ardently upon an "Americanization" of traditional European culture.

32. THE GREAT EXPERIMENT AND THE FUTURE¹

To sum up one's impressions about Russia is of necessity to engage in speculations about its future. Even the belief that has inspired what I have written above, namely, that the most significant aspect of the change in Russia is psychological and moral, rather than political, involves a look into an unrevealed future. While the belief is doubtless to be accounted for by contacts that were one-sided, with educational people, not with politicians and economists, still there is good authority for it. Lenin himself expressed the idea that with the accomplishment of the Revolution the Russian situation underwent a great transformation. Before it had taken place, it was Utopian, he said, to suppose that education and voluntary coöperation could achieve anything significant. The workers had first to seize power. But when they had the reins of government in their hands, there took place "a radical change in our point of view toward Socialism. It consists in this, that formerly the center of gravity had to be placed in the political struggle and the conquest of power. Now this center of gravity is displaced in the direction of pacific cultural work. I should be ready to say that it is now moving toward intellectual work, were it not for our international relations, and the necessity of defending our position in the international system. If we neglect that phase and confine ourselves to internal economic relations, the center of gravity of our work already consists in intellectual work." He went on to say that the cause of Socialism is now, economically speaking, identical with that of the promotion of coöperation, and added the significant words: "Complete coöperation is not possible without an intellectual revolution."

Further testimony to the same effect developed in an inter-

¹ From *The New Republic*, Dec. 19, 1928.

view some of us had with Krupskaia, Lenin's widow, an official at the head of one branch of the government department of education, and naturally a person with great prestige. Considering her position, her conversation was strangely silent upon matters of school organization and administration; it was about incidents of a human sort that had occurred in her contact with children and women, incidents illustrative of their desire for education and for new light and life—evincing an interest on her part that was quite congruous with her distinctly maternal, almost housewifely type. But at the close she summed up the task of the present régime: Its purpose is, she said, to enable every human being to obtain personal cultivation. The economic and political revolution that had taken place was not the end; it was the means and basis of a cultural development still to be realized. It was a necessary means, because without economic freedom and equality, the full development of the possibilities of all individuals could not be achieved. But the economic change was for the sake of enabling every human being to share to the full in all the things that give value to human life.

Even in the economic situation the heart of the problem is now intellectual and educational. This is true in the narrower sense that the present industrial scheme and plan cannot possibly be carried through without preparation of skilled technicians in all lines, industrial and administrative. What Wells said about the world is peculiarly true of Russia; there is a race between education and catastrophe—that is, industrial breakdown. It is also true in the fundamental sense that the plan cannot be carried through without change in the desires and beliefs of the masses. Indeed, it seems to me that the simplest and most helpful way to look at what is now going on in Russia, is to view it as an enormous psychological experiment in transforming the motives that inspire human conduct.

There are, of course, two points of view from which it is not a genuine experiment, since its issue is foredoomed. The fanatic of individual capitalistic business for private gain and the Marxian dogmatic fanatic both have the answer ready in

advance. According to the first, the attempt is destined to failure; it is fated to produce, in the words of Mr. Hoover, an "economic vacuum"; according to the latter, the transformation from individualism to collectivism of action is the absolute and inevitable result of the working of laws that are as positively known to social "science" as, say, the law of gravitation to physical science. Not being an absolutist of either type, I find it more instructive to regard it as an experiment whose outcome is quite undetermined, but that is, just as an experiment, by all means the most interesting one going on upon our globe—though I am quite frank to say that for selfish reasons I prefer seeing it tried in Russia rather than in my own country.

Both beliefs in their dogmatic form have served a purpose. The first—the "individualistic" philosophy—has enabled men to put up with the evils of the present order of things. If this is as fixed as human nature, and if human nature is built upon the pattern of the present economic order, there is nothing to do but bear up as best we can. The Marxian philosophy gave men faith and courage to challenge this régime. But ignoring both of these dogmatic faiths, I should say that what there is in Russia is an experiment having two purposes. The first and more immediate aim is to see whether human beings can have such guarantees of security *against* want, illness, old-age, and *for* health, recreation, reasonable degree of material ease and comfort that they will not have to struggle for purely personal acquisition and accumulation, without, in short, being forced to undergo the strain of competitive struggle for personal profit. In its ulterior reaches, it is an experiment to discover whether the familiar democratic ideals—familiar in words, at least—of liberty, equality and brotherhood will not be most completely realized in a social régime based on voluntary coöperation, on conjoint workers' control and management of industry, with an accompanying abolition of private property as a fixed institution—a somewhat different matter, of course, than the abolition of private possessions as such.

The first aim is the distinctly economic one. But the farther idea is that when economic security for all is secured, and when workers control industry and politics, there will be the opportunity for all to participate freely and fully in a cultivated life. That a nation that strives for a private culture from which many are excluded by economic stress cannot be a cultivated nation was an idea frequently heard from the mouths of both educators and working people.

It was at this point that my own antecedent notions—or, if you will, prejudices, underwent their most complete reversal. I had the notion that socialistic communism was essentially a purely economic scheme. The notion was fostered by the almost exclusive attention paid by socialists in western countries to economic questions, and by the loudly self-proclaimed "economic materialism" of Marxian communists. I was, therefore, almost totally unprepared for what I actually found: namely, that, at least in the circles with which I came in contact (which, however, included some working men as well as educators), the development of "cultivation" and realization of the possibility of every one's sharing in it, was the dominant note. It turned out, most astonishingly, that only in "bourgeois" countries are Socialists mainly concerned with improving the material conditions of the working classes, as if occupied with a kind of public as distinct from private philanthropy in raising wages, bettering housing conditions, reducing hours of labor, etc. Not, of course, that the present Russian régime is not also occupied with such matters, but that it is so definitely concerned with expanding and enlarging the actual content of life. Indeed, I could not but feel (though I can offer no convincing objective proof) that foreign visitors who have emphasized widespread poverty as a ground for predicting the downfall of the present régime are off the track. In the first place, poverty is so much the historic heritage of the masses that they are not especially conscious of the pinching of this particular shoe; and in the next place, there are large numbers, especially of the younger generation, who are

so devoted to the human and moral ideal of making free cultivation universal that they do not mind the pinch; they do not feel it as a sacrifice.

Perhaps I should have been prepared to find this attitude. That the movement in Russia is intrinsically religious was something I had often heard and that I supposed I understood and believed. But when face to face with actual conditions, I was forced to see that I had not understood it at all. And for this failure, there were two causes as far as I can make out—I am, of course, only confessing my own limitations. One was that, never having previously witnessed a widespread and moving religious reality, I had no way of knowing what it actually would be like. The other was that I associated the idea of Soviet Communism, as a religion, too much with intellectual theology, the body of Marxian dogmas, with its professed economic materialism, and too little with a moving human aspiration and devotion. As it is, I feel as if for the first time I might have some inkling of what may have been the moving spirit and force of primitive Christianity. I even hate to think of the time, that seems humanly inevitable, when this new faith will also have faded into the light of common day, and become conventional and stereotyped. I am quite prepared to hear that I exaggerate this phase of affairs; I am prepared to believe that, because of the unexpectedness of the impression, I have exaggerated its relative importance. But all such allowances being made, I still feel sure that no one can understand the present movement who fails to take into account this religious ardor. That men and women who profess "materialism" should in fact be ardent "idealists" is undoubtedly a paradox, but one that indicates that a living faith is more important than the symbols by which it tries to express itself. Intellectual formulæ seem to be condemned to have about them something pathetically irrelevant; they are so largely affected by accidents of history. In any case, it is hard not to feel a certain envy for the intellectual and educational workers in Russia; not, indeed, for their material and economic status, but because a unified religious social

faith brings with it such simplification and integration of life. "Intellectuals" in other countries have a task that is, if they are sincere, chiefly critical; those who have identified themselves in Russia with the new order have a task that is total and constructive. They are organic members of an organic going movement.

The sense of disparity between the Soviet official theology, the Marxian doctrines, and the living religious faith in human possibilities when released from warping economic conditions, remains. A similar disparity seems to have attended all vital movements hitherto undertaken. They have had their intellectual formulations; but use of the latter has been to provide a protective shell for emotions. Any predictions about the Russian future has to take into account the contradiction and conflict between rigid dogmas on one side and an experimental spirit on the other. Which will win, it is impossible to say. But I cannot but suppose that the Russian people will, in the end, through a series of adaptations to actual conditions as they develop, build something new in the form of human association. That these will be communistic in the sense of the leaders of the revolution, I doubt; that they will be marked by a high degree of voluntary coöperation and by a high degree of social control of the accumulation and use of capital, seems to be probable. Symbols, however, have a great way of persisting and of adapting themselves to changes in fact, as the history of Christianity and democracy both show. So, unless there is some remarkable breach of continuity, it is likely that the outcome, whatever it may be in fact, will be called communism and will be taken as a realization of the creed of its initial authors.

Education affords, once more, the material for a striking illustration of the rôle of experiment in the future evolution of Soviet Russia. In a region something less than a hundred miles from Moscow, there is a district fairly typical of northern rural Russia, in which there is an educational colony under the direction of Schatzsky. This colony is the center of some

fourteen schools scattered through a series of villages, which, taken together, constitute an extensive (and intensive) educational experimental station for working out materials and methods for the Russian rural system. There is not in my knowledge anything comparable to it elsewhere in the world. As the summer colony was in operation, we had the satisfaction of visiting the station and also noting its effect on the villages that have come under its influence. A somewhat similar undertaking under Pistrak exists in Moscow to deal with the problems of urban workers. It was closed on account of the vacation period, and so my knowledge is less at first hand. But it is in active and successful operation. Then, as has been noted, each province has its own experimental station to deal with specifically local problems. These enterprises are under the government, having its sanction and authoritative prestige. There is also in existence a supreme scientific council having a pedagogical section. The duties of this Scientific Council are in general to form plans for the social and economic development of Russia; the program, while flexible, looks ahead over a term of years and includes much detail based on researches that are continuously conducted. Of this undertaking, probably the first in the world to attempt scientific regulation of social growth, the pedagogical section is an organic member; its business is to sift and audit the results of the educational experiments that are carried on, and to give them a form in which they may be directly incorporated into the school system of the country. The fact that both Schausky and Pistrak are members of this Council ensures that conclusions reached in the experimental stations receive full attention.

This matter is referred to here rather than in the account of Soviet education to which it properly belongs, in order to suggest, through a concrete example, that, however rigid and dogmatic the Marxian symbols may be, actual practices are affected by an experimental factor that is flexible, vital, creative. In this connection it may be worth while to quote from Pistrak, the words being the more significant because he is a strict party member. "We cannot apply the same rules to

every school condition; that procedure would be contrary to the essence of our school. It is indispensable to develop in teachers aptitude for pedagogical creation; without this, it will be impossible to create the new school. The notion that pedagogues are artisans rather than creators, seems to us incorrect. Every human being is more or less a creator, and while an individual in isolation may fail to find a creative solution of a problem, in collectivity we are all creators." No one would claim that this ideal of creation is as yet realized, but no one can come in contact with educational activities without feeling that this spirit marks the Russian school leaders to an extent unknown in other countries. In my first article, before coming into any close contact with educational endeavor, I wrote of the feeling of vitality and liberation that was got from contact with the face of the Russian scene. The later educational contacts confirmed this surface impression, while they also left the feeling of being initiated into the definite movement by which the movement of liberation was intensified and directed.

I do not believe that any person's particular guess about the exact form of the outcome of the present Russian movement is of any importance; there are too many unknowns in the equation. If I venture in the direction of a prediction, it is only by way of calling attention to two movements already going on. The factor of greatest importance seems to me to be the growth of voluntary coöperative groups. In the orthodox theory, these form a transition stage on the road to the predestined end of Marxian Communism. Just why the means should not also be the end, and the alleged transitory stage define the goal, is not clear to me. The place occupied by the peasant in Russian life, the necessity of consulting his interests and desires, however disagreeable that consultation is, the constant concessions made to him in spite of official preference for the factory city worker, strengthens belief in the probability of coöperative rather than a strictly communistic outcome. Side by side with this factor, though of less im-

mediate practical force, I should place the experimental aspect of the educational system. There is, of course, an immense amount of indoctrination and propaganda in the schools. But if the existing tendency develops, it seems fairly safe to predict that in the end this indoctrination will be subordinate to the awakening of initiative and power of independent judgment, while coöperative mentality will be evolved. It seems impossible that an education intellectually free will not militate against a servile acceptance of dogma as dogma. One hears all the time about the dialectic movement by means of which a movement contradicts itself in the end. I think the schools are a "dialectic" factor in the evolution of Russian communism.

These remarks do not detract from the significance of the Russian revolutionary movement; rather they add, in my mind, to it, and to the need for study of it by the rest of the world. And it cannot be studied without actual contact. The notion that a sixth of the world can be permanently isolated and "quarantined" is absurd enough, though the consequences of acting upon the absurdity are more likely to be tragic than humorous. But it is even more absurd to suppose that a living idea that has laid hold of a population with the force and quality of a religion can be pushed to one side and ignored. The attempt, if persisted in, will result in an intensification of its destructive features and in failure to derive the advantages that might accrue from knowledge of its constructive features. Political recognition of Russia on the part of the United States would not go far in bringing about the kind of relations that are in the interest of both countries and of the world, but it is at least a necessary antecedent step. I went to Russia with no conviction on that subject except that recognition was in line with our better political traditions. I came away with the feeling that the maintenance of barriers that prevent intercourse, knowledge and understanding is close to a crime against humanity.

The phase of Bolshevism with which one cannot feel sympathy is its emphasis upon the necessity of class war and of

world revolution by violence. These features of Soviet Russia tend to recede into the background because of the pressure the authorities are under to do a vastly difficult constructive work in Russia itself. But the spirit that produces them is fed by the belief that the rest of the world are enemies of Soviet Russia; that it must be constantly on the defensive and that the best defense is aggressive attack. I do not think that free intercourse with the rest of the world would cause an immediate disappearance of the idea of stirring up civil war in capitalistic countries. But I am confident that such intercourse would gradually deprive the flame of its fuel and that it would die down. One derives the impression that the Third International is Russia's own worst enemy, doing harm to it by alienating other peoples' sympathy. Its chief asset, however, is non-recognition. The withdrawal of recognition by Great Britain has done more than any other one thing to stimulate the extremists and fanatics of the Bolshevik faith, and to encourage militarism and hatred of bourgeois nations.

I cannot conclude without mentioning one point that is not strictly connected with the remainder of this summary. In times of peace the Third International does, as I have said, more injury to Russia than to other countries. But if there is a European war, it will, I believe, spring to life as a reality in every European nation. I left Russia with a stronger feeling than I had ever had before of the criminal ineptitude of those statesmen who still play with the forces that generate wars. There is one prediction to which I am willing to commit myself. If there is another European war, under present conditions, civil war will add to the horrors of foreign war in every continental country, and every capital in Europe will be a shambles in which the worst horrors of the days of revolution will be outdone.



